RC28 Summer Meeting 2016:

Book of Abstracts

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Monday, August 29, 2016

M1 Parallel Sessions: Monday, 9:00am - 10:45am

M1-002: Gender I

Time: Monday, 29/Aug/2016: 9:00am - 10:45am · Location: Room 002 (Fab 6)
Session Chair: Deborah De Luca

Educational Expansion and Inequality of Educational Opportunity in Israel - A Gendered Perspective
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Education is considered the primary preparation for an occupation. If the education system is unequal, better education results from better social background; it is a cause of social reproduction rather than mobility. Studies on inequality of educational opportunities, or IEO, concern the association between social stratum and educational attainment, or the different odds of acquiring good education due to different social background.

While the effect of parental background on educational attainment is well documented (Blau and Duncan 1967, Shavit and Blossfeld 1992, Breen and Jonsson 2005), gender disparities in IEO have been largely overlooked, mostly due to the greater interest in the increasing feminization of higher education (e.g., DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013), which overshadowed the gender aspects of IEO.

However, several studies showed gender differences in IEO, although the results are inconsistent. Buchmann and DiPrete (2005) found that in the years after the great depression in the US, families of lower strata invested mainly in the education of sons rather than daughters, while the higher strata invested more or less equally in their sons’ and daughters’ education. Overall, the outcome was more IEO for women than for men. This trend changed for cohorts born after the 1960s, when parental background affected educational attainment similarly for men and women. This change in gender IOE was also found in Italy and Poland (Breen et al. 2009). However, in other European countries the higher inequalities in educational opportunities among women have remained stable over the years (ibid.). Legewie and Diprete (2009) explained the change in the gendered pattern of IEO over time in the US, in contrast to the relative stability in Germany, by the lack of incentives in Germany for lower stratum women to invest in female education, in contrast to men due to differences in the labor market and in returns on women's education. A recent study (McDaniel 2013) replicated these results for Germany but claimed that they were the exception. In most European countries there are no gender differences in IEO, with Switzerland, Denmark, Hungary and Norway showing them only for the oldest cohorts.

Our study seeks to join this body of research, and examine changes in IEO for men and women in Israel in the context of the rapid expansion in higher education in Israel in the last decade.

Gender and educational expansion

Policy makers regard educational expansion as an egalitarian reform (Jackson 2013) that will lead to greater participation in education, especially among students of lower strata (Becker 2003) and thus reduce IEO. However, studies reveal that although educational expansion has increased participation of all strata in the educational level, which has expanded, this effect has been more marked in the higher than in the lower strata, so inequality has increased.

Research in gender aspects of educational reform focuses mainly on attempts to reduce gender inequality (Amot et al. 1996). However, some reforms have gender side-effects. For example, Ayalon (2002, 2006) describes a reform in Israeli secondary education that expanded the range of subject choices, and as a side-effect enhanced the study of STEM subjects among orthodox Jewish and Arab women.

Regarding reforms of educational expansion, there is only little evidence of gender disparities in IEO. Here too the results are mixed. Reimer and Pollak (2009) found that although educational expansion in former West Germany changed the pattern of educational choices only in women, the effect of socio-economic background on field of study was similar between the genders. But in France, Ichou and Vallet (2011) found that with educational expansion the patterns of IEO changed differently for men and women: women from the lower strata were more likely to try to attain better education than lower strata men, resulting in fewer IEOs for women. Buchman and DiPrete (2006) found similar results in the US, where expansion in tertiary education increased IEO for men but not for women. They explain this by the qualitative differentiation of the expansion.

By contrast, in the Italian context Panichella and Triventi (2014) suggest that IEO might increase for women more than for men as a result of educational expansion. They expect the new educational opportunities to encourage women of the higher strata to enlarge their education, while higher strata men have already exploited these opportunities. This argument relates to the MMI hypothesis (Raftery and Hout, 1993). Unfortunately, Panichella and Triventi do not provide empirical evidence for their argument.

The Israeli context
In the 1990s Israel’s higher education experienced rapid expansion. Between 1995 and 2008 the number of students in higher education nearly doubled: from 116,817 to 237,747 (Council for Higher Education 2008), while population growth in these years was only about 28 percent (CBS 2009). This growth suggests that higher education has become available to students previously denied it, mainly through private and public colleges. This expansion serves as our context to study its effect on IEO.

Research questions
1. Do men and women differ in regard to IEO?
2. Has educational expansion increased IEO?
3. Has the effect of educational expansion proved similar in the genders?

Data
The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics holds a census every decade. We used the 1995 and 2008 census files, and merged them with the respondents’ household and parents’ data in the previous census (1995 and 1983 respectively). We restricted the sample to persons aged 28-34 years at the time of the census. This group was aged about 15-21 years in the previous census and over 90 percent were registered in the parental household and their records were linked to those of their parents through household IDs.

The method of analysis was a series of multinomial logit regressions where the dependent variable was educational attainment (the highest diploma or educational level the person attained). The main independent variables were father’s ISEI, cohort and interaction between cohort and father’s ISEI; this was to ascertain whether IEO changed after the rapid expansion. We also controlled for ethnicity and religion (Arab or Jewish).

To test whether the change in IEO was gender-based, we estimated the models separately for men and women.

Results
As presented in Figure 1a, in men, inequality of educational opportunity by father’s occupation increased at both ends of the educational distribution. In women however – as Figure 1b shows, inequality of educational opportunity by father’s occupation increased mainly in the transition from lower education levels to the matriculation diploma. These results are in line with Buchman and DiPrete’s (2006). While IEO increased for men after the expansion of higher education, it did not change for women.

The results suggest that the effect of educational expansion was gender-differentiated. Women, who increased their participation rates in higher education during the period of expansion, did not suffer from a more unequal educational system, as their male counterparts did.

The study demonstrates the significance of combining the two important traditions of IEO research: the effect of expansion on IEO and gender differences in IEO. We argue that the theory of educational expansion does not account for gender differences while the theory of gender differences in IEO does not take expansion sufficiently into account.

Does social advantage increase the gender gap in numeracy skills? Evidence from England

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Numeracy skills are a valuable resource for individuals, contributing to earnings, health, financial literacy and civic participation, independently of educational qualifications. In spite of superior performance in education, in many countries, including England, females have worse numeracy skills than males. While there is a large literature on gender and mathematics, little is known about how gender interacts with other key influences on numeracy skills, such as social background. The focus of this paper is the interaction between parents’ education and gender in relation to applied numeracy skills in early adulthood. Analysis is based on representative data on the numeracy skills of 18-30 year olds in England from the OECD’s 2011 international survey of adult skills (PIAAC). The findings suggest that females with university educated parents are far more likely than their male equivalents to have only basic numeracy skills. In contrast, there is no gender difference in this outcome among young adults with lower educated parents. This suggests that gender inequalities are exacerbated by inter-generational social advantage. The paper further explores whether this interaction effect is associated with both parents’ education, or whether it is father-specific.

What shapes great expectations? Gender, social origin and country differences in higher education expectations

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Over recent decades, female educational attainment has progressively caught up with that of males in many OECD countries. Expectations of attaining a university degree have accordingly been found to be higher among female adolescents than among their male counterparts (McDaniel, 2010). Preliminary analyses carried out with data drawn from the PISA 2003 database confirm this widespread female advantage. They also confirm a wide cross-national variation in this respect. Beyond McDaniel’s findings, these preliminary analyses show that this female advantage might actually be read as a male disadvantage at the bottom of parental education distribution: it is among children from lower social origin where gender differences in expectations of higher education seem to be greater. This is in line with Buchmann and DiPrete’s finding for the US that “where fathers had a high school education or less, daughters increased their rates of college completion, whereas the graduation rates of sons dropped” (Buchmann and DiPrete, 2006: 523).
The role of socioeconomic background to explain between and within gender differences by subject choice in Chile

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Despite women having made significant progress during recent decades into subjects traditionally considered to be male dominated, especially areas linked to business and biological sciences (Jacobs 1995, Turner & Bowen 1999); they still lag far behind in STEM areas such as engineering, physics, and computer science.

To explain gender differences in subject choice, sociological literature has emerged from different points of departure. On the one hand, researchers have highlighted the importance of social norms and cultural context to explain gender differences in values, especially areas linked to business and biological sciences (Jacobs 1995, Turner & Bowen 1999); they still lag far behind in STEM areas such as engineering, physics, and computer science. Multilevel analysis is applied to a combination of national-level data drawn from different sources (OECD, European Value Survey, World Value Survey and Bol and van der Werfhorst’s dataset on educational institutional differences) and individual and school data drawn from PISA 2003, which includes information on educational expectations. The three levels considered are the individual, the school and the country. As regards the school level, the academic and socio-economic compositions of schools are considered. I thus aim to account for peer effects in the formation of educational aspirations (Buchmann and Dalton, 2002; Dupriez et al., 2012). As regards individual-level variables, apart from social origin, the analysis considers family structure, ethnic origin, student’s attitude towards the school, academic performance and reading and maths ability scores. The analysis distinguishes between father’s and mother’s education, so as to capture different theories on the role of parents’ education on the educational expectations of their offspring.

But the main attention of the research lies in three factors that operate at the national level and may favour a higher expectation of university enrolment among female children of lower social origin, vis-à-vis male children: gender egalitarianism, educational differentiation and economic structure. As regards gender egalitarianism, a more gender egalitarian society may make capital investment in higher education more attractive for girls, since such an investment is more likely to be properly rewarded; that is, not curtailed or discouraged by gender discrimination or insufficient labour market performance among women. This effect may have different consequences for gender differences in educational expectations at the top and the bottom of the parental educational distribution; whereas at the top it is expected to make educational expectations of girls and boys run in parallel, at the bottom of the parental educational distribution it is expected to raise girls’ expectations well above those of boys.

As regards education differentiation, it is often associated with a well-developed vocational training system, which in turn provides an appealing alternative to general education. This explains why expectations of attending university are generally lower in a highly differentiated education system than in more general ones, both for girls and boys. But the effect for boys could be stronger, because enrolment in vocational training is slightly higher among them, and even more so in the case of dual systems that provide firm-specific training (Estevez-Abe, 2005). Therefore, wherever vocational training is well-established and offers good opportunities, boys who had otherwise not expected to attend university might be diverted from the general track. For this reason, I expect to find higher male disadvantage where vocational training is not well organised. Moreover, such a pull effect may be stronger among male children from a lower social origin, thus making gender differences in higher education expectations to be greater at low levels of parental education.

Finally, everything else being equal, the size and growth of employment and wages in strongly masculinised sectors (i.e. manufacturing and construction) may act as a pull factor dissuading male children from entry into university and making a vocational track or a straight entry into the labour market more appealing. I expect sons of lower educated parents to be more tempted by the prospects of these sectors than their daughters. Considering that the inheritance of familiar resources in small and medium sized companies may favour male children more than female ones, the importance of these types of companies may also explain why boys at low levels of parental education are more disinclined to follow an academic path (university) than girls.

Interaction effects between gender, social origin and the three variables capturing the national-level factors so far described should allow, first, to ascertain the extent to which gender differences in higher education expectation are driven by these national-level factors; second, the extent to which they have a specific effect at the bottom of the parental educational distribution, so that the gender difference in higher education expectation is greater here.

References
aspirations and preferences regarding occupational choices and careers. There are beliefs about the natural abilities and inclinations of females and males that have gained widespread acceptance in contemporary societies. Whereas men are taught to emphasize economic wealth, status, and prestige in their definition of an ideal career; for women, social and altruistic opportunities offered by jobs are more important (Jacobs 1995; Marini et al. 1996; Jonsson 1999; Van de Werfhorst & Kraaykamp 2001; Correll 2001, 2004; Charles & Brady 2002; Halaby 2003). On the other hand, scholars have posited that differences in mathematical ability explain much of the gender gap in the choice of science, engineering or math intensive fields among men and women. In most countries, the evidence shows that men perform better than women on mathematics achievement tests at different age levels (Baker & Jones 1993; Ayalon 2003). However, there is considerable cross-national variation in the magnitude of these differences and they tend to be smaller in countries where equal opportunities prevail for men and women.

Other scholars have analyzed how parental education and social class affect gender differences in subject choice (Dryer 1998; Reimer & Pollack 2009). Dryer (1998) posits that parents represent specific role-models to their children. Parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds have a more egalitarian view of gender and thus, promote less traditional gender attitudes and behaviors. Hence, students from ‘higher’ social groups are more likely to make atypical educational choices than those from working class backgrounds. His results show that parents’ socioeconomic background played a significant role in explaining differences within boys and girls. On the other hand, Reimer & Pollak (2009) found some gender inequalities on the selection of field of study but the effect of SES background works similar for men and women.

We find two caveats in the literature. First, most of the evidence refers to developed countries, with few studies considering subject choice in the developing world. Second, the literature has not clearly addressed the distinction between and within gender differences. The aim of this paper is to contribute to filling this gap. Using cross sectional data about university applications in Chile (n= 265,411) in 2013, we assess whether student socioeconomic background contributes to explaining between and within gender differences in subject choice.

These data allow us to identify the applicants’ preferences disaggregated by study program and university and, on the other hand, give information about sociodemographic characteristics of applicants (parental education, social class, and whether the mother is a housewife or not). In this study, we focus on their three first preferences. As we have more than a thousand different study programs, we group them into nine study areas. These areas were ordered according to three different criteria: how math intensive the courses are (following Goldman and Hewit 1976); their technical or care orientation (Barone 2011); and their income scales on the labor market.

We test four hypotheses regarding between and within gender differences in subject choice. We test two hypotheses related to between gender differences, namely, whether gender differences in the choice of scientific programs (vs. humanity programs), and technical programs (vs. care programs) are smaller among upper classes than lower classes. Regarding within gender, our first hypothesis is that upper class women have higher probabilities to apply to more lucrative areas than lower class women. Finally, we test whether housewife mothers reinforce gender differences in subject choice.

We conducted multinomial logistic regression analyses. Our dependent variable is the study area of preference and our explanatory variables are the applicant’s gender and the social origin of the applicants. We also control for prior academic performance, average score on the national standardized test, age, and type of high school (vocational/scientific).

Our results partially confirm our hypotheses regarding between gender differences. When study areas are ordered according to their scientific or humanistic character, we found three scientific areas where the gender difference is smaller among upper than lower classes (Engineering, Science, and Health). Further, when we order the areas according to their technical or care orientation, we confirm our hypothesis in two technical areas (Engineering and Science), but also in the Health area (care). In relation to within gender difference, we do not find evidence that support the hypothesis that upper class women have higher probabilities of applying to more lucrative areas than lower class women. Regarding the influence of housewife mothers, we found that this reinforces within gender differences in some areas. In Engineering, we found that a housewife mother has an influence only on men; the probability of applying to Engineering increases with a housewife mother. Alternatively, in Education, a housewife mother has an influence only on women, increasing their probability of applying to this area as compared to girls whose mothers have a paid job. Overall, our main conclusion is that social origin helps to explain gender differences on subject choice, especially in technical and scientific areas.
Despite their high education on average, ethnic minorities in the UK tend to face disadvantage in the labour market. This paper analyses the importance of various factors to explain this disadvantage by comparing transitions to the labour market of ethnic minority and white British graduates. We also explore reasons for heterogeneity within ethnic minority groups by studying the role of parental class and the size and resources of the local co-ethnic community.

We make use of the Destination of Leavers of Higher Education (DLHE) dataset. This is a survey of all graduates in the UK and we included all British nationals who graduated from their first degree between 2005 and 2012 and were younger than 24 upon graduation. This dataset has very detailed information on the degree someone obtained as well as information on parental background and the local area someone lived prior to graduation. Graduates are asked about their labour market situation 6 months after graduation and a subsample is re-surveyed 3.5 years after graduation. We can therefore study labour market outcomes right after graduation and whether ethnic gaps persist 3 years later.

There are several reasons for ethnic differences in employment or wage among graduates. First of all ethnic minorities are more likely to hold degrees from less prestigious universities and have on average lower grades than white British. Ethnic minority graduates are also less likely to come from a high social class parental background which may mean that they cannot access the same financial or social resources as white British graduates. Besides the immediate family, these resources can also originate in the local community; ethnic minorities tend to be disadvantaged by living in more deprived areas. This lack of opportunities is likely to affect employment and wages.

To answer our first question regarding the factors accounting for ethnic gaps on the labour market we model employment and earnings 6 months and 3.5 years after graduation. We use logistic regression for employment and OLS for log of earnings and estimate ethnic gaps accounting for different sets of controls: parental class and type of school attended; local authority district characteristics, measured through indices of deprivation, ethnic segregation, share of graduates and share of benefit claimants; and the grades obtained, subject studied and type of university someone graduated from. All analyses are separated by gender.

We find that six months after graduation ethnic minority graduates are substantially less likely to be employed than white British, but these employment gaps are not explained by differences in the local area, qualifications obtained or parental background. However, three and a half years after graduation such gaps are substantially reduced once we control for employment status six months after graduation. This suggests the importance of the first transition to the labour market as it can have long-lasting effects on later wages and employment probability.

In terms of earnings we find small ethnic gaps six months after graduation, which disappear (for men) or are reduced significantly (for women) after taking into account differences in resources and qualifications. Three and a half years after graduation differences in earnings, especially for women, tend to become larger which could indicate that ethnic minority graduates experience less career progression than their white British peers.

We then study how the experience of ethnic minority graduates and their disadvantage may depend on resources. By resources we mean support and advice, or financial help enabling graduates to wait for a "good" job match, or information on available jobs through social networks. These resources can be available through parents but also through the local community. For ethnic minorities the co-ethnic community may be especially important in providing information and support as the literature on ethnic capital and co-ethnic networks shows.

To allow for minority-specific resources we include the share of co-ethnics, the share of graduates in the co-ethnic community and the employment rate of co-ethnics. Parental background may be a larger discriminant among ethnic minority graduates than among the white British as there is less selectivity into university among ethnic minorities than among the white British. To test this we allow parental class to affect ethnic minorities differently than natives.

We find that ethnic earning (and employment) gaps are quite large for ethnic minority graduates from low parental background and those who lived in a small and lowly educated co-ethnic community. On the other hand, minorities whose parents are better off and who can count on a large co-ethnic community that is highly educated, have similar or even higher earnings than white British. This supports the idea that, especially for ethnic minorities, the information and resources available in the community can provide support in finding good jobs.

To summarize, we find substantial ethnic gaps even among graduates. The gaps are largest in terms of employment. These gaps are reduced somewhat 3.5 years after graduation however. A large part of the differences in earnings are due to parental class, local area characteristics and qualifications obtained however. We also highlight the importance of considering the local area characteristics and accounting for co-ethnic networks and resources.
In Switzerland, about two thirds of a birth cohort enters initial vocational education and training at the upper-secondary level. The majority serve a firm-based apprenticeship in the so-called dual system. After completion, young people may either enter the labour market or continue their educational path at the tertiary level. Depending on the type of tertiary programme, access requires some years of professional experience or a specific higher education entrance certificate, the vocational baccalaureate, which can be attained either simultaneously or after completion of initial vocational education and training.

With regard to allocation within VET as well as the risk of dropping out of VET prematurely, existing studies revealed disadvantages for migrant youths originating from former Yugoslavia, Turkey or Portugal (Fibbi et al. 2006, Stalder/Schmid 2006, Imdorf 2010). Furthermore, german studies show that youths with a migration background also encounter disadvantages at labour market entry when compared to native youth (Hillmert 2001, Seibert/Solga 2006). To some extent these disadvantages even persist if grades and competences are taken into account. In order to explain these disadvantages, Seibert (2011) assumes that the signaling value of educational degrees differs for young people with and without a migration background. For Switzerland, little is known regarding migrant-specific inequalities at the transition from VET-into the labour-market. Our paper thus investigates whether such inequalities exist and – if so – analyses the mechanisms explaining these inequalities. Our focus will firstly be on the transitions into employment in the trained occupation (measured by indicators such as the duration of job search, educational mismatch fixed-term contracts or unemployment). Secondly, we will analyse the transitions into tertiary education (e.g. professional education and training, universities of applied sciences). We are particularly interested to learn whether youths with a migrant background face disadvantages at the transition into the labour market or tertiary education, which cannot be explained by performance indicators and/or educational degrees.

In order to explain social inequalities in educational decisions, a rational-choice approach is useful. The main argument of this approach is that the subjectively estimated utility of educational programmes and degrees varies between the social groups (Esser 1999). Moreover, the characteristics of the different VET-programmes (e.g. in terms of physical and intellectual requirements) as well as opportunities provided by employers (e.g. in terms of encouragement to simultaneously prepare a higher education entrance certificate) are likely to matter. In order to explain inequalities between migrants and non-migrants persisting even if such factors are taken into consideration, further arguments (e.g. higher educational aspirations of migrants, Kao/Tienda 1995) are necessary. In order to explain inequalities at the transition to employment, we draw on the labour-queue model (Thurow 1975, 1978), signaling theory (Spence 1973) as well as Seibert’s argument that employers might perceive the signaling value of educational degrees of youths with and without a migrant background differently.

Based on Seibert’s argument we expect that migrant youths also experience disadvantages at the transition to employment when compared to non-migrants, even if their degrees and certificates are taken into account. Concerning the transition to the tertiary education system, we also expect that these migrant groups exhibit lower transition rates than non-migrants – due to their disadvantaged social background and previous allocation within the VET-system.

The analyses will be conducted at the basis of the TREE data – a panel survey which followed the PISA 2000 cohort until the age of 30. All youths who successfully completed initial vocational education and training by the age of 21 are included into the analyses. Since the migrant groups investigated in this paper may systematically differ from native youth due to their disadvantages at entering the VET-system, we will apply methods controlling such a possible selection bias.

The dependent variable differentiates between the transition to tertiary education (especially professional education and training and universities of applied sciences), the transition to employment as well as the transition to unemployment. Multinomial as well as binary (educational mismatch, marginal employment, fixed-term contract) logistic models will be estimated. Migrant background is used as the main explaining variable. As control variables performances, certificates, social background characteristics, gender, job search activities as well as characteristics of VET-programmes and employers are taken into consideration.

Literature


Aiming higher, just not to fall much too low: Explaining the mismatch between educational attainment and labour market position of the second generation minority ethnic members in the UK

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The classical accounts of education and social mobility are the rational action and relative risk aversion theories as developed by Goldthorpe and Breen. The theories are designed for the mainstream population or for general purposes. For ethnic studies, especially those pertaining to the second generation, accounts of ethnic penalty and hyper-cyclical unemployment as developed by Heath and Li are more powerful and specific. As the socio-economic integration of ethnic minorities, the second-generation in particular, is of increasing importance to the social stability and economic prosperity in developed countries, this paper seeks to bridge the mainstream and ethnic-specific theories in explaining the mismatch between educational and occupational attainment of second-generation ethnic minorities in Britain.

We examine the educational and occupational attainment of the second-generation ethnic minority groups in the UK using the UK Longitudinal Household Study (UKLHS). As the first generation tend to suffer in the labour market owing to their lack of language fluency and other socio-cultural-economic resources, the second-generation tend to come from poorer families and are expected to have lower educational levels than do white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages. Even those second-generation members from Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean backgrounds who are the poorest groups in Britain have higher levels of education than white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages. Even those second-generation members from Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean backgrounds who are the poorest groups in Britain have higher levels of education than white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages. Even those second-generation members from Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean backgrounds who are the poorest groups in Britain have higher levels of education than white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages. Even those second-generation members from Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean backgrounds who are the poorest groups in Britain have higher levels of education than white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages. Even those second-generation members from Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean backgrounds who are the poorest groups in Britain have higher levels of education than white British. Yet we find that the second generation from all major groups outperform whites in educational attainment in spite of their parental socio-economic disadvantages.

Yet we also find that the returns to education are much lower for the second-generation groups than those for whites, not only for the whole population as a whole but even for those with degree-level education among them. The lower returns are shown in most aspects of the socio-economic life such as the higher risks of unemployment at the normal times, the rocketing (hyper-cyclical) levels of unemployment during recession years, poorer access to professional-managerial (salarial) positions, lower incomes and earnings, and much higher chances of discrimination of one kind or another, such as those experienced in getting an interview, being offered a job, or being blocked a training or promotion opportunity etc on ethnic grounds.

The mismatch between educational success and labour market disadvantage of the second generation is not fully explicable by the classical theories of class-lined social reproduction or relative risk aversion but needs to take into account experienced, expected or perceived ethnic penalty. We suggest that in anticipation of disadvantages that they believe they are going to face in the labour market in recruitment and career advancement, the second generation, urged by their parents, are determined to redouble efforts and provide the strongest possible signals in the form of gaining much higher educational qualifications than do their white peers in order to offset the likely discount of the values of such signals by potential employers in the screening process and in the subsequent evaluation of their performance if they are lucky enough to get a job. The decision to ‘aim higher’ is not only based on prospective considerations...
but also reinforced by lateral and retrospective cues as frequently conveyed to them in the form of barriers, setbacks and frustrations, particularly those associated with experiences and memories of hyper-cyclical unemployment, as encountered by their parents, relatives, and co- and pan-ethnic friends, schoolmates and acquaintances. Thus the second generation’s decision to aim and achieve higher in educational attainment is rational in the sense that this is a pre-emptive strategy designed to avoid falling much too low in the labour market: even with much higher levels of educational qualifications, they fared worse; what would have happened if their education was the same as or lower than that of whites?
Determinants and trends of in-work poverty risks in Italy. An analysis of the 2000-2014 years.

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According to recent OECD estimates (OECD 2014, 2015), Italian labour market displays comparatively low levels of earnings dispersion and moderate low-pay incidence. Regardless the specific measure of earnings dispersion taken into account (9th to 1st, 9th to 5th or 5th to 1st deciles ratio), the earnings inequality remained consistently below OECD averages along the period between 2002 and 2013 with, if any, minor hints of compression of the wage structure. A picture of overall stability emerges also looking at the incidence of low pay, being the share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings between 2002 and 2013 (OECD 2014, 2015) one the lowest among OECD countries. However, the relative stability of the last two decades in aggregate measures of economic inequality did not imply a substantial inertia in the horizontal distribution of economic risks ran by different segments of the workforce and by different social groups (in terms of age cohort, education, labour market position and household-types). Moreover, the empirical support in favour of relative economic equality in the Italian labour market appears less straightforward when the inequality measures refer to the household level and/or it focuses on the most recent trends. Looking at OECD data covering the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s (OECD, Growing Unequal, 2008) and at data taken from OECD income distribution database (OECD Employment Outlook 2013), it rather emerges how Italian household disposable income distribution kept widening over time in the last decades, especially in concomitance with the recent economic crisis. On this point, it is worth noticing that even in the pre-crisis period, Italy displayed an in-work poverty incidence around 10%, slightly higher than the OECD and EU27 averages and close to those ones of others southern European countries (Lohmann 2008) (Eurofound, 2010) (Marx and Nolan, 2012).

In this work we provide a longitudinal perspective concerning the main (macro) trends and the most relevant (household level) determinants of in-work poverty in Italy, focusing on the period between 2000 and 2014. Needless to say, this is a period characterized by relevant modifications as a joint product of institutional reforms and economic downturn. We make use of the last eight cross-sectional datasets of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (Bank of Italy SHIW data) as well as of their longitudinal components. The data include information on the main personal and labour-market-related characteristics of both employees and self-employed in the Italian labour market; they also allow for the reconstruction of the main household characteristics (in terms of composition, employment patterns, presence of children etc.).

The aim of the proposed analysis is threefold. First, we start accounting for changes in aggregate measures such as the incidence of in-work poverty (and, as an ancillary estimate, low-pay rates). Second, we provide a descriptive analysis concerning the changes occurred over time in the relative distribution of in-work poverty risks ran by distinct social groups, defined in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and/or in terms of their specific position in the Italian labour market. Third, we carry out a multivariate analysis of possible determinants of in-work poverty by means of random effects and dynamic random effects panel models, in order to check for the main drivers of in-work poverty, the accumulation of risks on specific household types, and the existence of genuine state dependence of in-work poverty statuses.

The overall picture emerging from the analyses confirms the increase of in-work poverty rates during the 2000-2014, especially in concomitance with the recent economic downturn. On average, being in employment does not represent a valuable protection from poverty for more than 11% of the workforce, with relevant variation depending, among other factors, on education, age groups, contractual arrangement and individual labour market position as well as household employment patterns. In-work poverty risks are higher for low educated, young and middle aged (25-46) individuals (and couples), especially if employed in low-wage, temporary and part-time positions. Moreover, the analyses clearly show that a crucial issue concerning the in-work poverty distribution (and therefore the inequality among different households’ profiles) is the employment combination, at the household level. Three main aspects are worthy of consideration and deserve further analyses. First, in a context of (still) low female labour market participation, single-earner couples represent a relevant portion of Italian households and a significant driver of in-work poverty exposure, especially if combined with disadvantaged conditions in the secondary labour market (low-wage job, marginal forms of employment and low work intensity arrangements) of the sole-wage provider. A second element is the possible accumulation of personal labour market risks at the household level. The overall pattern of results clearly suggest how even dual earner settings can provide only week protection in case of both workers experience employment instability (temporary jobs) or low-work intensity (part-time jobs), while no protection at all is provided in case of the compresence of two low-wage workers). This is a relevant issue in a dualistic and highly segmented labour market, characterized by significant cohort divide, as the Italian one. Third, according to our analyses, in-work poverty in Italy tend to produce dynamics of relevant state dependency, increasing the risk of repeating and protracting in-work poverty statuses over time, with negative consequences not only in terms of mid-term economic and social risks, but also in terms of overall between-households inequality trends in the Italian society. We also stress how (individual and household) attributes interact with specific triggering events (like a child-birth) increasing the dynamics of in-work poverty entrapment, and boosting severe risks of societal inequality as well as of intergenerational transmission of social exclusion.

Based on our analyses, the definition of possible policies contrasting the diffusion of in-work poverty in Italy would require a combined set of policy measures. It seems crucial the implementation of policy tools aimed to reduce the incidence of single earner households, by promoting a further increase in the female employment even if on a part-time base. A second point is the implementation of policy measures contrasting the accumulation at the household level of individual labour market risks, which would probably require a significant (but conflictual) redefinition of the strongly dualistic setting of the Italian labour market. Moreover, effective social policies...
should be targeted to cushion, by means of reliable unemployment benefits and fiscal incentives, the poverty risks related to low-work intensity and employment precariousness of the weakest segments of the workforce.

Status differences between siblings. The effect of birth order reconsidered
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To understand how much the family impacts socioeconomic status attainment, scholars mostly study differences between families, such as the socioeconomic standing of the parents or the size of the family. Indeed, research shows that cross-family stratification is strong and accounts for 20-40% of inequality in contemporary Western societies (De Graaf and Huinink 1992; Sieben and De Graaf 2001). However, this means that the remaining 60-80% of inequality results from differences within families (Conley 2004). Relatively little is known about the extent to which the family is responsible for these differences between siblings or to what extent differences result from processes unrelated to the family. Probably the most studied factor related to family processes that may explain differences in achievement between siblings is the order in which siblings are born (Black et al. 2005; Härkönen 2014; Lee 2009; Steelman et al. 2002). Some report considerable birth order effects on outcomes related to socioeconomic attainment (Black et al. 2005; Härkönen 2014; Sowell 2007; Zajonc 1976; Zajonc and Markus 1975), while others report small or no effects (Retherford and Sewell 1991; Rodgers et al. 2000; Steelman et al. 2002). It is therefore an ongoing debate whether or not birth order is an important factor to consider if we want to understand the impact of the family on intra-family stratification. The underlying aim of this article is to shed new light on exactly this question.

An important reason given in the literature for the mixed findings on birth order effects is that the effect of birth order is easily confounded with other effects, such as those of family size, birth cohort, and other observable and unobservable characteristics. Results are therefore very sensitive to the methodology that studies use. Another reason may be that the size of birth order effects depends on characteristics of the context studied. However, it is largely unknown to what extent birth order effects are a universal characteristic of societies of all locations and times, as an influential study claims (Sowell 1996), or whether they differ between societies and change over time. The explanation for this lack of knowledge is probably that data that allow to effectively control for observable and unobservable confounding factors are rare for any context, let alone for multiple contexts at the same time.

In this study I examine whether and how birth order affects occupational status attainment. More specifically, I analyze to what extent the answer to this question depends on the methodology used, and to what extent the answer to this question depends on the context studied. To do so, I make use of GENLIAS, a database containing digitized information from Dutch marriage certificates for the period 1812-1922, and HISCI-NL, a database containing information on context-level characteristics (see also Knigge et al. 2014; Knigge, Maas & Van Leeuwen 2014). This allows me to study birth order effects in occupational status attainment of 479,864 Dutch brothers from 266,652 families while covering more than 500 municipalities and an 80-year period (1842-1922). Because marriage certificates are linked such that one knows who are siblings of one another, it is possible to use family-fixed effects models, which is paramount in controlling effectively for observable and unobservable confounding characteristics of the family. The data also contain appropriate controls for confounding individual characteristics, such as birth year and age at marriage. Moreover, the Netherlands in this period is extremely fruitful to study the context-dependency of birth order effects because many societal changes occurred, such as the change from a traditional society to a modern industrial one. The effects of industrialization and other modernization processes are studied using measures from the HISCI-NL database.

Preliminary results show that birth order effects are as would be expected based on the most prominent theory in this field, resource dilution theory (Becker and Tomes 1976; Blake 1981; see Figure 1A), or an adaptation of this theory (Bras et al. 2010; see Figure 1B). However, birth order effects are in substantive terms almost negligible (at most 1 point on a scale from 10.6 to 99) and very small compared to other factors, such as the effect of father’s status or family size. In other words, if we want to understand the impact of the family on intra-family stratification, it does not seem to be a very prominent factor, at least not for the Netherlands in the 19th century. Another important conclusion is that birth order effects depend greatly on the type of model specified and the type of controls included. For example, birth order has a positive instead of a negative effect on occupational status when controlling insufficiently for year of birth (later born sons have a higher status than their older brothers because average status increases in society over time) (see Figure 2). Whether and how birth order effects depend on the context studied is still work in progress.

How employment and financial uncertainty affect satisfaction with family life in Europe.
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During the recent economic crises, many families have experienced financial difficulties due to job loss or a loss of income. Both being financially deprived and being unemployed influence the functioning of families. Financial difficulties make people more anxious and require families to adjust their spending patterns to their new level of income. Such adjustments may induce arguments between family members. In addition, unemployment influences families aside from merely affecting the family’s financial situation. Unemployment reduces people’s social status, social contacts, and structured time and unemployment lowers the esteem partners have for their spouse. While some studies did investigate the association between financial deprivation and satisfaction with family life in individual countries, little is known about cross-national variation and dependence on the national context. Therefore, our first contribution is to study the influence of unemployment and financial deprivation on people’s satisfaction with family life in 34 European countries.

Our second contribution is to go beyond the influence of current financial difficulties and employment by investigating the impact of future expectations regarding financial problems and employment. Little is known about how families react to uncertainty about future
earnings and job insecurity. Couples do not only live in the now, but make plans for the future, making security about future income vital for the family functioning. Expecting that the family’s income will become lower in the future or expecting to lose one’s job lowers psychological well-being, but limited research has focused on how uncertainty affects satisfaction with family life. Therefore, next to current unemployment and financial deprivation, the influence of employment and financial uncertainty on family life satisfaction will be investigated as well. Another indicator of employment uncertainty lies in temporary (in comparison to unlimited) contracts. We will therefore also investigate how temporary employment contracts influence satisfaction with family life. These types of contracts are characterized by uncertainty about future earnings and are relatively (and increasingly) common in Europe.

Third, we improve on previous literature by assessing whether poverty and unemployment influence couples similarly. Two moderating influences will be investigated, namely the presence of children and macro-economic conditions. First, previous research has shown that parents are more rejecting of financial risks than childless people. This highlights the preference of parents to provide for financial stability for their children. Parents experience more responsibilities than childless people, including to financially provide for their children. When couples experience or foresee a loss of income, the emotional consequences may therefore be higher when people have children, making the impact of financial uncertainty more detrimental. Second, the macro-economic conditions may influence how people perceive individual economic setbacks. On the one hand, during macro-economic turmoil, job loss may be less attributed to one’s own functioning and therefore be less influential on satisfaction with family life; people may have lost their jobs not because they are ‘losers’, but because it is the economy. On the other hand, uncertainty about future earnings and future employment may be elevated by poor macro-economic conditions.

Our research questions read: To what extent are (a) unemployment, (b) financial deprivation, (c) job insecurity, and (d) financial insecurity related to satisfaction with family life. And how are these associations influenced by (e) the presence of children in the household and (f) macro-economic circumstances.

Based on the family stress model, we would expect that when people experience financial and employment difficulties or uncertainty about these issues, they become more stressed and irritable because they worry about the financial future. In addition, financial strain puts budgetary matters to the fore and these issues generate frustration and anger. Therefore, we would expect that people are less satisfied with family life when they experience financial and employment uncertainty. In addition, theories on relative deprivation guide our expectations on how macro-economic conditions moderate the influence of financial deprivation on family life satisfaction. We will investigate the following hypotheses:

(Hypothesis 1) When people are (a) more financially deprived or (b) unemployed they are less satisfied with family life.

(Hypothesis 2) When people expect (a) financial decline or (b) job loss in the near future, they are less satisfied with family life.

(Hypothesis 3) For people with children (a) financial deprivation, (b) unemployment, (c) expecting a financial decline, and (d) expecting job loss, are more negatively related to satisfaction with family life than for people without children.

(Hypothesis 4) In times of economic recession (a) financial deprivation, (b) unemployment, (c) expecting a financial decline, and (d) expecting job loss, are less negatively related to satisfaction with family life than in times of economic prosperity.

To investigate these issues, we use the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) in which 43,636 individuals have been surveyed across 34 European countries in 2011. We select respondents who live together with their partner and who do not live with parents. We use multi-level regression analyses – separate for men and women - to test our hypotheses. Preliminary analyses (on a subset of our hypotheses) indicated that both men and women were less satisfied with their family life when they were more financially deprived or expected financial difficulties in the near future. Unemployment and having a temporary employment contract were negatively related to satisfaction with family life for men, but not for women (with financial difficulties held constant). Subsequent analyses on a subset of the sample including employed people only revealed that stronger expectations of job loss in the next months went together with lower satisfaction with family life. These results indicated that people were less satisfied with their family life when they experienced financial difficulties or when they expected to experience financial difficulties in the near future. Only for men unemployment was negatively linked to family satisfaction. In contrast, for both men and women potential loss of employment appeared to be negatively associated with satisfaction with family life.

Common patterns of employment trajectories after receiving social assistance in Germany

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Currently, around 4.3 million employable people in Germany have received Arbeitslosengeld II (social assistance). Arbeitslosengeld II is paid when the household income does not suffice the needs of the family. Unemployment is one of the reasons for people being in need of social assistance. However, a great share of people receiving social assistance have work arrangements in marginal, part-time or full-time jobs. Such life circumstances are for example reflected in the debate on “working poor”. This shows that social assistance is received by people of very different employment trajectories and within different life circumstances. In our research we are interested in the differences between employment trajectories of people after they received social assistance for the first time. We will set the need for benefit in the context of the individual life course.

Using an explorative design, we detect common patterns of employment trajectories following and parallel to the reception of social assistance in Germany. Therefore, we draw a complete picture of the individual trajectories by using sequences which account for three important statuses in the individual trajectories: employment, benefits receipt and attendance in active labour market programs. In a further step we present the influence of different social-demographic characteristics, different life circumstances and different regional contexts on the probability to belong to a specific cluster.
We make use of administrative data collected by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for all recipients of social assistance in Germany. The data include information about welfare receipt, dependent employment, participation in active labour market programs and the socio-demographic characteristics of the recipient and is available since 2005. We observe individuals over three years after they have received social assistance for the first time. We use a one percent sample of all persons of employable age (not in education) who have received social assistance between 2007 and 2009. We observe sequences of benefit receipt, dependent employment and participation in active labour market programs on a monthly basis for up to three years. These sequences will be clustered in ten characteristic patterns by means of optimal matching analysis (with Ward algorithm). These clusters will then be used as a dependent variable in a further multinomial regression analysis. Besides socio-demographic factors (as age, education, citizenship, family status, age of the youngest child) we will take the regional context (e.g. employment rate) and former labour market experience into account.

The cluster analysis yields to ten clusters, in which trajectories are most homogenous within each cluster (in terms of combinations of states of receipt, employment and participation in active labour market programs) but differ the most between clusters. We can group the clusters into three main groups: The first group contains trajectories of permanent unemployment or only little labour market participation with parallel reception of social assistance. The second group includes trajectory clusters, which are characterised by employment (marginal, part-time and full-time) with a successful exit of social assistance. We call these clusters ‘benefit exiting’. The third group also contains clusters which are characterized by employment, however, with continued reception of social assistance. Hence, there is a period of parallel social assistance reception and labour market activity. We refer to this cluster as ‘parallel benefits’. In this paper we will focus on the last two groups of clusters.

In our sample full-time jobs are typically done by men. The percentage of males is very high in both cluster groups, in the ‘full-time and benefit exiting’ cluster and in the ‘full-time and parallel benefit’ cluster. The men in the ‘exiting’ cluster are more often single and better educated than the men in the parallel benefit cluster, who are predominantly in relationships (with and without children). Women, on the other hand, concentrate in the part-time clusters. They are more likely than the overall (female) population to be single mothers. With respect to age and education, the ‘part-time and benefit exiting’ and the ‘part-time and parallel benefit’ clusters differ greatly. Women in the ‘exiting’ cluster are on average younger and possess better education than those of the ‘part-time and parallel benefit’ clusters. We find also a remarkable share of mothers with one or two children who live together with a partner in this parallel benefit cluster.

For the two marginal employment clusters, there is no such clear gender division. For cohabiting women with three or more children, marginal employment seems to be an exit strategy or, more likely, a complementary strategy to the exit strategy of the partner. On the other hand: If marginal employment appears together with continuous benefit needs we find two dominant socio-demographic circumstances. In this cluster we find more often low educated older single men as well as lone mothers with two or more children. Altogether, the family circumstances seem to have high explanatory power to identify the benefits and employment trajectories. We find, that social circumstances as well as gender clearly stratify the group of persons who enter the social welfare system in terms of exiting probability due to employment.
As a consequence of ongoing immigration, western societies have in the past decades become increasingly diverse in terms of people's ethnic background, cultural convictions and religious practices. This process of diversification has triggered a heated political debate in many of these western countries about the possible threats of ethnic heterogeneity for the well-being of society (Quillian and Pager, 2011). In the last few years this debate has also become a central theme in academic debates. Social scientists have, more specifically, started questioning if and under what conditions ethnic diversity in people's living environment has a negative influence on social cohesion. While these scholars have produced a vast amount of comparable empirical studies (e.g. Putnam, 2007; Stolle, 2008; Letki, 2008; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Savelkoul, Geesthuizen & Schepers, 2013), there is little consensus about a generic harmful effect of ethnic minority density on social cohesion. But, if negative effects of ethnic minority density are found, it is much more common in the United States than in other countries, and it is more consistent for aspects of social cohesion that are spatially bound to the neighborhood, such as trust in neighbors and favorable neighborhood evaluations (Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014).

Building on these important insights, we investigate to what extent ethnic minority density affects individuals' trust in neighbors in American neighborhoods (among whites). We argue that ethnic minority density alone is unlikely to erode social cohesion, and that consequently more attention should be paid to other neighborhood characteristics that could undermine favorable contact opportunities in particular and social cohesion in general. We aim to bring the field forward by examining, besides the impact of ethnic minority density, economic deprivation and the prevalence of crime in shaping individuals' feelings of trust in neighbors conjointly. The harmful effect of ethnic minority density on individuals' intra-neighborhood cohesion is, in the existing literature, explained in various ways. Researchers have argued that ethnic minority density defines contact between neighborhood residents, creates feelings of ethnic threat and is the culprit of anomic feelings (Laurence, 2011; Savelkoul et al., 2011; Coffé & Geys, 2006; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). With respect to economic deprivation, it is argued that in economically deprived neighborhoods offer their residents with fewer resources that facilitate contact between different residents, such as public facilities, effective infrastructure, neighborhood safety and residential stability (Tolsma et al., 2009) and make people experience more ethnic threat as a consequence of a (perceived) scarcity of resources (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008). According to Oliver and Mendelberg (2000, p. 576), economic deprivation leads to a condition in which residents perceive insecurity and an inability to cope, and fear, alienation from neighbors, lack of trust in others, and suspicion toward out-groups in general. Two studies that consider the influence of crime in the neighborhood on individuals' feelings of trust in the United States indeed seem to confirm this hypothesis (Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2010; Putnam, 2007).

Besides the role of the actual neighborhood composition, we investigate the mediating role of individuals' perceptions of the ethnic, economic and crime composition. These perceptions are a more proximal cause of individuals' attitudes and beliefs, such as feelings of trust, than the actual neighborhood composition (Weden et al., 2008). We contend that individuals' neighborhood contexts are, besides an invariable physical reality, social constructions (Wong et al., 2012) that are at least as important in explaining the influence of the neighborhood composition on individuals' attitudes and beliefs. The local environment can, namely, only be consequential if individuals are indeed aware of it (Wickes et al., 2013; Pickett, 2012).

We use a combination of contextual-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau and individual-level data from the American Social Fabric Study (Butts et al., 2014). Because our respondents are nested in neighborhoods (i.e. census tracts) we employed multilevel linear regression analyses (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Models are estimated with the lme4 package in R 3.1.3. Moreover, we will employ multilevel structural equation modelling for testing mediation (Preacher et al., 2010).

In line with previous research we demonstrate that ethnic minority density is negatively related to trust in neighbors for whites in American neighborhoods. Trust is also lower in economically deprived neighborhoods and neighborhoods with a high crime rate. Not only the actual neighborhood composition, but also the perceived neighborhood composition plays a role in shaping whites' levels of trust in neighbors. Perceived ethnic minority density, perceived deprivation and perceived crime are all negatively associated to trust if individuals are indeed aware of it (Wickes et al., 2013; Pickett, 2012).

Understanding the role of contextual factors for the salience of majority and minority ethnic identity
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Background and hypotheses

Ethnic identity development and expression is an area of strong academic interest and political debate. Increasing attention has been paid to the patterns and determinants of ethnic and national identities among minority populations in Western nations (Phinney 1990, Berry 1997, Manning and Roy 2010, Aspinall and Song 2012, Karlsen and Nazroo 2013, Platt 2013, Masell 2013, Georgiadis and Manning 2013, Nandi and Platt 2015). We now know much about the factors influencing the expression of stronger or weaker ethnic identities – as well as how they vary both across country contexts and across ethnic groups within a single country context. However, there is only a much smaller literature that explores the contextual influences in identity expression. In addition, ethnic identity is often regarded as solely the preserve of minorities, and more rarely investigated among majority populations (cf. the discussion in Nandi and Platt 2015).

Using, a large nationally representative UK data set, this paper explores the role of social context in shaping the expression of ethnic identity. Specifically, we test whether (inter-ethnic) friendships, partnerships, acquaintanceship and the ethnic composition and diversity of neighbourhoods influences the expression of ethnic identity.

We start from the social identity literature with the premise that individuals do not behave in all social situations as a member of a specific group, but the probability of doing so depends on their own social identity. Some social situations heighten these intergroup differences and in turn strengthen social identity (Tajfel 1981). Experimental situations have highlighted how context can be manipulated to lead to individuals being more likely to express their identity as members of the social group (Turner et al 1994).

Existing results for the UK suggest that socio-economic position and educational attainment is negatively associated with ethnic identity expression, but substantial differences between ethnic groups remain, even after controlling for migration status and socio-demographics (Nandi and Platt 2015). One reason for such differences may be that ethnic identity expression increases in contexts in which it is experienced as salient – and that such contexts themselves vary across ethnic groups. Drawing on Abrams’ (2010) distinction between public and private identities, we expect that as identities are experienced more as public identities, they will be expressed as more important and significant. This transition to public identity and heightened salience is more likely to occur through interpersonal contacts with other groups’ members (Turner et al. 1994), strengthening expression of ethnic identity and the ownership of the ‘ingroup’. At the same time, closer and more intimate contacts (close friends or partners) may serve to reduce salience of ethnic difference as points of commonality and shared understandings come to dominate perceived ethnic differences. Such an effect may also be consequent on reverse causality – those who have weaker ethnic identities may select more easily into friendships and relationships with outgroups. If it is possible to disentangle these two processes it will give better insight into the conditions under which boundaries between groups may reduce.

We thus develop the following hypotheses relating to exposure and contact (context):

- Ethnic identification increases in salience according to context. (H1) Specifically,
  - Those with mixed ethnic acquaintance networks (H1a) and those living in mixed ethnically diverse neighbourhoods or where proportion of own ethnic group is small (H1b) will express stronger ethnic identity

Conversely we expect that close relationships with those of other ethnic groups will be linked to decreasing salience of own ethnic identity and that,

- Those living in mixed-ethnic partnerships (H2a) and those having close friends of other ethnic groups (H2b) will express weaker ethnic identity.

- However if this effect is driven by reverse causality: This will not change over time (H3).

Moreover we expect these patterns to differ between majority and minority. While the patterns above would be expected to apply to the majority, for ethnic minorities, ethnicity will tend to be constantly salient as they are by definition a minority. Therefore

- Minority ethnic groups will express stronger ethnic identity than the majority (H4)

- Context effects will have more limited impact on their ethnic identity (H5)

Data

We use data from the second (2010/11) wave of Understanding Society, a household panel survey comprising a nationally representative UK sample and incorporating an ethnic minority oversample. We restrict the analysis to those aged 60 or less. We match at the LSOA (c. 500 households) level 2011 census data on neighbourhood composition, and 2010 neighbourhood deprivation scores. Our sample size is 14,520. We estimate linear probability models of the probability to report strong ethnic identification.

Our contextual variables were: whether partner was of a different ethnic group; the share of network not from own ethnic group; whether a best friend from a different ethnic group; and measures of neighbourhood ethnic composition, specifically ethnic diversity, measured using the Herfindahl Index (cf. Putnam 2007, Letki 2008), and own group ethnic concentration (Knies et al. 2014), controlling for neighbourhood deprivation.

Additional explanatory variables included gender, age (grouped), educational qualifications, main activity status, gross household income quintiles, region of residence (GOR), marital status, and experience of harassment.
Findings

We find that those living in mixed ethnic-partnerships and having close friends of other groups express weaker ethnic identity than others, whether they are of majority or minority ethnicity (H2a, H2b). However, this is not time invariant. Hence, rather than being an illustration of reverse causality (H3), this indicates that ethnic identification adjusts to more intimate relationships, representing an accommodation. By contrast mixed neighbourhoods and acquaintances are associated with stronger ethnic identity – but only for the majority (H1a, H1b, H5). This is likely linked to the fact that it is only under such conditions that majority identity is experienced as ethnicity, whereas minority identity tends to be consistently salient. This latter explanation is supported by the fact that minority ethnic identity is stronger than majority ethnic identity for all minority groups (H4). While we do not find a general weakening of identity with context effects for minorities, the pattern is distinct from that for the majority, indicating how identity processes need to be conceived within the wider social context.

Interim conclusions and next steps

Overall we find that identity is susceptible to context effects and that this is particularly the case for majority group members. We note the limitations of the study in exploring associations without at this point, being able to rigorously investigate causal associations. Next steps will consider ways of a) exploiting (future) repeat measures to leverage a better approximation of causality and b) investigating the implications of identity and identity expression for interaction, cohesion and self-concept.

Individual's Social Networks and Benefit Receipt - How Access to Social Resources and Interaction with Neighbors Affect Benefit Receipt

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A fairly recent stream of economic and sociological research has begun investigating how individuals' social networks affect benefit receipt (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000; Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2012; Markussen and Reed 2015; Mood 2004; Mood 2010; Aizer and Currie 2004) – a topic closely related to studies on poverty and economic inequality. Typically, it is hypothesized that more benefit receiving peers lead to a higher likelihood of becoming a benefit recipient and a lower likelihood of getting off benefit receipt. This effect comes about because these peers provide access to knowledge of the welfare system, increase the perceived normality of receiving a benefit and thereby reduce the stigma of receiving a benefit, and increase the utility of leisure time. Network effects are typically operationalized as the proportion of benefit recipients in the neighborhood, notwithstanding the studies on family networks or intergenerational transmission of benefit receipt (e.g. Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad 2014) and one study that also takes into account former school- and classmates (Markussen and Reed 2015). By using this approach, existing research has (1) overlooked other features of individuals' networks not necessarily related to the peers' benefit receipt, and (2) assumed social interaction among neighbors. In this study we argue that this has lead to an underestimation of the full effect of social networks on benefit receipt.

First, it is likely that not only the number of benefit recipients in the neighborhood but also other network features affect benefit receipt. There is a longstanding line of research arguing that access to social resources impacts various labor market outcomes, such as the likelihood of unemployment, level of earnings, and social status (see Lin 1999, 2001). This line of research has, to our knowledge, not examined benefit receipt explicitly. Hence, we pose the following research question: “To what extent does access to social resources affect individuals' benefit receipt?”.

Second, the impact of benefit receiving neighbors on individuals' benefit receipt is typically assumed to arise from actual interaction. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that only when individuals interact with their benefit receiving neighbors their entry to and exit from benefit receipt can be influenced. At the other side observing neighbors and minimal contact with them may also affect benefit receipt through the perception of normality. Both arguments point toward an effect of interacting with benefit receiving neighbors, but only in the latter case would we expect an additional effect of the proportion of benefit recipients in the neighborhood. The second research question we examine is: “How does social interaction with benefit receiving neighbors affect individuals’ benefit receipt?”.

In this paper we focus on the receipt of three cash benefit programmes, namely unemployment, disability and social assistance, and derive hypotheses on the likelihood of entering and exiting such a benefit program. Based on earlier research on benefit non-take up (e.g. van Oorschot 1994), we theorize on two stages in the process leading to benefit receipt: (1) Risk manifestation, and (2) the decision to apply for a benefit. Risk manifestation makes that a person may be in need of (and possibly eligible for) a benefit, for example because of unemployment or disability. We argue that access to job-related social resources plays a crucial role in the prevention of risk manifestation. At the application stage, individuals consider whether to apply for a benefit, and we expect that this decision is mainly affected by the proportion of benefit recipients in the peer group.

This study employs a dataset that combines longitudinal administrative and survey panel data from the Netherlands. This unique combination provides more elaborate and direct measures of egocentric social networks than administrative data alone can provide, and with the administrative data we are able to circumvent the underreporting of benefit receipt that is typical of survey data. The survey data are drawn from the LISS online panel study (Scherpenzeel and Das 2010) that covers the years 2008-2014 and consists of about 5,000 households comprising 8,000 respondents in total. Some respondents (9.1%) did not allow their records to be linked to administrative data, but Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012) indicate that this selection leads to a relatively small bias compared to other sources of bias such as measurement error and nonresponse, in a population of German benefit recipients. The longitudinal nature of the combined dataset allows us to estimate less biased social network effects (Mouw 2006; Halaby 2004; Manski 1993). The network characteristics are time-lagged, meaning that the characteristics in the previous year (t-1) are used to predict benefit entry and exit in a given year (t). We estimate two different regression models to predict an individual’s inflow and
outflow from benefit receipt: A less restrictive logistic discrete-time model and a more conservative fixed-effects (conditional logit) model. Although a fixed-effects model is very advantageous because it takes into account unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity (Halaby 2004), it can only be estimated on a select sample of the respondents that actually start or (later) stop receiving a benefit. The logistic discrete-time model impose less restrictions on the sample, but is likely to estimate biased network effects.

A preliminary descriptive analysis based on the survey data only, shows that 848 respondents (8.7%) have received a cash benefit at least once across all waves. In total, 545 respondents transition either into or out of benefit receipt; 113 respondents both enter and subsequently exit benefit receipt. In line with previous findings (e.g. Mood 2004), we find that inflow is more common than outflow. The latter is only experienced by 195 respondents, whereas inflow is experienced by 350 respondents.

References


SOCIAL POSITION & ACCESS, MOBILIZATION AND RETURNS OF MIGRANT SOCIAL CAPITAL: The case of migration from Africa to Europe

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Despite the wealth of scholarship exploring how social capital influences individual labor market success, health or migration, less attention has been dedicated to how social capital is conditioned and shaped (Portes 1998). Here, we focus on how inequality and social capital are linked in contexts of international migration. We build on prior work by Lin (1999, 2000, 2001) and Smith (2005) to examine how individual social position relates to the ability to access, mobilize and take advantage of migrant social capital. The paper uses the recent quasi-longitudinal Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) data and event-history methods. Preliminary findings suggest that both access to and the mobilization of migrant social capital are deeply stratified by class, albeit in opposite directions. In contrast, returns to migrant social capital appear only marginally conditioned by social class.
Children of the Cultural Revolution: Multigenerational Effects on Educational Outcomes in China

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There is now an emerging literature documenting the direct effects of grandparents' socioeconomic status on grandchildren's socioeconomic status, net of parents' socioeconomic status. There are good reasons to believe that the non-Markovian multigenerational effects are most pronounced when stable social institutions for transmitting social status intergenerationally are altered. A radical political movement that severely disrupted China's education system for a whole generation, the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976 was such a historically unique event. Analyzing data from a recent nationally representative social survey, we show that children of parents whose education was affected by the Cultural Revolution exhibit a pattern of educational attainment reverting towards what could be predicted on the basis of their grandparents' characteristics. That is, net of everything else, children of parents who under-achieved given grandparents' characteristics during the Cultural Revolution attained higher levels of education, whereas children of parents who over-achieved attained lower levels of education.

The mark of an economic downturn: the persistent effects of early career conditions on within-cohort inequality

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There is a rich sociological and economic literature that examines the persistent effects of entering the labor market during a recession on subsequent career prospects, earnings and occupational status (e.g., Blossfeld 1986, DeVreyer et al. 2000, Raunum/Reed 2006), or likewise the persistent effects of adverse events like early-career unemployment on respondents' subsequent job histories (e.g., Gregg et al. 2001). From a more macrosociological perspective, Chauvel and Schröder (2014) have recently added the observation that macroeconomic conditions at labor market entry often translate into persistent cohort advantages or disadvantages in terms of life-time incomes, and especially so in Continental and Southern European welfare regimes. The present paper contributes to this stream of research by emphasizing that early career conditions also tend to create adverse and persistent effects for economic inequality at the cohort level, and examines various mechanisms that underlie the observed relationship. In addition, these findings bear a special theoretical significance for social integration, as it has long been recognized that within-cohort inequality corresponds to what is addressed in most philosophical, economic and sociological models of economic inequality (cf. Paglin 1975).

Methodologically, the analysis relies on a time-series cross-sectional dataset of working-age respondents from 26 OECD countries and waves 1967-2013 of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), and fixed-effects (FE) and related variants of age-period-cohort (APC) regression modeling to estimate the effect of macroeconomic conditions at labor market entry on within-cohort levels of economic inequality. Specifically, I focus on the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the permanent component of within-cohort inequality, and I examine this relationship across four income domains, namely wages, earnings, household market incomes and household disposable incomes, in order to identify associated changes in market, household or public policy processes as potential sources of the observed relationship between early career conditions and permanent levels of within-cohort inequality. In addition, the analysis employs multilevel FE and APC modeling in order to examine the extent of contextual variation in the observed relationships as well as potential institutional effects of national education systems, labor market regulation or welfare regimes.

Empirically, the analysis suggests that early career conditions have marked adverse effects on the inequality of cohort market incomes, although tax and transfer systems are able to significantly moderate these relationships. In addition, the relationships between early career conditions and inequality reveal many interesting complexities that point to the interaction of various stratification processes in generating the eventual macro relationship. For example, while permanent wage inequality clearly increases with adverse early career conditions, the distribution of earnings actually tends to become significantly more equal because women are much more likely to (permanently) enter the labor market as a consequence of experiencing a labor market crisis early on in their life courses – a finding that in fact confirms an earlier observation in Elder’s (1974) iconic study of the Children of the Great Depression. In addition, increasing educational attainment as well as increasing educational homogamy appear important for explaining the net adverse effect of early career conditions on market inequality, whereas first results do not suggest a major role for changing public policies [further results for cross-country variation to be added prior to the meeting]. Overall, these results indicate that early career conditions create adverse implications for cohort inequality because early life course outcomes are hard to fundamentally reverse in the labor market later on.

References


Compared with the increasing participation of women in male-dominated occupations, the presence of males in female-dominated occupations continues to be far lower (Snyder 2008; Williams 2015). This difference is not fortuitous. First, male-dominated jobs offer higher pay, more fringe benefits, and more promotion opportunities than jobs in female-dominated fields (England et al. 1994; Glass 1990). Second, men fear stigmatization and being associated with female trades (Lupton 2000; Williams 1992, 1995). Despite the mentioned downsides, previous research has demonstrated that men who decide to work in female-dominated occupations enjoy certain advantages in relation to their female counterparts (Williams 1992). Indeed, despite their numerical rarity, men in such occupations lead their female counterparts in terms of earnings (Budig 2002), promotions (Williams 1992), and perceived workplace support (Taylor 2010). However, these benefits have not yet been sufficient to eradicate male disinterest in women’s work.

Despite significant contributions, research has tended to neglect men’s exits from female-dominated occupations. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have explained the mechanisms of male entry and promotion but failed to account for men leaving female-dominated fields. How long do men remain employed in female-dominated occupations? Where do they go after working in a female-dominated job? Providing satisfactory answers to these questions will contribute to a full assessment of male occupational trajectories in female-dominated occupations.

In this study, I deeply examine the dynamics of men’s entry into and exit from female-dominated occupations. Building on previous theoretical and empirical findings (Jacobs 1993; Williams and Villemez 1993), I argue that female-dominated occupations are stopgaps in male occupational trajectories. While some men move up the career ladder (Williams 1992) or settle in female occupations (Simpson 2005), I contend that some men use female-dominated occupations (for example, to avoid unemployment episodes) and leave after a short period of time. Such men do not commit to female work; instead, their stay in the female field is temporary and ends when they find a more rewarding or prestigious non-female job. This pattern of mobility has negative consequences for segregation because unlike men riding the glass escalator and settlers, stopgappers do not contribute to the long-term integration of occupations.

Furthermore, I postulate that this scenario is particularly likely in low-status occupations for a number of reasons. First, gender egalitarian attitudes are more pronounced among highly educated people (Cotter et al. 2011). Second, men in low-status occupations are less likely than men in advantageous positions to ride the glass escalator (Williams 2015). Third, high-status job features are not as heavily associated with female traits as features in traditional female ghettos, such as nursery or elementary teachers. Consequently, stigmatization is presumably higher in low-status occupations than in other occupations.

This paper draws from two different data sources. First, Census data for 1980, 1990, and 2000 are used to explore variations in sex-typed fields over time. Second, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) is used to examine the entry and exit patterns of men in female-dominated occupations. This survey consists of data concerning a nationally representative sample of 3,003 young men in the civilian population who were born in the 1950s or 1960s. Individuals were first surveyed in 1979, and the period analyzed here runs until 2006.

The empirical part of the paper is divided into three sections. First, I trace the distribution of workers across sex-typed occupations over time. Second, I examine the fluxes of entry into and exit from male-dominated occupations from 1979 to 2006. Third, a discrete-time hazard model is used to model career experiences. Concretely, I estimate the risk of exit from the female field for high-status workers (managers and professionals) and low-status workers (service, clerical, service and blue-collar workers). Finally, I run supplemental regressions to estimate the probability of wage increase among occupational changers, depending on their occupation of destination.

First, the data show that male participation in female-dominated occupations continues at the levels observed in 1980. Second, while aggregate levels remained fairly constant, there has been a constant flow of men entering and leaving female-dominated jobs. Third, the probability of leaving the female field is disproportionately higher among newcomers, especially in low-status occupations. In addition, men leaving the female field are on average better off than men staying in female occupations. Altogether, these findings are consistent with a stopgap scenario.

The study contributes to the development of a comprehensive theory of inequality that accounts for the way the structure of inequality is reproduced (Jacobs, 1993). These results highlight the need to design specific approaches to promote sex integration within female-dominated occupations.

References:


Occupational characteristics and female representation in occupations: Explaining their true relationship by using static and dynamic fixed-effects panel regressions

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This paper provides new evidence on the causes of occupational sex segregation. Occupational sex segregation is a distinct feature of modern labour markets and has a wide impact on labour market outcomes. Typical female occupations are accompanied by lower average wages, lower status positions, and few career opportunities. Although prior research generally shows that occupational sex segregation results in social inequality, there is still a research gap concerning the causes of this labour market feature. The basic assumption for theoretical approaches explaining occupational sex segregation is the traditional division of labour in families and the existence of traditional gender roles. New Home Economics explains the development of the traditional division of labour in families by female comparative advantages in housework. This leads to men specialising in gainful employment and women in housework. The approach of a “female work capacity” however emphasises that the traditional division of labour is not naturally inevitable, but the historical restriction of women to housework has led to a society caused division of labour. Despite a progress in society towards gender equality, recent empirical evidence shows that the division of labour between sexes and female employment are still formed by traditional believes. To explain the macro level phenomena of occupational sex segregation, we rely on mechanisms on the micro level. In this line of argumentation, occupational sex segregation is the result of female occupational preferences and choices on the supply side of the labour market as well as employee selection and access to occupations on the demand side of the labour market. Main approaches of female occupational choices are economic and socialisation theories as well as institutional based approaches. Theories of female occupational preferences and choices state that women “supply” themselves to different occupations. On the demand side of the labour market, employee selection and the gender specific access to occupations are addressed by statistical discrimination theory and the closely linked approach of labour queues. These different theoretical approaches let derive the importance of several aspects for the explanation of occupational sex segregation. This study aims to combine the demand and the supply side of the labour market by focussing on the two aspects compatibility of family and work life and job requirements. Both aspects can be depicted by occupational characteristics which we are able to measure empirically. For example compatibility of family and work life can be measured by working conditions like the usual working volume in an occupation. Hence, this paper analyses empirically the influence of occupational characteristics, such as working conditions or qualification requirements, on the share of women in occupations. So far, only few studies exist which focus on the interplay between occupational characteristics and the share of women in occupations on the occupational or job level. And virtually all of these studies are based on cross-sectional data and are, hence, limited in interpreting their effects as causal. Building on this, we aim to improve causal statements with the help of dynamic fixed effects panel data analysis. Thus, we analyse if changes in working conditions and qualification requirements, depicted by various occupational characteristics, influence the share of women in occupations. For this reason, we build a dataset on the occupational level by aggregating individual data of the 1996 to 2010 waves of the German micro census by merging the information of all respondents that work in the same occupation. Relying on causal interpretations of parameters obtained by dynamic fixed effects panel models we then test whether changes in occupational characteristics influence the share of women in occupations. Our key findings show that increasing non-standardised working time arrangements and rising work volume lead to a decreasing share of women in these occupations. We trace this back to different occupational choices influenced by gender roles and the division of labour in families. If we assume that women are disproportionately responsible for homework and child care and are less career-minded than men, they prefer - or have to take up - occupations with reasonable working conditions. Secondely, a rising representation of academics in occupations reduces the respective percentage of women. Theoretically, this result can be explained with theories of labour supply and of labour demand. First, expected employment interruptions and anticipated family duties should lead to women
choosing less demanding occupations. On the other side, due to these female obligations, employers expect women to be less stable, productive or reliable employees. This is in line with the assumption of men being preferred in jobs with demanding tasks due to ascribed attributions of higher productivity and less labour turnover.

**Beyond economic labor market inequalities. Causal dynamics of occupational gender segregation and working time regimes in West Germany**

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In recent years, female employment participation has grown steadily in Germany, and along with it part-time ratios of female (but not male) workers have increased (Wanger 2015). In contrast to this trend, the German labor market is characterized by a high and persistent degree of occupational gender segregation (Hausmann and Kleinert 2014). This raises the question how female part-time work has spread among the gendered landscape of occupations, and how occupational segregation has been affected by the inflow in part-time working women.

In general, the fact that men and women are distributed unevenly among occupations is regarded as essential explanation for the persistence of gender inequalities in the labor market. Empirically, this assumption has not yet been fully investigated, though. While there is rich theoretical literature and empirical evidence on how segregation contributes to the gender wage gap (for Germany, see Hausmann et al. 2015a, Busch 2013, Liebeskind 2004), its impact on other aspects of gender-related labor market inequalities seems to be more complicated. In the literature hints can be found that the gender composition of occupations might be associated also with their working-time regimes, but the results are inconclusive. Some studies show that flexible working conditions are more common in female-dominated jobs (Lowen and Sicilian 2009, Davis and Kalieberg 2006, Baird and Reynolds 2004), while others find that integrated occupations offer the highest amount of flexibility (Glauher 2011, Deitch and Huffman 2001). Furthermore, there is hardly any evidence on the mechanisms behind this association. On the micro level of workers, Frome et al. (2006) showed that young women who originally intended to take up male-dominated occupations often switch their aspirations in order to avoid high time demands. Cha (2013) found that women tend to leave occupations after childbirth if they have to work 50 hours per week or more. On the macro level of occupations, mainly case studies of single occupational groups can be found, mostly of particular ‘greedy’ occupations (Blare-Loy 2006) with respect to working time. In this strand of literature, no overall pattern of interplay of working time and segregation can be found.

Thus, in sum we know only little about the causal relationship of occupational gender composition and working time regime: Do occupations that offer family-friendly working conditions attract more women? Or does part-time work grow in those occupations, which have already been staffed in-creasingly by women?

The first perspective is supported by the theory of compensating differentials (Filer 1985, Rosen 1986). It assumes that the monetary and non-monetary rewards that occupations offer are systematically linked: the better the working conditions, the lower the wages, and vice versa. Goldin and Katz (2011) applied this approach to working-time flexibility. On the demand side, they assume that women value family-friendly working conditions higher than men and thus accept lower wages. On the supply side, occupations differ in how affordable they can offer working-time flexibility. When costs decline, employers will offer more flexible working times. Since women appreciate flexibility more than men, they will increasingly demand these jobs. Thus, a higher part-time rate in an occupation should lead to an increasing share of women (H1). In order to support the second perspective, we draw on the empirical literature on mothers’ working careers in Germany. It shows that part-time employment is mainly demanded by mothers in the first years after their children are born (Froedermann et al. 2015). In the timespan under view, women in West Germany had the right to return to their previous job after a certain time of parental leave, and many had also the right to reduce their working time when returning. Thus, an increasing share of women in an occupation should result in a higher part-time rate some years later, at least if employers cannot substitute mothers not willing to work full-time by men or childless women (H2). Both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but reflect causal dynamics that might happen simulta-neously.

In order to test these assumptions, we use data of an occupational panel that comprises yearly information on 254 occupational groups for 1976-2010. The panel was generated by aggregating SIAB data, a large sample of employers’ social security notifications for all regular employees in Ger-many (for details, see Hausmann et al. 2015b), and enriched by occupational information generated from the Microcensus of the Federal Statistical Office. We test our assumptions with fixed-effects panel models with time-delayed covariates. Additionally, we estimate dynamic fixed-effects models in order to avoid biased effects caused by (real) path dependency of the two dependent variables – the share of female employees and the share of part-time work up to 20 hours per week – over time. In all the models, we control for period effects and central characteristics of occupations, such as employment growth/decline and structure of employees, firms and sectors.

Our results show that between occupations there is a strong and stable association between the share of women and the share of part-time workers. Within occupations, we find general evidence for causal dynamics in both directions. These dynamics seem to be dependent on the base level of the share of women per occupation: In male-dominated occupations, an increase in women leads to a later increase in part-time ratios. In mixed occupations, an increase in the share of part-time workers results in a later inflow of women. In female-dominated occupations, we find no evidence for a causal relation between changes in segregation and changes in flexibility.

We conclude that in male-dominated occupations women seem to be the driving factors for the increase in part-time work, while in mixed occupations there are signs for employer-induced increases in flexibility that in turn attract more women to these fields. In the next steps, we will test our hypotheses more thoroughly by incorporating indicators for employer incentives of offer part-time work as
Part-Time Work and the Family Life Course in Germany and Taiwan

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Part-time work has been the most widespread ‘atypical’ working time arrangement in many European countries. Comparative studies have pointed to large cross-country differences in the development, extent and quality of part-time employment. There appear to be some common features: part-time work is dominated by women and most jobs are in the lower-grade occupations, particularly in service sector industries. On the one hand, part-time work is seen as a resource and an opportunity to enter or stay in the labor market; on the other hand, it is seen as a path to occupational marginalization, contributing to social stratification of the incumbents. However, regardless of the perspective, it is essential to consider part-time work in the context of the family and gendered division of labor. The part-time rate for women in Europe (32%) is four times the part-time rate for men (8%), and part-time work plays a particularly important role from the life-course perspective. In European countries with high part-time rates, mothers of young children are disproportionately concentrated in part-time jobs, reflecting the gendered division of labor in the life-course stages when women are most constrained by domestic and child-care responsibilities. The typical pattern is that of an employment interruption upon the birth of a child and a subsequent entry into part-time jobs. In the ongoing debate concerning women’s disproportionate involvement in part-time work, some researchers argue that women have a preference for part-time employment; the others underline the constraints women face in their negotiation of paid employment with family responsibilities.

Current theoretical understanding on determinants of the rise in part-time work and empirical knowledge on characteristics of part-time workers is based largely on experiences in Western countries. What role does part-time work play in East Asian societies? In recent decades, part-time employment has grown considerably in some East Asian countries. Still, unlike in Western industrialized countries where part-time work has been studied extensively, this employment arrangement received lesser attention in South East Asia. In particular, little is known about the differences and similarities in the role of part-time work in the life course of individuals and families.

In this paper, we address the dynamic patterns of part-time work over the life course and the determinants of part-time employment for men and women in Taiwan and Germany. Both countries share some surprising similarities, such as constitutive elements of a corporatist welfare state. Family is considered the preferred source of care for children and the elderly, upholding the traditional male-breadwinner model. Also, later marriage and low fertility rate are common in both countries. However, the countries also exhibit substantial differences in institutional support and conceptual understanding of family and care. In spite of rapid social and economic change in Taiwan, including changing position of women, living arrangements differ between the countries, with intergenerational co-residence still being much more common in Taiwan.

The data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) and The Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD) in Taiwan. We use detailed event history data on the life courses of individuals to examine determinants of entry into and exit from part-time employment in various stages of the family life course, and the similarities and differences in these processes in Taiwan and Germany. The method is event history analysis or duration analysis in order to analyze transition rates between various employment states: entry into part-time work from full-time employment and from an inactivity status as well as leaving part-time work for a full-time job or inactivity. A piecewise-constant exponential model is used for estimations, a modification of a standard exponential model, which can take into account time dependence in the process under consideration. Further, by using a shared frailty model specification we take into account that multiple employment episodes within a person are probably not independent from each other. A shared frailty model specification therefore accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. Both time constant and time-varying covariates are considered, such as age, education, marital status, children of different ages, health status of the respondent, partner and parents (in-law) if they live in a joint household with the respondent.

Preliminary results indicate that part-time work plays a very different role in both countries. It is not only that part-time employment is much more common in Germany; also the determinants of part-time jobs and the role of part-time employment over the life course of individuals and families differ. In Germany, our results confirm the notion of part-time employment as a predominant employment pattern of women, particularly married women with young children. In Taiwan, there are no gender differences in entering part-time employment. It seems that part-time is in general a working arrangement associated with older age, lower educational level and poor health.
In many immigration countries immigrant children lag behind their native-born peers educationally. More than that, in some countries the second generation immigrant children, i.e. the children who were born to immigrants already in the host country, doing worse educationally than the children who immigrated with their parents. There is not enough systematic empirical evidence to how such factors as parental aspirations, cultural capital and social and ethnic networks shape the educational attainment of children growing in immigrant families.

The present paper attempts to fill this gap in the research through a consideration of how educational attainment of immigrant children is being influenced by the communication between immigrant parental and children generations in 20 countries of immigrants, that include 15 EU countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel.

A substantial body of research shows that educational attainment of the second generation of immigrant children is worse than that of the first generation. According to the literature (Portes 2005) the second generation of immigrant children experience assimilation in the low aspiring and low achieving segments of the native population (e.g., urban poor) and this affects their educational aspirations and attainment. Furthermore Portes (ibid) suggests the immigrant parents whose children were born in the immigration country sometimes are less capable to communicate well with their children and have a little ability to transfer to their children their own values and preferences and influence their children education, aspirations and choices.

This paper sets to test this hypothesis empirically. This paper looks at how knowledge of their parents’ native language and a communication at home in this language influences the educational attainment of the first and the second generation of immigrant children in several immigration countries, which include both countries of traditional immigration as well as in Western European countries and how this relationship is mitigated by the characteristics of the schools and families. This paper also aims to understand whether the above relationships differ across the counties of immigration, between the first and the second generation of immigrant children, and according to the immigrant origin.

The methodology. The study is based on the quantitative research methodology and uses the 2006&2009&2012 OECD Programme of International Students Assessment (PISA) datasets. The techniques of the data analysis include linear regressions and multilevel regression models that explore individual, school and country level factors that intervene the relationship between educational attainment and speaking the immigrant native language at home for 15 year old immigrant children.

The findings.

• The preliminary findings show that speaking at home a language other than the immigration countries’ language has a negative impact on the attainment of the first generation immigrant's children in all countries covered in this study.

• Yet, speaking at home other than the host country language has a positive effect on educational attainment of the second generation of immigrant children.

• We did not find evidence that a presence of grandparents is positively related to the educational attainment of the second generation of immigrant children.

• However the attainment of the first generation of immigrant children is positive affected by a presence of grandparents. We yet need to explore in-depth the school effects and the immigrant origin effects on the relationship between speaking at home the immigrant native language and the educational attainment of the first and the second generation of the immigrants students.

Based on the present findings we conclude that intergenerational communication pays important role in the education of immigrant children. However, there are important differences how the communication is being achieved.

Thus, for the first generation of immigrant children speaking at home their native language could be considered as an impediment since that would mean that they do not have enough practice in the host country language. Yet, presence of grandparents at home has a positive impact on the educational attainment of immigrant children, The latter relationship may indicate that such children are well integrated in ethnic network and are being looked after by grandparents while parents at work.

However, the positive relationship between the educational attainment and speaking at home the immigrant native language for the second generation of immigrant children means that communication with parents on their native language has a positive impact on the educational attainment. The second generation immigrant children are fluent in the host country language. For them being able to communicate well with their parents and the rest of the family and their native ethnic network may facilitate the transfer of family/ethnic community values, aspirations and encouragements from parental to children generations and then prevents the segmented assimilation of immigrant children into low archiving and low aspiring segments of the native born population. The presence of grandparents is negatively related to the attainment of the second generation of immigrant children, which may indicate that while immigrants spend longer time in the host country they adopt the western cultural patterns which include nuclear rather that multi-generational families. In the latter case the presence of grandparents become a proxy of traditional families or families in less advantageous socio-economic circumstances, with the latter having a negative impact on the attainment.
Blacks in Movement: Comparing Racial Inequalities among College Graduates in Brazil and the United States

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Differences between race relations in Brazil and the United States, the two largest former slave nations in the Americas, have long drawn research attention. Most of these comparative studies are based either on historical data or on survey data on racial identification. They generally emphasize the countries' different historical trajectories but shared (and persistent) ethnoracial exclusion. Brazil-US social stratification comparisons relying on demographic data have been rare, descriptive and mostly anecdotal. In this paper, we propose a strategy to overcome the available comparisons focusing on the top of the social stratification in both countries: college graduates. Relying on data from the 2010 Brazilian Census and a combination of the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), our goal is to compare racial inequalities in fields of study allocation, occupational opportunities and income returns between white and black college graduates in the US and Brazil. In order to do that, we follow three stages of analysis in this paper. First, we look at self-selection into educational categories, i.e. how much blacks and whites in Brazil and the US are concentrated in certain fields of study that may impact their occupational and income prospects. Second, we look into occupational concentration within the most frequently chosen fields of study in the two countries (Health, Teaching, Engineering and Business), i.e. we examine the most frequent occupations that blacks and whites graduated in the same field of studies in Brazil and the US. Finally, in the third section of the paper, we compute racial differences in the earnings returns to different fields of study in the two countries, and we also compute earning differentials between blacks and whites within the most frequent and better paid occupations, controlling for region, age, fields of study and occupation.

Tracking the ‘North-South Divide’ in Integration Outcomes: Children of Immigrants’ Educational Achievement in five European Countries

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Introduction and theoretical framework:
The transition of Southern European countries into immigration destinations is one of the main features of the recent phase of international migrations. In the public discourse, the lack of a systematic framework of integration policies characterizing these ‘new’ immigration countries has been identified as a possible source of lower integration outcomes for ethnic minorities. Notwithstanding the growing concern about the so-called southern ‘laissez-faire model’ of integration, comparative empirical research analyzing this north-south divide is still in its initial stage.

In this paper I look at children of immigrants' educational achievement, considered as a long-term indicator of the integration of ethnic minorities in the host country. In western European societies, education represents a pivotal factor for children of immigrants' social mobility. At school, second generation students acquire the necessary knowledge and credentials to conveniently navigate the host country labor market, achieving this way mastery over their lives. Educational success is often viewed by immigrant parents as the main resource to fight poverty and social exclusion, so as an important step in the integration process.

In a nutshell, the research question that guides the analyses is: do ethnic minorities show a lower level of structural integration (measured by educational achievements) in southern European countries than in northern European countries?

Specific contribution and research hypotheses:
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it allows a close comparison between traditional immigration countries and countries that only in the very last decades were subject to consistent migration inflows. Even if, in terms of overall incidence of foreign population, Southern European countries in short time caught up with traditional destinations, they are still underrepresented in comparative research. Secondly, it addresses the drawbacks of the common operationalization of the concept of ‘second generation’. In order to have enough cases within each ethnic group, second generation students are often defined as: children of immigrants either born in the host country, or immigrated at an early age. In contrast, I propose to decompose immigration background in two different aspects: the individual’s migration experience (i.e., being born in a country other than the country of residence, regardless of age of arrival), and ethnicity (that reflects the cultural lineage of the individual, detectable by means of parental country of birth).

Such distinction is crucial because the channels through which the two dimensions influence educational outputs may be different. On the one side, the psychological literature shows that the traumatic experience of a migration lowers the sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy of the student, negatively affecting his/her investment in education no matter the age at which migration take place. On the other side, sociological studies, highlight that, regardless the amount of economic resources, specific ethnic minorities may be more or less disadvantaged because of the different endowment of parental cultural resources, parenting style, and knowledge about the functioning of the educational system.

To summarize, this paper aims to test the following hypothesis:

H1: The negative effect of the experience of a migration on achievements, net from ethnicity and social origins, is stronger in southern European countries.

H2: The negative effect of ethnicity on achievements, net from migration experience and social origins, is stronger in southern European countries.

Data, analytical strategy and main findings:
To test the research hypotheses, five countries that greatly differ in terms of integration models, welfare regimes and educational systems have been chosen. The analyses are based on representative samples of students in Italy, Germany, England, Sweden and the Netherlands. Data comes from two surveys made comparable: the CILS4EU-2010 survey (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in four European Countries) and the INVALSI-2012 survey (Italian Program for the Evaluation of the Scholastic System). Both surveys have collected detailed information on students aged 13-14, reporting their social and immigration background as well as their school achievements. To the best of my knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to use the recent CILS4EU survey in combination with other data sources to compare northern and southern immigration contexts.

Results are obtained by means of multilevel random intercept regression models, computed for each country separately. In line with the previous literature, the clearest common trait across countries is the importance of social origin in explaining the gross disadvantage of children of immigrants. Contrary to the expectations, however, the results suggest that ethnic minority students in Italy do not show a higher penalty than their counterparts in northern and central European countries. More precisely, in all the countries, but England, both ethnicity and the migration experience have an independent and significant effect on achievements, even when social origins is controlled for. In England, the overall ethnic penalty seems to be mainly due to the migratory experience: when the latter is accounted for, the effect of ethnicity becomes insignificant. In all the remaining countries, non-European migrants show the lowest performances. Their achievement score is, on average, almost half of a standard deviation below the one of their native peers. Interestingly enough, migrants from the European Union face a much lower educational penalty in Italy than in any other considered country.

Racial Differences in College-Going Behaviors
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RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN COLLEGE-GOING BEHAVIORS

Morgan (2005) proposes that the enactment of college-going behaviors is dependent upon how strong and precise the student’s beliefs are regarding the benefits and costs of college, and their ability to succeed in this endeavor. Using research from Morgan and Mehta (2004) that found that black students place less weight on test scores and grades than white students, Morgan predicts (though doesn’t test) black students thus have lower levels of college-going commitment through behaviors because they have less precise beliefs in their ability to succeed in college.

In this study, after controlling for background and academic achievement, I find that black students are actually more likely to engage in college-going behaviors, and are more likely to enroll in college, potentially decreasing racial differences in stratification in college enrollment and attainment. Multiple possible explanations for these racial differences are explored, but each falls short. I conclude that this puzzle is much more complicated than any one theory can answer.

Data/Methodology

The dataset used to explore these questions is the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS). ELS researchers gathered data from a nationally representative sample of students who were sophomores in high school in 2002 (Ingels et al. 2007). Participants were high school graduates, non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic black adolescents.

The predictive strength of race was investigated by controlling for demographic, school, and academic ability variables, as well as parent and student expectations of educational achievement. The five dependent variables are a collection of college-going behaviors. These variables include: whether or not the student took the SAT or ACT (takesat), whether or not the student took an Advanced Placement (AP) test or indication of plans to take this test (aptest), the number of colleges the student applied to (applynumber), whether or not they applied to a four-year college (apply4yr), and whether or not they applied to a selective four-year college (applyselect). I conducted high school fixed effects, OLS, and logistic regression models of different specifications to determine if there are any racial differences in these five college-going behaviors, and why.

Main Findings

Using logistic and OLS regressions with the controls outlined above, I analyzed whether or not race moderated the behaviors. I reveal that black students are significantly more likely to engage in four of the five college preparatory behaviors (there were no significant racial differences for aptest). In fact, across the four significant variables, black students were 5 to 24% more likely to engage in these behaviors when reporting marginal results across a race by SES interaction.

It is possible black students may engage in college-going behaviors more than white students because they perceive they will receive a boost in college admissions due to affirmative action (Alon 2010).

To tease this apart, I added a subsequent race by GPA interaction with applyselect and revealed that black students are indeed more likely to apply to selective colleges than similar whites, regardless of GPA. But Black students apply to non-selective colleges at a higher rate than whites as well. So while a perception of affirmative action may drive application rates at selective colleges to a certain point, something else is driving the rest of the difference.

Next, analyses were conducted testing whether black students were more likely to engage in college-going behaviors than whites because they are less likely to take low grades as a sign they are not ready for college (Blau 2003; Blau, Moller, and Jones 2004). Including a race by GPA interaction, I find that black students still have a significant advantage over whites over all levels of GPA, with a larger advantage for low-GPA blacks for apply4yr and takesat. This suggests that discounting test scores and grades may play a role in explaining the difference between low-GPA black and white rates of college-going behaviors. However, it would not explain the
difference for black students with a GPA of 3.5 or above as they would not need to discount their performance evaluations. Yet, these students still engage in these behaviors 2-12% more than similar white students.

Next, I perform tests to determine if black students are more likely to thrive in high poverty or racially segregated schools, where they are supposedly less likely to suffer from possible negative curricular and psychosocial risks that come with competing with middle- and high-income students (Crosnoe 2009). In separate models, I include a race by poverty interaction (measured as percentage of students on free/reduced lunch) and a race by percentage-minority-students interaction to the behaviors.

I find that white students are more influenced by the income and racial demographics of their schools than black students, whereas black student engagement in these behaviors was less sensitive. Plus, black students still have an advantage regardless of school demographics (except for aptest), though this advantage is not consistent across the remaining behaviors. Sometimes black students in low-minority and low-income schools have a greater advantage (applyselect and takesat), while those in highly segregated schools have the advantage other behaviors (applynumber and apply4yr).

I also conducted high school fixed effects models to see if within schools, black students are still more likely to engage in these behaviors than white students. Doing so helps me determine if there are differences in these behaviors regardless of the income or minority segregation of the school. Results suggest that even within schools with adequate racial and income diversity, black students are still more likely to engage in these behaviors than white students.

Discussion

Results from this study suggest that answering why black students are more likely to engage in positive college-going behaviors is complicated. In testing multiple hypotheses, I found that how black students respond to their chances of college enrollment behaviorally could depend on perceptions of previous academic performances or affirmative action, though not entirely. These results also suggest that there is no uniform benefit for black (or white) student behaviors for those in income or racially segregated school, as previously suggested. Even within the same schools, black students engage in more positive college-going behaviors than white students.
The direct effect of social origin on men’s occupational attainment in the early life course: An Italian-Dutch comparison

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This paper examines the effect of social origin on occupational attainment and its evolution over the work life. In particular, the focus is on social inequalities at labour market entry (in terms of impact on socio-economic status), and on whether occupational progression accounts for accumulation or compensation of these inequalities over the work career. Men and women entered the labour market from the 30’s to the mid 80’s are examined in two countries characterised by different evolution of their institutional configurations: Italy and the Netherlands.

Comparative intergenerational mobility research typically focused on social inequality looking cross-sectionally at limited time points in the biography of individuals – being the first occupation, the occupation at a certain age, or the occupation at later stages of the career (e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967; Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). While the second generation of intergenerational research considered how the first job mediates the overall relation between social origin and occupational destination, career mobility has often been downplayed in this field, not least due to unavailability of comparable life history data.

However, while interesting per se, career mobility has also important implications for intergenerational reproduction, as argued by relatively recent developments in the literature (Barone and Schizzerotto, 2011; Manzoni et al. 2014; Hillmert, 2015). Uneven paths from the first job on could indeed mitigate or strengthen social inequality at labour market entry, and therefore career mobility is important for the evaluation of the overall process of social stratification in a given society (ibidem).

In this paper, we examine the stratification process in Italy and the Netherlands focusing on the contextual determinants of career mobility and their importance for intergenerational reproduction. In doing so, we built on previous literature that integrates inter- and intra-generational mobility perspectives by illuminating the role of institutional and historical contexts.

In this regard, Italy and the Netherlands offer a privileged field of comparison. Until the 80’s both countries were characterised by rigid labour and products markets, employment-related welfare entitlements, as well as familialisitic-oriented cultures (Esping Andersen, 1990). However, the institutional settings of the two countries started to diverge considerably with the crisis of the fordist model in the early 80’s (ibidem). On the one hand, The Netherlands reacted to this crisis by largely flexibilising labour and products markets, thus favouring job-creation, lowering job-tenure, and considerably increasing workforce turnover (Muffels and Luijks, 2008). Conversely, Italy reacted to the rising unemployment rates by introducing flexibility as a partial and controlled experiment directed towards specific groups “at the margins” of the labour market, thus failing in fostering job-creation and turnover levels (Regini, 2000).

We argue that these two strategies not only led Italy and the Netherlands to different macro-economic performance in the following decades, but also had important effects on both the level and the distribution of career mobility across social groups, and therefore on the intergenerational transmission of inequality.

Data are from the ‘Italian Longitudinal Household Panel Studies (ILFI)’ and the ‘Family Survey Dutch Population (FSDP)’. These data were particularly adequate for our aims, since they allow the reconstruction of full occupational trajectories of a quite large sample of men and women entered the labour market from the 1930 to the 1985.

The analyses are performed via growth curves modelling on monthly-personal datasets. These models account multiple time-observations nested within individuals – in our case, monthly observations of ISEI scores along individuals’ careers. We restricted our overall sample to the first 15 years after leaving full time education, in order to focus on the early career development and to allow for cross-cohort comparisons (careers are right-censored for the last cohort of entry). This strategy allows us to estimate the ISEI score at labour market entry conditioning on social background – i.e, the social origins penalty at the beginning of the career – and to understand whether this initial penalty accumulates or compensates along one’s early career. Moreover, the inclusion of educational level – and its interaction with the career duration – will allow us to disentangle the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects of social origins both on labour market entry and on career progression. All models are run separately in for men and women in the two countries, and for different labour market entry cohorts, thus allowing for gender specific cross-country and cross-cohorts comparisons.

The empirical results show that career mobility is generally more limited in Italy compared to the Netherlands, and that – in both countries and irrespective of the period considered – women are less mobile over the early career compared to men. Interestingly, a pattern of increased intra-generational mobility over the 20th century can be found only in the Dutch context, whereas in Italy people entered the labour market after the 80’s are as mobile as the earlier cohorts.

However, these patterns of career mobility are unevenly distributed across people with different social backgrounds, thus leading to distinct patterns of intergenerational transmission of inequality. In Italy, both the direct and indirect effects of social origins on the socio-economic status of the first job are relatively large and quite stable over the life course. Conversely, in the Netherlands, the direct and indirect penalty related to social origins is comparatively lower at labour market entry but slightly increasing over the early career, especially for the latest cohort. Anyway, the slow pace of accumulation in the Dutch context led to lower levels of social inequality after 15 years of career compared to the Italian context.

Finally, our findings confirm a general reduction of social inequality along the 20th century both in Italy and especially in the Netherlands.

References
To this end, this study pools longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2013, v30) in order to estimate the effect of different types of non-standard employment on low income after accounting for the allocation of atypical employment amongst labor market entrants. Following individuals for a period of five years after leaving education for the last time, the sample includes a balanced panel of 4,248 labor market entrants.

**Key Questions and Research Aims**

From the post-war period until the 1990s, West Germany was characterized as a country with high shares industrial employment, relatively strong labor market regulation, standardized working conditions and access to generous social protection that was based on an individual’s employment position. As part of an on-going process of labor market deregulation, the Hartz IV reforms have more recently contributed to the growth of so-called non-standard employment, especially amongst labor market entrants. Although Germany is typically characterized by smooth transitions into the labor market, the prevalence of non-standard employment is extremely likely to increase insecurity experienced during this period.

From this perspective, Germany is a particularly interesting case for investigating how non-standard employment has impacted employment stability and low income during the early career. Amongst the numerous potential socio-economic consequences of non-standard employment, including effects on health and life satisfaction, I chose these two outcomes as indicators not only for their potential implications for labor market integration, but also economic well-being and independence, the latter having been identified in life course research as one of the key stages of young persons entering adulthood.

**Key Concepts and Theoretical Considerations**

Non-standard employment refers here to any employment relationship that does not fully exhibit qualities of the so-called standard employment relationship (SER), characterized as full-time, continuous, within one firm, providing sufficient income and providing full access to social security. Hence, the term non-standard employment has been more generally used to refer to a variety of work arrangements that differ at least in one respect to these characteristics. As SER was the predominant type of employment relationship held from the 1950s to 1970s (i.e. the employment relationship upon which social security is based) most discussions of non-standard employment have emphasized an increased insecurity and vulnerability experienced amongst the working population. Despite this emphasis on the precariousness of non-standard employment, the two are not analogous. Rather, non-standard employment constitutes a heterogeneous group that demonstrates various types and degrees of precariousness.

Consequently, previous studies ascribing to either an integrative or entrapment perspective of non-standard employment (i.e. bridge or trap) are not able to fully capture the dynamics of socio-economic risks associated with different types of non-standard employment. Moreover, consequences are conditional on the structure of the labor market, individual preferences and job matching processes, which in turn shape pattern of labor market entry as well as the extent and duration of socio-economic risks experienced. Therefore, I take up the dualization framework, which emphasizes socio-institutional processes contributing to social inequality and is rooted in (1) critical welfare state theory, (2) labor market segmentation theory and (3) insider-outsider theory.

More expressly, I ask whether non-standard employment at the start of the career reinforces structural dualization of German labor markets either in terms of the strengthening of existing institutional dualisms (i.e. the differential treatment of insiders and outsiders) or the widening of existing institutional dualisms (i.e. groups that have been previously treated like insiders are increasingly treated like outsiders). These socio-structural influences are expected to impact the prevalence of non-standard employment in Germany and to what extent early career patterns have become more differentiated over time. In addition, they are expected to influence micro-level processes that shape the allocation of non-standard employment and the distribution of socio-economic risks.

**Data, Methods and Preliminary Results**

To this end, this study pools longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2013, v30) in order to estimate the effect of different types of non-standard employment on low income after accounting for the allocation of atypical employment amongst labor market entrants. Following individuals for a period of five years after leaving education for the last time, the sample includes a balanced panel of 4,248 labor market entrants.
To model economic independence as an outcome variable, I take an individual measure of low income, i.e., below the 60% threshold of the national median of individual net monthly income. Although this measure is not necessarily a high-risk factor for poverty, it nonetheless has implications for economic well-being and economic independence, irrespective of household resources or welfare support. Additionally, low income is more closely related to the individual’s position in the labor market, whereas poverty measures reflect the individual’s position in the overall income distribution. With regards to the aims of this dissertation, few have research the association of different type of employment relationships with low income, after accounting for allocation processes.

Preliminary results demonstrate an unequal distribution of non-standard employment between specific groups in the labor market, whereby individuals with weaker labor market positions face an increased likelihood of holding these positions. This is particularly true for low-skilled individuals or married women who hold these jobs as a secondary earner within the household. In addition, individuals from more affluent households are more likely to receive financial transfers that allow them to take up low paid work if it is perceived to afford them better employment opportunities in the future.

Using Event History Analysis, a few observations can be drawn from preliminary results with regards to the allocation of non-standard employment and the risk of low income during the early career. First, household composition is not only important for understanding how economic consequences are buffered by combined household resources, but also for understanding individual preferences and self-selection into non-standard employment. Second, the risk of low income amongst labor market entrants is largely transient, although clearly greater for individuals in non-standard employment. Finally, the duration of experiencing low income, and ultimately impacting the integration of labor market entrant during the transition to adulthood, is highly conditional on gender, skill level and occupation – with substantial implications for growing inequality amongst the working population.

The Impact of Recessions on Initial Job Attainment: The Role of Institutions, Family Income and Education Level

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In many countries, youth transitions from education to employment have been negatively impacted as a result of the Great Recession. Scholars have highlighted a multitude of causes for this, including changing hiring practices and labour demand, disparities in individual and family circumstances and varied institutional contexts. All these factors may interact and lead to distinct transition outcomes for youth based on their level of education (e.g., secondary or tertiary), socio-economic background and local context. However, to date little is known about how (1) the pace of the transitions from education to work and (2) the quality of first job attained, varies across different countries and distinct economic conditions.

Our study addresses these questions by providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of youth transitions across 17 European countries, and Australia, over the period 2005 to 2013, covering both the pre- and post-recession periods and a broad range of institutional models. This allows us to undertake a more detailed examination of youth transitions to employment than has been previously conducted. We measure the pace of youth transitions from education to employment by the number of months from leaving education to job attainment. Job quality is measured both in terms of wages and occupational prestige. Using panel data from EU SILC, GSOEP and HILDA, we estimate a series of survival models.

Theoretical Expectations

Predictions about youth transitions from education to work under varying economic conditions are based on two prominent theoretical models: the job competition and the social closure model.

Under the job competition model, scholars suggest that jobs are ranked based on their level of wages, status or progression opportunities, also referred to as ‘jobs ladder’. In a recession, this ‘jobs ladder’ is assumed to contract. Employers respond by lowering wages (where possible) and increasing hiring standards, while employees respond with longer search periods, further education, occupational downgrading and/or accepting lower wages. Higher educated youth are expected to trade the speed with which they transition to employment, with the quality of their first job attained (resulting in lower wages and occupational status). However, while higher educated youth are generally seen to accept lower quality positions rather than extend their search or transition time, this is likely to vary with family income. Youth from higher income families may face less pressure to accept lower quality jobs, choosing instead to hold out for better jobs with higher wages and progression opportunities. The role of family income in guiding this trade-off is expected to be particularly important in countries where unemployment benefits are not immediately available to youth.

Lower educated youth, in contrast, are expected to enter the jobs ladder at a much lower position. During a recession these youth, therefore, face not only a reduction in the number of jobs available, but also crowding out, as higher educated youth trade down, taking positions that in better economic conditions would be available to lower educated youth. As a result, lower educated youth are likely to have limited scope for occupational downgrading, thus facing longer employment transitions. As such, the job competition model predicts very different recession impacts for youth on the basis of education.

While the job competition model is broadly supported, under certain institutional arrangements the ‘social closure model’ may better reflect the education to work transition. Under this model, education is assumed to provide vocationally specific skills and acts as a screening mechanism, effectively limiting entry to certain occupations or industries. This is in contrast with the job competition model where education is positional. Countries that fit within the social closure paradigm are, therefore, characterised by vocationally oriented education systems, incorporating dual-system apprenticeships, with occupational entry and progression generally determined centrally through collective bargaining. As such, the social closure model is seen to reduce employee mobility, limiting the potential for occupational downgrading by tertiary educated youth during a recession and protecting the market position of lower educated youth.
Therefore, while the job competition model suggested that recession impacts will vary by education level, we can expect minimal differences across these groups under a social closure model.

Our analysis will evaluate whether youth transitions to employment during a recession match those predicted under the job competition or social closure model, and the role of institutional differences in shaping these changes in outcomes. Specifically, we test whether recession impacts, in terms of job attainment time and quality, vary based on (1) education level; (2) family income and (3) whether these differences hold in countries where the social closure model is appropriate. Furthermore we will consider the role of national institutions in shaping youth transition outcomes across the business cycle. Institutions considered include labour market flexibility, collective bargaining arrangements, relative wage levels, union density, and education stratification.

Data and Methods
We use EU SILC, GSOEP and HILDA panel data from 2005 to 2013 to answer our core questions. Measures of institutional variation are sourced from the OECD. Changes in transition time are estimated based on monthly activity data using a Cox Proportional hazard model, providing estimates of the impact of institutional settings and family income on the duration of time until attaining a job across the pre-recession and recession periods. These are estimated separately for tertiary and secondary educated youth. We then estimate how the quality of jobs (in terms of hourly wages and occupational status) attained change from the pre- to post-recession period.

Results
We quantify the impact of the recession on initial job attainment and show clear evidence for the operation of the job competition model across a majority of selected countries. Distinct impacts from the recession are found across youth with different education levels, with non-tertiary educated experiencing comparatively slower transitions to employment. We also show that prior to the recession period, higher family income results in reduced transition times for both secondary and tertiary educated youth. However during the recession period, higher family income is found to have a much weaker, and sometimes negative effect, on initial transition time for tertiary educated youth. This suggests that during a recession, youth with greater family resources will use these to hold out for higher quality initial employment. In contrast, for secondary educated youth in all regions (except for continental or corporatist Europe), the effect of family income in reducing transition time becomes much stronger during the recession period, again highlighting the distinct outcomes by education level as hypothesised under the job competition model.

We also find evidence for the social closure model in northern continental Europe, with similar transitions patterns found across secondary and tertiary educated youth in the recession period. The role of vocational education programs are also shown to reduce transition times for secondary educated youth, with these benefits remaining constant across both the pre-recession and recession periods. Vocational programs are also seen to improve transition times for tertiary educated youth in the pre-recession period. However this impact reverses during the recession, suggesting that vocational education improves labour market allocation generally during economic expansion, but reduces occupational downgrading opportunities for tertiary educated youth during a recession as predicted by the social closure model.

In addition, we look at the role of institutions in shaping youth transitions during a recession. Interestingly, we find little evidence that increased labour market flexibility results in improved youth employment transitions in a recession, regardless of education background.

Perceived employability among young unemployed: The effect of (further) education
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To keep up reemployment chances, is important that unemployed individuals do not stop believing in their ability to (re)gain satisfying employment. If they lose faith in getting a job, this will undermine their motivation for job searching activities as well as their confidence in job interviews, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy (see e.g. Berglund and Wallinder 2015, Chen and Lim 2012, De Cuypers et al. 2008). This is particularly problematic for young adults with little previous work experience who are prone to receiving long-lasting scars from experiencing unemployment (cf. Schmillen and Umkehrer 2013).

In the present paper, we thus focus on young unemployed and their subjective assessments concerning their chances of getting (fulfilling) work. We study the factors that affect perceived employability of young adults at the beginning, during, and after unemployment spells. Thereby, we hope to enhance understanding of what increases or diminishes perceived employability during periods of unemployment.

Employability is defined as an individual’s ability to gain initial employment, maintain employment or obtain new employment, and ideally employment of the desired quality (Hillard and Pollard 1998). The literature distinguishes perceived employability from objective employability (Berntson and Marklund 2007). A simple indicator for objective employability would be the employment status. For people that are currently unemployed, objective employability could be measured by the number of job offers a person receives or the length of the transitional period between jobs (Cramer 2006). Employability depends on the one hand on the skills of the potential employee and on the other hand on employers’ demands for these skills (and for employees in general). Perceived employability is an individual’s subjective assessment of its own objective employability (Vanhercke et al. 2014). Hence, perceived employability is not equal to objective employability, but the two concepts are interrelated, with past experiences of objective employability influencing present perceived employability, and present perceived employability influencing future objective employability (Hogan et al. 2013). As a consequence, the employment history and past job experiences (i.e. whether someone already had a long-term job, felt qualified for that job, or the way the employment was terminated) may affect perceived employability. Likewise, experiences made during the unemployment spell (i.e. the percentage of job applications leading to a job interview or even to a job offer) could affect perceived employability among those that are still unemployed or those that were able to find a new job. Apart from the potential effect of past...
experiences, previous research mainly concentrated on the question to what extent the level of education affects perceived employability (e.g. Berntson et al. 2006). As human capital (especially in the form of education) enhances the objective success on the labour market, this is supposed to be reflected in subjective perceptions. In addition to mirroring the objective opportunities, education may also directly affect self-confidence and thus the subjective evaluation of employability (Andeson and Pontusson 2007). These effects may not only hold for general education obtained before the beginning of the unemployment period, but also for education obtained during unemployment, e.g. training courses provided as part of active labour market policies (cf. Koen et al. 2015).

To test the hypothesized effects of past experiences and education on perceived employability, we rely on data from a panel study we recently conducted among unemployed young adults (aged 18-28) in Austria. The study consists of two survey waves. In wave one (t0), respondents were interviewed directly at job centers, at the beginning of their unemployment spell. Wave two was conducted one year later (t1), when some of the respondents were still unemployed while others had managed to find new jobs. The survey data was merged with register data, resulting in a dataset containing detailed information on educational background and work history, as well as information on the period between the first and the second wave concerning job search experience, supplementary education and training, etc. Perceived employability was measured in different ways and at different points in time. At t0, respondents were asked how they perceived the probability to find a new job within the next six months as well as how they perceived the probability to get the job they desired. To measure perceived employability during the unemployment spell, respondents were asked to which extent they worried about not getting a job. Finally, to measure perceived employability at t1, respondents were again asked to estimate the probability of getting the job they desired.

Employing regression models with the respective measures of perceived employability as dependent variables and several indicators for educational background and work history as independent variables, we find that there are different drivers behind different forms of perceived employability: for the perceived probability of getting a job (no matter what job), the previous employment history proved to be important, while education did not display a significant effect. Conversely, education was found to have a significant effect on the perceived probability of getting the desired job. We detect a similar effect of education on changes in perceived employability between t0 and t1: the fact whether a person received additional education during this period (either on own initiative or as part of an active labour market programme) enhanced the perceived probability to get the desired job or at least helped to avoid a more significant decrease in this form of perceived employability during the unemployment period.
Adolescents’ online skills, school success and social contexts

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In current societies digital media is integrated in (or at least is part of) the daily life of children, youngsters, but also parents and the elderly. Many scholars have been occupied with the relation between online use and risks, and also policy makers, governments and the media have been focusing on the downside of online use. Though this has been highly relevant, and still is, it is now time to focus on adolescents’ online opportunities and advantageous digital skills and the relation with “real life” outcomes. In today’s information-based society it is hardly possible to manage without these features. More important, online opportunities and “beneficial” online skills may improve a person’s social success and well-being, even more so in future generations.

Young people spend quite some time on media use, especially on internet use. Though adolescents are highly experienced online users, their digital skills and opportunities are socially differentiated, which may have important implications for “real life” outcomes, such as educational success (Notten et al., 2009; Van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2015). There is some evidence of a positive relation between children’s online access and use on the one hand and school performance or cognitive development on the other (e.g., Attewell and Battle, 1999; Biagi and Loi, 2013; Castles et al., 2013; Notten, 2009, Paino and Renzulli, 2012). However, there is hardly any cross-national comparative research on this topic, nor is it known how this relation might vary along different social contexts, such as social background, school settings and national contexts. If online skills are crucial for (future) societal success and well-being, it is highly relevant to find out to what extent social contextual factors may increase or decrease this particular type of social inequality. Therefore, in this study we want to explore to what extent adolescents’ online skills relate to their educational success, and to what extent social inequalities herein may be due to the moderating impact of social contextual factors.

RQ1: To what extent do adolescents’ online skills relate to their educational success?

RQ2: To what extent does this relation vary across different social contexts (family background, school, and country)?

We use Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of cultural reproduction as a theoretical framework and combine it with digital divide research (e.g., Compaine, 2001; DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005, 2012) and modernization theory. These theories are applied to the domain of online opportunities and educational inequalities. We use data from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2012 for the empirical analyses, including about 300,000 15-year old students in 65 countries. We apply multilevel analysis to study the relation between adolescents’ online skills and school success, and how this relation is moderated by family, school and country-level factors. The contribution of this study lies in the combination of the well-established mechanism of reproduction of social inequality with the more recent literature on the impact of online skills and the emergence of “new” inequalities in this domain. Comparing this relation across different social contexts also enables to explore possible trends in the development of inequality regarding a key competency that will surely become even more important for various life chances in the future.

References


Background
Scholars in the United States have found differential participation of students in non-academic extracurricular activities, such as sports and music, by family background, which has led to two different explanations (Weininger, Lareau, and Conley 2015). A cultural explanation, represented by the concept of 'concerted cultivation' (Lareau 2003), emphasizes a cultural mode of parenting among middle class parents who consider student participation in organized activities as "a means of cultivating children’s potential talents and skills" (Weininger et al. 2015: 481), distinctive from the cultural mode of 'natural growth' among working class parents. However, some studies challenge this cultural explanation, highlighting material resources, not cultural orientation, as a key factor that prevents working class children from participating in those out-of-school activities (Bennett, Lutz, and Jayaram 2012; Chin and Phillips 2004). Finding a positive relationship between mother’s education and student participation in non-academic extracurricular activities even after controlling for income and other material resources, Weininger et al. (2015) argue that the result supports the cultural explanation as they see mother’s education to tap into the cultural logic of parenting.

In this paper we extend this literature in two important ways. First, given the emerging global trend of student participation in private supplementary education such as private tutoring, cram schooling, and learning centers after regular school hours (Park et al. 2016), it is increasingly relevant to examine the extent to which students from disparate socioeconomic background differ in participation in academically-focused out-of-school activities as well as non-academic extracurricular activities. As Park et al. (2016) explain, intensified competition for children’s educational success in many contemporary societies, combined with rising income inequality and growing economic return to educational credentials, has pushed parents, particularly of middle class, to invest more in children’s education. This, in turn, has increased demand for out-of-schoolopportunities for additional learning. To respond to the growing demand, private supplementary education industry, which provides organized learning opportunities to students after formal schooling, has burgeoned.

Moreover, some studies on parental involvement in children’s private supplementary education have demonstrated that student participation in private supplementary education is not only affected by family economic resources but actually requires parents’ concerted efforts to find the ‘right’ private tutors and learning centers, to schedule students’ after-school hours, and to communicate with private instructors for their children’s progress (Park, Byun, and Kim 2011). In other words, student participation in private supplementary education is not only what money can buy but actually reflects the cultural logic of childrearing, which suggests the application of the conception of ‘concerted cultivation’ (Park et al. 2016).

We not only extend the existing literature by suggesting that student participation in academically-focused out-of-school activities be conceptualized as concerted cultivation but also assess the global scope of concerted cultivation by examining whether mother’s education influences student participation in private supplementary education, after taking into account family economic resources, in 63 societies.

Research Questions
We follow Weininger et al.’s (2015) interpretation that a significant effect of mother’s education on student participation in private supplementary education, net of an extensive list of controls for family economic resources, may reflect cultural orientation of middle class parents toward children’s education. Using individual- and familial-level data of 15-year-old students in 63 societies, we specifically ask the following two questions:

1. To what extent do 15-year-old students participate in a private supplementary education activity after regular school hours across 63 societies?

2. To what extent does mother's education affect student participation in a private supplementary education activity after regular school hours, net of family economic resources? – Is concerted cultivation, represented by a significant effect of mother’s education, a global pattern?

Data and Methods
We draw data of 15-year-old students from the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA has administered literacy tests to 15-year-old students every three years since 2000. PISA has also collected a variety of information on students, families, and schools. In particular, PISA 2012 specifically asked students to indicate whether they "attend out of school classes organized by a commercial company, and paid for by parents." We use this information to create our dichotomous outcome variable of whether students participated in a private supplementary education activity.

We distinguish students into four different groups depending on their mother’s educational attainment: those whose mothers have (1) less than high school education, (2) high school, (3) some college education (but not a bachelor’s degree), and (4) a bachelor's degree. In order to interpret the effect of mother’s education to reflect cultural orientation, it is critical to control for an extensive list of family economic resources which tend to be correlated with mother’s education. We control for mother’s working status (1 = currently working), father’s occupational status and family wealth. We also control for student’s gender and family structure (1 = intact family). Additionally, we conducted supplementary analysis to control for family income along with other family economic resources for 10 countries in which this information was available via parental survey. The results of the supplementary analysis was similar to that without family income, although the effect of mother’s education was slightly reduced in several countries. Therefore, we are confident that lack of family income would not substantially affect the conclusion.
After nearly 25 years of empirical research there is an ongoing debate if Peterson's thesis is empirically correct. A systematic research international stratification research and cultural sociology alike.

In 1992, Richard A. Peterson posited that in the U.S. American context, and probably in Western countries more generally, the socially stratified hierarchy of cultural taste had undergone a historical transformation. Instead of being "snobs" exclusively consuming "high cultural" goods, high-status groups are assumed to have a broad, tolerant and "omnivorous" taste that crosses symbolic boundaries and includes diverse forms of "popular culture" next to high culture. Low-status groups, on the other hand, are conceived of having rather narrow, specialized, "univorous" tastes. This so-called "omnivore-univore thesis" attracted great scholarly interest in international stratification research and cultural sociology alike.

After nearly 25 years of empirical research there is an ongoing debate if Peterson's thesis is empirically correct. A systematic research overview, however, is lacking so far. Providing such an overview is impeded by the fact that empirical studies vary considerably in the cultural domains studied, in definitions and theoretical conceptualizations of omnivorouiness, in operationalizations and item selections, in country contexts, populations covered as well as techniques of statistical data analysis. Due to this heterogeneity of approaches, it is not feasible to conduct a proper meta-analysis. Instead, we give a structured research overview of typical conceptual and methodological research decisions and their impact on empirical results. Based on a cited reference search of the Social Science Citation Index and additional search strategies, our review covers about 190 empirically as well as theoretically oriented publications referring to data from more than 25 Western and non-Western countries.

Our presentation has three aims. Firstly, we give a structured overview of how the omnivore-univore thesis has been interpreted, conceptualized, operationalized and brought to empirical tests. Based on our literature review we, secondly, evaluate the empirical

**Results**

**Prevalence of Student Participation across 63 Societies**

Figure 1 shows the percentage of 15-year-old students who attend out of school classes organized by a commercial company and paid for by their parents across 63 societies. Cross-societal difference is evident: from Indonesia and Viet Nam, where more than seven out of 10 students attend out of school classes, to Norway and Finland, where less than 5% of student attend. However, similarly evident is that a substantial number of students participate in this private supplementary education across many societies. In as many as 53 societies, at least 10 or higher percentages of students take part in academically focused out-of-school activities, which reflects the global scale of private supplementary education.

**The Effect of Mother's Education on Student Participation**

Table 1 presents the results of logistic regression that predicts odds of attending out of school classes by mother’s education, net of various family economic resources and other individual characteristics. Based on the table, Figure 2 shows the coefficient of mothers with a bachelor degree compared to mothers with less than high school education. Most of all, in 476 societies, students whose mothers have a bachelor’s degree are significantly more likely to attend out of school classes than their counterparts whose mothers have less than high school education. In other words, the result reveal the global scale of concerted cultivation for student participation in private supplementary education.

[Key] References


**Maternal Education, Parenting, and Children’s Educational Outcomes**

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Both parental practices and parenting styles have been proposed as the mediating link between parental education and children’s educational outcomes. Theoretically parenting practices can be seen as an extension of parenting styles. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics - Child Development Supplement (PSID-CDS), I analyze whether parenting styles explain the mediation effect of parenting practices in the association between maternal education and children’s reading and math test scores. I find that parenting practices mediate the association between maternal education and children’s test scores, but that parenting styles do not.

**Changing structures of cultural taste? A critical assessment of international research on the omnivore-univore thesis**

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In 1992, Richard A. Peterson posited that in the U.S. American context, and probably in Western countries more generally, the socially stratified hierarchy of cultural taste had undergone a historical transformation. Instead of being “snobs” exclusively consuming “high cultural” goods, high-status groups are assumed to have a broad, tolerant and “omnivorous” taste that crosses symbolic boundaries and includes diverse forms of “popular culture” next to high culture. Low-status groups, on the other hand, are conceived of having rather narrow, specialized, “univorous” tastes. This so-called “omnivore-univore thesis” attracted great scholarly interest in international stratification research and cultural sociology alike.

After nearly 25 years of empirical research there is an ongoing debate if Peterson’s thesis is empirically correct. A systematic research overview, however, is lacking so far. Providing such an overview is impeded by the fact that empirical studies vary considerably in the cultural domains studied, in definitions and theoretical conceptualizations of omnivorouiness, in operationalizations and item selections, in country contexts, populations covered as well as techniques of statistical data analysis. Due to this heterogeneity of approaches, it is not feasible to conduct a proper meta-analysis. Instead, we give a structured research overview of typical conceptual and methodological research decisions and their impact on empirical results. Based on a cited reference search of the Social Science Citation Index and additional search strategies, our review covers about 190 empirically as well as theoretically oriented publications referring to data from more than 25 Western and non-Western countries.

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With regard to definitional issues, approaches that conceptualize omnivorosity by the sheer volume of preferred cultural genres have to be distinguished from approaches that consider the crossing of symbolic boundaries between major groups of genres (“meta-genres”) as decisive. Moreover, some authors focus on aesthetic tolerance, others on aesthetic preferences and still others on actual knowledge and competencies in the command of cultural products. Obviously, these definitions imply unequal difficulty of being an omnivore. As we will show, specific conceptions of omnivorosity do not translate into unequivocal measurement approaches. For example, one-dimensional scales have been constructed in the literature, no matter if a volume or a boundary-crossing definition has been used conceptually. The main alternative to scaling approaches are typological approaches: Statistical methods like cluster or latent class analysis produce various configurations of tastes that lead researchers to identify one or more types of omnivorosity (e.g. a “highbrow” and a “lowlbrow” omnivore). We illustrate these analytical strategies with examples from the literature and discuss their advantages and drawbacks, respectively.

In order to assess the validity of the omnivore-univore-thesis, we reconstruct it from Peterson’s original writings and partition it into five testable hypotheses. They refer to the supposed carrier groups of omnivorous and univorous tastes, to their development over time and to the explanatory account that Peterson offers. A disproportionately large part of existing research allows us to investigate the cross-sectional hypothesis that high-status groups have broader tastes than low-status groups. Depending on the measurement of “status” (education, income, occupational prestige or social class), the hypothesis is confirmed in 75% to 89% of our studies. This is great support for Peterson’s main proposition. The picture gets more uneven when we turn to the historical dimension of his claims. Only 16 studies use time series data. They show mixed results: Some studies indicate that high-status groups had a more inclusive taste already back in the 1960s, some show that their repertoire of favored genres has increased over time, others show that it has shrunk. Various explanations are offered by the authors for these time trends, but they are usually hard to prove with the data that are employed. We also discuss the findings of qualitative and mixed-methods studies. They are most informative for the micro-level explanation of the omnivore-univore thesis because they try to find out about actor’s motives of status-seeking and distinction in their practices of cultural consumption. In our discussion we try to evaluate the impact that the definitional and conceptual variations as well as the differences in the analytical techniques have on the empirical results. We also discuss cross-country variation in the confirmation and disconfirmation of the main hypotheses.

We conclude with a recommendation of a few preferred ways of investigating Peterson’s thesis in future research. We also opt for more primary data collections that allows researchers to operationalize omnivorosity in a theory-driven manner.
Labour market insecurity and couple dissolution in Italy

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During the last decades, scholars’ interest has been triggered by the increase of divorce and cohabitation rates. Although existing studies are mainly focused on Northern European and Anglo-Saxon countries (Amato, 2010; Lyngstad and Jalovaara, 2010), a remarkable increase of divorce and cohabitation rates has taken place in Italy. Among others, partners’ socioeconomic position has been addressed as determinant of couple dissolution (Cooke and Gash, 2010; Jalovaara, 2013; Kaplan and Herbst, 2015). During this line of study, we try to clarify whether partners’ working position has an impact on dissolution of marriage and cohabitation in Italy. The country is dominated by a “familistic” welfare state (Saraceno, 1994), where the family is left alone to cope with social risks, especially those shaped by labour market uncertainty (Ferrara, 2015). In fact, the two-tiered Italian labour market shapes a dramatic gap in terms of wages and social benefits inequalities between outsiders, namely unemployed individuals and temporary workers, and insiders, namely permanent workers, which reproduces inequalities in other spheres of life and in the broader society. Therefore, this paper aims to understand whether being unemployed or holding a temporary contract increases the chances of experiencing marriage or cohabitation dissolution.

Combining economic and sociological bargaining models (among others: Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) with the crisis or family stress theory (Vinokur et al, 1996), we argue that labour market insecurity might bring the couple to a threat point that might be difficult to overcome. Indeed, unemployed or fixed-term workers experience economic hardships, as well as undesirable psychological consequences and they are targeted as outsiders of labour market. Furthermore, the economic and financial deprivations, together with the reduction of prestige and both partners’ satisfaction, undermine the couple well-being and may lead to the revaluation and renegotiation of the suitability of the partner and to the possible break-up. However, we expect differences on couple dissolution depending on whether the male or female partner is the outsider of labor market: the division of power within the couple, the societal norms and gender values play a fundamental role in determining couple stability (Cooke and Gash, 2010). Indeed, the Italian context is still characterized by a male bread winner model concerning the division of paid and unpaid work (Salvini and Vignoli, 2011), meaning that female employment is considered as a additional source of income and benefits for the household. Thus, male partner’s insecure labour market position is expected to increase the likelihood of union dissolution, while female labour market insecure position might have no impact on the risk of union dissolution.

Analytically, retrospective monthly data from the 2009 Italian Multipurpose Survey, Families and Social Subjects, are analyzed with discrete time event history models. This survey, conducted by ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics), provides representative data at national and regional level of households and individuals about working career, family relations and household dynamics. Risks of marriage dissolution and cohabitation dissolution are studied separately in order to account for the dissimilarities between these two forms of union. Concerning the effects of labour market insecurity, two different aspects are distinguished: unemployment and atypical work. In order to have a clearer image of unemployment influence, three forms are considered, namely unemployment from a permanent working position, unemployment from a temporary one and long-term unemployment. Moreover, adjusting the employment classification by Barbieri and Scherer (2009) based on contractual status, a differentiation of permanent and temporary working position is provided. The former consists of permanent dependent employment and traditional self-employment or liberal professions. The latter is constituted by temporary dependent form of employment, pseudo self-employment and other nonstandard forms of employment.

Our preliminary findings show that for men being unemployed or holding an atypical contract leads to higher chances of experiencing the end of their marriage, while female insecure labour market position seems to protect the marriage, highlighting the existence and
the persistence of a traditional division of labour within the couple. Furthermore, cohabitation is threatened more by labour market insecurity than marriage, since it is a less stable form of union compared to marriage. Indeed, in Italy married couples have stronger commitments, such as the presence of children and sharing of goods, that might protect against the risk of divorce (De Rose and Vignoli, 2012). However, in cohabitations we do not find gender differences of the influence of labour market insecurity on dissolution. As argued by Nazio and Blossfeld (2003), individuals who share more equal gender roles and models tend to prefer to cohabit instead of getting married. Therefore, couples who have a more equal division of tasks inside and outside the household, an outsider position of the labour market has the same impact on the risk of cohabitation dissolution if it is experienced by men or women.


A Stalled Revolution? What can we learn from Women’s Drop-out to Part-time Jobs, a comparative analysis of Germany and the UK

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This study examines how within-couple inequalities, that is power differences between men and women in a partnership, act as predictors of transitions from full-time to part-time employment applying Heckham corrected probit models in three different institutional and cultural contexts: Eastern and Western Germany and the United Kingdom. The analyses reveal that when women are in a weaker position within their relationships they are more likely to drop-out of full-time work, but that this tendency varies by context. The authors also find an increased tendency for women to leave full-time for part-time employment in both Eastern and Western Germany. This is suggestive of ongoing incompatibilities in the institutional support for dual-equal earning in Germany. The study uses longitudinal data covering the period 1991 until 2012 from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and from the British Household Panel (BHPS) and ‘Understanding Society’ for the UK.

Do parents treat (their) children differently?

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How parents treat their children is highly relevant for offspring life chances. However, there are numerous concepts of what constitutes “parenting”, and several ideas about why it should be relevant to children’s well-being, skill development, and educational attainment. Various parenting styles and activities are theorized as cultural capital in sociology, and as skill-enhancing factors in behavioral economics. Some common and some different antecedents and consequences are hypothesized in the two fields. Parents are always differently able to realize parenting practices thought to be favorable, due to psychological resources such as own skills and personality as well as social resources such as money, time, culture, or status. Moreover, they may react to perceived characteristics of their children differently based on these resources but also based on differences in children’s personality and ability display. For example, they may invest in the development of those whom they perceive as having more potential, or they may make compensating investments in those whom they perceive as less “naturally” advantaged. Or, following egalitarian ethical considerations, they try to treat their children equally regardless of child characteristics. Existing evidence is inconsistent, and these inconsistent results might at least be partly due to different concepts of parenting, different operationalizations, and methodologies that do not sufficiently account for unobserved heterogeneities or confounding variables.
We address this by investigating several different parenting concepts and their social as well as psychological antecedents. We present analyses of the first half of wave 1 of the new TwinLife study, comprising 2000 twin families in four twin birth cohorts spanning middle childhood to young adulthood. We focus on the interrelations between parenting styles and parental activities representing cultural capital and skill production. We explore main drivers of differential parenting, above all parental cognitive ability, personality, education, income, and social class and analyze their influence on different dimensions of parenting. The study design includes rich information about both parents and children, making it possible to assess which aspects of parenting are dependent on parental education, SES and income, family structure, or their skills and personality. With the nuclear twin family design we can also assess how genetic and environmental factors contribute to differential parenting.

As an example, we report preliminary results regarding parental engagement in singing, making music and reading activities with their children (abbreviated: SMR activities). They are treated as fostering the development of cultural capital and possibly also general skills. Therefore, we expect stratification along parental education, with higher educated parents engaging in SMR activities more often since such activities are a more prominent part of a "high brow" than a "low brow" culture, and the activities are posited to reflect "concerted cultivation" in Lareau’s terms. Moreover, we expect a higher frequency of SMR activities with daughters than sons since parents often consider such activities more central for the female in comparison to the male gender role. Furthermore, we anticipate differential parental investment reactions to the perceived developmental potential (PDP) of their children by parental education: Given psychological and social resource restrictions and status attainment motives we hypothesize that less educated parents invest more in children with higher PDP, i.e., they react in a way which reinforces differences in PDP between siblings or twins. In contrast, more educated parents are expected to invest more in children with lower PDP to offset differences in PDP between siblings or twins.

To minimize bias in the within-family effect estimates by genetic or within-twin pair sex differences we restrict our first analyses to monozygotic twin pairs. We look at twins born in 2009 or 2010 and model female and male twin pairs separately. The level of SMR activities is indicated by a score based on two items reported by parents which measure the frequency family members did such activities with each individual child in the month prior to the interview (Cronbachs α: .83, mean: 0, s.d.: .57). Parental education is indicated by the ISCED level of the biological mother. We restrict our analyses to families with biological mothers present to exclude effects of differential parenting based on different twin-to-mother kinship relations. As indicator of the individual twin’s PDP we use the birth weight in grams (rescaled in units of 500 grams for the regression analyses) either recorded in the twins’ health record book ("Untersuchungsheft") or alternatively reported by the parents. The twins’ birth weights are decomposed into their mean level within twin pairs indicating differences in PDP between twin pairs (abbreviated: mean bw) and the deviations from this mean level signaling differences in PDP within twin pairs (abbreviated: dev. bw).

Table 1 shows mixed- (see M1 to M3) and fixed-effect (see M4) regression results of SMR activities on covariates. The intercept is defined by maternal ISCED levels of 1 or 2 and a mean bw of 2320 grams. As expected we find higher levels of SMR activities for daughters than sons in all ISCED groups and greater levels of SMR activities with maternal ISCED for both. These results hold for all mixed-effect specifications (see M1 to M3). For female twin pairs in the low-ISCED group (levels 1 and 2) we find fewer SMR activities given a higher mean bw while for female twin pairs in the medium- and high-ISCED groups the level of SMR activities is greater given a higher mean bw (see M3). For dev. bw, we find the opposite pattern for female twin pairs: Here, the level of SMR activities is greater given positive dev. bw in the low-ISCED group but lower given positive dev. bw for the medium- and high-ISCED groups (see M3). These dev. bw results are in line with the hypothesized education-related differential parental investment reactions to PDP for daughters: More educated parents try to offset PDP differences in their children by investing more in the lower birth weight twin, while less educated parents invests tend to reinforce these differences by investing more in the child with more PDP, i.e., the twin with the higher birth weight. In contrast, we do not find this difference for sons. Together with the overall lower levels of SMR activities for male twin pairs these results indicate that such activities are considered less important for development in boys than girls. The comparisons with the almost identical fixed effect regression results (M4) demonstrate that our within family mixed effect estimates are not biased by the random effect assumption regarding the between twin family variance in SMR activities.

We will extend our analyses to include other parenting concepts, i.e., other parent-child activities as well as parenting styles. Moreover, we will incorporate dizygotic twin pairs into our analyses, utilizing the additional potential of behavioral genetic modeling based on twin family data like TwinLife.
The role of gender on labour market outcomes is understudied in ethnic stratification research. My aim is to assess to which extent gender gaps in labour force participation (LFP) among the general population generalise to different ethnic origin groups, and whether usual explanations for female labour force participation (FLFP) also hold true for women within these groups. Gender and country of origin are strongly associated with LFP. Women tend to participate less than men in the labour force (gender gap), and immigrant and native-born persons with an immigrant background also present, on average, lower participation rates compared to natives (immigrant/ethnic penalty). There is however significant variation across ethnic origin groups in different host societies, with some groups participating more, and others less, than natives. The UK is a paradigmatic example of this variation. My aim is to explain these ethnic origin differences in FLFP by moving away from ethnic-based accounts while engaging in explanations based on gender role attitudes and preferences —as well as intergenerational processes of housewifery transmission— and their interaction with material conditions.

I use data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) to test different theoretical explanations of FLFP. For theoretical and statistical robustness, I use two indicators of LFP namely activity and job hours per week. As explanatory factors, I consider classical individual-level characteristics such as human capital and household conditions, but also less studied attitudinal factors such as level of religiosity and gender role attitudes. Moreover, I also test for intergenerational effects of housewifery across groups by accounting for the working status of the mother when the respondent was aged 14. In the second part of the analysis, I restrict the sample to married and partnered women, and add couple-level accounts in the explanation. To this aim, I test hypotheses on partner/spouse’s labour market resources such as educational homogamy/heterogamy within the couple, his working status and monthly income, as well as his gender role attitudes and degree of involvement in domestic work. In line with recent developments in the economic literature, I also check for the effect of the mother-in-law’s working status on respondent’s participation, and how this might account for ethnic origin differences on top of other variables.

Exploratory results based in non-hierarchical cluster analysis show that, based on key explanatory factors of FLFP, we can identify in the data four different profiles of women —i.e. family-oriented, LM-oriented, traditional, religious—, unequally distributed across ethnic origin groups. Multivariate analyses show that compositional differences in individual-level characteristics account across models for about the totality of the initially observed participation penalty (measured both as activity and average job hours) of Bangladeshi and Pakistani women, but are less successful in explaining the participation premium of African women, and to a lesser extent Jamaican. Partners/spouses’ characteristics add to the explanation of ethnic-origin differences in participation, as partner/spouse’s labour market resources, gender role attitudes, and mother’s working status contribute on top of individual-level factors. I also test for within-ethnic-origin group effects by interacting ethnic categories with the main explanatory variables of concern, namely gender role attitudes, number of children, and different couple-level specificities. Compared to natives, I find both substantive and statistically significant differences across groups in average marginal effects and adjusted predicted probabilities for some of the main explanatory factors.

The main contributions of the present research to the literature are primarily the inclusion of mother’s and mother-in-law working status for ethnic origin differences on top of other variables. A reconsideration of ethnic penalties in inactivity and unemployment: a study of second generation men and women in England and Wales

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Background and rationale

Ethnic inequalities facing the children of immigrants are a central concern for both researchers and governments across much of Europe. Particular attention has been paid to labour market disadvantage and to inequalities in educational attainment (Heath and Cheung 2006; Heath and Brinbaum 2014). Second generation ethnic minorities have typically shown substantial improvements over
time, particularly relative to the first generation. Research in the UK shows that ethnic minorities are able to achieve relatively high educational outcomes even from low socio-economic backgrounds, by contrast with their majority group peers (Crawford and Greaves, 2015; Burgess 2014). Such educational mobility has enabled ethnic minorities to improve their labour market outcomes (Khattab, 2012; Platt, 2007; Zuccotti, 2015), especially when compared to their parents. However, while gaps are closing in terms of occupational outcomes, substantial differences in unemployment remain; and gaps in employment rates are arguably a greater challenge than access to more advantaged social class positions (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015; Hills, 2010). Specifically, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Caribbean populations often have lower employment probabilities than the White British, even at the same levels of educational attainment (Cheung and Heath, 2007; Rafferty, 2012).

One of the key explanations behind these so-called ‘ethnic gaps’ has been discrimination in the labour market (Heath and Cheung, 2006; Kingston et al., 2015; McGinnity and Lunn, 2011). Although we cannot know to what extent the ‘ethnic gap’ in terms of employment found in quantitative studies can be explained by discrimination, employer discrimination seems to be a robust finding in the literature. However, we argue that this might not be the whole story. Ethnic minorities have overwhelmingly poor social origins and are much more likely to have experienced workless families as children. We know that this can have negative effects on individuals’ employment and labour market participation in general, as well as on their ability to translate higher educational attainment into labour market success (Machin et al. 2009). Existing research is increasingly turning to family background to help understand occupational differences between ethnic groups. A recent study for the UK showed that part (or in some cases all) of the explanation for ethnic penalties in occupation can be attributed to the relatively poorer socio-economic background in which ethnic minorities are raised (Zuccotti, 2015a, 2015b). However, family background has only rarely been used to help understand differences in unemployment (Platt 2005).

We therefore investigate the role of family background and family resources in accounting for unemployment gaps between white British and second generation ethnic minorities in the UK. In addition, for women, we also study inactivity, since this arguably represents a form of ‘hidden unemployment’, or may indicate an alternative form of disadvantage, particularly given the substantial variations across ethnic groups.

Data and measures
We use the ONS Longitudinal Study (ONS-LS), a unique dataset that links census records for a 1 per cent sample of the population of England and Wales across five successive censuses (1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011). This prospective study allows us to measure individuals’ family resources when they were children living with immigrant parents in England & Wales, and link these with their employment outcomes as adults. Family resources are operationalised as parental social class and employment status, and material resources, such as car ownership. Furthermore, by linking information on where families lived when the ONS-LS members were children to measures of area deprivation, we are also able to construct measures of neighbourhood context (disadvantage). Neighbourhoods of upbringing are often argued to be relevant for social mobility (Chetty et al. 2014) and children’s educational and economic outcomes (Sampson 2008); but, again, are rarely considered in attempts to identify influences on contemporary labour market inequalities across ethnic groups.

Using pooled samples of around 150,000 men and women, we estimate a series of linear probabilities models to ascertain: a) the extent to which Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Black Caribbean, Black African and White British ethnic groups face differential unemployment risks; b) how far those unemployment gaps are explained or exacerbated by taking account of educational attainment; and c) the role of family background and childhood neighbourhood context in attempting to account for such ethnic penalties. Finally, we investigate the extent to which ethnic penalties differ according to level of achieved education. We estimate separate models for men and women and we adjust our estimates for repeat observations on individuals. We also subject our estimates to a range of robustness checks.

Results
We show that, net of educational attainment, Pakistani and Caribbean men are around 6% more likely to be unemployed than white British men; this penalty reduces by half once we control for social background and origin neighbourhood deprivation. Some unexplained gaps thus remain. Among women, social origins also play a role in explaining some of the penalties for both unemployment and inactivity. It is also notable that while Caribbean women have higher rates of activity – even net of education and family background – than their white majority counterparts, they face substantial higher unemployment rates.

The results also show that among those with a university degree, most ethnic minority male groups are equally or even less likely to be unemployed compared to their white British counterparts. Although higher returns to education have been previously found among ethnic minorities (Heath 2007), such ‘positive gaps’ remain a novelty in these type of studies. Higher education also considerably reduces the penalty found for inactivity and unemployment for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women.

We conclude that taking account of childhood family context provides new insight into the substantial unemployment risks faced by a number of minority ethnic groups. We also identify the protective role of higher education, even given disadvantaged backgrounds, as an area for further research.

Differing labour market integration of migrants in Western Europe: composition and contextual differences in returns to investments

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The integration of migrants in European societies receives a lot of political and scholarly interest. Equal access to the labour market is a crucial aspect of wider integration for migrants and also ensures an efficient use of the skills migrants bring with them. There is
substantial variation in labour market outcomes for migrants across Europe, but much is still unknown about the reasons for country variation in successful labour market integration of migrants and their children. This paper addresses labour market integration of migrants and their children in the EU-15 and Norway. It is important to understand these factors in order to highlight the factors that can facilitate successful integration.

In this paper we contribute to the literature by addressing three factors that may account for regional variation in labour market integration. First of all the composition of migrants in each country; second the differences in resources migrants invest in or have at their disposal while in the country and which can affect their labour market outcomes; and third the social and institutional context within the country which can affect the extent to which migrants can make use of their resources. The question is then how these three factors account for differences in labour market integration of 1st and 2nd generation migrants over the EU15 plus Norway.

We use the ESS 2002-2014 and add contextual data from other sources such as the EU-LFS and MIPEX. The ESS includes a lot of individual characteristics and also has detailed information on country of birth of respondents and their parents. We can therefore include contextual data on the country of origin as well as on the intersection of country of origin and destination. We study disadvantage in activity and employment, but also the quality of work when employed and overqualification in the EU15 and Norway.

Studying several outcomes provides better understanding of the labour market inclusion of migrants as being employed on a job below someone’s skills can impede further integration as well as being wasteful given the European drive towards attracting highly skilled migrants.

We first account for differences in the composition of migrants and their children in certain countries which can affect labour market outcomes. This is done through individual factors as well as characteristics of the country of origin and the intersection of country of origin and destination to account for possible reasons for migration and differences in selection. The second set of characteristics we analyse aim to capture investments into ties with the country of destination. Here we include factors such as language skills, social contacts, naturalization, taking part in civil life and attending courses or education in the country of destination. We see these acts as investments that can bring certain expected benefits. The final aspect we look at is how the contextual and institutional factors in the country of destination affect this further integration and its' returns. Here we include factors such as the regulatory framework, industrial make-up in the region and the share and resources of the migrant community. We aim to highlight the factors that are more conducive to successful labour market integration as well as those that place hurdles. We broadly follow in the framework of segmented assimilation and aim to answer what contextual factors account for different strategies and outcomes.

Our main analyses consist of sequential models to analyse the labour market outcomes by origin. We first add the compositional factors, then the characteristics of investment in the country of destination and finally the contextual data which is also allowed to interact with the investment in the country of destination. Binary outcomes are estimated through logistic regression and we study the marginal effects to analyse labour market gaps. To analyse the regional variation in labour market outcomes we extend the models using random coefficients for labour market outcomes at the regional NUTS level. All analyses are separated by gender.

Preliminary results indicate substantial variation by groups in the gaps in activity and employment with especially women from North Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Migrants from the new EU member states tend to be more likely to be economically active but suffer some penalties in employment and in job quality. While some groups of migrants such as those from the EU-15 or EFTA and North America tend to do very well in terms of employment and activity, all 1st generation migrants are substantially more likely to be overqualified than similarly qualified natives.

We find that compositional factors explain most of the disadvantage of 2nd generation migrants and tend to explain especially the large gaps experienced by migrants from North Africa and the Middle East. Accounting for individual integration characteristics all but explains the gaps in employment for women and the gaps in activity. Finally, the regional context also matters in accounting for labour market disadvantage and accounts for some of the differences in employment and occupational status.

Random coefficient models show substantial variation across regions for the more disadvantaged groups such as migrants from the new EU member states, North Africa and the Middle East and Latin America. On the other hand, migrants from the EU-15 and EFTA or North America do not see a lot of variation in their labour market outcomes across regions.

These preliminary results highlight the importance of considering both individual and contextual variables in understanding the differing labour market outcomes of migrants and their children in Western Europe. It is important to understand the way in which contextual factors affect the opportunities individuals face to invest in their future and how this affects different long-term labour market integration.

Understanding these factors better can also help inform the policy debate about the effective utilization of human capital. In further steps we explore this contextual variation further.

Ethnic differences in labor market outcomes: The role of language-based discrimination.

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Proficiency in the host country language (L2) is crucial for the economic assimilation of immigrants. Considerable research demonstrates that income, occupational attainment as well as employment opportunities increase with rising skills in the respective national language (e.g. Chiswick/Miller 2010; Dustmann/vanSoest 2002; Lindemann/Kogan 2013; Kalter 2006; 2011).

In most of the previous works it is assumed that the (L2) language skills represent a form of human capital (Chiswick/Miller 2001) and impact the labor market outcomes via an increase in productivity. However, another mechanism could also explain the general findings: The linguistic patterns associated with lower language proficiency can trigger discrimination (Horr et.al. 2010; Rakic et.al. 2010; Rödin/Ozcan 2011); as these patterns vanish with rising language skills, language-based discrimination should disappear as well. In this case, labor market outcomes would also increase with rising (L2) language skills. As a consequence, the effect generally
interpreted as the effect of (L2) language proficiency (resp. the associated increase in productivity) could co-capture the effect of language-based discrimination. If that were the case, previous studies would systematically overestimate the influence of (L2) language competence.

In this contribution, I aim to disentangle the effect of (L2) language competence (resp. the associated productivity increase) from the effect of language-based discrimination. As for the German context, L2 skills seem particularly relevant to account for the disadvantaged labor market situation of Turkish immigrants (Kalter 2006; 2011). I will primarily focus on this group of origin.

In order to investigate both effects, I test the assumptions that the two competing approaches imply. According to the “classical” approach (Chiswick/Miller 2001), L2 proficiency should (c.p.) affect the labor market prospects for all ethnic groups alike, as the same increase in L2 skills should equal the same increase in productivity and thus translate into the same increase in returns.

According to (economic) discrimination theories however, one would expect group-specific returns to rising L2 proficiency. Building on the assumptions of discrimination tastes (Becker 1971), the linguistic patterns associated with lower language proficiency may elicit (stronger) distastes for certain ethnic groups, as they are prominent reminders of the respective origin (Rakic et al. 2010; Rödin/Özcan 2001). As these patterns vanish with rising language skills, group-specific distastes should reduce as well. In other words, employers may not only value language skills in terms of productivity, but also factor in fewer group-specific distastes when evaluating immigrant jobseekers with high language skills. As in Germany the strongest distastes exist for the Turkish group of origin (Ganter 2003; Steinbach 2004), this group should profit more strongly than other ethnic groups from rising (and ultimately native-like) proficiency in the German language, since these (L2) language skills should reduce (or cancel out) the respective stronger distastes.

It might also be the case that employers do not factor in their own, but their customers distastes, as it is more economically reasonable (Kalter 2003:98). This in turn would imply that the Turkish group should only profit in jobs with direct customer contact more strongly from rising proficiency in the German language than other ethnic groups, as language-related customer preferences are otherwise irrelevant.

Moreover, lower (L2) language skills may also trigger error discrimination (England 1992). Employers might associate lower L2 proficiency with lower skills in other domains that they cannot directly observe (e.g. specific- or soft skills), even though this association does not have to be the case. This negative transfer should be particularly likely, if it corresponds to the content of an adverse group stereotype (c.f. Johnson et. al. 1993). With this, especially ethnic groups confronted with strong negative stereotypes should profit from higher L2 proficiency. For the German context, this again holds especially true for Turkish jobseekers (Kahraman/Knoblich 2000). As this type of discrimination should only occur, if the employer lacks the relevant information (i.e. on specific- or soft skills), this would imply that for the Turkish group the influence of German language proficiency on labor market outcomes should be more (negatively) conditional on the amount of information available to employers than for other groups. To put it again in less technical terms: If necessary skill-specific information is unavailable to employers, members of the Turkish group should profit more strongly from a higher proficiency in the German language, as these L2 skills prevent a negative transfer; if the necessary skill-specific information is available however, they should not profit disproportionally from the respective language skills, as the negative transfer would not have been applied to begin with.

To empirically test the above mentioned assumptions, I exploit employment biography data from the “National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). Applying (logistic) regressions, I examine whether language skills affect crucial indicators of labor market success differently for groups that vary with respect to the distastes they face (Becker 1971). I also investigate whether this effect is conditional on the amount of customer contact in the respective job (Kalter 2003:98), or the amount of relevant information available to employers (England 1992). Analyses indicate group-specific returns to higher language proficiency. As this effect is not conditional on other relevant information available to employers, this might indicate language-based taste discrimination (Becker 1971).

In all, these findings could contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms that produce ethnic differences in labor market outcomes and call for a sensitive interpretation of language effects on labor market integration.
Introduction
Understanding how unemployment qualitatively affects individual’s occupational careers is crucial given that the direction of mobility upon re-employment determines future career trajectories (Gangl 2006). Occupational prestige is an important element of job-quality and job-seekers usually attempt to maintain prestige held prior to unemployment. What then drives the unemployed to accept a job that entails involuntary occupational downgrading? The present study examines the trade-off between accepting any job quickly or holding out for potential job offers to avoid occupational downgrading. We establish a link between involuntary downward mobility and opportunity and choice elements of search, which combined determine mobility in an occupationally segmented labor market (Greve 2000). One is the number of job opportunities accessible to the individual job-seeker coming from a given occupation, defined as ln(Vi/Ui); two is the particular career stages of the unemployed.

Theoretical considerations
Theories of search and matching (Rogerson 2005) assume the unemployed attempt to maximize utility when facing a trade-off between lower search duration and accepting a lower quality job. Theory posits that the stronger the competition on the labor market is, the higher are the chances that the unemployed accept a lower quality job (Mortensen 1986). Psychological theories expect the social pressure to work (Wanberg 2012) to exert stress on the unemployed and influence their decision making. Thus, job-seekers may feel pushed towards taking up any job as soon as possible, regardless of quality considerations.

We argue that there are heterogeneous responses to opportunities and pressures among the unemployed in line with different career stages. Building on literature of the life course and career development (Elder 1975), we hypothesize that early career job-seekers are more likely to accept a lower prestige job as an employment gain and are more responsive to changes in their labor market conditions i.e. job opportunities than other job-seekers. Whereas the unemployed at a late, ‘maintenance’ oriented stage of their career are thought to attach greater importance to a loss of prestige, which is unresponsive to their current job opportunities and lead them to hold out longer (Lorence 1985).

Data and Method
Our study is based on national administrative data, the placement services and labor market statistics (AVAM) for the years 2006 to 2014. The survival analysis uses monthly records of all registered unemployed in Switzerland. Our dependent variable is the hazard of involuntary occupational downgrading, defined as a job at least 10 percent lower in occupational prestige than the job prior to unemployment and when the job-seeker did not voluntarily search for a lower prestige job. With ln(Vi/Ui) we measure occupation specific job opportunities as the number of published job advertisements per unemployed accessible to a job-seeker on the basis of their former occupation and a weighted likelihood of occupational transitions. Overall labor demand measures opportunities to take up any job regardless of prestige. For these two indicators job vacancy data are matched in from the Swiss Job Market Monitor data (SMM). Our other key independent variable is an indicator of three career stages incorporating both work experience and age: Trial, establishment and maintenance stage. Using these two indicators job vacancy data are matched in from the Swiss Job Market Monitor data (SMM).

Results
Our results show that labor demand in the form of job opportunities is an important determinant of unemployed job-seekers’ subsequent occupational downgrading. According to our expectation based on search and matching theories, a low number of job opportunities increases the likelihood that unemployed job seekers take up a job that represents an involuntary downgrading in occupational prestige. A key finding of our study is that behavior conceptualized in rational, maximum-utility terms only offers us a partial story of search behavior. Though they lend important insights into the decision-calculus, the unemployed also seem to face a psychological and social pressure to accept any job offer as soon as possible. A high number of overall job opportunities in the labor market increases unemployed job-seekers’ chances of quickly accepting a downgrade in occupational prestige. The old axiom that ‘any job is better than none’ receives some support herein. In this vein, developing more detailed measurements of the demand side in the labor market is a promising avenue for future unemployment research.

We can further demonstrate that career stage is an important factor affecting the decision to take up a job of lower prestige. Compared to mid-career workers, young individuals at the trial stage of their career are more inclined to accept occupational downgrading. Whereas, older workers in the maintenance phase of their career try to avoid downgrading to a greater degree than mid-career workers, because they face a greater risk of losing their built-up prestige. Crucially, our findings demonstrate that job opportunities matter more or less depending on career stage. Trial-stage job-seekers respond more strongly to job opportunities than do establishment and maintenance stage unemployed; they seem to emphasize on-the-job learning and gathering experience. These results reinforce the need to jointly analyze individual characteristics and demand side forces.

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they were also more likely to lose work. The latter of these two effects appears to have dominated on average during our sample
Our statistics also suggest that younger people were more likely to find work following the Great Recession than older people, but
that employment is being created in high-qualification occupations, to the relative detriment of lower educated population subgroups.
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Results suggests that tertiary education, while not delivering an unambiguously higher likelihood of being hired following the Great

References


Private Insurance Against Unemployment. How Wealth Reduces Wage Scars

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Job loss has many detrimental and long-lasting effects on individuals, including a reduction of their post-unemployment wages. The size of these “wage scars” from job loss, however, depends on the extent to which individuals can rely on effective safety nets during unemployment. The prior literature has focused on the effectiveness of public safety nets, namely unemployment insurance, in reducing wage scarring. In this contribution, we additionally investigate the importance of private safety nets, namely those provided by family wealth. Since access to this form of insurance is more unequally distributed, vast differences in family wealth may reinforce the stratifying effects of unemployment experiences on later wage inequalities. We also provide a comparative assessment of the United States and Germany to understand the extent to which private safety nets tied to parental wealth make up for and interact with public provisions of insurance against the effects of job loss.

Climbing out of Crisis: Characteristics of the newly employed in Europe

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Many studies have shown that low and middle skill jobs have been particularly affected during the Great Recession increasing the divide between highly skilled and other workers. A key question now is how the labour market experiences of different individuals will evolve as countries recover from the recession. The widespread expectation that job creation across Europe during the recovery will be concentrated in high-skill / high-qualification occupations gives reason to doubt the extent to which the recovery will help to lift poorer households out of poverty. Using recently available household data from the ‘EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC), this paper explores the characteristics of individuals who have found new employment in Europe following the Global Financial Crisis.

One advantage of EU-SILC for the current study, as opposed to other candidate data sources (e.g. Labour Force Survey data), is that it provides details on individuals’ labour market histories as well as information concerning a wide range of individual and household specific characteristics that may be related to labour market outcomes. These include education levels, number of dependent children, the work intensity of the household, or whether the household was at risk of poverty in the preceding year. Another useful aspect of EU-SILC data for the purpose of this analysis is the 12 months labour market recall questions. This information can help us identify the people who have found a (new) employment position over the 12 months preceding the interview and allow us to conduct the analysis using the entire sample (cross-sectional dimension of the survey). Only one quarter of interviewees are re-contacted 12 months later for the follow up interview (longitudinal dimension of the survey).

Our analysis is based on a statistical comparison between trends at the trough and trends during the recovery period. The sample of countries was selected to include only those that reported a complete set of data covering our variables of interest, and for which at least one year of recovery was available. In practice, 16 out of the 18 countries selected have at least two years of data covering the recovery period. These 18 countries are then organised in three subgroups: the New Member States (NMS), ‘core countries with persistent labour growth’, and ‘core countries with disrupted labour growth’. The group of core countries with persistent labour growth is limited to European countries that are not described as a NMS, and which saw peak to trough variation in the total number of people employed through the Great Recession (from 2007 to 2011) of less than 1%.

Results suggests that tertiary education, while not delivering an unambiguously higher likelihood of being hired following the Great Recession, has delivered measurable security against job loss in all three subgroups of countries. Furthermore, at the opposite end of the educational spectrum individuals with less than upper secondary education are both less likely to obtain employment, and are subject to more substantive risks of job loss than people with higher education. These observations tend to support the conjecture that employment is being created in high-qualification occupations, to the relative detriment of lower educated population subgroups. Our statistics also suggest that younger people were more likely to find work following the Great Recession than older people, but they were also more likely to lose work. The latter of these two effects appears to have dominated on average during our sample period. That younger people should display higher employment transitions than older people is not surprising. However, in context of the generally weak production growth observed in Europe since 2008, and the anaemic recovery in employment numbers, the tenuous
nature of employment status among younger people may have contributed to exacerbate the negative effects on life-course prospects of the Great Recession.

Indeed, our results suggest that the nascent labour recovery in Europe has led to a rise in tenuous forms of employment, exposing new workers to substantive risk of job loss. In general, relative to the trough, newly employed people during the recovery were more likely to be employees, work part-time, on a temporary contract, with fewer years of experience, and in small companies. Exit rates from employment appear to be disproportionately higher in relation to all of these employment characteristics. Furthermore, statistics for household work intensity among workers in all country subgroups indicate a slight reduction in hour intensity during the recovery. These statistics, in conjunction with a general rise in the share of survey respondents reporting a desire to increase hours of employment, suggest that the recovery may be eroding ‘job quality’ in labour markets on average.

Statistics describing risks of poverty and social exclusion suggest that these are more pronounced among individuals without employment. In core European countries, newly employed are identified as approximately twice as likely as the entire working population to have been at risk of poverty or social exclusion, and around two thirds more likely in the New Member states. These statistics highlight the importance of getting people into work, and retaining employment, in helping reduce poverty. With the 2014 wave of EU-SILC data - due to be released shortly - we will be able to extend the study to estimate the likelihood that individuals from poor households find a new employment position given their individual characteristics.

We also investigated the distribution of monthly wages in the five countries for which the required data is available. Our results suggest that new employees tend to be skewed toward the bottom of the earnings distribution. In the core European countries analysed, there is, however, a stronger skew toward the bottom of the earnings distribution for all workers at risk of social exclusion than for all new employees. This supports the conjecture that the new employment positions helped to mitigate social exclusion over that period. In contrast, the reverse trend is true for Poland suggesting that, even if employment may have helped increase the income of the newly employed in that country, the improvement may have been insufficient to lift them out of poverty.

Unemployment scarring in the Great Recession

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As the current economic recession dramatically raised the levels of unemployment in a number of European countries, we seek to address the question of how institutional protection for the unemployed has performed in this period of severe economic crisis. Previous research demonstrated that episodes of unemployment have enduring negative effects on worker career prospects and that labour market institutions, such as employment protection or unemployment insurance, play an important role mitigating those effects (e.g. Gangl, 2006). Earlier research also demonstrated that aggregate labour market conditions affect unemployment scarring, yet it has not been examined whether or not the effectiveness of labour market policies in protecting workers’ reemployment and earnings capacity also is, as might be expected, deteriorating in a period of severe economic crisis. We examine these questions with harmonized work history data for 30 countries for the years 2004 to 2012, using data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), the Understanding Societies Survey (UKLS), and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). We use multilevel modelling to estimate the effect of the recession on workers’ reemployment and post-unemployment earnings, and to assess how this effect varies across countries.
Sociologists have long recognized the importance of socioeconomic rather than the prestige dimension of occupation to understand the process of status attainment and social inequality in modern industrial and post-industrial societies. With the development of standard international indices such as the Standard International Occupational Prestige Score (SIOPS) and International Standard Socioeconomic Index (ISEI), fewer and fewer studies today adopt indigenous measures to study social inequality, especially in rapidly developing countries. They have now been supplanted by standardized measures instead. The goals of the current project are twofold: (1) develop a local indigenous and pure measure of socioeconomic status in China (CSEI) using data compiled from the China General Social Survey from 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2012 using the partial association models as optimal scaling tool; and (2) compare and contrast the relative performance of indigenous measures with standardized measures of socioeconomic status in two important inequality outcomes: educational and occupational attainment.

International Mobility in Brazilian Higher Education: understanding the association between students’ socioeconomic characteristics and prestige of the university of destination during the Science Without Border Program.

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Brazil is undergoing an expansion of opportunities in higher education for students from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. During this time, research has observed an increase in the demand for international mobility of middle and upper-class students (Nogueira, Aguiar, & Ramos, 2008). In July 2011, the Brazilian Federal Government implemented the Science Without Borders Program - SWB. The aim of the program was to promote expansion and internationalisation of science and technology, and increase Brazilian competitiveness through international exchange and mobility. The program intended to distribute 101,000 scholarships between 2011 and 2014 for undergraduate and graduate Brazilian students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics field of studies.

Currently, the majority of research on educational inequality analyses the impact of socioeconomic characteristics in transitions from lower to higher educational levels (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Lucas, 2001; Raftery & Hout, 1993). However, the effects of students’ socioeconomic characteristics on the internationalisation of higher education and its consequences for educational inequality have received little empirical attention. Through the analysis of the Science Without Border Program, this research aims to investigate the increasing demand for international mobility in higher education in Brazil. Testing the theory of Effectively Maintained Inequality (EMI), this research analyses whether the classes that had previously secured their advantage through their exclusive education now seek international mobility as a strategy for ensuring their qualitative differences after the implementation of higher education expansion policies in Brazil.

In order to investigate the relationship between international mobility in higher education and education inequality in the Brazilian context, I analyse the High School National Exam (ENEM) datasets. The ENEM is a yearly non-mandatory exam performed during a weekend. The exam is coordinated by the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP) and is taken by a large proportion of Brazilian high school students. Currently, several universities use students’ ENEM scores as part of their admission process. Students’ performance in the ENEM is considered an eligibility criterion for participation in the Science Without Borders program: students must achieve 600 points or more in the ENEM exam performed after 2009 in order to apply for the scholarship.

Constructing a dataset of students in the SWB required merging administrative data from three different institutions. Students in the SWB are funded by one of two funding sources – CAPES and CNPq. CAPES and CNPq provided the Brazilian national identification numbers of all the funded undergraduate students, and using this number, INEP generated an indicator variable for each student awarded a SWB undergraduate scholarship in the 2009 to 2013 ENEM datasets.

The first part of this research analysed how the predicted probability of students participating in the SWB is associated with differences in students’ socioeconomic characteristics, using probit regression models. Students who parents have higher education degree were more likely to participate in the SWB program. Moreover, higher test scores in math and natural sciences in the ENEM exam also increased the likelihood of a student participating the SWB. The results of the first part of this research were presented at the RC 28 Summer 2015 Conference, at the University of Pennsylvania.

In the RC 28 Summer 2016 Conference, I will present the second part of this research. The second part of this research analyses the association between the prestige of the university of destination during the SWB program and students’ socioeconomic characteristics. The prestige of the universities of destination was measured using the QS and Times Higher Education world universities rankings. Despite being heavily criticised, world universities rankings have effects on students’ choices when applying to tertiary education (Sauder & Lancaster, 2006). Therefore, this research tests whether students from more advantaged background tend to go to high-
In this article, we examine role of the secondary education in the production of cultural capital. In particular, we will consider the difference between the formal degree obtained and type of school that was attended. Embodied cultural capital is mainly gained by being exposed over a longer time to other people with a certain cultural capital. It starts at home, where the children absorb the cultural capital from their parents. However, the children will spend a substantial part of their time at school, where they are exposed to the cultural capital of teachers and classmates. One of the traditional focis of this area of research was the prediction that a mismatch between the cultural capital at home and at school can be a barrier, making it harder for those children to be successful at school. However, in this article we focus on those children that are successful at school regardless of the mismatch. They will be exposed to the cultural capital at that school level, and we predict that they thus attain some of the cultural capital they did not obtain from home.

We will use the case of the former Czechoslovakia to test our prediction. The secondary education in the former Czechoslovakia offered four ways to obtain one identical graduation diploma: apprenticeship with graduation, vocational school 4-year and 8-year Gymnasium. We argue that although the formal degree had the same value from all of those four tracks, but that each of the tracks led to acquisition of different embodied cultural capital. We expect that children with diplomas from gymnasium have more embodied cultural capital than children with diplomas from vocational school, because they were exposed to a particular kind of teachers and classmates. In similar way, we predict that the children with diploma from vocational school have more embodied cultural capital than children with diploma from apprenticeship school.

Research question: Is embodied cultural capital influenced by the school attended?

Our theory is based on Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital and cultural integration. While the theory of cultural capital states that there is embodied cultural capital acquired during socialisation, the theory of cultural integration describes a specific function of school, cultural integration, which is responsible for the way we react on specific stimuli, for example art. The cultural integration is not same at each school. Therefore, there should be observable differences across different secondary education institutions.

Our theoretical assumptions are supported by previous research done on the same topic. For example, Ineke Nagel (2010) used panel data collected in Netherland to explain how family background and educational career influence cultural participation of children in age between 14 and 24 years. The results show that both effects are significant and independent of each other. Furthermore, there are significant differences in cultural consumption between children attending different types of secondary education.

To answer our research question, we analyse data collected by Donald J. Treiman and Ivan Szelenyi in 1993/1994, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989. The original sample contains information from six post-socialist European countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, The Czech Republic and Slovakia. After selection of the Czechoslovakian subsample, we got exactly 10,541 observations.

The dependent variable, embodied cultural capital, is operationalized as cultural consumption and measured on a scale capturing how often a respondent participates on the following forms of cultural activity: 1) visits a museum or art-exhibits; 2) goes to a ballet, opera, theatre, or concert; 3) listen to a classical music at home; 4) read serious books such as history, biography, science, or literature; 5) goes to a library. The main independent variable, secondary education, has five categories: eight years long gymnasium, four years long gymnasium, vocational school, apprenticeship with graduation and apprenticeship without graduation. We use method of linear regression to see whether the education significantly influences embodied cultural capital. The relationship is controlled for influence of parental cultural capital, which was measured in the same way as the dependent variable, sex, nationality and the year a respondent started secondary education.

The results of the analysis confirm our hypotheses. The secondary education has significant influence on possession of embodied cultural capital, independently from the effect of parental cultural capital. In particular, persons that attended a gymnasium have significantly more embodied cultural capital than persons that attended a vocational school; people that attended a vocational school have significantly more embodied cultural capital than people that attended an apprenticeship. However, there is no significant difference between people attending an eight years long gymnasium and a four years long gymnasium. This might be because eight years long gymnasiums and four years long gymnasiums are usually connected. Therefore, there is no difference between the
teachers’ effect on students from four years and eight years long gymnasiums, as the teachers are the same for both groups of students. The only difference is in the influence of classmates. Another explanation of the non-significant difference might be a small amount of respondents in the category of eight years long gymnasium.

Our research shows that holders of formally equal diploma in the Czechoslovakia do not have equal embodied cultural capital. The difference is based on type of secondary education attended. These are important findings for two reasons. First, they show that the school is not only a passive reproducer of family based inequalities. Second, this result has consequences for new levels of education that are formally or nearly equivalent to higher secondary education, but aimed at children with a disadvantaged background (e.g. Fachabitur in Germany or Baccalauréat technologique in France). One of the reasons why these levels do not lead to the same outcomes as the traditional levels may be because their students will probably obtain less cultural capital at school.

Twin similarity and social background - descriptive evidence for Germany
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This study provides for the first time descriptive evidence for correlation patterns among monozygotic (MZ) twins in educational outcomes in Germany depending on socio-economic background characteristics of the family. I study patterns in cognitive ability and upper secondary track attendance and explore to which extent parent’s highest level of education accounts for educational inequalities within families. Correlations based on MZ twins capture the importance of shared-familial influences more accurately because MZ twins share by far more family influences than ordinary siblings do: MZ twins grew up under almost the same environmental conditions and are genetically alike. Empirical analyses are based on the newly collected data from the TwinLife study. TwinLife is a unique data source that contains information of twins and their families based on a representative sample in Germany. Preliminary results indicate that intergenerational transmission processes are dependent on parents’ educational background but also differ with respect to the outcome under study: correlations in cognitive skills are high among twins from lower and higher social background. However, inequality for MZ twins from lower social backgrounds increases when looking at upper secondary track attendance as correlations for MZ twins from less advantaged social backgrounds are the lowest. This finding indicates that parents from lower social backgrounds may direct parental inputs –due to the lack of resources– differently in children with similar cognitive ability.
This text is concerned with ethnic homogamy in Slovakia. The authors depart from the assumption that ethnic homogamy is an indicator of ethnic tolerance and multiculturalism. Higher ethnic homogamy indicates larger social distances between ethnic groups, and vice versa. The authors analyze data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. The data include all marriages according to the ethnicity of the spouses in Slovakia between 1992 and 2014. The authors test hypotheses of the trends in both absolute and relative ethnic homogamy. The conclusions show that the norm of ethnic homogamy strongly structures marriages in Slovakia. The probability of ethnically heterogamous marriage varies among particular ethnic groups; however, it does not increase for any of the ethnic groups over the analyzed period. The members of particular ethnic groups have not come socially closer together, inter-ethnic distances have not decreased due to the marriages, and ethnic tolerance in Slovakian society is not on the rise.

Do the risk averse among the last more strongly wish to be first?

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Summary

While social scientists have extensively researched the causes and consequences of upward social mobility, much less is known about effects of downward mobility. When Luckmann and Berger (1964: 339) refer to the „quasi-religious character of the mobility ethos“, it is evident that (upward) mobility should fulfill something Schopenhauer called “Man’s Need for Metaphysics” (The World as Vol. II, Ch. XVII). But what should ‘man’ do if the sacrament of upward mobility is denied to him? First, I postulate that the downwardly mobiles in particular will turn to the initial wellspring of metaphysical edification: religion. Second, I argue that the risk averse among the downwardly mobiles are more in need of religious support than their risk-seeking counterparts (moderator effect). Third, I expect Protestants to compensate their experience of worldly failure by both worldly and otherworldly forms of religiosity, while Catholics may directly turn to otherworldly forms of religious compensation. Preliminary results suggest that downward mobility increases religious importance for risk averse individuals, but not for risk seekers.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Building on the well-known explanatory framework outlined by Coleman (1990), it is possible to distinguish between both individuals’ definition of the situation (macro-micro link), action selection (micro-micro link), and aggregations of individual actions (micro-macro link). In order to acknowledge that the very same social situation may exert heterogeneous effects on different individuals (e.g., Xie 2013), it has been proposed to enrich this model by the notion of actors internal conditions comprising beliefs, preferences, and identity and possibly leading to different definitions of the same situation (Esser 1999, 2000). Hence, external circumstances such as material deprivation may take different effects on religiosity for individuals with different psychological traits (Stolz 2009).

Turning to action selection, a general assumption of rational action theory is that individuals choose lower-level instrumental means to produce higher-level goals and, thereby, utility (Stigler/Becker 1977; Lindenberg 2013). In this framework, religiosity may contribute to both physical well-being (e.g., by balancing arousal and comfort via prayer) and social approval (e.g., by attending religious service). Stating that upward mobility has matured to a quasi-religious doctrine in capitalist society means that instrumental means initially provided by religion are nowadays provided by commodities gained as a consequence of upward mobility. Yet, individuals even moving socially downward may turn back to religiosity to compensate for losses in utility.

Ever since Weber’s Ethics of Protestantism scholars have investigated the relationship between religiosity and economic behavior (e.g., Becker/Woessmann 2009). Yet, results on the effects of economic conditions on religiosity are less consistent (Immerzeel/Tubergen 2013), and to the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to test for downward mobility effects on religiosity. In sum, I expect higher religiosity among downwardly mobiles (H1).

A second research gap to be filled by the present contribution concerns the relation of risk aversion and religiosity. While there is robust evidence on positive correlations between both constructs (Nousair et al., 2011), I argue that risk aversion moderates the effect of downward mobility on religiosity: the extent of risk aversion constitutes an internal condition that shapes how different actors define one and the same social situation (i.e., the experience of downward mobility). I suspect the risk averse among the downwardly mobiles to be more in need of religious support than their-risk-seeking counterparts, leading to higher levels of religiosity among the former (H2).

Third, following the Calvinist doctrine, Protestants should regard their worldly success more strongly as an indicator of their salvation hereafter than Catholics: “The rationalization of conduct within this world, but for the sake of the world beyond, was the consequence of the concept of calling of ascetic Protestantism” (Weber 2005 [1930]:100). Hence, Protestants should try to compensate their experience of worldly failure by both worldly and otherworldly forms of religiosity, while Catholics, having regarded upward mobility as an end in itself, may directly turn to otherworldly forms of religious compensation (H3).

Data and variables
I will rely on several data sources to test my hypotheses. First, I will use several waves of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to analyze how risk aversion moderates downward mobility effects on the importance of religion. Second, selected waves of the Dutch LISS Panel can be used to study if risk aversion is a moderator of potential downward mobility effects also on other worldly forms of religiosity such as praying or belief in the existence of heaven and hell. Third, pseudo-panel techniques of the European Social Survey allow explicit comparisons of worldly and other worldly forms of religious practices. Wherever possible, cross-lagged path analyses will be used to control for endogeneity bias, while multiple group comparisons allow for significance difference tests of both mean structures and slopes between religious denominations.

Tentative results

Preliminary results based on HRS data suggest that counterintuitively, downward mobility exerts a negative effect on church attendance—which is slightly more pronounced for the risk averse. In contrast, there seems to be a tendency for a positive downward mobility effect on the importance of religion for the risk averse but a negative one for the risk seekers.

**Effects of Global Economic Integration and Domestic Institutional Quality on Within-Country Income Inequality: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis of 89 countries from 1980 to 2010**

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Policy makers around the world are concerned about the increasing levels of income inequality, particularly within-country income inequality. Within-country income inequality has adverse and multi-faceted impacts resulting in social, economic and political exclusion. This paper aims to add to the literature by understanding income inequality in its relation to economic globalization and domestic institutions. The paper attempts to analyze the impact of economic globalization and domestic institutions on within-country income inequality in 89 countries across three decades (1980-2010). It attempts to study the impact of the major modes of global economic integration: trade openness, financial openness and foreign direct investment, and the quality of domestic political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions on within country income inequality using an econometric analysis. As a second level of analysis, polity 4 score is used to assess the impact of economic globalization and domestic institutions on income inequality based on the level of democratization of a country (represented by polity scores for Autocracy, Anocracy and Democracy). The objective is to study the relative significance of each of these factors using proxy variables in explaining within-country income inequality.

Methodology: A large and diverse dataset is used to represent a global setting.

In order to test the hypothesis, a panel regression is run with GINI index and Income share of the poorest 20% as the dependent variables. A Multiple Panel Data Linear Regression is used to analyze the model. All independent variables are converted to moving averages. The dependent variables: gini index and income share of the lowest 20% are converted to moving averages with 5 forward and one existing observation. The independent variables are: Foreign Direct Investment, Trade openness, Financial openness, Quality of political institutions, Quality of economic institutions, Quality of legal institutions, Control variables: Secondary School enrollment percentage, Population, GDP Per Capita.

The following model is used for the econometric analysis (’Ma’ or ‘MA’ means Moving Averages):

Ma GINI Index = 5 year Lagged GINI, Trade Openness, Financial openness, Foreign direct investment, quality of political institutions, quality of economic institutions, quality of legal institutions, Control Variables – log population (MA), log gdp per capita(MA), log education (MA)

Multiple iterations of the model are used to study the impact of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables. The income share of the poorest 20% is also analyzing using the same set of independent variables. Panel data linear regression in STATA is used to analyze the model. Moving averages are taken for the all the variables in order to account for the time lag effect of independent variables on gini index. The regression is run with Heckman selection and bootstrapping estimation, in order to account for the selection bias in missing data, especially for the dependent variable. The Heckman selection model assumes that gini index is more likely to be reported if the country has a high GDP Per Capita, better legal institutions and a higher Polity 4 score. Bootstrapping allows minimizing error by running regression on multiple samples of the same dataset. Regressions are run on repetitions of 500 to minimize error due to selection bias, randomness and interaction effects.

Main findings: Overall results indicate that there is a strong correlation between the quality of economic institutions and income inequality and this holds true for most of the countries in the dataset regardless of levels of economic development or democratization. Better quality economic institutions are also associated with lowering the share of income for the poorest 20%.

Political institutions do not appear significant in explaining income inequality; however, they seem significant for explaining income share of the lowest 20% in Anocracies. Legal institutions seem almost always associated with lesser inequality. Economic globalization variables have rather mixed results, hinting at the importance of domestic variables in explaining within country income inequality. Economic globalization has a mixed impact on income inequality and it is definitely lower in strength and less significant in explaining inequality as compared to domestic factors. Political institutions do not seem significant in most cases, except in Anocracies, where their impact on income share of lowest 20% seems significant. Higher trade openness lowers the income share of the lowest 20% in Anocracies. Financial openness seems to lower inequality in most cases except for democracies, where it is associated with an increase in inequality and a lowering of the income share of the lowest 20%. Foreign direct investment is associated with lower inequality in most cases.
For the sake of the children? A longitudinal analysis of residential relocations and school performance of Australian children.

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In this research, we adopt a life course perspective to study the associations between children’s residential relocations and their academic performance. Drawing on longitudinal data from a representative sample of 3,509 millennial children from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children’ (LSAC-K), we examine age-specific performance of primary school children (NAPLAN test scores and teacher’s ratings) conditional on childhood relocation trajectories. Preliminary findings reveal that relocations during school-age, over long distance, and highly frequent display moderate negative associations with school performance, especially at earlier school stages. In contrast, children who only moved before school age outperform children who did not move by age 10/11. Next steps include analysing between- and within-individual variation using panel data methods to assess whether the empirical associations are due to pre-existing differences across children or changes in academic performance of same children. We will also tease out how family and residential environments explain the observed associations.

The impact of parental education on university grades. Evidence from a large German student survey

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Motivation and research question

International and German studies among university students show that social origin affects academic success. For Germany, this is especially interesting as social selectivity is high in the German education system. The system is characterized by early tracking and high differentiation. Students from lower social origin are less likely to obtain a higher education entrance qualification and if holding one, their likelihood to enter higher education is lower and especially low for research-based universities compared to students of higher social origin (Mayer, Müller & Pollak, 2007). Thus, the student body in research-based universities is highly selected. Students from low social origin who enter university against the odds have successfully overcome many obstacles throughout their educational career. We could thus assume that those students possess the same formal (school leaving certificate) and informal (e.g. competences) qualification for succeeding at university. Yet, studies show that social origin, and especially parental education, affects the grade point average (GPA, as one dimension of study success) in tertiary education (Clifton, Perry, Roberts & Peter, 2008; Smith & Naylor, 2001; Walpole, 2003). University grades, and particularly the final grade point average, are highly relevant for the labor market. By this means, origin effects on grades contribute to disadvantage highly educated people of lower social origin even after their studies. Against this background the question arises which mechanisms can explain the social origin effect at university level? For years the entry rates into tertiary education have increased in Germany. Likewise, the student body has become more heterogeneous. Especially in light of the changing student body, it will be of interest how social origin in higher education is mediated into social disadvantages. The goal of this presentation is to analyze how differences in parents’ education influence university grades.

Theoretical framework

We know from the international literature several explanatory pathways. However, so far those pathways have neither been tested in a systematic fashion, nor at the same time. Research on social origin, potential mediators and success in higher education is fragmented, refers to different theoretical and methodological frameworks and is carried out in different disciplines that hardly refer to each other. Only few studies analyze the actual effect of social origin on grades at university (e.g. Stephens, Hamedani & Destin, 2014). Also, we lack findings for the German context (an exception is Bargel, 2007). My contribution is to help fill this research gap by identifying relevant mechanisms known from previous studies and to compile and integrate them in an interdisciplinary explanatory model. Consequently, my research refers to different theoretical frameworks.

According to the current state of research, studies from mainly psychology show that some of the internal characteristics which foster good grades vary by parental education due to origin-specific socialization (Kaiser & Diewald, 2014). Among the psychological factors that are likely to mediate the social origin effect on achievement are learning- and achievement motivation, academic self-concept, academic self-efficacy, concentration and conscientiousness (Big Five) (e.g. Robbins et al., 2004).

From sociological research, we know that students’ study resources like their social, cultural or economic capital depend on the social status of their parents. While the effect of economic constraints on achievement can be explained straightforward through a lack of time for studying due to employment, the effect of social and cultural capital is more indirect. Being well-connected within the student body and to the teaching staff facilitates mobilizing support resources when encountering academic obstacles. Eloquence is an implicit grading criteria and socially appropriate behavior facilitates integration into the academic environment. Both dimensions of cultural capital have been shown to affect achievement (e.g. Thomas & Quinn, 2007).

The aforementioned influencing factors do not necessarily have a direct effect on grades. Rather, they are connected to study behavior which in turn affects students’ performance. Consequently, study related behavior like lecture attendance, time-management or test anxiety are incorporated as well, as research in educational sciences has shown that variation in this behavior correlates with grades (e.g. Kuh, Kinzie, Buckley, Bridges & Hayek, 2007).

Data

We collected data for the project among university students in Germany. The target population is defined as all regular students at German research-based universities (students at universities of applied sciences and at colleges of art, film, sports or music are not included). 93 public and private government recognized universities were asked for participation in the online-survey. 14 institutions
(dispersed over Germany offering a wide variety of subjects) invited their entire student body to participate in the survey in the beginning of 2016. Although random sampling of students within institutions was not possible, every student within a cooperating institution had the same probability of being invited to the study, thus approximating our “sampling” procedure to random sampling. Consequently the coverage error was reduced significantly compared to convenience sampling. N=12,460 Students completed the survey.

Analytical strategy

Using these data, different analyzing steps are necessary in order to answer the research question. First of all, the assumed mechanisms are analyzed separately in mediation models. This is to answer the question whether the theoretical explanations of why we find significant differences in average grades by parental education, actually holds true for the German case.

Secondly, those assumed mechanisms which empirically proved to be actual mediators for the effect of parental education on grades are combined in one model. To test whether competing explanatory mechanisms cancel each other out, I use multivariate linear regression with robust standard errors (to account for the hierarchical data structure) to test the different mechanisms under study.

Main findings

Preliminary findings show GPA disparities by parents’ education. Taking into account mean differences in GPA by subject area, I find significantly better grades for students whose parents both hold a university degree in comparison to students where one or no parent holds a tertiary educational degree.

References


Thinking about Dividing the House: Taiwanese Women’s Attitude toward Divorce, 1985-2010

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Studies show that, whereas highly educated women were more likely to divorce than low educated women, the pattern has reversed in many countries (Chen 2012; De Graaf and Kalmin 2006; Harkonen and Dronkers 2006; Hoem 1997; Park et al. 2008; Raymo et al. 2004). Mirroring the educational crossover in divorce behavior, women’s attitude toward divorce also shows an educational crossover: among more recent cohorts, the less educated tend to be more open to divorce than the more educated (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Martin et al. 2006; Schoen et al. 2000). While scholars find that divorce attitudes and behaviors closely align, studies often focus on divorce attitudes in Western societies, where societal development, educational expansion, and gender equality took place over a long period of time. In areas that experienced rapid development, trends in divorce behavior and attitude may be less aligned, as one may fall behind the other. However, whether and how divorce attitude relates to divorce trends in these societies is not entirely unclear.

This study examines women’s divorce attitudes in Taiwan. Specifically, we ask whether the less educated women are increasingly open to divorce than their higher educated counterparts when divorce is increasingly concentrated among the less educated. Taiwan offers an opportunity to examine whether and how divorce attitudes align with trends in divorce behaviors because of its educational crossover in divorce behavior in the past few decades (Chen 2012). Taiwanese society developed rapidly, exhibiting some of the highest rates of socioeconomic development, educational expansion, and institutionalization of gender equity arrangements. Yet, there
Taiwanese women’s attitude toward divorce has evolved across three time points that cover three decades. We combine the surveys in 2005 and 2017 to represent the attitude observed in the beginning of the 21st century. For the purpose of this study, we focus on women ages 25-45 in each wave (N=2,357). We then excluded the respondents who did not provide information on education, work, marital status, or divorce attitude. The final sample consists of 2,300 women.

We measure women’s divorce attitude with one question asked across all surveys: “To what extent do you think the following is wrong? Getting a divorce because the husband and wife can’t get along.” Respondents’ answers were coded into five categories (1=seriously wrong, 2=very wrong, 3=somewhat wrong, 4=no opinion, 5= not wrong at all), with higher numbers showing more acceptance of divorce. Our key independent variable is women’s education. Since education rapidly expanded between 1985 and 2005 (combined with 2010) and the proportion of women’s with higher education increased substantially, we categorize education into relatively low, middle, and high levels of education in each decade. In other words, instead of using nominal categories of education (such as middle school, high school, or college education), we create relative education measures that roughly correspond to 0 to 50 percentile (low education), 51-75 percentile (middle education), and 75 percentile above (high education) of the schooling distribution in each survey. The results do not change when we substitute relative education by their nominal levels of education. In estimating the relationship between education and attitudes toward divorce, we control for other demographic characteristics, including age, labor force participation, marital status, and whether the respondent has children (Martin et al. 2006; Yi and Jao 2013). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all used variables.

We first descriptively examine the trends in attitudes toward divorce by education by presenting mean values of attitudes toward divorce for each level of relative education in each survey year. In doing so, we pay particular attention to whether educational crossover in divorce attitudes took place in Taiwan. We use ordered logistic regression to examine whether the relationship between education and divorce attitudes remains and if temporal changes remain intact after taking to account other individual-level characteristics. In our models, we first examine the effect of education and periods, which is represented by survey year. We then investigate whether the effect changes when controlling for demographic characteristics. Finally, to clearer understand the effect of relative levels of education and periods, we include interaction terms (education and survey year) in addition to demographic characteristics.

Our findings show that women of all relative levels of educational hold increasingly open attitudes toward divorce (see Figure 1). While lower and middle-educated women were against the idea of divorce to comparable degrees in 1985, the gap increased in 1995 and stabilized in 2005 and 2010. Higher-educated women also demonstrated increased openness towards divorce, and the attitude gap between them and middle- and lower-educated women remained stable between 1985 and 2010. In other words, all women exhibited increased acceptance toward divorce, and we do not find ceiling effects on higher-educated women’s attitudes.

Examining the associations of divorce attitude with other demographic characteristics, we find that education is significantly related to attitude toward divorce (see Table 2). Being higher-educated is significantly associated with higher degrees of openness toward divorce after controlling for other characteristics. Younger women were more open to the idea of divorce. Similar to findings in the U.S. (Martin et al. 2006), labor force participation is significantly positively related to openness toward divorce. However, unlike Martin et al.’s finding, the effect of women’s levels of education holds after controlling for work. On the other hand, having been married and having children were negatively related to acceptance of divorce. The interactions in Model 3 shows that the higher educated women in later periods (1995 and 2005-10) hold more open attitudes toward divorce.

Overall, our findings differ from the American findings around the same period (Martin et al. 2006) and points to a misalignment between changes in divorce attitude and behavior. It should be noted that we do not gauge the causal relationship between attitude and behavior, nor do we argue against the educational crossover in Taiwan. While we find continued, increased acceptance toward divorce among all education levels, to the extent that there may be lagged diffusion in value change, it is likely that educational crossover has not taken place. However, since the degree of divorce acceptance for higher-educated women approached the maximum value (at 4.5 out of 5 in 2005/2010), the educational crossover point may be as high as near universal-acceptance. The limitations notwithstanding, women’s value change carries implications for general social change and gender norms. Our next step is to investigate how men’s attitude toward divorce may differ from our findings on that of women’s. To the extent that the alignment of social values and behavior patterns contribute to social and marital stability, our findings point to important changes in gender ideology and inequality in Taiwanese society and elsewhere.
Why do the affluent find inequality in Germany increasingly unfair? Objective Inequality and Justice Perceptions in Germany, 1984-2014

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Since the beginning of the 1990s, social inequality in Germany is rising. This involves the polarization of income and wealth as well as a decrease in social mobility and an increase in poverty (Frick/Grabka 2009; Pollak 2010). Especially between 2000 and 2007, inequality and poverty in Germany have grown faster than in any other OECD-country (OECD 2008). Furthermore, poverty remains high and persistent in individual life-courses (Groh-Samberg 2015) even though employment rates grow and the impact of the financial and economic crisis has not been as severe as in other countries. What are the consequences of these developments for perceptions of (in)justice?

Existing research suggests that objective trends in inequality are not necessarily reflected in societal fairness perceptions (Kenworthy/McCall 2007). Rather, rising inequalities translate into critical fairness judgements only to the extent that individuals realize and evaluate inequality as problematic. Yet, studies show that rising inequality in Germany has indeed triggered an intense media response, as objective developments of inequality and media reporting on these issues are closely related (Schröder/Vietze 2015). At the same time, perceptions of injustice in recent years have also increased (Noll/Weick 2012).

Therefore, we hypothesize that citizens in Germany observe and realize the development of objective inequalities. Concentrating on the evaluative dimension of perceptions of inequality—i.e., (in)justice judgements—we assume that assessments of societal differences as unfair are closely related to the development of objective levels of inequality themselves. Furthermore, in contrast to theories of individualization, we expect that high and low income groups differ in their perceptions of injustice. Based on the argument of pure self-interest, the poor should evaluate inequality more critical than the affluent. Moreover, their assessment should have become more negative, as they are the losers of the described inequality processes, and they hardly benefited from income growth in recent years.

Thus, in the first part of our empirical analyses, we examine whether changes in objective inequalities are associated with changes in perceptions of justice on an aggregate level. Using OECD macro data and the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) for the years 1984-2014, our findings show that since the beginning of 2000 the development of objective inequality and justice perceptions runs parallel. Thus, there is a strong and significant correlation between inequality—as measured through the poverty rate and the gini-coefficient—and justice perceptions on the macro level.

To test whether this is due to an increase in injustice perceptions among the poor and to control for possible composition effects (i.e. a growing number of people with low incomes) and other individual covariates, we conduct multivariate logit regressions pooled across four time periods to analyze the over-time development of fairness perceptions across different income groups. Surprisingly, our findings show that—in stark contrast to our theoretical assumptions—the overall growth of injustice perceptions cannot be explained by a rise of unfairness judgements among lower income groups. Instead, we find that the the overall pattern is due to changes in the attitudes of high-income groups. Interestingly, among affluent respondents (more than 200 percent above the median income) there was a steady increase of injustice perceptions since 2000, which reached its peak in 2010 and slightly declined again thereafter (without returning to its initial level in 1984). In contrast to our expectations, the perceptions of low-income groups remain more or less stable over time, resulting in a convergence of the perceptions of different income groups. These results also hold in the multivariate analyses: We find a positive interaction term between time periods after 2000 and high-income groups in comparison to the end of the 90s. Finally, we analyze how the increase of injustice perceptions among the affluent as well as the convergence with middle- and low-income groups can be explained and why there was no increase of injustice perceptions among the poor, although they felt the negative impacts of recent inequality developments more acutely than other income groups.

We consider diverse explanations, derived from different theoretical frameworks, including: social comparison processes/relative deprivation of the rich due to income gains of the very rich; future economic expectations; changing values of individualism and collectivism; and information about political processes as indicated by political interest. We also consider the influence of intergenerational social mobility. Our results of different logistic regression models show that none of these factors can entirely explain the shift of injustice perceptions of the affluent as the interaction effect between being in a high-income group and the most recent time span (2009-2014) remains stable in all our models. Further investigation will focus on the question whether there is a general value shift of the affluent towards increasing solidarity or a genuine effect of the financial crisis.

Literature:
Outgroup trust, poverty, and diversity: Evidence from 30 countries

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Introduction

Recent research has shown that trust toward outgroups is strongly related to economic inequality and ethnic diversity. However, the results of empirical studies often stand in contradiction to one another and the mechanisms that are responsible for the effects of inequality and diversity on trust are not clear and often debated. This research examines the relationship between the extent that individuals trust members of outgroups and how this trust is mediated by poverty and ethnic diversity, focusing on the conditions under which outgroup trust develops or flounders.

In recent times, two major concerns have arisen in many Western countries: That rising socio-economic inequality on the one hand and ethnic diversity due to increasing migration flows on the other hand threaten the integration and cohesiveness of societies. A growing body of research investigates the relationship between ethnic diversity, inequality, and cohesion. A salient aspect of this research suggests that the level of trust within the society is a key determinant of the ability of a society to cope with such changes and maintain cohesiveness. In places where there is a high level of trust, research suggests that institutions, markets, and societies appear to function better. On the other hand, in societies with low levels of trust, it is more difficult for new-comers to be integrated and for contracts to be completed leading to a higher likelihood of costly market failures. The question is whether people lose trust in contexts where economic inequality and diversity is on the rise and if so, to what extent this leads to a decrease in the cohesiveness of societies.

Theoretical framework

With respect to inequality, we see at least three mechanisms at work that explain why poverty affects trust. First, regarding the SES-effects on trust one would expect a compositional effect: A higher inequality could result from higher proportions of poorer people, diminishing trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) due to the well-established negative relationship between trust and both neighbourhood SES (Letki, 2008) and neighbourhood diversity (Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000). But higher inequality could also suggest that as the proportion of wealthier people rises, the overall level of trust is increased. Second, increasing poverty is believed to lower trust because of the increasing dissimilarity between social groups which derives from heightened inequality. Evidence for this proposition has been found repeatedly, both at the national level (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005) and at the local and regional level (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Increasing poverty signals decreasing chances of upward mobility for the lower classes and increasing threats of downward mobility especially for the middle classes, lowering outgroup trust—particularly in the case of immigrants who are perceived as competitors for scarce resources.

With respect to the impact of diversity, the results reveal an even more inconsistent pattern. Some studies report the commonly expected negative effects of diversity on trust or related aspects of social cohesion. For example, Putnam (2007) reports a negative relationship between diversity on trust of both in and outgroup status, as well as within neighborhoods. Recent studies point to the fact that diversity may have different, even contradictory effects on aspects of trust (Schmid, Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2014). On the one hand, diversity may have a negative effect on trust since people might be likely to believe that they would not be able to connect or associate with people from a different background, with the end result being a lowered level of social trust (Dinesen and Senderskov, 2015; Gisberts, Van Der Meer and Dagevos, 2012). Moreover, the conflict-hypothesis suggests that perceived threats of “outsiders” might evoke conflicts over scarce resources, lowering outgroup trust in particular (while possibly heightening ingroup trust at the same time). Because of this “dissimilarity-effect”, mere exposure to dissimilar others may (directly) diminish social trust. On the other hand, diversity fosters more intense contacts to diverse others—particularly in large urban centers—and repeated, intimate contacts help to diminish prejudices and to develop common values and norms, which in turn enhances tolerance to outgroups and thereby social trust according to the contact hypothesis (Schmid, Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2014). Especially “bridging ties” between ethnic groups (as opposed to “bonding ties” within these groups) are useful in this respect (Laurence, 2011). Thus, diversity seems to have a positive effect on trust by enlarging opportunities to develop beneficial social ties to dissimilar others. Whether these two opposing effects mount up to a positive or negative overall-effect on trust depends on various factors. Regarding bridging ties, diversity seems to have negative effects for people without bridging ties and none for people with such ties, so all factors contributing to the development of bridging ties are of great importance Stolle and Harell (2013).

Research questions

Thus, the three main research questions of the study are:

1. What is the effect of poverty on outgroup trust?
2. What is the effect of diversity on outgroup trust?
3. How does the interaction between poverty and diversity affect outgroup trust?

Additionally, the research weighs in on the theoretical debate regarding the relative explanations offered from the conflict and contact hypotheses.
Data and methods

To address these research questions, our research utilizes data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (spanning the years 2005-2008) for 30 advanced, OECD countries. In addition to a series of control variables, our outcome variable of outgroup trust, is measured according to a series of items regarding whether people trust individuals of another nationality, another religion, or who they are meeting for the first time. We also examine ingroup trust which we conceptualize as individuals trusting (or not) family members, neighbours, and friends. For national characteristics, we focus on the ethnic diversity and poverty rates of the various countries, examining data from the OECD for the corresponding survey year as well as the rate of change over the previous 5 and 10 years. Additionally, we also examine the employment rates of countries to examine if that is a moderating factor. We use multilevel regression models to assess variation at the individual and national level with individuals nested within countries. All models specify a variance component for clustering at the national level.

Findings

We make three primary contributions. First, confirming earlier research (e.g. Delhey and Welzel, 2012), we find there to be a strong relationship between ingroup and outgroup trust within a country. That is, contexts that exhibit high levels of ingroup trust often also exhibit high outgroup trust. But our research suggests that this is not universal to all countries under examination which leads to our second finding that a society’s outgroup trust is greatly affected by the degree of poverty within societies. We show that outgroup trust is not automatically decreased by increasing diversity, but that if increasing diversity takes place in the context of high levels of poverty, regardless of whether the poverty rate is increasing or consistent overtime, outgroup trust is negatively affected.

Third, after examining both over time changes and static conditions of ethnic diversity and poverty, the analysis suggests that the positive effect of ethnic diversity on outgroup trust is strongest in countries where ethnic diversity and poverty are consistent over time suggesting that it might be sudden changes that increase distrust of outgroups. We observe that there is no positive effect in the most prosperous and developed societies where fast-growing diversity due to immigration in the last decades is a vital and contested issue in national public debates unless the poverty rate has also increased. In the short term, ethnic diversity generated by recent and rapid immigration may not foster trust across different cultural groups, as argued by contact theorists (and might even have deteriorating effects). In the long run, however, ethnic diversity seems to have the potential to breed trust across different cultural groups. We conclude that increasing poverty signals decreasing chances of upward mobility and economic security for the lower classes and increasing threads of downward mobility especially for the middle classes, lowering outgroup trust—particularly in the case of where immigration is perceived to increase competition for increasingly scarce resources.

References


Stratification of education systems. Towards a shared definition

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The main research question of my dissertation is why do countries show different patterns in the associations of the OED triangle? Comparative literature analyzing the effect of social origin on education (OE) as well as the effect of education on destinations (ED) has already considered the stratification of education systems as a possible explanation. However, such studies suffer from two pitfalls.
First, the lack of a clear and detailed definition of what stratification means. For each study, ad hoc definitions are employed, often developed on the basis of the specific countries analysed. Being not comparable, such definitions are not entirely available to the field. Second, directly related to the previous one, the effect of stratification has been rarely explained at the micro-level. As the degree of stratification increases, scholars are expected to find stronger effect of the independent variable (either social origin or education) but the theoretical mechanisms explaining how such macro effects come about at micro level are still unknown.

I address the abovementioned shortcomings accounting for the micro-level theories dealing with OE and ED associations. Discussing the rational action framework (as recently proposed by Breen, van der Werfhorst, and Jäger (2014)) and the training costs model (Glebbeek, Nieuwenhuysen, and Schakelaar 1989), I identify 5 characteristics of stratification that are supposed to lessen or amplify the effect of social origin on education as well as the effect of education on destination. Doing so, a new definition of stratification of education system is provided.

The characteristics of stratification theoretically discussed are:
1) when the first allocation into different curricula takes place;
2) the number of curriculum to choose from;
3) the criterion upon which such allocation is based;
4) the consequences of such allocation (accounting for both the rigidity of the system and the direct access into tertiary education).

To measure the degree of stratification of education systems, the abovementioned country-level characteristics are collected and analyzed for several European Countries (i.e., those participating in all the rounds of the European Social Survey that is the main data source for the macro-micro analyses). This paper indeed aims to generate a new, theoretically driven, index of the stratification of education systems.

After discussing which macro-level characteristics must be accounted for in explaining micro-level effects of stratification, the next step is to identify the corresponding empirical indicants (summarized in Table 1). Besides being the most popular dimension, timing of selection is the only indicator that has been consistently operationalized so far (Schulz, Ursprung and Wößmann 2008; Brunello and Checchi 2007; Bol and van der Werfhorst 2013). Accordingly, the proposed indicator measures when the first allocation into different curricula occurs.

Although less famous than the first one, the number of curriculum available has been increasingly employed in empirical research (Ammermüller 2005; Marks 2005; Horn 2009; Bol and van der Werfhorst 2013). Apart from Ammermüller's (2005) study, all the above mentioned analyses employ the indicator computed by the OECD. The OECD measure refers to a specific point in time i.e., when students turn 15. As a consequence, this indicator provides an unbiased measure of the number of school types available only for those countries that select at upper secondary level. In contrast, I propose that to measure the number of curriculum available, it's important to collect, for each country, the number of curriculum students choose from when the first selection takes place.

When it comes to selection criterion (ability-based versus self-selection), Horn's (2009) analysis is one of the few OE studies that accounts for such aspect. As for the number of school options available, the proportion of schools that used students' ability as a selection criterion refers to a particular point in time within students' educational career. On the contrary, my third indicator is whether the first allocation is based on either students' ability or self-selection.

As already mentioned, the consequences are distinguished into: system mobility (or rigidity) and enrolment opportunities at tertiary level. Considering both, one can measure the formal and the empirical indicants. While the formal indicator accounts for what is formally stated at national level (i.e., does the system allow mobility between curricula? Are vocational graduates allowed to enrol at tertiary level without obtaining additional degrees?), the empirical one accounts for the actual percentage of students who changed their curricular locations, as well as the actual percentage of vocationally trained school leavers who directly enrolled at university institutions. Since no empirical studies have measured these concepts before, there's no conventional way to proceed. The best strategy is to collect both formal and empirical indicants and to use both of them in the analysis.

Since these 7 indicators are supposed to define the level of stratification in a given country, by means of factor analysis, they are grouped in a lower number of unobserved variables. The advantage of such practice is that the subsequent analyses do not need to include all the 7 indicators, but only the restricted number of identified factor(s). This gain becomes even more important when analyses aim at country-level effects on micro-level outcomes relying on a limited number of countries (as in this case). As a result, the main research question of the paper is do the seven indicators belong to the same underlying factor?

Since the indicators are supposed to empirically measure the five characteristics of stratification theoretically derived, I expect to find only one single factor.

**The effect of school choice on student’s academic performance**

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Without changing the amount of government resources allocated to schools or the quality of teachers, changing how students are assigned to schools alone can affect various student outcomes. Thus school choice is widely used as a policy tool in the hopes of improving student and school competitiveness. Whether school choice can indeed achieve these goals, however, is highly controversial.
Proponents of school choice emphasize that allowing families to choose which school their children will attend would improve school-student match quality and also incentivize public schools to become more productive (Friedman, 1962; Hoxy, 2000). Opponents argue that school choice would segregate the student body along socio-economic status lines and high-ability students would benefit more from enhanced choice than low-ability students (Carnoy, 2000; Epble & Romano, 1998; Levin, 1998). Positive spillover from high-achieving students to low-achieving students would become much smaller if a few elite schools manage to cream-skim. On the other hand, there are also studies that find no or only small differences in achievement from expanded school choice (e.g., Rothstein 2007).

In this paper, we examine the effect of school choice on students’ academic performance by studying the introduction of open enrollment in Seoul, Korea. Seoul had effectively retained a within-district random assignment program for over three decades until 2009. With the onset of open enrollment in 2010, however, middle school graduates could apply to any high school in the city (regardless of school zone). The transition occurred without any phase-in or trial period, instantly affecting all students in Seoul regardless of demographics. Such policy change in a large metropolitan area provides an undoubtedly useful experiment to investigate the effects (and side effects) of enhanced school choice.

To capture the effect of school choice, we use 2010–2012 data on second year high school students’ National Assessment of Educational Achievement (NAEA) test scores in Korean, English, and math and exploit the fact that only students who entered high school after 2010 and lived in Seoul were affected by the policy. The data is collected by the Ministry of Education and Korea Education and Research Information Service and is provided via EduData Service System (EDSS). NAEA, designed by the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation, is annually taken by second year high school students (11th grade) at the end of their first semester. The test covers the previous year’s entire (10th grade) curriculum in three subjects: Korean, English, and math. Thus students who took the exam in 2010 are those that entered high school in 2009 – before the education reform in Seoul. Students who took the exam in 2011 and 2012 are the first and second cohort under the enhanced school choice system, respectively.

Difference-in-differences estimation indicates that, on average, the treatment effect is about -0.04 standard deviations in English and math – that is, school choice did not improve average student outcomes in Seoul (Table 1). In order to explore differential treatment effects within Seoul, we further investigate how school choice affects students by school type (Table 2 & Figure 1) and their relative position in the test-score distribution (Figure 2). We find that first, regular high schools and existing elite high schools were hurt by the policy whereas newly converted private high schools gained. As a result, the gap in students’ academic performance across schools widened in Seoul. Second, although we find a small increase in the relative achievement of high-performing students in Seoul, the drop in low-ability students’ relative test scores is more prominent and is observed across a wider range of the test score distribution, particularly in math. This implies that the expansion of school choice may have adverse effects on the peer environment and learning atmosphere of disadvantaged students.

Can Education Solve Suicides? The Compositional Effect in Educational Stratification of Suicides in 20 European Countries between 1994 and 2013

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We examine the relationship between education inequality and suicide rates in 20 European countries between 1994 and 2013. The aim of the text is to explain the relationship between educational expansion and decreases in the suicide rate (on an aggregated level) – as illustrated by Figure 1. Could educational expansion be the cause of the decline in suicide rates in European countries? Would better education significantly reduce suicides on the European continent? To answer these questions and to unpack the relationship between educational inequality and suicide rates, we analyze data from 20 European countries covering the time from 1994 to 2013. The data come from the World Health Organization’s Mortality Database and contain detailed information on numbers of suicides by country, year, and five-year age groups. To complete the dataset, we include population size for each country, year, and age group and also the measure of educational expansion (percentage of the population with tertiary attainment) for each country and year. The analysis consists of two steps. First, we analyze suicide data as population data from an age-period-cohort (APC) perspective (IE – intrinsic estimator approach for identification APC models) and identify all three effects separately (sociological macro-level). Our results show that the decline in suicide rates in European countries in the analyzed time frame is driven more by cohorts than periods. This finding implies a cohort replacement explanation and a compositional effect in suicide decline (changes in the educational structure of populations). Secondly, we transform suicidal data into individual data (sociological micro-level) and analyze them from a multilevel (hierarchical) perspective (CCREM – Cross-Classified Random-Effect Model). The effects of age, period, and cohort have been identified in this approach, controlled for educational expansion. The results show that there are significant differences in the number of suicides among European countries and analyzed years. We also document that educational expansion influences suicides via birth cohorts. The compositional effect has been identified: changes in educational structure (higher number of people with tertiary education) have a positive effect on the decline of suicides in European countries.

Inequality of Educational Aspirations: Social influence or rational choice?

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Research Question & Background

The determinants of students’ educational aspirations are analyzed. In particular we are interested in the question to what extend these determinants mediate effects of students’ social background on their aspirations. In educational sociology there is a controversy
surrounding the determinants of educational aspirations. Frequently, the Wisconsin Model of Status Attainment (WSC) and Rational Choice Theory (RCT) have been utilized for explaining educational aspirations. Both theories predict different determinants and these predictions have not been tested simultaneously in the same analysis. This is surprising since social differences in the level of aspirations are considered to be one of the most important factors for explaining social disparities in educational participation and success (Maaz, Baumert & Trautwein, 2011). However, in order to undertake effective interventions to reduce inequality in aspirations and educational opportunity, the reason for these disparities needs to be known. The aim of this contribution is to test the conflicting hypotheses of WSC and RCT about those factors which are assumed to mediate the effect of social origin on educational aspirations with data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) in Germany.

Theory & Hypotheses

In educational sociology it is common to refer to so called push and pull factors (Gambetta, 1987) for classifying the determinants of aspirations. Push-factors describe social and structural constraints that pre-structure students’ educational carrier. In this perspective students’ passively follow their pre-determined pathways. The WSC is one prominent theory in this line of research (Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 1970). It assumes that students’ educational aspirations are the result of significant others’ aspirations and expectations. The students’ achievement motivation is shaped through socialization by and imitation of the social context. Contrary to this, RCT is frequently utilized to explain pull-factors. In this line of research actors decide actively between alternatives on the basis of future oriented cost benefit calculations. They choose the alternative with the highest subjective expected utility (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Esser, 2000). In the case of RCT aspirations can be understand as a summary evaluation of a certain educational option, based on its utilities, costs and success expectancies. It can be hypothesized from both theories that social differences in the level of students’ educational aspirations either will be mediated by differences in the level of aspirations/expectations of significant others (WSC) or by differences in the costs, success expectancies and the motive of status maintenance (RCT).

Data

Data source are the first three waves of the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), Starting Cohort Grade 5. The NEPS sample includes in total 4.989 students from regular schools. The data is collected annually with paper and pencil questionnaires from students and with computer assisted telephone interviews from the parents. The analysis sample is restricted to cases, where interview data from both, students and parents, is available. Class repeaters and students who have not yet reached secondary school in the first panel wave were excluded from the sample. All together 2.487 were available for analysis.

Analytical Strategy

Binary logistic regression analysis was utilized to examine in a first step differences in the level of students’ aspirations according to their EGP-class of origin. In a second step the determinants of aspirations predicted from the WSC, the classmate’s ambition as well as the aspirations of friends and parents, were added in the model. The goal was to assess the magnitude by which effects of students’ social background were mediated by the WSC determinants. The assessment of the RCT determinants followed the same procedure. Finally, the explanatory power of both theories were tested simultaneously in a combined model. Missing values in the variables of interest were imputed by using multiple imputations (m=100) from Stata 12.1. The regression parameters for the EGP-class of origin were made comparable between the hierarchical logistic regression models using the KHB method, proposed by Karlson et al. (2012).

Results and Conclusion

The results with respect to the predictions of the WSC shows significant effects of the friends and in particular of the parents’ aspirations on the students’ ambitions. The substantial disadvantage of students with working class background is found to be completely mediated by their significant others’ lower aspirations (in particular by those of their parents). The results with respect to the predictions from the RCT shows that the anticipated determinants such as labor market utility and motive for status maintenance exert substantial effects on the level of students’ aspirations. Since the inclusion of these factors substantially reduce, but not completely explain the direct effect of social class of origin, they can be regarded as partial mediators only.

The simultaneous test of the determinants of both theories reveals that in the case of the WSC parents and friends’ aspirations remain significant, even when controlling for the RCT variables. In contrast, the explanatory power of the RCT factors is considerably reduced, when controlling for the aspirations of the significant others. Additionally, the RCT factors do not add explanatory power to the one of the WSC. These findings confirm the importance of the social environment for explaining students’ aspirations and effects of social origin herein. Consequently, policy measures that aim for desegregation of friendship networks between adolescents and emphasizing the (labor market) value of education seems to be effective for raising educational aspirations.

**Women’s Employment on the Frontline: Muslim Women in Jerusalem, 1980-2009**

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This research focuses on the unique conditions of Muslim women in Jerusalem. It is almost half a century since East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel, and we hardly know anything about the social and demographic characteristics of its Palestinian inhabitants. Palestinians in Jerusalem live under very different conditions than both Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians who live in the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This paper is among the first attempts to investigate their lives. We focus on Muslim women and inquire into their educational achievements, family characteristics, fertility, labor force participation and its determinants, occupational enrollment and its correlates, part-time versus full time work, and earning attainment and its determinants.

Throughout our analysis we compare our target population to two other Muslim groups: (1) Muslim women living in ‘mixed’ Jewish and Arab-Palestinian cities in Israel which as ethno-religiously heterogeneous urban communities are the most similar communities to
Jerusalem; (2) the major group of Muslim women in Israel who unlike the Jerusalemite women live in purely Palestinian villages and towns in more rural areas. In several of the analyses we also compare Muslim women in Jerusalem with their male counterparts in the city and with Jewish women in Jerusalem. We base our analysis on Labor Force Surveys (1979-2009) and the 1995 and 2008 Censuses.

Jerusalem's Muslim women live in the largest city in Israel, in a center of government, tourism, and religions, and at a point of encounter between the West Bank and Israel, and between the south and north of the West Bank. Since the Israeli annexation the state has poured huge budgets into developing the city and turned it to a busy metropolitan center. One could expect that with so much activity, the employment rates of Muslim women would be higher than in less developed urban communities.

Yet this is not the case. In spite of the seemingly favorable conditions in Jerusalem, the employment rates of Muslim women have been very low even compared with the low labor force participation rates of Muslim women in Israel proper. This is especially evident when we look at labor force participation rates of women with higher education: About half of them do not participate in the labor market. We believe that the special circumstances under which Palestinians in Jerusalem live account for this reduced participation. Three major problems are identified and explained in the paper.

First, although numerically Palestinians are a stronger minority in Jerusalem than in any of the five other-ethno religiously heterogeneous cities, politically they have less power because they do not take part in municipal elections. As a result the services that cater to Palestinians are much fewer and smaller. This fact means that there is less demand for highly-educated Arabic speakers for social services relative to other Palestinian communities under Israeli rule.

Second, the Israeli government has used its augmented power and resources to enlarge and advance the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and rather than sharing the fruits of development with Palestinians, has tried to limit their number, tacitly slowing their economic development and pushing them to leave the city. In Jerusalem Palestinians are also less likely to find employment in state bureaucracies, a major employment option for Jewish women and men.

Third, Jerusalem is on the front line of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the violent clashes between the two sides and the measures taken by Israel in response to them have severely damaged the Palestinian economy in Jerusalem. Arab Jerusalem used to be an economic hub where West Bank merchants, politicians, artists, and activists met. The city provided various services to the whole West Bank and was a place where dozens of NGOs operated. Since the first Intifada, movement into Jerusalem from the West Bank has become more difficult, and hardships have increased even at the time of the Oslo Accords, as well as later during the second Intifada. The separation barrier has parted several neighborhoods of Jerusalem from the rest of the city, making the search for jobs even more difficult.

The impact of these problems is evident in the stagnation and decline of educational achievements and employment in contrast to their rise among all the other Palestinian groups that live under Israeli rule. We suggest that this comparison of Jerusalemite women and Palestinian women citizens in Israel indicates that structural conditions are the major force behind low female labor force participation and not cultural preferences of the women themselves. Other indications are the very narrow occupational enrollment of those Jerusalemite Muslim women who have entered the labor market. Those women are mostly employed as teachers and nurses, indicating that Muslim women are blocked in many other occupations. The very low earnings of Muslim female employees and the disadvantage in converting their human capital into earnings might be considered as further structural impediments that keep women away from employment.

**Gender differences in early career mobility of university graduates in Switzerland**

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Theoretical Framework

In contemporary labour markets, men and women do not hold the same hierarchical positions. It follows that status and income are not equally distributed (England 1992; Reskin and Bielby 2005; Dressel and Wanger 2010; Holst and Wiemer 2010; Ochsenfeld 2012; Reskin and McBrier 2000). Also in Switzerland, women hold management positions less often than men. In 2014, 4.1% of the employed women and twice as many men, 8.6%, held a management position (SLFS 2014). In the management boards of the 100 largest Swiss companies only 6% were women. In supervisory boards their share was 15% in 2015 (Schillingreport 2015). Also, several studies show that the career start is significant for later labour market outcomes (Barone and Schizzerotto 2011; Buch and Hell 2014) and that the educational degree is crucial for getting a good first job as well as for subsequent upward mobility (Bukodi and Dex 2009).

Previous research demonstrates that part of these inequalities in career outcomes can be explained by differences in human capital, horizontal sex segregation and the fact that women often interrupt their careers or work part-time because of family duties (Falk 2005; Ochsenfeld 2012; Bihagen and Ohls 2006; Holst and Wiemer 2010; for Switzerland: Bühl er and Heye 2005; Epple et al. 2012; Oberholzer Michel 2003; Rost 2010). So far, however, it is less clear whether the remaining difference is due to self-selection or discrimination. Therefore the proposed paper asks whether the remaining differential in career outcomes between men and women is due to lower career aspirations of women. This paper goes beyond existent research in two aspects. In contrast to most labour market surveys career aspirations will be considered and longitudinal data will used.

Higher education graduates do not substantially differ in their human capital and mostly they do not have children yet. This eliminates some of the main reasons for unequal career outcomes. Despite this fact, Imdorf and Hupka-Brunner (2015) show some evidence of vertical segregation in Switzerland at labour market entry among higher education graduates (see also BFS 2015). Whether these findings still hold when the relevant factors influencing career outcomes are controlled for has not been examined so far (notable
exceptions are Leemann et al. 2010; Schubert and Engelage 2010; 2011, but only covering academic careers inside universities). This paper seeks to fill this gap by analysing the career start and its development in the first years after graduation of Swiss university and university of applied sciences graduates. The following hypothesis will be tested:

Net of human capital, horizontal sex segregation and sociodemographic factors, differences in career outcomes can be explained by unequal career aspirations among men and women.

Conversely, if gender differences remain also after controlling for career aspirations, discrimination as a possible source of inequality cannot definitely be ruled out.

Data
The data used in this paper is the Graduate Survey of the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics from 2003 to 2013. This panel survey is conducted every two years and covers graduates of all Swiss universities and universities of applied sciences, including teacher education. Each survey consists of two waves, one year and five years after graduation. It covers topics of education, transition to the labour market and characteristics of occupation. The dataset includes information about the occupational position, for example whether a person holds a job in the lower, middle or upper management, whether he or she has a supervisory role or is responsible for budget decisions.

Unlike most other labour market surveys in Switzerland, the graduate survey also contains questions about career aspirations. They cover several aspects of work values and work orientation, such as, for example, the importance of pursuing a career and earning a high salary, combining work and family life, having a job that corresponds to one’s own convictions, or having a good working atmosphere.

Analytical Strategy
So far, results on gender differences in career outcomes in Switzerland are either merely descriptive or based on cross-sectional data. This paper aims to shed light on the processes that lead to the known unequal outcomes in career success by analysing the early years using panel data. In particular, it will be tested whether upward career mobility between one year and five years after graduation depends on initial career aspirations (net of human capital, horizontal segregation, sociodemographic factors, and other control variables).

First, gender differences in career aspirations and career outcomes one and five years after graduation will be described. In a second step, using logistic regressions, different models will be calculated to examine the influence of career aspirations on career outcomes for men and women.

Preliminary descriptive results
In line with previous research (eg. Chevalier 2007; Vianen and Fischer 2002), preliminary results show gender differences in work values and career aspirations. Men clearly more often put emphasis on good career prospects, high salary and the prestige of a company when they are looking for a job (differences range between 12 and 15 percentage points). Considering work-life or work-family balance, differences are less clear-cut. For men it is almost as important as for women to find a job near where they live and to reconcile family and work (difference of about 5 percentage points). There is a certain inconsistency though, as men clearly less often indicate that they want to find a job near where their partner/family/friends live and they especially less often give importance to working part-time than women do (difference of 20 percentage points).

In total, one year after graduation 25% of men, but only 16% of women hold a management position and this gap widens over time. Five years after graduation 36% of men and 24% of women hold a management position. University graduates with a Ph.D. and graduates of the university of applied sciences more often hold a management position. In contrast, graduates of the university of teacher education, almost never hold a management position (on average less than 5%).

The observed pattern indicates that career aspirations might be a factor contributing to the career gap between men and women. How strong the relation is net of human capital and other control variables will be evaluated using multivariate models following the analytical strategy outlined above.

Literature
The Emergence of Contact with Natives among Turkish Men and Women in Germany: A Gender Perspective

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This paper looks at the emergence of contact with natives of Turkish men and women in Germany. Many studies have shown that for immigrants contact with natives has beneficial effects in many areas. Migrants who have native friends or a native partner, for example, are more likely to be employed, to earn a higher income, and to obtain a higher occupational status than immigrants who lack such bridging ties (Duveender, 2001; Kanas et al., 2011; Lancee, 2012).

Despite the many studies which look at the consequences of social networks of migrants, little is known about how these networks emerge and which factors promote and which hinder contact with natives (exceptions are Lancee & Seibel 2013; Schacht et al. 2014). Moreover, the question of gender in this regard has been predominately neglected. This is surprising as gender is still one of the most prevalent determinants of employment and family trajectories. This might be even truer for immigrants who still often follow traditional gender roles which massively impacts their life course. In therefore contribute to the existing literature by looking at the emergence of contact with natives among immigrant men and women in Germany. I thereby focus on Turks which are one of the biggest immigrant groups in Germany and their social integration is still heatedly disputed in academia and public.

I study two outcomes: first, I look at the frequency of contact to natives in order to measure the exposure towards the native community. However, since social capital is not only built by exposure but also by intensity of these relations, I also look at close friendships. For example, Turkish women might be less likely to have frequent contact with natives, however, the contacts they have are of close nature and therefore benefitting these women.
I start with the general assumption that Turkish men are better socially integrated than Turkish women and continue with explaining these gender differences with two main explanatory factors: First, Turkish men face a much better opportunity structure than Turkish women. One of the most important loci for meeting natives is the workplace. Though many Turks also work in ethnic niches, the majority is employed in occupations where natives are employed as well. Also, Turkish men seem to obtain better host-country language skills than Turkish women, a development which is also likely to be linked to the workplace. Hence, Turkish men have better opportunities to meet natives and to communicate with them than Turkish women. This is likely to affect not only the frequency of contact with natives, but also the emergence of close friendships with natives.

Second, social contact is determined by social distance (Bogardus 1959). The more similar people are in terms of their appearance and values, the lower the social distance and the more likely they are to get into contact and even to become friends. One important indicator of social distance is discrimination. The higher social distance, the more likely discrimination occurs. Some studies indicate that Turkish women are more prone to discrimination than Turkish men (Kaas and Manger 2003). Reasons are not well studied yet but two factors might be relevant: First, migrant women experience a ‘double disadvantage’ in society: they possess migration background and are women. Both factors lead to discrimination and to increased social distance. Second, many Turkish woman wear a headscarf which stands for the incompatibility of western and Muslim values, thereby further increasing the social distance between natives and Turkish women.

To test these hypotheses I analyse data from the ‘Social Cultural Integration Processes’ Project (SCIP) (Diehl et al. 2015). The Survey was conducted among Turks and Poles who migrated within the last 18 months to Germany, which a follow-up survey around 1.5 years later. This data has two main advantages: First, the panel structure allows for better causal references. Second, this data is one of the few which looks at recent migrants and their socio-cultural integration. Studying integrational developments in the first years after arrival is crucial, as they determine immigrants’ integration into host-society on the long run (Fuller & Martin 2012). Hence, immigrants who manage social integration in the first years after arrival are likely to experience positive labor market outcomes later in life.

The results indicate that Turkish women are less socially integrated into the host-society than Turkish men. Around 25% of women report that they never spend time with natives, compared to only 9% of Turkish men. Also, around 44% of Turkish women report to have only Turkish close friends compared to only 31% of Turkish men. Hence, Turkish women are much more embedded in their ethnic niche than men. As hypothesized, the main reason lies in the differences in employment status of men and women. Turkish women still are predominately caretakers which affects their chances of getting in contact with natives. Further analyses also reveal that having small children are a major impediment towards social integration of Turkish women. Speaking the host-country language and education also explain part of the gender gap, however, to a lesser extent than labor force participation.

However, contact to natives is also hindered by experienced discrimination. Turkish women report more discrimination than men. Also, women wearing a headscarf are much less likely to have contact with natives or have native friends, than women without a headscarf and men. Hence, one reason could be that natives hesitate to get into contact with Turkish women because of the increased social distance and as a reaction, Turkish women tend to not get into contact with natives.

References


First Generation Graduates and their Life Earnings: Intergenerational Education Mobility in Israel

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Since 1995, Israeli higher education system has undergone a remarkable expansion of both number of students and number of higher education institutes (Ayalon and Yogev 2005; Menahem, Tamir, and Shavit 2008). Thus, for example, between 1990 and 2010 the number of students has increased almost fourfold, from about 55,000 in 1990 to 190,000 in 2010, and the number of higher education institute has increased from 10 in 1990 to over 55 in 2010 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2012). These changes in the structure of the educational system are translated to intergenerational education mobility, particularly mobility into higher education. Consequently, growing number of ‘first generation students’ (FGS) enter higher education. This study examines changes over time in the socio-demographic correlates and determinates of this growing population in Israel, as well as the labor market consequences of FGS.
Spiegler and Bednarek (2013) in their international literature review on qualitative and quantitative research of FGS show that the focal points in FGS research concern their pre-college and family background characteristics, decisions about institution, degree and subjects, FGS’ experiences at university, and academic outcomes. Generally, the literature reveals a picture of FGS as a group at risk in terms of access, experience and success at university, as also the MMI hypothesis would postulate.

Less is known, however, about the labor market consequences of FGS. One possible outcome of the increase in graduates in the workforce, is that newcomers (i.e., FGS) enter at the bottom of the wage hierarchy for educated people, and over time – as the relative size of FGS increases – the variation in the income distribution of FGS is increasing as well as the gap between them and non-FGS is increasing. Put differently, the expansion of higher education might have – unintentionally – contributed to a raise in income inequality in Israel.

Data for this project come from linking the 1972-1983, 1983-1995 and 1995-2008 Israeli censuses to generate intergenerational files. To these files we then link registered life history information on individual income from employment to date. This unique data-set will enable us to compare trends in the income distribution with that of educational credentials with high quality data, in a period of dramatic raise in income inequality (Dahan 2001; Kristal 2013).

Origins matter: Educational selectivity and immigrants’ labor market performance
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RESEARCH PROBLEM

“Migrants are not a random sample of the population at origin” (Lee 1966: 56), but differ in certain characteristics from individuals who stay. One of the most frequently addressed attribute is immigrants’ skill level.

Consequences of educational selectivity have been studied in different disciplines and with regard to different outcomes such as income (e.g., Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1987), education (e.g., Feliciano 2005, 2008; Ichou 2014) or health (e.g., Weeks et al. 1999).

One of the central research questions in this context is whether immigrants’ selectivity has an enduring impact on integration. While such a link has been repeatedly observed, less attention has been payed to the underlying processes (Gans 1999; Heath et al. 2008). The proposed paper focuses on the relationship between educational selectivity and a crucial aspect of integration, that is, the labor market performance of immigrants.

CONTRIBUTION

It contributes to the existing literature, first, by addressing the relationship between educational selectivity and immigrants’ occupational status in the country of destination. The paper points to the necessity to pay closer attention to the enduring influence of pre-migration characteristics and to explicitly focus on the processes by which educational selectivity affects immigrants’ incorporation.

Second, the account is substantiated for various immigrant groups who came to different Western European destinations during the past decades. This contrasts most of the existing research which focuses on migrants in single countries.

Empirically little is known about how immigrant educational selectivity affects labor market outcomes. Therefore, third, based on data of the European Social Survey (ESS), we present analyses on this relationship.

WHY SELECTIVITY MATTERS

In Western Europe, most research on ethnic inequalities in the labor market has focused on the typical disadvantages which immigrants frequently have experienced. Since many of these immigrants worked in low-skilled jobs, it was often assumed that they were negatively selected in terms of their human capital. This assessment usually was made in comparison to the majority populations in the destination countries rather than in relation to the populations in the countries of origin. However, for a sending country in which the average level of education is lower, a medium educational degree is relatively more valuable than in a context in which the average level of education is higher and where most individuals complete at least a medium degree. The problem is that analyses on ethnic inequalities in the labor market typically make use of information on educational qualifications acquired in the country of origin as they translate into seemingly equivalent degrees in the destination country, while disregarding the relative position in the educational distribution of the sending country. We argue that, if an immigrant is positively selected, this should reflect in a more favorable occupational position, whereas in the case of a negative selection this influence should be zero or negative. Note that this reasoning applies to the individual and not the group level, so that within the same immigrant group, in principle, there can be positively and negatively selected individuals.

In order to account for the impact of educational selectivity on immigrants’ labor market performance, motivation is an important candidate. That is, if migrants are more selective in terms of education, “it is likely that they are also more selective in terms of motivation” (Van de Werfhorst et al. 2014: 253). This motivation can be a trigger for working hard. It might also reflect in a stronger drive to climb the occupational ladder; and it may lead to self-selection into contexts which allow acquiring relevant skills.

Another set of arguments emphasizes that post-migration socio-economic status is an incomplete indicator of social origin, as it does not reflect the pre-migration status (Ichou 2014). This status inconsistency or “status paradox of migration” (Nieswand 2011) implies that immigrants with a high relative education in the country of origin but a lower status position in the country of destination are still likely to “see themselves as having a high social status and behave accordingly” (Ichou 2014: 752). On the one hand, this subjective status perception can be related to a higher motivation to succeed (Destin et al. 2012). On the other hand, immigrants may display behaviors which correspond to their higher pre-migration status. These behaviors may promote occupational advancements. They may pay off, for instance, in the hiring or in other job-related selection processes.
Educational selectivity may also stand for important resources such as cognitive skills or other competences which are useful on the labor market. For example, language learning is easier for the better educated who progress faster and who therefore should acquire better language skills (Kristen et al. 2016). This higher level of proficiency pays off in the labor market (e.g., Dustmann/Fabbri 2003).

EMPIRICAL STUDY

The empirical study draws on the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) which, in addition to the majority populations, covers immigrants in a variety of destination countries. It is a cross-national survey that has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2002. We make use of data from 2004-2014 (rounds 2 – 7) which contain detailed country of origin data for foreign born respondents. The analysis will be confined to immigrants who have completed their education in the country of origin and lived at least 5 years in the residence country.

To consider the educational distributions in the countries of origin for the relevant age groups, we refer to the Barro-Lee data set. It compiles international data on educational attainment distributions from 1950 to 2010 in 146 countries (Barro/Lee 2012).

In the literature, different measures of selectivity have been applied (e.g., Borjas 1987; Cobb-Clark 1993; Dronkers/Heus 2010; Feliciano 2005, 2008; Ichou 2014; Levels et al. 2008; Van de Werfhorst et al. 2014). Following Ichou’s (2014) approach, we combine information from the educational distributions in the country of origin with individual-level information from the ESS. This allows creating a measure of immigrants’ relative level of educational attainment which captures the individual position in the educational distribution of the country of origin.

The primary dependent variable is organizational status (ISEI), derived from ISCO occupational coding. The data are modelled as multi-level data, with immigrants (level 1) being nested in birth-cohorts (level 2) nested in countries of origin (level 3) and cross-classified in countries of residence with fixed survey year effects.

Regional disadvantages and life dissatisfaction in Finland
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We analyze the effects of regionally accumulated social disadvantages and personal disadvantages on life dissatisfaction. Previous Finnish research of regional social disadvantages has mainly compared municipalities and rural regions to urban regions. Finnish studies of social segregation within urban regions has measured regional differences in large regional units which cannot capture the regional differences accurately enough. We analyze the regional differences and possible neighborhood effects in a smaller regional units than before.

We measure regional disadvantages by unemployment rate, school dropout rate and poverty rate. We used to cluster analysis to remove the effect of sociodemographic factors and to identify regions with accumulated social disadvantages. Personal social disadvantages are measured as straight as possible by using several objective indicators which corresponds with regional disadvantages. Both, indicators of regional and personal social disadvantages were included in regression analysis to explain subjective experience of life dissatisfaction. For our analysis we used high quality survey data (ATH) which was gathered from the six biggest cities of Finland (N=17748).

Our result is that even though personal economic problems and receipt of social assistance had stronger effect on life dissatisfaction than regional disadvantages, living in the region with accumulated social disadvantages increased the risk of life dissatisfaction more than personal school dropout and almost as much as personal unemployment.

Attitudes towards gender roles among teenagers in comparative perspective
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Despite women’s increased presence in the public and political sphere over the past decades in many countries worldwide, gender inequality is still present in various domains such as employment, pay, and the division of unpaid domestic work. Beyond many structural characteristics that keep women in a secondary position in society (e.g. lack of adequate family policies and childcare provision, glass ceilings etc.), scholars argue that traditional attitudes toward gender roles are also responsible for the persisting inequalities between women and men. However, while much previous research has focused on the levels, determinants and consequences of gender role attitudes among adults, less is known on what teenagers think should be the appropriate roles for women and men in society. In particular, we lack empirical evidence on cross-national differences in attitudes towards gender roles among young citizens.

Today’s youth is tomorrow’s adult population. Therefore, by investigating what teenagers think about women and men’s place in society, we can obtain a glimpse of the development of gender inequalities in the upcoming decades. This study adds to the literature on gender inequality by investigating the determinants of attitudes on gender roles among adolescent students in different contexts. In particular, we examine a) differences in attitudes towards gender roles between teenage girls and boys; b) the relationship between teenagers’ attitudes and the socioeconomic background of the family of origin, in particular parental level of education; and c) the relationship between attitudes, gender and parental education in comparative perspective. Drawing on Roger’s theory of the diffusion of innovations, we expect students with a better socioeconomic background to display more egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles, but we anticipate that the relation will be stronger in less developed countries. In our preliminary analyses, we focus on parental education as proxy for socioeconomic status, as research has demonstrated a tight link between education and attitudes towards gender roles.
To address our research questions we apply multilevel models to the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 (ICCS) conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The ICCS is specifically designed to study how young people are equipped to become citizens in 38 countries. It aims to measure attitudes and orientations taking a large comparative perspective. The ICCS is particularly suited for our scope as it includes a cross-country tested measure accounting for the students’ attitudes towards gender roles, which accounts for whether students think that i) men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government; ii) men and women should have the same rights in every way; women should stay out of politics; iii) when there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women; iv) men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs; v) men are better qualified to be political leaders than women. Moreover, beyond including information on the respondents, the ICCS includes detailed information about the parents.

Preliminary results based on random intercept-random slope multilevel models point to important cross-national differences in the relationship between gender and attitudes towards gender roles. As can be seen from Figure 1, the positive country-level random coefficients for gender indicate that girls tend to have more gender egalitarian attitudes than boys. Thus, the finding confirms a gender gap in attitudes among teenagers that has already been documented for the adult population. However, the figure also shows that gender differences are more pronounced in more developed countries, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). A possible explanation behind this apparently counterintuitive result could be that at lower levels of HD, both boys and girls have traditional gender role attitudes. In countries with higher HD, teenagers of both genders have more egalitarian attitudes, whereas development is more tightly linked with egalitarian attitudes among girls.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 2, instead, shows the relationship between attitudes, gender and maternal education by country. As can be seen, girls in all countries have more egalitarian attitudes than boys. Moreover, in virtually all countries, the association between maternal education and attitudes is greater for girls than for boys, suggesting that having a highly educated mother has a small albeit positive effect on egalitarianism but mostly among girls, while the effect for boys is negligible in most countries. Interestingly, preliminary analyses on the association between attitudes, gender and paternal education reveal a very similar pattern. Hence it appears that daughters of better educated parents are more likely to have gender egalitarian attitudes than girls and boys of less educated parents but also of boys with high educated mothers and fathers.

[Figure 2 about here]

Two considerations can be drawn from these preliminary results. First, the findings go against our expectation that parental education would have a stronger effect in less developed countries. Indeed, parental education appears to have very similar effects in most of the considered countries. Second, the results indicate that daughters are more responsive to parental education than sons. Hence, it could be that boys uphold more gender traditional attitudes even when their parents are highly educated because even in the most gender egalitarian contexts (e.g. Sweden and Norway) sons are nonetheless exposed to some form of socially accepted gender inequality. Hence, being subject to the influence of other sources (peers, media, other contextual factors) that emphasize traditional gender roles, it might be more difficult for them to pick up the inputs of highly educated mothers and fathers.

Literacy and Self Rated Health: The Role of Social factors of education and health system

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Literacy is one of the important factors that explains education effect on health. The strength of the impact of education via cognitive skills on health may vary by the macro-level social context. Under certain social structure, individuals may behave more in line with the behavioral assumptions (e.g., educational credentials are well matched with the level of cognitive skills and well-educated are better at using those skills) that explain the education effect on health than under other social contexts.

Current study will assess the associations between literacy skills and self-rated health after controlling for educational attainment across 19 countries using the 2012-2013 survey of Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). It will assess the extent to which country-level factors moderate the link between literacy and self-rated health using a two-level linear hierarchical multilevel approach. Particularly this study focuses on country-level between school inequalities in academic achievement and expenditure on health(% GDP) as main factors that could explain variations in the link between literacy and health across countries.

The positive coefficient of literacy indicates that literacy is positively related with better health outcome even after adjusting for educational attainment and other socioeconomic status in many countries. The significant and positive coefficient of the cross-level interaction between educational inequalities and literacy implicates that the literacy gradients in health are more pronounced in societies with unequal schooling system. In other words, larger effects of measured literacy on health in countries with a strong educational stratification implicate that information on health care productivity is not fully captured by education credentials.

Logistic regression: When can we do what we think we can do?

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Since the appearance of the overview article by Mood (2010) there has been a growing concern within sociology that the odds ratio can no longer be used in research. In particular Mood (2010, pp. 67-68) concluded:
1. “It is problematic to interpret log-odds ratios or odds ratios as substantive effects, because they also reflect unobserved heterogeneity.

2. It is problematic to compare log-odds ratios or odds ratios across models with different independent variables, because the unobserved heterogeneity is likely to vary across models.

3. It is problematic to compare log-odds ratios and odds ratios across samples, across groups within samples, or over time – even when we use models with the same independent variables – because the unobserved heterogeneity can vary across the compared samples, groups, or points in time.”

In this article I will argue that the first and the last of these problems actually represent desirable properties of the logistic regression model if one interprets the dependent variable, the probability, as an assessment of how likely it is that the event of interest happens. This article adds to this debate by stating that unobserved heterogeneity does have the effects as summarized by for example Mood (2010) and Auspurg and Hinz (2011), but that that does not have to be a problem and in many cases is actually desirable. The key difference with previous contributions is that a probability is considered to be an assessment of how likely it is that an event occurs. A probability should thus be dependent on the information available for making such an assessment; the more (mutually consistent) information we have the surer we are. In logistic regression the set of explanatory variables represents the information used for making such an assessment. So adding variables to a model that predicts a probability should result in different coefficients.

To be more precise, consider what one would expect if one adds an additional variable z, and that variable is relevant for predicting a probability. In that case one will be more certain after adding it. In other words, the probabilities should be closer to either zero (I am more certain that the event does not happen) or one (I am more certain that the event does happen). This should also influence the effect of other variables. Say I am interested in the effect of a variable x. Before adding the additional variable z the predicted probabilities should be further away from either zero or one compared to after adding that additional variable. As a consequence there is less room for the variable x to have an effect before adding z than after adding z. So adding the additional variable z should increase the effect of a variable, even if x and z are uncorrelated. The log-odds ratios and odds ratios from a logistic regression show exactly this behavior. So Mood (2010) was right when she noted in the first problem that these coefficients are dependent on which variables are included in the model even if those additional variables are uncorrelated with the variables of interest, but that property of logistic regression is actually desirable instead of being a problem.

The size of the effect on a probability is a function of how certain we are that the event of interest happens. This degree of certainty can change by adding a variable as discussed above, but it can also differ from group to group. Here we would expect stronger effects in groups where are more certain. Within groups were we are more certain the predicted probabilities can get closer to zero or one, so there is more room for a variable to have an effect. Logistic regression coefficients have exactly this property. So rather than making odds ratios incomparable across groups, this property of logistic regression ensures that a comparison of odds ratios give an accurate description of the difference in effects across groups.

The comparison coefficients across models is more complicated. The purpose of such a comparison is often to see how much of an effect can be explained by a set of intervening variables. One first estimates a model with the explanatory variable of interest but without the intervening variables and then a model with both the explanatory variable of interest and the intervening variables. The difference in effect of the variable of interest between these models is interpreted as the part of the effect that is explained by the intervening variables. However, this does not work with logistic regression, since adding variables will change the effect even if the added variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variable of interest. So Mood’s second problem is a real problem.

To summarize, the three problems with logistic regression stated by Mood (2010) are not as bad if we interpret the dependent variable, the probability, as an assessment of how likely it is that the event of interest occurs. In that case one can conclude that:

1. The odds ratio is a meaningful effect-size. The fact that it is dependent on which variables are included in the model is not a problem but actually a requirement for an effect on a probability.

2. It is indeed problematic to compare coefficients across models with different sets of explanatory variables, since effects on probabilities are supposed to change when variables are added to the model even if they are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables.

3. A comparison of odds ratios across groups provides an accurate description of the difference in effects across these groups.

**Economic inequality among children in low-fertility societies: Focusing on Japan from a cross-national perspective**

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1. Aim of the study

This study examines economic inequality among children in societies with relatively low fertility rates. The second demographic transition has been described as closely related to expanding inequality among children (Mclanahan 2004), but no systematic consensus has been reached about the relationship between fertility rates and inequality among children. The fertility rate is an indicator of how many women aged 15 to 49 have children, and inequality among families with children is an indicator of how unequal their children are. These two indicators are related, but they must be interpreted with caution because they differ across life stages. Their relationship is not a simple one. Societies with low fertility do not necessarily feature high economic inequality among children. For instance, Germany displays a low degree of economic inequality among children, while its fertility rate is relatively low among advanced capitalist societies.
Income inequality is examined on two levels: between-group and within-group inequalities (Western, Bloome, and Percheski 2008). Western, Bloome, and Percheski (2008) claim that within-group inequality largely explains the increased income inequality among families with children in the United States. In this study, I focus on economic inequality within families with children.

Japan has suffered from very low fertility rates since the mid-1970s; as a result, the number of families with children has decreased. Japan has introduced several policies to increase fertility rates, without success, over the last 25 years, and Japan’s social security system faces severe budgetary constraints, mainly due to the aging population. More importantly, income inequality among children cannot be ignored.

To clarify Japan’s situation, I employ a cross-national comparison. I compare Japan to Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan, Germany, Spain, and Taiwan have low fertility rates and the others relatively high ones. I focus on the redistribution between families with and without children and the significance of the mother’s income in explaining income inequality among children.

2. Data

My Japanese data are taken from the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions (CSLCJ), and data for the other societies are drawn from Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS). The CSLCJ is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of households conducted annually by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare and is rich in detailed income sources for household economies.

Income inequality is measured as the post-transfer disposable equivalent income (with equivalent income calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size). Two measures of income inequality are used: the Gini coefficient and the squared coefficient of variance (SCV) for decomposing income sources.

3. Background and preliminary findings

Figure 1 shows the trend in total fertility rates among the societies studied. The figure shows that 2000 is the turning point for changes in fertility. The United Kingdom, Sweden, and France begin an upward trend after 2000, while the rates for low-fertility societies Japan, Italy, and Spain begin to converge after that year. Taiwan eventually attains the lowest global fertility rate. After 2000, national differences in fertility become pronounced, leading me to wonder why.

Figure 2 presents the simple relationship between the total fertility rate and the Gini within families with children aged 17 and under, showing three distinct groups among the low-fertility societies: high-, middle-, and low-inequality groups. Japan and Germany belong to the third group and Italy and Spain to the first. Differences appear in the extent of the economic inequality among low-fertility societies, and I will discuss why such differences exist.

First, I will examine the economic gap between families with and without children. I will also examine the degree of redistribution across families. Second, I will discuss the impact of the mother’s socio-economic status on her children’s economic well-being. Finally, I will show how the mother’s income explains the degree of economic inequality across low-fertility societies.

Japanese families with young children have received a limited degree of redistributial benefits, as have families in Taiwan. Both societies have a welfare system for young families that is less developed than in European societies; children’s economic well-being is determined almost entirely by the parents’ economic status. In such a situation, it can be difficult for children to escape from a disadvantaged family background.

The contribution of a mother’s income to the household is more or less limited in low-fertility societies. The incomes of mothers in Japan, Spain, and Italy seem to have limited impact in explaining economic inequality among children, on average. However, Spain and Italy have more well-paid double-income couples than does Japan; thus, economic inequality among families with children is higher in Spain and Italy than in Japan. Ironically, therefore, the increase in the number of well-paid mothers does not seem to be negatively associated with fertility, while economic inequality has remained stable along with gradual increase in fertility since the mid-1990s in both Italy and Spain.

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Elderly Europeans’ participation in paid and unpaid work. Can welfare state typologies predict productive ageing regimes?

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The share of people aged 50 and older has increased considerably in the past decades in all European countries and will continue to grow with the ageing of the baby boomer generation. Our article focuses on chances related to this demographic process, namely European elderly’s participation in different forms of paid and unpaid activities. Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the article provides in a first step an overview on country differences in European elderly’s participation in employment, informal care for elderly relatives and volunteering in clubs and associations. In a second step, we assess the analytical potential of different welfare state typologies, using linear regression models. Existing welfare state typologies either do not address the specific situation of the elderly as in the case of volunteering typologies or address the issue only as part of a larger picture as in the case of caring classifications which analyse child and elderly care together in one typology. Our analyses measure in how far the typologies which
were developed for the general population are suitable for explaining country differences in the elderly’s participation in paid and unpaid productive activities. It is relevant to look more closely at specific welfare state typologies and the extent to which these models can explain the employment situation of women or unpaid productive activities.

Dependant variables are the participation rates on country level for employment, informal care and volunteering. We than calculate separate models for each typology using the country clusters as independent variables. For each of the three activity fields we compare the explanation power (R squared and Akaike's information criterion) of the available typologies.

We show that for labour market participation, Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology has more explanatory power for men as well as for women than Pfau-Effinger’s (2005) typology. As regards informal care regimes, the typology of Saraceno and Keck (2010) is more suitable than the typologies of Bettio and Plantenga (2004) or Haberkern and Szydlik (2008). And the voluntary engagement can be better explained with the typology of Pichler and Wallace (2007) than with the typology of Musick and Wilson (2008).

Those typologies are not just preferable as compared to the other models of our analysis, but they are substantially valuable for our purposes since they explain a substantial part of the variance in productivity of elderly across Europe. For men, Esping-Andersen’s typology explains 41% of the variance in labour market participation and for women even 56%. 40% of the variance in caring activities of men and 44% of women’s variance are explained by Saraceno and Keck’s typology. And for volunteering Pichler-Wallace’s typology explains 52% of men’s and 68% of women’s variance between countries.

We conclude that we can differentiate between three productive ageing regimes which roughly follow a north-south gradient.

The Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark) are overall most successful in encouraging productive ageing in various respects: First, they have a much more involved labour force, regarding both men and women. Second, they are more successful in encouraging unpaid volunteer work. And third they also manage to encourage additional help for family members in need of care.

Mediterranean countries fare very low regarding successful integration into the labour market of men and especially women aged 50 or older. At the same time, a relatively low percentage of elderly is involved in informal elderly care. What is very weakly developed in Mediterranean countries is the involvement in formal volunteering in clubs and associations.

Conservative and liberal countries have an intermediate position regarding integrating men and especially women aged 50 or older in the labour market, informal care provision for elderly family members and volunteering.

Post-communist countries are not so easy to classify. After the dissolution of the Soviet Republic, the former communist countries took different paths in restructuring society. Overall, post-communist countries have most similarities with Mediterranean countries but with many exceptions.

Our article shows that whether an elderly person actively participates in society is not just a question of individual life decisions, but it is also framed to a certain extent by the societal context a person is living in. In order to provide a theoretical explanation for these differences, we have to dig deeper into the countries’ institutional frameworks that influence elderly Europeans’ decisions for different types of paid and unpaid activities. This analysis provides a new dimension for examining economic inequalities in European welfare states.

Sources:

European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-6 (2014). Data file edition 1.0


The Intergenerational Patterns of Early Family Formation in Sweden

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Early family formation is related to parental family and social background. In this research, we shed more light to these associations by acknowledging family lives as biographically-constructed processes to the study of intergenerational patterns of early family formation. More concretely, we examine the alignment of entire sequences of family events during the teenage stage and the early young adulthood of parents and children. To this end, we deploy extensions of optimal matching analysis (a.k.a. sequence analysis) to analyse patterns in joint early family formation trajectories for parents-child dyads, and regression analysis to assess the correlates of intergenerational family patterns. Analyses are performed on a person-month dataset of union and family transitions between ages
The question of whether middle classes decline and social polarization grows has been central in the social sciences at least since Marx. In the United States, the dominant view has been that the decline of the middle intensifies social polarization and jeopardizes social cohesion. In Europe the dominant view has been that the embourgeoisement of the working classes and the expansion of the Welfare State have buffered class conflicts and reinforced social cohesion. But in the last years, and more so during the last economic crisis, sociologists have turned attention to phenomena like growing proletarization of middle classes, crisis in the welfare state, rising economic inequalities, stop in the ‘social lift’, etc. Our work is an attempt to test the degree to which these concerns find support in the evolution of income inequalities in Spain. Thanks to the European Household Panel and EU-SILC data, it is possible to trace changes in disposable income from 1993 onwards. We follow the recent work by Atkinson and Brandolini, who use two different approaches to define economic classes. According to the first, classes are defined by income quantiles, the variable being their shares in the income distribution; according to the second, classes are defined by income intervals, the question being the size of the population inside each class. In both cases, we insist upon the relevance of measuring income in constant terms. Our main results indicate that using income deciles as cut-points, income shares hardly change but mean income in constant terms increases for all classes, and more so for middle classes. Using relative income intervals as cut-points, class sizes hardly change; but when cut-points are set in constant terms, middle classes shrink, as well as poor classes shrink, and rich classes expand, the outcome being not polarization, but structural change. The main consequence of our analysis is that taking a middle term perspective dilutes disputes around middle classes and polarization.

Income Inequality and Patterns of Food Consumption in Russia

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Patterns of food consumption and expenditure are essential for consideration within both economics and sociology (Engel, 1857; Bourdieu, 1979). Following Engel’s Law, as income increase, the proportion of expenditures on food decreases. In other words, a higher income level allows greater investment in social needs such as health care, cultural events, travelling, etc. A well-known fact is that no one but Bourdieu made the most significant sociological contribution to the tackling of this problem by trying to explain Engel’s law with certain social factors determined since childhood and resulted in personal habitus of social agent. In his “Distinctions” Bourdieu analyzed the role of an individual’s social background and the taste of food consumption.

Even though this topic is well established in international sociology (Germov & Williams, 2008; Irala-Estévez, et al., 2000; Hupkens, 2000) and there are plenty of statistical studies in Russia measuring consumer spending on food, a wide research gap exists in the sociological explanation of taste and food consumption patterns relative to income level in Russian post-socialist society.

The main question that this paper addresses is:

Basing on the framework of the Engel Curve, how do consumer expenditures on whey, fats and carbohydrates-consistent food (dependent variable) change relative to the income level (independent variable)?

In other words, what food products do poor and rich Russians prone to consume more? Does it applicable to the Russian society that the richer people are, the more they consume whey-consistent food and the less they spend on fats and carbohydrates.

The “Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey”-2014 by the Higher School of Economics form the dataset for the analysis. The sample consists of households and counts 4714 observations. However, in the course of the analysis by consumer spending on the certain goods, due to missing values the number of observations varied from 132 (such as seafood) till 3921 (white bread).

• The given study employs the method of logarithmic regression as it fits consumer data best (Working-Leser Model). Consumption of the following products relative to income level was analyzed: fish, seafood, pork, beef, fats and bacon, potatoes, white bread, semi-finished and finished food.

• In order to normalize distribution and build valid regression models, both variables, namely, income level and food expenditures, were logged. On the second step, outliers and rough observations were deleted in order to receive a statistical significance of the models. By the end of the analysis, residuals were checked on distribution as well.

The following is a summary of the results.

1) Consumption of whey consistent products such as beef and pork does not increase with the growth of income level. It remains almost the same and therefore, these products can be considered as neutral.

2) The tendency to consume such products as fats and speck, white bread and potatoes does not change significantly in relation to the income growth: the regression line goes up at the beginning but then becomes almost parallel to the x-axis, so income growth does not affect the propensity of Russians to consume these goods.

3) The analysis has shown a trend of sustainable growth in seafood consumption relative to the increasing income. Thus, seafood can be considered the most desired luxury product. Regression coefficient for fish occupies the third place meaning that the richer people are, the more they consume fish.
4) A high regression coefficient for finished and semi-finished food appears to be probably the most surprising finding. Here one can make a few conclusions. Above all, the results testify that Russians do not use food consumption for status signaling. As long as household food consumption has no conspicuous effect, and an agent performs it in private, there is no need to spend money on expensive products. Definitely, even a rich consumer in Russia willingly eats white bread, potato, fats and bacon that are considered to be more commonly consumed by the poorer classes in developed countries. The fact that it applies to semi-finished and finished food is most of all surprising.

A collective habitus acquired during the years of the Soviet Union era and determining a so-called “taste of necessity” (Bourdieu, 1979) toward cheap and simple food such as bread, potato, fats and bacon, still dominates in the daily life of the Russians. A “taste of necessity” has institutionalized in a typical practice of everyday life and formed the contemporary consumer culture of Russians. Thus, there can be no holiday without bread and potatoes on the table.

Particularly, if one wishes to compare the patterns of food consumption in today’s Russia with the data of the USSR times, one will definitely notice a substantial positive trend. Consumer culture in the USSR was formed under the dictatorship of a dire necessity. According to the Soviet statistics, on the edge of the 40-50s, the household consumer expenditure of food accounted for more than 50% of income. In 1989 no significant positive change occurred, and this indicator accounted for 45% of a household income (Belova & Dmitriev, 1990). As I has already mentioned, today’s food consumption makes up 28.5% of a household income. Hence, in spite of a positive wealth accumulation dynamics, it is clear that cultural habits in consumption are much more static and still of the most importance. Probably, Russian society needs much more time to reconstitute the existing habitus in the patterns of food consumption.

Finally, a fact that contemporary upper class consists of new riches determines the popularity of cheap food among Russians. These people accumulated their wealth during a socio-economic transition of the 90th, but their cultural capital was quite low. Consequently, healthy lifestyle and nutrition are not a virtue for them, and the preference for semi-finished & finished food is clear as well. Even though Russia experienced economic growth after 2000, the culture of healthy lifestyle is not developed to this moment with regard to low income level of the majority of the Russian population and cultural habit to cheap and square meal obtained during the years of the Soviet era.

**Intergenerational transfer of high-ranking status in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe**

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**Theoretical background and the research problem**

Nee (1989, 1991, 1996) formulated his seminal theory of market transition based on Szelényi’s years of research (Szelényi 1983 and 1988, Konrád and Szelényi 1979). From the three theses of the theory, the following debate mainly concentrated on the first, the market power thesis. It postulates that as markets gradually replace state-controlled structures of the economy, the value of political capital decreases relative to political capital. In turn, direct producers benefit and former cadres (redistributors) lose (at least in relative terms) from the shift from plan to market. Several researchers, however, subsequently came to a different conclusion. For instance, Rona-Tas (1994) showed, based on Hungarian data, that former cadres have an advantage in corporate entrepreneurship. Several explanations, clarifications and modifications to the theory in order to account for the diverging results have been put forward over the years. Szelényi and Kostello (1996) brought attention to the caveat that neither markets per se nor redistribution per se define the fate of the former elite, but it is rather the larger macroinstitutional environment that plays the major role. Walder (2003) put forward in the same vein that in addition to the replacement of redistribution by markets, it is necessary to turn attention to how political connections impact control over finances and assets in the course of privatisation. In Gerber’s view, the former Communist Party members’ advantages are explained by structural conditions on the one hand (Gerber 2002), but on the other hand also by their superior human capital and unobserved individual characteristics which were a criterion for selection into the party in the first place (Gerber 2000).

Decades after the beginning of the transition, additional factors have been brought forward to shed light on former cadres’ advantages. One of these is the intergenerational transfer of advantage based on social and economic capital. Zhou and Xie (2015) came to the conclusion that social fluidity has decreased over the course of transition in China, increasing the inheritability of socioeconomic status. Walder and Hu (2009) found that the offspring of post-revolutionary elite members in China have an advantage at entering elite administrative posts. However, they do not claim it to be an inherent consequence of the transition from plan to market but rather an outcome impacted by the co-occurring political liberalisation. In several Central and Eastern European countries it has been found that intergenerational inheritability of status has in general increased during the transition (Bukodi, Goldthorpe 2010; Gerber, Hout 2004; Robert, Bukodi 2004; Saar 2011; Titma, Roots and Soidla 2010).

Whereas Nee’s market power thesis has in recent years been revisited from the point of view of intergenerational status transfer of the former communist elite in China, there is a gap to fill in this regard in Central and Eastern Europe. Hence our research question: What is the impact of socialist era managers on their offspring’s career outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe?

**Working hypotheses**

Based on previous research, we formulate the following working hypotheses.

H1: The offspring of socialist era managers have higher incomes, higher occupational position, and are more often in leadership positions and entrepreneurs.

H2: Intergenerational transfer of high-ranking status is greater in former Soviet Union countries than in other former Soviet bloc countries. We assume this to be the case because changes were more rapid and abrupt in the countries of the former group.
How Do Packages of Fringe Benefits Shape Economic Inequality? The Case of Precarious Work in the Israeli Labor Market

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Increasing economic inequality and welfare state retrenchment have drawn increased academic attention to the provision of fringe benefits. This current study examines which packages of fringe benefits exist in the Israeli labor market and how they relate to economic inequality, especially in relation to precarious work. Using Latent Class Analysis, multinomial and OLS models as well as the Israeli Social Survey data from the years 2010-2012, the current study offers the first empirical examination of the distribution of packages of fringe benefits in the labor market. Our findings reveal that there are four distinctive packages of fringe benefits: 1) Package with no benefits. 2) Package required by law. 3) Security package. 4) Package with all benefits. This paper relates the clustering of benefits to the general trend of increasing economic inequality by studying the association between unstandardized working arrangements and the likelihood of receiving specific packages of benefits. In addition, this paper shows how differences among marginal workers with regard to the likelihood of receiving the best packages are shaped by structural positions in the labor market. The findings suggest that the distribution of the packages of fringe benefits increases economic inequality in the labor market.

Nonstandard work arrangements, inequalities and employment regulation in the EU

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The demise of the standard employment relationship as the normative model of employment has been well under way across most industrial societies when the global financial and economic crisis struck in 2008. Although the origins of the crisis can be to a large extent linked to regulatory failure, the remedy applied to the European labour markets in the desire to create jobs and restore growth was based on more of the same, thus further deregulation. As a consequence, nonstandard forms of employment, including largely involuntary temporary and part-time work, currently constitute the majority of jobs created in the EU.

This paper aims to contribute to the debate about changes in the nature of employment by discussing some important consequences for workers as well as labour markets associated with these changes. The objective is to understand cross-national differences in job quality and patterns of labour market inequality and exclusion associated with nonstandard work arrangements across the EU. The paper is structured as follows.

The first section provides an overview of trends in nonstandard employment across the EU since the onset of the crisis. In 2008 (second quarter) 14.2% of employees in the EU28 worked on temporary contracts. Their share slightly declined after the onset of the crisis and in 2013 stood at 13.7%, corresponding to a net loss of nearly 1.7 million temporary jobs compared to 2008. This was driven mainly by huge job losses among temporary workers in countries hardest hit by the crisis and characterised by a high share of temporary employment (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece). The majority of the EU member states recorded an increase in the number of temporary jobs between 2008 and 2014. On the other hand, part-time work has been on the rise in the EU28 for quite some time and it is a trend that accelerated with the onset of the crisis. The net job growth in the EU28 between 2008 and 2013 was exclusively in terms of part-time employment.

The second section of the paper explores labour market inequalities in job quality associated with nonstandard employment. The analysis applies multilevel regression models, with individuals nested within countries, to the data from the fifth wave of the European Working Conditions Survey, which was conducted in 2010, and a sample of workers from the EU27 countries. The analysis focuses on four dimensions of job quality: income, job security, quality of working time and intrinsic job quality. Intrinsic job quality consists of four sub-dimensions, namely skills and discretion, social environment, physical environment, and work pressures (inverted). Nonstandard employment is defined as work based on temporary contract, fixed-term contract, temporary agency work or apprenticeship, and is compared to jobs based on indefinite contracts. In addition, a series of control variables account for
compositional factors. They include individual worker characteristics, such as gender, age and educational attainment. Furthermore, labour market compositional factors and job features are accounted for by occupational groups (ten groups based on 1-digit ISCO), sectors of economic activity coded into fourteen groups based on NACE rev.2 classification, and a number of weekly working hours.

Nonstandard contracts are found to be of lower quality on all dimensions of job quality selected for the analysis. The effects are somewhat reduced but remain statistically significant after accounting for individual and job characteristics. Overall, the results point to the persistent job quality penalty associated with nonstandard employment, while strong compositional effects suggest concentration of ‘bad jobs’ in certain segments of the labour force (vulnerable workers) and labour market (sectors and occupations).

The findings are contextualised by the consideration of patterns of labour market inequality and exclusion associated with lower job quality of nonstandard employment, i.e. trends in the in-work risk of poverty, patterns of individual labour market transitions, as well as volatility of the nonstandard labour market segment. Among others, those employed on temporary and part-time contracts saw the highest relative increases in in-work poverty risk between 2010 and 2013, suggesting a strong link between precarious work and poverty. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued (e.g. European Commission 2014) that temporary jobs, together with part-time employment, play a positive role in contributing to job creation. At a first glance, the data on hiring rates may appear to support this claim. For instance, in the EU27 (excluding France due to lack of data) in 2012, 58% of all hiring was through temporary contracts, while in Spain the proportion was nearly 90% (European Commission 2014c). However, over the same period in the EU27 (excl. France) permanent contracts remained at a stable level and temporary contracts shrunk by 3%, while in Spain permanent contracts shrunk by 3% (0.37 million jobs) and temporary employment shrunk by nearly 12% (a loss of 0.46 million jobs). Thus, if compared with changes in the volume of jobs, the hiring rates seem to reflect high turnover rates and high volatility of nonstandard employment, rather than any genuine employment growth.

The third and final section of the paper considers the role of employment regulation. A review of recent EU labour market policy responses to the crisis highlights the remarkable durability of the deregulatory rhetoric. The role, value and limitations of labour market regulation are discussed, and recommendations for the future are considered.

In sum, the rise in nonstandard employment, largely involuntary, can be expected to have negative consequences for labour market attachment, job quality, and career development, but also for productivity in the long run. The high volatility of temporary jobs points to an increasing risk of segmentation of the labour force, with low transition rates into permanent jobs and weak contribution to the net growth in employment. The findings point to the urgent need to redirect European-level policies and strategies. The objective for the future and for the revised Europe 2020 Strategy is to redefine employment recommendations and targets so that not only the number of persons in employment but also the quality of newly created jobs is monitored and assessed.

Resource-Sharing among Married and Cohabiting Couples. Insights from 31 European Countries

Patrick Prügel-Bennigsen, Katia Begall, Judith Treas

Resource sharing – economic and otherwise – is one of the prime principles of couple relationships. When partners specialize in labor market and homemaking tasks, the efficiency gains that accrued from specialization only worked to the advantage of both partners if the breadwinner’s earnings were shared with the homemaker. Today, however, single earner, married couples are no longer the most prevalent or ideal form of household organization. Both partners have usually been active in the labor market and built independent lives before entering a relationship. In addition, the rise in cohabitation and divorce means that more people will have comparatively tenuous, co-residential relationships with more than one partner during their lives. These developments make resource pooling a riskier and less efficient strategy (Lauer & Yodanis, 2011; Treas, 1993). This is especially true for cohabiting relationships with a lower level of commitment that lack common children or plans for marriage (Hiekel et al., 2014).

Our study contributes to the literature in two key ways. First, it is the first to examine resource-sharing comparing cohabiting and married couples in a large number of countries (31 European nations). Previous research on resource-sharing has considered fewer countries (Hiekel et al., 2014) or only addressed married couples (Lauer & Yodanis, 2011; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Second, we go beyond the dichotomy of pooled vs. separate accounts by examining the proportion of income each partner contributes to the common household budget. This enables us, first, to test whether both partners contribute equally. Second, we can examine equality in terms of relative and absolute contributions to the household. Put differently, we can differentiate between partners sharing the same part of their income or the same amount of money. This distinction is important for understanding the implications of household gender inequality for economic inequalities in the labor force.

Drawing on the transaction cost approach and theories of resource bargaining (Treas, 1993), we distinguish three individual-level determinants of resource-pooling: Expectations of continuity of the relationship (marriage versus cohabitation, spouse aged 70+), relationship-specific investments (children, union duration, home-ownership), and the ease with which contributions can be measured (both partners employed, self-employment).

The extent to which ‘separate purses’ or a ‘common pot’ is the most efficient strategy for managing money not only depends on individual factors, but also on the cultural and institutional context. Countries vary considerably in the occurrence and regulation of cohabitation, divorce rates, and laws on tax treatment of couples and property division in divorce. For instance, cohabitations are more marriage-like where they are more common. Multi-level analyses include information about the taxation system (separate, joint for married, joint), the matrimonial property regime (community of property, liability), and divorce and cohabitation rates.

We aim to answer the following research questions:
1) How are country-level legal arrangements emphasizing joint property in fiscal and property regulations related to income pooling among married couples and cohabiting couples?

2) Regardless of their individual circumstances, are cohabitors more likely to pool income in countries where cohabitation is more common?

Data and preliminary findings

We use data from the EU-SILC 2010 ad hoc module on ‘intra-household sharing of resources’ which contains information about 150,000 couples from 31 European countries. Our dependent variable is the share contributed to the common pot by each partner – drawn from the question ‘What proportion of your personal income do you keep separate from the common household budget?’

Table 1 indicates that approximately equal shares of men and women keep all or most of their income for themselves. More men than women contribute about half or more of their income to the common pot, reflecting the high pooling required by couples with women having no income. Nearly 60% of men indicate they pool all their income, compared to about 50% of women. Considering only respondents who actually have incomes, the proportion of men and women in the different pooling categories is virtually identical (58% among men, 57% among women). For income pooling, a comparatively high share of variance is at the country level (19% for women, 25% for men). The 31 countries give us sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate effects of country-level variables (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). For respondents with income, Figure 1 presents the percentage of men and women who pool all their income by country.

In our next steps, we predict men’s and women’s income pooling based on individual-level (marital/cohabitation status, age, children, relationship duration, educational attainment, employment status, home-ownership) and country-level (prevalence of cohabitation, divorce rate, tax regime, matrimonial property regulations) data, using multilevel (random coefficient) regression models.

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Subjective intergenerational mobility and income inequality

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Subjective intergenerational mobility and income inequality

Extended Abstract

In recent years, several studies have found that income inequality is negatively associated with intergenerational income mobility. This finding, known as “the Great Gatsby Curve” (Krueger 2012) received great media attention, due to the fact that it raises questions regarding the stability of the social order itself: When a society no longer provides opportunities that justify its level of inequality, what prevents its collapse? However, studies which measure mobility using other measurements of intergenerational mobility that are not based on income, such as occupational prestige or social class, have found less conclusive results. Most of these studies showed only low negative correlation or even no correlation at all between income inequality and occupational or class intergenerational mobility. These results suggest that the rising inequality does not affect equality of opportunities and thus will not produce such harmful consequences to society.

In order to provide a different perspective on these inconsistent results, and their perceived consequences, the current study evaluates whether the Great Gatsby Curve is experienced as such by individuals. To do that, I study how income inequality affects the subjective intergenerational mobility at the cross-national level.

The question whether people experience intergenerational mobility, regardless if it actually happened, has been mostly overlooked in quantitative studies (but see Kelley & Kelley, 2009). If people perceive themselves as mobile, or even as facing a high level of equal opportunities, they might be less bothered by income inequalities per se. In his 2012 op-ed in the New York Times, Paul Krugman, who referred to the Great Gatsby curve as “an evil to be opposed,” noted that in America, the public notion is of high level mobility, contrary to the data.

The association between subjective mobility and income inequality might explain if and how the Great Gatsby Curve is experienced by people. The Great Gatsby Curve effect stands in contradiction to the idea of fairness and justice in a society and might lead to...
social instability. On the other hand, if income inequality increases subjective intergenerational mobility, this could perhaps explain the relative social stability, even in countries with extraordinary high levels of income inequality.

Therefore, the questions in the centre of this paper are: Is the Great Gatsby curve experienced as such? Do people in unequal countries feel that they experience less intergenerational mobility than people in more equal countries (be it upward or downward)? Is the subjective experience of mobility affected by the level of inequality in a country?

In order to answer these questions I use the 2009 wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) dataset which contains information on intergenerational occupational mobility as well as subjective mobility perceptions. The data covers 40 countries, most of them European and the rest East Asian, South and North American, plus South Africa. The analyses in this paper proceed in two steps. The first is a simple descriptive scatter-plot of the proportion of the sample that experienced subjective immobility in each country, as a function of income inequality. The second analysis is consists of a multilevel binary logistic regression.

The dependent variable in the models is subjective mobility which was measured directly by the following ISSP Question:

Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t have one now). If you compare this job with the job your father had when you were 14 would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was)…

Respondents who answered “about equal” are considered not to have experienced mobility. This is the subjective equivalent of the reproduction diagonal measured in all the other strategies. The independent variables in the models include individual level variables and country level variables. As the main interested in the study is the effect of levels of inequality on individual subjective mobility variables I employ the Gini coefficient, after tax and transfers, at the household level obtain form the World Bank and the OECD data for 1990. At the individual level I control for gender and age. The dependent variable is the (log odds ratio of the) respondent’s experience of subjective reproduction vs. mobility. The independent variables at the individual level are gender and age, and the main country-level variable is the Gini index of income inequality.

The results indicate an inverse Great Gatsby Curve: inequality increases the chances of subjective perception of intergenerational mobility, as presented in Figure 1. That is, higher levels of income inequality are associated with higher levels of subjective intergenerational mobility. This stands in contradiction to all previous studies on the Great Gatsby Curve. Even though some studies found only little or no correlation at all, an inverse Great Gatsby curve has not been found using contemporary data. These results suggest that even if the Great Gatsby Curve effect persists, it is not experienced as such by the people. That means that even though individual in countries with higher levels of inequality are suffer from lower levels of intergenerational income mobility, individual perceptions of their social opportunities are significantly different. The subjective experience of mobility actually increases in countries with high income inequality. Therefore, the effect of the Great Gatsby curve on social stability might be less important than has been assumed.

Trends in Gender Inequality by Cohorts in Latin America

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A high gender wage inequality in Latin America persists over time. Evidences present gender comparisons which disregards the wider trend of wages stagnation and the polarization of wages. The parametric analysis of location and shifts provides a restricted framework for comparisons, addressing only how individuals are allocated to positions at the wage distribution, but not the structure of these positions. This restricted focus on allocation is unjustifiable, since last decades in Latin America constitute a period of demographic changes and economic restructuring in several dimensions, and the impact on wage distributions between and within groups was huge. The structure of the wage inequality and the median trends are not the same for the sex groups, real median wages fluctuate a lot and the wage variance persists in a high level. A set of important questions is hidden behind these summary statistics. The upper and lower tails of the wage distribution increased at the same rate? Are there further facts in the narrowing of the gender wage gap then the convergence of median wages between the groups? Notions of relative distribution represent a non-parametric statistical framework for the comparative analysis of distributions differences and shifts. The density and the cumulative distribution function of the relative data are used to fully describe and analyze distributive differences. Summary measures based on relative density are used to test hypothesis about differences in distributions. The relative density is decomposed in effects of differences in shape and location, and in effects that represents compositional changes in covariates and changes in the relation between the covariates and the dependent variable. Decomposition allowed separating location, structure and compositional effects; then distinguishing the impact of changes of the population composition (a demographic process) from changes in the attribute location (a social or economic process). Inequality is a proper application of relative distribution methods, because it is a distribution property, rather than an individual property. We examine the evolution of gender wage inequality particularly following cohorts over time in Latin America from a pseudo-panel of repeated cross-sections microdata from National Household Sample Surveys, from 1981 to 2014.

Results point that while the median ratio suggests that women improved, the relative distribution shows that this improvement has been more intense to women in the lower tail of the wage distribution. If the skills upgrading was to explain this, it refers to those at the bottom of the scale. Key aspects of the changes represent the combined outcomes of several factors: the median wage gap between the groups, changes in this gap over time and changes in the shape of the male and female wage distributions. The relative distribution was decomposed in shares that account for these effects: female gains in the bottom of the distribution are due to increasing female wages, but also to decreasing male wages; in other quantiles the decline of male wages is still more relevant. Beyond common conjuncture shifts, we found declines in wages for men in all deciles and raises for women. Nevertheless, female gains are not enough to equalize their distribution to the male one and the gender gap persists, although women had relative and absolute advances. For both men and women there was a growth of inequality within groups in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s and afterwards a decline.
To further access the gender wage inequality between and within cohorts, we estimated classic mincerian regressions for each country over time, separately for men and obtained the returns to each male attribute. With these coefficients, we estimated a counterfactual predicted wage for women and constructed our response variable, the gender wage gap, which represents the gap between observed and counterfactual standardized female wages, yielding a measure of gender differential (or discriminatory component). We followed cohorts in different stages of their life cycles, so cohort age groups were defined to split individuals in ages of different wage mobility patterns. We estimated the relative distribution of the gender wage gap for sets of reference-comparison: cohorts when they have the same age, and the same cohort in different phases of their life cycles. So, it was possible to investigate how the cohorts improved (or worsened) their position in terms of the gender wage gap.

The relative distribution approach also enabled the decomposition of effects in changes in the median or in the structure of the distribution, leading to enlightening analysis of the effects of changes over time. There was a reduction in the median of the wage gap distribution. Women improved their position in terms of the gender wage gap over time, as the relative density is increasing, which suggests an increasing median wage gap over their life cycle. However, the effect of changes in the structure was the most important determinant of the global relative density and points to the polarization of the gender distribution. We also accessed how the educational composition of the female labor force varied between cohorts and age groups. The adjustment of the gender gap relative distribution for the effects of these compositional changes answered the question of how the higher education of recent cohorts contributed to explain the observed wage gap relative distribution between cohorts. Results reveal uniform densities, which mean that there was not a significant change in the marginal density of the wage gap, adjusted by the education level.

In summary, for each age group, women in more recent cohorts are better off in terms of the gender gap. Besides, each cohort experienced an improvement in the gender gap over the life cycle. For the oldest cohort, changes in the structure of the wage gap were preponderating, and for the youngest cohort, the change in the median gap was the main determinant of the upward mobility over its working life cycle. Changes in the marginal density of education, related to the wage gap, were not crucial for the observed shifts in the wage gap between the cohorts, by age group, even when we consider that the more recent cohorts are more educated than the earlier.
In this paper we put forward a new explanation for union decline by focusing on a currently neglected site that exemplifies the fragility of unions – the shop (or office) floor in the computer revolution era. While we know that both union decline and the computerization of workplaces have been taking place over the last decades, playing a major role in rising wage inequality (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Kristal and Cohen, 2015; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), the literature on rising inequality treats computerization and union decline as independent forces. This paper seeks to challenge this common assumption. That computer-based technologies interact with union decline was first mentioned thirty years ago in an edited book by Cornfeld (1987) that discussed the effects of computerization on labor relations in 14 case studies of U.S. industries. More recently Acemoglu, Aghion and Violette (2001) connected the interaction between union decline and computerization to rising income inequality, a relationship that was demonstrated by Kristal (2013b) and Kristal and Cohen (2015) who argued that computerization is class-biased and diminishes working class organizational strength. What is unique to our work is the concrete conceptualization and the most comprehensive analyses of the effect of computerization on unions within U.S. private industries to date.

Using industry-year data from several sources including the National Labor Relation Board (NLRB), we analyzed the effect of computerization on several indicators for union strength within detailed United States industries between 1973 and 2002. Specifically, we employ four indicators for union strength: 1) the number of union members, 2) their share of the workforce (i.e., union density), 3) the number of unfair labor practice cases filed against employers to the NLRB concerning labor’s right to organize unions and bargain collectively with employers, and 4) number of Representation elections supervised by the NLRB.

The findings from OLS models with variables in first-difference (year-to-year change) and single-equation error correction models (ECMs) suggest that computerization decreased union density, reduced new organizing efforts, and enhanced employers’ resistance to unions measured by their use of unfair labor practices as documented by the NLRB.

We explain these findings in a theoretical framework that specifies that computerization reshape the way products are made and services are provided, as well as boost the power shift from labor to management throughout workplaces. First, by changing the practical aspect of the production process, as articulated by the Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC) thesis, computerization led to a downsizing of unionized jobs and the spread of flexible employment relations that diminished union organizing efforts. Second, by transforming the relations in production through making production information less personalized and localized by storing most of it in databases, and by easing monitoring of work and workers, computerization led to a power shift from labor to management, enabling firms to intensify their opposition to union organizing.

This explanation for union decline should hold in particular for the United States’ pluralist industrial relations and less so for European corporatist relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In the United States, the pluralist system of industrial regulation subjects the workplace to a system of labor-management self-regulation in which parties are encouraged to determine their own norms through collective bargaining. Collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is done at a particular workplace (the “bargaining unit”). If there is a sufficient show of interest by workers (30 percent or more of the employees) in a particular workplace (a so-called card drive), the NLRB conducts an election among employees working in the unit to determine whether a majority favor the union. After unionists have won both the right to hold a representational election and the election itself, then they negotiate a contract with the employer. The system of workplace elections requires unions to organize along these three phases in each new establishment or firm individually, rather than organize entire industries. This makes it essential for United States’ unions to effectively conduct the struggle on the shop floor.

The finding of this study that computerization is biased against organized workers lends some support to the Class-Biased Technological Change thesis for rising income inequality articulated by Kristal (2013) and Kristal and Cohen (2015). The negative effects of computerization on unions suggest that computerization’s effect over the wage structure is governed not only by skills, but also via diminishing workers’ organizational power. The latter operates, we suggest, through computerization’s reshuffling of the division of labor between occupational classes that historically were characterized by different prospects of being unionized, and by computerization’s restructuring of power relations between management and labor toward unilateral managerial control.

References
Returns to Higher Education, Social Inequality and the Role of Vertical and Horizontal Educational Decisions: Which Mechanisms lead to Income-Inequality?

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Abstract: Despite educational expansion, social inequalities in access to higher education are still pronounced in Germany. In addition, students from low SES-families less often reach a prestigious professional position (Jungbauer-Gans & Gross 2013) and are underrepresented in the group of high income earners (Spangenberg et al. 2012).

While the cumulative process of social inequalities on the way to higher education has been disentangled by several studies (Mare 1980; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Becker and Hecken 2009; Breen et al. 2010) as well as the association between higher education and returns to education (Becker 1964; Dickson & Smith 2011), far less is known about the mechanisms leading to the observed income-gap between social groups. To fill this research gap, we describe in a first step the social differences in educational attainment and income level, and expand our analysis in a second step, by outlining the underlying mechanisms leading to the cumulated income differences.

By drawing on a unique longitudinal dataset of students who obtained their upper secondary degree in 1990, we are able to follow educational careers throughout higher education and into professional life over a period of twenty years. By taking on a life course perspective (Elder et al. 2003; Hillmert and Jacob 2010), we are able to investigate social selectivity in educational achievement, vertical and horizontal educational decisions as well as the returns to education. Our analyses show pronounced effects of social origin on educational attainment, educational decisions as well as labour market outcomes. We find that a part of the income-gap can be attributed to primary effects. However, this explains only part of the social origin differentials. Decomposition analyses hint to the high importance of previous educational decisions and motivational factors (secondary effects) as an additional explanation for social inequalities at the labour market.

Extended Abstract: The aim of the paper is to investigate to what extent and why the labor market outcomes of upper secondary graduates still differ according to social origin despite the social selection processes that have occurred on the way to upper secondary attainment.

Attaining an upper secondary educational degree (Abitur) is a decisive landmark in the German educational system, since it formally assigns eligibility for higher education. At the same time, upper secondary attainment is highly socially selective (Mayer et al., 2007). This means that the group of students who are eligible for higher education and come from disadvantaged social backgrounds already describes a preselected population. Therefore, the characteristics of upper secondary students from disadvantaged and privileged families should be more similar than in the full population (Mare, 1980). For this reason, one would expect that any further social inequalities within this subgroup should be comparatively small. This expectation would be in line with a general interpretation from mobility research according to which the association between social origin and social destination tends to be the smaller the higher the level of education is (Breen and Luijkkx, 2004).

Yet, several studies point to pronounced social inequalities in the educational pathways following upper secondary education in Germany – both on a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Students from low SES-families less often enroll into higher education, choose different fields of study, less often choose a high ranked university and less often study abroad (Mayer, et al., 2007; Reimer and Pollak, 2010; Schindler and Lörz, 2012; Weiss et al. 2015). This paper seeks to identify to what extent these social selectivities in the further educational career are driving later earning differentials of upper secondary degree holders of different social origin.

On theoretical grounds, the following basic mechanisms are hypothesized to generate social differences in wage returns to the upper secondary degree:

First, even though upper secondary graduates of differing social origin should share a similar level of general aptitude, they might still differ systematically with respect to education-relevant resources, risk-aversion, motivations or occupational aspirations. Following the standard rational-choice-theories (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996), this triggers systematic differences in post-secondary educational choices.

Second, since post-secondary education is highly stratified in Germany, educational choices at the post-secondary level are closely related to wage returns.
By drawing attention to the role of post-secondary educational choices, the paper focusses in particular on the relative impact of vertical and horizontal aspects of educational pathways. A vertical post-secondary choice would be the decision between vocational training and higher education. Horizontal aspects relate to the choice of field of study. It shall be assessed which of the two dimensions is more important in creating earnings differentials between students of differing social origin.

In order to investigate these questions empirically, the paper draws on a unique dataset containing longitudinal life-course information of German upper secondary school leavers who graduated in 1990. Their post-secondary educational and occupational careers can be observed for a period of 20 years after graduation. The data also contains detailed information on occupational motivations, performance indicators and social background. Earnings are measured 20 years after upper secondary graduation. Earnings differences between persons with an academically educated parental background and persons without an academically educated background are decomposed by drawing on the Blinder-Oaxaca-technique (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) and the contributions of vertical and horizontal aspects of post-secondary educational choices are estimated.

First, the results suggest that, on average, earnings show a pronounced difference between upper secondary degree holders with academically and non-academically educated parents. Second, these differences are largely mediated through post-secondary educational pathways. Thereby, the biggest share is due to differences in the vertical decision between higher education and vocational training. Differences in horizontal choices between fields of study only add a minor part to the explanation of the earnings gap.

Third, alternative explanations, such as performance differentials or motivational aspects do not add much to the explanation of the gap net of educational decisions.

**Occupational classes and earnings and income inequality in Europe, 2005-2013**

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For much of the last century, inequality research has been divided by disciplinary boundaries: while economists used to focus on individuals’ earnings, incomes and wealth, sociologists were mainly concerned with social classes, that is categorical aggregations of occupations, measured at the household level. Since the early 2000s, however, this situation has changed. On one side, the need to address the main causes behind increasing earnings and income inequalities and the economic crisis have compelled economists to enlarge their view of socio-economic inequality, adding to the picture the distributive role of the family and the study of the intergenerational transmission of social positions. In methodological terms, they started to look at those details of the distribution of income and wealth, and of their intergenerational transmission, that are most easily seen by categorizing incomes. On the other side, sociologists have been pushed towards the analysis of earnings, income and wealth, inequalities by the inconsistencies between trend evidence concerning occupation-based (and education-based) measures of inequality, who have been decreasing in most of the countries, and the contrary evidence concerning income and wealth inequalities, who appear to be on the rise almost everywhere, albeit with strong international variation.

A central issue of this research stream is the relation between occupations and earnings and incomes. A new life, and more importantly new empirical evidence, has been given to the discussion concerning the economic bases of occupational social classes. The general problem, also raised by those sociologists who criticize class analysis from the “individualization” perspective, is whether social (occupational) classes can be considered a good indicator of life opportunities. Up to now, research on this has been mostly limited to single countries studies, whereas comparative studies are largely missing. Available results, however, suggest that, despite an increase in the within-class dispersion of earnings and incomes, occupational social classes still individuate groups of individuals with similar available economic resources and life opportunities.

This paper contributes to this research endeavor by enlarging it to a comparative perspective. It uses EU-SILC data for the years from 2005 to 2013, that allow an accurate measure of both individual and household income and social class for 19 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and employs techniques of group inequality decomposition, simulation and standard regression analyses. Using these different techniques, we will be able not only to distinguish the portion of inequality deriving from between-class differences and inequalities due to differences within classes, but also we will be able to explore the extent to which inequality trends are to be attributed to variation in the structure of income/earnings inequality and/or to changes in the social class composition of European societies.

Besides describing the trends in income inequality and class structure over time, the paper answers to three sets of research questions, both for Europe as a whole and for single countries. First, at the aggregate level, we study which portion of income inequality is to be attributed to the difference between social classes (between-class variance) compared to within class differences, and describe how this contribution changes over countries and over time. Second, at the individual level, we look at the relation between social class and income (income inequality among social classes), again describing how it changes over countries and over time. Third, we were interested in detecting the eventual effect of the recent economic crisis both over the share of between-class variance and concerning income inequality among social classes. Attention will be given to the comparative dimension, and to whether country levels and trends cluster according to some known dimension.

Our preliminary results, still to be checked for robustness over inequality measures and class schemes, show that:

1. The portion of between-class income variance in Europe is still relevant over time, thus indicating that the role of social classes in shaping income inequalities is not trivial. Important differences concerning this aspect emerge when we look at different countries,
both for personal and household income. In fact, in some countries the contribution of between-class variance is much higher than in others.

2. Between-class income inequality is in general stable over time. While in some countries an increase is observed, in others we see a decrease, without a clearly recognizable pattern over socio-economic models (à la Hall and Soskice or Esping-Andersen). Changes are not very strong. Looking at the single classes within countries, the patterns are not very different, with the exception of the self-employed, whose income levels and trends appears to be very different over countries.

3. The contribution of social class to the individual income appears to be generally stable over time, and the class hierarchy does not change much, neither over time nor over countries. The only exception is related to the agricultural classes, whose relative situation with respect to the other classes appear to have improved.

4. Overall, the recent economic crisis has not affected either the share of between-class variance or income inequality among social classes. However, at country level, some notable exceptions deserve to be stressed and discussed.

Inequality and Middle Class Trust across 29 European Countries: Some inequalities matter more than others
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Abstract
Equal societies appear to be more trusting. However, the exact social mechanisms on how inequality affects social trust have not been identified. It is usually assumed that higher economic distances erode social ties and familiarity among income groups and thus create a distrustful environment. Alternatively, higher inequalities with the rich may induce sentiments of relative deprivation and accentuate suspicion within the lower income classes. So far, the empirical work has not distinguished between these two arguments and has focused instead on highly composite measures of income inequality, such as GINI coefficients and measures of social trust that refer to the general population. In this study, I attempt to assess empirically how the distances between the middle class and the rest of the income classes affect its trust levels and thus evaluate if all distances have the same effect or whether some inequalities matter more than others.

Extended Abstract
In 1955, American political scientist Edward Banfield visited Montegrano (i.e., Chiaromonte), a small poor village in Southern Italy, in order to study its social structure. Banfield (1958) eventually concluded that much of Montegrano’s social backwardness could be attributed to the high levels of suspicion and distrust among its members. Each family of the village was concerned exclusively about its own interest at the expense of the common good. Under such circumstances it was almost impossible for collective action to be coordinated and public goods to be delivered to the community.

Montegrano’s case study reveals in extreme fashion that trust in others than of our immediate or familiar environment is of utter importance in advancing collective well-being. Trusting societies have been indicated to attain higher levels of growth (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001), have superior governance performance (Boix & Posner, 1998; Knack, 2002; Putnam et al., 1994; Uslaner, 2008) and even better public health (Kawachi et al., 1997).

But what drives some societies to be more trusting than others? A number of studies have indicated that factors such as ethnic diversity, institutional quality (i.e., rule-of-law), the number of Protestant adherents and a former socialist regime all affect social trust in a non-trivial way (Berggren and Jordahl (2006); Bjørnskov (2007); Delhey and Newton (2005); Knack and Keefer (1997); Rothstein and Uslaner (2005); Zak and Knack (2001)). Most importantly, social inequalities and distances between individuals have been put forward as one of the most important corroding factor of social trust. Distances may inhibit the formation of social ties and integrated networks between different income classes, as people tend to associate and create more ties with people from the same economic background (McPherson et al., 2001). Under such setting, information costs will be high and trusting attitudes weak (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). A different kind of argumentation posits that an income distribution relatively skewed to the right, (i.e., yielding a large share of income to the upper class) will invoke sentiments of relative deprivation from the side of the lower and middle classes and accentuate their suspicion towards other individuals in general.

The empirical research has so far strongly suggested that indeed inequality is detrimental to trust. Yet, almost all the studies on the effects of inequality on trust focus on highly composite measures of inequality, mainly GINI coefficients, and as such treat all distances as of equal weight. If economic distance increases between two individuals, no matter in which income class they belong to, trust will tend to be lower. This approach may not be completely wrong if indeed all distances matter the same for trusting attitudes. However, in case that some inequalities weigh more than others to formation of trusting attitudes, then this approach is not the appropriate one.

The focus then should be on evaluating how economic distances among different income classes affect their respective trusting attitudes. Eventually, the social mechanisms explaining the effects of inequality refer to social groups as a whole, and suggest that the distances between these groups is what matters. In the present study, I attempt to contribute towards this direction by evaluating how the economic distances of the middle class to the rest of the income classes affect its trust levels. If all distances matter the same, then a familiarity hypothesis may be more pertinent, if however the distance with the upper class is more relevant then a relative deprivation effect may be stronger. In addition, the study contributes in two more aspects: first, I extend my empirical analysis to instrumental variables statistical inference, so to check for possible endogeneity, due to potential reverse causality between inequality and trust; and second, I focus my analysis on the trust levels of the middle class, which may be more related to the beneficial effects of social trust. Thus far, the relevant literature has focused on the whole population but it may be of great interest to focus on the middle class, as a prosperous and wealthy middle class has been connected with an array of desirable societal features such as higher levels of growth and smooth provision of public goods (Easterly, 2001).
In order to evaluate these aspects empirically, I make use of a time-series cross-section dataset of 29 European countries during a fifteen years period (2000-2014), and obtain detailed measures on income class specific trust levels retrieved from the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). Subsequently, I combine this with distributional data from the Eurostat, where I construct measures of income distances between the middle and the rest of income classes. The analyses proceed in two steps, OLS and 2SLS instrumental variables, and the results suggest that the distances with the upper class have a strong corroding effect on the trusting attitudes of the middle class. However, the distance with the lower classes seems to receive less empirical support. In that sense, a relative deprivation argument may be more relevant and reducing inequalities with the upper class may be crucial in fostering stronger trusting attitudes in the long-term.

References
T1-003: Segregation

Time: Tuesday, 30/Aug/2016: 9:00am - 10:45am · Location: Room 003 (Fab 6)

Session Chair: Neli Demireva

Social segregation and social class gradients in education: Cross-national evidence from Europe

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Theoretical framework and research questions:

Research has revealed a relationship between social segregation within education systems and social gradients in student achievement. Education systems characterized by higher levels of social segregation tend to be those in which students’ achievement is, on average, more closely linked to their socioeconomic status. However, there is an ongoing debate on whether social segregation within education systems actually increases the impact of socioeconomic status on student achievement at the individual level. For instance, social gradients in student achievement could be the result of inequalities within society at large or of the broader contexts beyond education systems, rather than the consequence of social segregation within the education system. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether differences in the social composition of schools (i.e., social segregation between schools) generate noticeable inequalities in student achievement when taking into account students’ family background characteristics at the individual level. Against this background, this study addresses two research questions:

1. To what extent is the degree of social segregation within education systems in Europe related to the socioeconomic gradient in student achievement at the aggregate (system) level?

2. Does social segregation within education systems moderate the associations between socioeconomic status and student achievement at the individual level?

Methodology:

Data:

This study draws on data from the 2012 round of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), a cross-national comparative survey that analyzes 15-year-olds’ achievement in mathematics, science, and reading in a three-year cycle since 2000, with a special focus on one of these dimensions in each round. PISA uses a stratified sampling procedure. In a first stage, schools are selected with probabilities proportional to the size of the schools. In a second stage, students are selected at random within schools. We use data from 29 European countries with a total of 171,159 students, nested in 7,301 schools. PISA weights are applied so that the sample of each country reflects the total population of the 15-year-old students within each country.

Variables:

The dependent variable is student achievement, estimated in the form of five plausible values which represent the range of abilities that a student can be expected to have, given the student’s responses to the PISA test items. To determine population statistics, each plausible value is used separately in any analysis. The results of these analyses are then averaged to produce the final statistics. The independent variable is students’ socioeconomic status (SES). The moderating variable is an index of social segregation within national education systems, estimated by means of intra-class correlations of SES, using a multilevel modeling approach in line with previous studies. The intra-class correlation assesses the ratio of between-school variance in SES to the total variance in SES within a country (or the degree to which students of a given school are socially similar). The analysis includes control variables at three hierarchical levels - individual, school, and country.

Analytical strategy:

Bivariate analysis is used to analyze links between social segregation and socioeconomic gradients in student achievement at the macro level of European education systems. Hierarchical linear regression modeling is used to assess whether social segregation moderates the individual-level associations between socioeconomic status and educational achievement. Hierarchical models take into account that the data are clustered (students in schools, schools in countries) and that the observations therefore cannot be considered independent. These models allow us to estimate direct effects of individual-, school- and country-level variables on student achievement and to evaluate whether social segregation at the country level moderates the individual-level relationships between SES and student achievement. The model is specified as follows: The educational achievement Y of a student i in school j in country k is estimated as a function of the overall mean student achievement, a vector of individual-level variables, a vector of school-level variables (school type and school SES composition), and a vector of country-level variables, including the index of social segregation within the education system. The model includes a cross-level interaction between the (country-level) index of social segregation and (individual-level) SES. Furthermore, the model includes a random slope on SES at the school level. The random slope is specified by a fixed effect for the school average on SES and a random effect that defines the variance in the slopes between schools. Three random terms are associated with the intercept and fixed effects, reflecting the residual variation at the country, school, and student level. These random terms are assumed to have zero means given the independent variables, to be drawn from normally distributed populations, and to be mutually independent. We use un-centered binary variables and grand-mean centered continuous variables. There are no collinearity issues in the model (VIF values below 2).

Findings:

The correlation between the index of social segregation and the socioeconomic gradient in student achievement is significant, r(27)=0.372, p < .05, and indicates a moderate positive relationship at the aggregate level between social segregation and social disparities in education. Furthermore, the hierarchical linear regression analysis indicates, among other things, a significant cross-
level interaction between students’ SES and the index of social segregation, suggesting that the links between SES and educational achievement were stronger in countries with a higher degree of social segregation within the education system. To facilitate the interpretation of this interaction effect, we analyze the marginal effects of SES on educational achievement as the degree of social segregation within education systems changes (when all other variables take the value zero). This marginal effects analysis indicates that, on average, a one-unit increase in SES was associated with an increase in student achievement of somewhat less than 30 points (approximately a 0.30 SD) in the least segregated education systems, Norway and Finland, and of slightly more than 36 points (or a 0.36 SD) in the most segregated system, Bulgaria.

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY

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This study investigates how living in the same neighborhoods as high-income adults during childhood is related to the probability of upward intergenerational social mobility. The overarching question can be summarized as follows: If we compare two children with similar home situations, but where one child is exposed to adults who have more resources, is this increasing this child's probability of upward social mobility? We follow 700,000 individuals born in 1978-1984 from early childhood until they turn 28, and examine how their residential context change, and how this in turn is associated with their income and education when aged 28. Preliminary results suggest that residing in a more affluent area when growing up is associated with higher earnings at age 28. In a next step we will construct neighborhood characteristics based on coordinates rather than administrative borders, and use different modeling strategies to adjust for selection into different kinds of neighborhoods.

Occupational Mobility Networks

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Introduction

Studies of intra-generational occupational mobility tend to view individuals’ transitions between occupations as events that are mostly independent of other moves in the labour market. The likelihood of occupational transitions is often discussed in terms of exogenous job characteristics that distinguish occupations, such as wage or skill levels. The theoretical focus on exogenous job characteristics is reflected in the methods employed in empirical analyses of mobility, as their fundamental assumption is the independence of observations. Our approach offers an alternative method that can account for an interdependence of movement in the labour market; by allowing and explicitly analysing dependence between occupational transitions we gain new insight into the structure of mobility.

An intuitive way to analyse dependence in the labour market is to model occupational mobility as a network in which individuals’ transitions connect occupations (Fig. 1a). Dependence between occupational moves is analysed using statistical techniques for social networks, explicitly developed to model and account for systems with interdependent observations. We illustrate the value of a networks approach to social mobility with regards to two open questions of relevance to the stratification literature.

Research Questions

The first question we address is how movement in the labour market feeds into occupational sex segregation. A feature of post-industrial labour markets is the notable variation in the distribution of workers of different status or sex, for example native and immigrant workers, or men and women, across occupations. The formation of ‘occupational ghettos’ is a persistent phenomenon in contemporary labour markets (Charles and Grusky 2004). From theories of feedback loops between gender and labour market transitions we would expect that women will move towards male-dominated occupations for higher status gains. The opposite holds for men’s occupational mobility: an increasingly feminised workforce entering an occupation should act as a push factor behind male exit patterns.

Recent research highlights that women’s reasons for exiting occupations, in particular for opportunities related to pay and promotions, are dependent on the dominant sex composition of the occupation (Murphy and Oesch 2016), such as the majority share of men in science occupations, rather than the occupation itself (Hunt 2016). We analyse how e.g. in higher-level occupations, an inflow of women into law or pharmacy professions relates to men’s outflow patterns (Fig 1b). Similarly, we analyse e.g. in lower-level occupations how mobility between being a cleaner, caregiver, and waiter or bartender are differentially connected by movement according to gender.

Second, modelling dependence between occupational transitions allows for an analysis of endogenous processes that express, for example, clustering and hierarchisation of the labour market that goes beyond expectations from exogenous job characteristics alone. Clustering can be operationalised as transitive closure in occupational transitions, i.e. does a large flow between occupations A and B as well as between B and C co-occur with a large flow from A to C (Fig 1c left). This allows us to model the extent to which (if at all) occupations group together in a way that cannot be explained by observable characteristics, such as occupational incumbents’ social background or skill similarities. Hierarchisation of the labour market can be expressed by directed net flows of workers within the labour market. A large net-flow from occupation C to B, and from B to A is assumed to indicate a higher position (in terms of e.g. prestige or wage) of A in the hierarchy than B and C, and people can acquire a position as A later in their career. Thus, moves from A to C should be very unlikely (Fig 1c right), thus avoiding cyclicality of moves above what is predicted by occupational characteristics.

Method
The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate the value of the proposed approach by testing two hypotheses on data from two different European countries, namely Great Britain and Germany. We draw on data from two representative, national surveys; the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) consists of a sample of approximately 5,000 households and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 11,000 households interviewed on an annual basis. Aggregating individual-level observations over two ten-year periods we compare transitions between 84 micro-class occupations over the 1990s and 2000s. The British and German labour markets differ markedly in their institutional setups, which leave transitions in Germany more restricted than in Britain.

The statistical model employed is an extension of Exponential Random Graph Models (Lusher, Koskinen and Robins 2013), designed to analyse weighted distribution networks. Intuitively, the model is similar to a multinomial regression model in which each person that leaves his/her occupation decides on another occupation into which to move. This decision can depend on (i) the person’s characteristics; (ii) characteristics of the previous and successive occupation, including similarities between them; (iii) the moves of other individuals in the network; and (iv) a combination/interactions of these points. Dependence between the moves of different persons is respected in the statistical model, and explicitly modelled in (iii) and (iv).

Hypotheses

First, we expect there to be a positive interdependence between women’s entry into an occupation and men’s exit from a given occupation. We expect there to be a greater endogeneity of intra-generational occupational movement according to gender where distances between occupations are less defined, i.e. in less occupationally-specific labour markets. Further, occupational transitions are more likely to alternate between male-majority, integrated, and female-majority occupations at higher levels of the occupational structure; at lower levels women and men will be more likely to move into and out of same-sex majority occupations.

Second, we model clustering and hierarchisation of occupations as outlined above. In a stepwise model-selection, we analyse to what extent clustering and hierarchisation are explained by exogenous job characteristics, and to what extent (if any) these are purely endogenous phenomena.

References


DYNAMICS OF THE INFORMALITY IN THE BRAZILIAN LABOUR MARKET: OCCUPATIONAL AND EARNINGS MOBILITY

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The aim of this paper is to discuss recent dynamics of informality in the Brazilian labor market, addressing in occupational mobility patterns, especially regarding to transitions between formal and informal labor, as well as to verify the earnings mobility resulting of these transitions, separately by gender. We use microdata from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME) of the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE) for 2002-2012. The analysis of the changes in the mobility patterns is performed by estimating the transition probabilities between different occupational status over the period, using the Multinomial Logit Model. For the earnings mobility analysis, we estimate equations for earnings variation resulting these transitions, using Quantile Regressions. Results indicate a high degree of mobility from unemployment to formal employment in the period but suggest the persistence of mobility patterns. Women are better off in the period. The earnings mobility resulting of these occupational transitions confirms the appreciation of formal employment relatively to informality, especially at the bottom of the earnings distribution. For entry into the labor market, the returns to the transitions to formal employment are higher in all quantities of the distribution and are higher for men than for women.
The research question

This study examines the intergenerational effects of parental unemployment in European countries and the United States. We explore how the unemployment of parents affects their children’s transition into tertiary education in different contexts. We are particularly interested in the extent to which the adverse effects of parental unemployment are alleviated by contextual effects, such as generosity of unemployment benefits, affordability of higher education and selectivity in the education system. Previous literature has examined the consequences of parental unemployment on educational attainment at the level of household (reviews in Brand 2015, Kalil 2013) but has lacked the comparative perspective considering relevant features of welfare states and education systems.

Theoretical framework

When making a decision about continuing studies, families are expected to evaluate costs and benefits of different options as well as the perceived probabilities for more or less successful outcomes (Breen & Goldthorpe 1997). One consequence of unemployment is the reduced level of household income. For instance, Coelli (2011) found that parental job loss affects enrolment in tertiary education in Canada mainly due to financial constraints. However, the level of costs, benefits and perceived success varies between contexts.

First, social insurance policies affect the extent to which households are insured against socioeconomic consequences of adverse events that could alter their living standards (DiPrete 2002). Hence, effective unemployment insurance can generate a long-term stability of incomes and offers unemployed an opportunity to seek for adequate reemployment (Gangl 2004). Moreover, the unemployment increases a perceived economic strain in the family and an uncertainty about the future (Leininger & Kalil 2014). Thus, we expect that the parental unemployment has less adverse effect on the entry to tertiary education in countries with more generous unemployment insurance because it provides for unemployed parents more income and career stability as well as could reduce their economic insecurity about the future.

Second, the affordability of tertiary education varies between countries. We expect that the parental unemployment matters less for the higher education entry in countries where parents have to contribute less. Besides low tuition costs, more extensive systems of financial support help to cover the living costs and foster the independence of students from their family (e.g. Triventi 2014).

Third, the selectivity in the education system might shape the role of parental unemployment. The expansion of tertiary education tends to differentiate this sector and promote the access for students from all social strata (Arum et al 2007). This might offer more flexible study options for students from unemployed households. Moreover, parental unemployment might have less adverse effects in vocationally oriented education systems. In such countries, a selective group of students is eligible for higher education who might already have higher academic motivation and who might come from more privileged social backgrounds. Also the labour market prospects for youth without specific skills are limited (van de Werfhorst 2011). However, we recognize the challenge of identifying the linkage between selectivity in the education system and parental unemployment because a lower vocational orientation coincides with a larger sector of higher education in several countries, i.e. more study options are likely to be counterbalanced by smaller selectivity.

Finally, the economic recession might channel youth to tertiary education to wait for the improvement of economic situation. Therefore, our analysis systematically controls for youth unemployment rates.

Data

We use data from five longitudinal surveys to analyse educational transitions in years 2003-2013 in 21 countries. The main source of data is the EU-SILC longitudinal panel study (Eurostat). The data for the U.S. are from the Survey of Income and Program Participation panels 2004 and 2008. The data for Germany are from the German Socio-Economic Panel and for the UK from two surveys: the British Household Panel Survey and the Understanding Society (UKHLS). Based on these surveys, we created a harmonised dataset for educational transitions that includes school-leavers and the characteristics of their households. The contextual variables are mainly from Eurostat and OECD databases.

Analytical strategy

We use three-level logistic regression models to estimate how the parental unemployment affects the entry into tertiary education. School-leavers’ households are nested in transition years and these years are nested in countries. We analyse the consequences of the job loss of one parent in two-earner families as well as the unemployment of entire household. We consider the importance of reduced household income and control for the parental education as the level of educational resources and expectations varies between families. However, we are particularly interested in the interactions between parental unemployment and contextual level variables. Following our theoretical expectations, we explore the role of three contextual aspects:

1) generosity of unemployment benefits (replacement rate and coverage);
2) affordability of higher education (financial aid to students and share of private funding);
3) selectivity in the education system (vocational orientation and supply of study places in tertiary education).

Main findings
We find that parental unemployment has a strong negative effect on the entry into tertiary education. This effect is not fully explained by parental education, income and the extent of income loss. The effect of parental unemployment is somewhat weaker in families where one parent remains employed. Our preliminary analysis provides support to hypotheses about the importance of the unemployment insurance generosity and the affordability of higher education in alleviating the adverse effects of parental unemployment. Children of unemployed parents are more likely to enter to the tertiary education in countries where unemployment benefits have higher replacement rate and coverage. Thus, despite similar levels of current income, unemployed households in countries with more generous benefits seem more confident in investing in the higher education. Moreover, the lower importance of private contributions and the larger financial support to students tend to reduce adverse effect of parental unemployment. However, our first findings do not confirm the expected role of selectivity in education system.

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Non-Take-Up of Social Assistance - On the relevance of stigma effects
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Most western societies provide social assistance for households that lack the resources to maintain a minimum living standard. However, redistributive effectiveness of such policies can be compromised if eligible recipients do not claim the benefits they are entitled to. If non-take-up rates are high, it is questionable whether anti-poverty schemes are designed adequately. This paper follows two main goals. First, although non-take-up rates may be assumed to be high also in Switzerland, previous estimates for Switzerland are problematic due to methodological shortcomings (most important missing information on wealth). This study provides results based on an alternative estimation approach using tax data from the canton of Bern. Second, I exploit regional variation in non-take-up rates to study potential stigma effects. As expected, non-take-up rates decrease when wealth is controlled for; the non-take-up estimation drops from 51.7 percent (without wealth) to 23.6 percent (including wealth). There is substantial regional variance, that is used for further analyses by fitting a multilevel-model with municipalities as level-1 and social service regions as level-2 units. Non-take up indeed can be related to several variables that theoretically can be associated with different regional norms (rural vs urban areas and French speaking vs German speaking part). Social norms are proxied with voters share for parties that have “social assistance” explicitly on their political agenda. As theoretically expected, non-take-up rises with rising support for the restrictive Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and falls with rising support for the social democratic Party (SP). These findings are in line with stigma theory, but should not be interpreted as a final test of the assumed relationship.

Why has Poverty in Germany increased since the 1990s?
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Since the end of the 1990s, Germany has been experiencing an increase of relative at-risk-of-poverty rates from about 12% to 16%. This was unexpected as the employment rate has increased strongly in this period. Is the availability of more jobs no longer sufficient to lower the poverty rate, or is it unfavorable demographic developments that influence the poverty rate? We examine how different household types have contributed to changes of the income distribution between 1992 and 2011. Influences at the lower end and the middle of the distribution are of particular interest, as they result in increases and decreases of the relative poverty rate. While there is a broad literature about compositional changes of household types and their specific poverty risk, there are very few studies about the underlying sources of the aggregate poverty rate. Within our talk, we will focus on the influence of pensioner households and non-
earner households on the poverty rate in Germany from 1993 to 2011 using the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). These two household types were treated rather differently by German welfare politics over the last two decades. Pensioners have experienced a significantly improved economic situation since reunification, especially in Eastern Germany where the pension level was adjusted to the Western level. Federal subsidies, additional regulations targeting widows and ‘Spätaussiedler’ as vulnerable groups improved the income situation of many. The ‘Agenda 2010’ was intended to motivate unemployed citizens to (re)enter the labor market. For that purpose, the government shortened the period for unemployment benefits (‘Arbeitslosengeld 1’) and created new rules of reasonableness that could force unemployed people to accept (even bad) work offers. As a result, the economic situation of the (long-time) unemployed weakened.

Furthermore, scholars and politicians alike assume that the demographic change in Germany increased both the number of pensioners and non-earner households. The growth of a household type alone can be a strong influence on changes of the poverty rate. We therefore expect that the improved economic situation of especially low-income pensioner households and their stagnating share influence the income distribution mainly at the bottom and decrease the poverty rate. As for non-earner households, the deterioration of the income situation of this already vulnerable group and their increasing share in the population over the last two decades is assumed to increase the poverty rate.

Compositional influences have to be disentangled from economic ones at different points of the income distribution, as these two possible drivers have different policy implications. Additionally, they might counteract and therefore hide possible influences of household types on income inequality and poverty. We use the decomposition of unconditional quantile regressions to split the influence of both household types on different points of the entire income distribution into two parts: The first refers to changes in the household specific economic situation, and the second refers to the growth of the household type.

We find that pensioner households, especially through the improved economic situation, strongly muted a more severe poverty increase. Non-earners reinforced it by both their increasing share in the population and also by their worsening economic situation through welfare changes.

Our results suggest the following interpretation: During the 1990s, poverty rates increased only slowly because new labor market pressures were largely compensated by vastly increasing public redistributions and especially by the growing subsidy to the pension scheme. However, the strong redistribution effect of the pension scheme reached its top at the end of the 1990s and has since decreased. Simultaneously, the labor market has deteriorated drastically with the crisis at the beginning of the new millennium until 2005. The result was a rapidly increasing poverty rate from 1999 until 2005, as this comprehensive trend was not met by further compensations. Since around 2005, however, compensations have switched roles: Increasing employment is probably dampening poverty, while the group of poor pensioners is growing again. The poverty rate has thus remained more or less stable since 2005.

Collateral consequences of criminal convictions in the United States: Assessing effects on employment and welfare use among low-income lone mothers

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Background and aims

Since the mid-1970s, there has been a substantial rise in incarceration in the United States. Researchers interested in stratification have become increasingly interested in the role of imprisonment in understanding inequalities in a wide variety of outcomes including the labour market, health, and child outcomes. These researchers have found that, “like other stratifying institutions, the prison both reflects pre-existing disparities and acts as an independent cause generating future disparities” (Wakefield & Uggen 2010, p 389). For example, those who have limited educational attainment are more likely to end up in prison. The negative effect of being incarcerated reflects pre-existing disparities and acts as an independent cause generating future disparities for African American men (Pager 2007).

While important, by focusing mostly on the deleterious effects of incarceration on men, existing research has not fully accounted for the far-reaching impact of the larger criminal justice system in promoting and exacerbating inequalities. Collateral consequences of criminal convictions are legally- and socially-imposed penalties or disadvantages that automatically occur upon a person’s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or other offense in addition to the sentence imposed by the court. These consequences operate across multiple systems that influence peoples’ everyday lives and can include losing access to job opportunities, the right to vote, and/or becoming ineligible to receive public assistance benefits. Importantly, these consequences are imposed regardless of whether or not the conviction leads to imprisonment. Given the fact that collateral consequences can be imposed by national, state, and local lawmakers, there is substantial variation in the consequences faced by residents of different states. Taking collateral consequences into account may produce a more accurate picture of the stratifying role of the criminal justice system as incarcerated individuals only account for 3.5 percent of adults with a history of a criminal conviction in the United States (Glaze, 2011).

Along with a narrow focus on incarceration, existing research is also limited, as it has inadequately explored the effects of criminal justice involvement among women (Sheely & Kneipp, 2015). However, the number of women involved in the criminal justice system has increased dramatically in recent decades: between 1985 and 2008, the rate of imprisonment among women quadrupled (White House Council on Women and Girls 2011); and, in 2011, one in four adults on probation and over one in ten adults on parole were women (Maruschak and Parks 2012).

In this paper, I explore the effects of state imposed collateral consequences that restrict access to welfare provision on employment and welfare use among low-income lone mothers. Given the strong employment penalties of incarceration among African American men, I also investigate whether the influence of collateral consequences is different for White and African American women.
Data and measures

This project cobines data from multiple sources. I assess state-level statutes that limit access to two programs for convicted drug felons – the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP). I gather state-level data on restrictions to TANF from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database. This database provides information on welfare rules for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. For SNAP restrictions, data is from an annual report issued by the United States Department of Agriculture. Along with information on collateral consequences, I also collect data on state poverty and employment rates from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research.

For information on employment, welfare use, and the demographic characteristics of women, I use pooled data from the 2004 and 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Each SIPP panel includes a nationally representative stratified sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the United States. A recent study finds that, compared to eight other nationally representative surveys in the United States, SIPP does a superior job of measuring the income of low-income households (Czajka & Denmead, 2008). The sample for this analysis includes all lone mothers between the ages of 18 and 64 with incomes less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level (N=4,444). For maternal and household characteristics, I include information on race, ethnicity, age, educational attainment, marital status, whether a woman has children, and lives in a metropolitan area.

Findings

Initial analyses reveal that the restrictions on welfare receipt for women with felony drug convictions leads to the decreased use of TANF and SNAP and increased employment among low-income women. Decreased program use is especially pronounced for African American women.

Keywords:
Labor markets, women, welfare state, criminal justice
Introduction and theoretical considerations

Over the past decades, young people’s educational transitions have been widely studied in sociology (e.g., Breen and Jonsson 2005, Gamoran 2001). Often drawing on Boudon’s (1974) concept of primary and secondary effects, previous studies have shown that in all Western countries young people’s socio-economic background plays an important direct and – mediated by performance – indirect role in explaining secondary and tertiary educational attainment. Although previous research has provided clear evidence that educational achievement also depends on informal competencies, delineating non-certified individual competencies, (e.g., Farkas 2003, Heckman et al. 2006), the majority of studies on transition to secondary or tertiary education has focused on the significance of SES and school performance. The role of informal competencies has been largely neglected to date. The literature on informal competencies distinguishes between social, self- and productive competencies. Generally, we expect them to be of different significance according to the educational transition of interest and play an essential role in explaining school performance, grades, and attainment at school and in the labour market (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1976, Farkas 1990, Haase et al. 2008).

Turning to the case of Switzerland, parental socio-economic status is particularly relevant for educational transitions as this country features a highly stratified educational system coupled with early tracking (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Pfeffer 2008, Buchmann et al. 2016). Lower-secondary education is subdivided into several tracks characterized by different academic requirements. In upper-secondary education, young people are allocated to vocational education and training programs (VET) of different intellectual requirements, to specialized schools or to baccalaureate schools. Despite the fact that VET programs vary greatly in intellectual requirements, previous studies have treated VET as a homogenous educational track. Against this background, we investigate, for Switzerland, the interplay of informal competencies, SES, and lower-secondary tracking for explaining access to two VET levels of different intellectual requirements, to specialized schools or to baccalaureate schools.

We assume that there are two mechanisms at work regarding how informal competencies may affect educational transitions. On the one hand, informal competencies may influence the search behaviour of young people for an apprenticeship position as well as the learning behaviour of those who intend to enter general education. On the other hand, a positive assessment of informal competencies by potential employers and teachers will facilitate securing an apprenticeship or the teachers’ support (e.g., positive recommendations, motivation and encouragement). The latter mechanism may be particularly relevant for productive competencies, i.e., the capability for effective planning and implementation, and in cantons where access to baccalaureate school (also) depends on teacher recommendations.

Data, Variables and Method

Our analyses are based on the Swiss longitudinal study COCON, including a sample of 15-year-old youth born in 1990/91, and being representative of the German and French speaking part of Switzerland. We use data from the survey waves of 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, when the respondents were 15, 16, 17 and 18 years old. We ran multinomial regression models (based on weighted data) and made use of the KHB method (see Karlsen and Anders 2011; Kohler et al. 2011) in order to decompose the effects of interest. The dependent variable captures the first transition into upper-secondary education and distinguishes between VET with low or medium intellectual requirements (VET-), VET with high requirements (VET+), specialised schools and baccalaureate schools. The models include measures for social competencies (i.e., the ability to cooperate in a team), for self-competencies (i.e., self-efficacy) and for productive competencies (i.e., ability to exert effort, persistence and volition), as well as measurements for SES, lower-secondary track, school grades, basic cognitive abilities, gender, migration background and system characteristics (i.e., cantonal proportion of baccalaureates, cantonal entry regulations to baccalaureate schools).

Preliminary results

The preliminary findings show that informal competencies affect access to the four tracks differently. Productive competencies facilitate entry into high level VET. This is in line with our expectations and can be explained by the importance of such competencies in the labour market. Workers who are willing to exert effort and who are able to persistently tackle a problem or a task tend to be more productive and are therefore thought after employees. Employers, when recruiting apprentices, therefore value such competencies and may use them as selection criteria. Young people with high productive competencies are also more likely to exhibit efficient search behaviour when looking for an apprenticeship position. As a result, they are more likely to find attractive apprenticeships.

High levels of self-competencies increase the probability of entering baccalaureate schools. The analysis does not confirm our hypothesis that high productive competencies have a stronger effect on entry into baccalaureate schools in cantons where entry regulations include teacher recommendations. Interestingly, neither productive, social nor self-competencies matter for specialised schools.

In addition to our results of informal competencies, our findings also clearly show that track allocation to lower-secondary schooling sets the course for future educational opportunities. Young people from lower-secondary tracks with high requirements have a significantly higher probability of entering specialised or baccalaureate schools. Track allocation to lower-secondary schooling thus
determines selection into upper-secondary educational tracks and leads to unequal opportunities for entering tertiary-level education. Social background plays a direct and indirect role, which is mediated by performance and track placement (amounting to about 20-35% of the total effect). This highlights that social inequalities in educational opportunities are still fairly strong.

Identifying school engagement practices that facilitate higher education participation of students from low-socioeconomic background in Australia

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Motivation and research aims
Like other developed countries around the world, Australia has been undergoing profound social and economic transformations, which have had an immense impact on the lives of young people. Since the transition into a post-industrial economy and a post-modern society, the early life course trajectories of young Australians have become more diverse, and the transitions that young people go through have become less structured (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1994). The traditional pathways from school to work or apprenticeship on the one hand, or to higher education on the other, have become only two options in a whole range of possible trajectories after leaving secondary schools. The rise of the Vocational Education and Training (VET) programs since the early 1990s, coupled with the expansion of low-skilled, entry-level flexible service jobs, predominantly in the retail and hospitality sectors, have created attractive alternatives to higher education for many young people, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

In this context, it is paramount to understand the complex choices that young people from disadvantaged backgrounds face when deciding whether to continue their education at a university, and to identify the key factors that influence the decision-making process that have the potential to have durable impacts on subsequent outcomes. Many of those factors can be located in the school setting and include the support and career advice that students receive from schools, as well as students’ own experiences with the schooling system, manifesting through their engagement with school and education, and their active involvement with the process of learning (Reeve 2002; Skinner et al. 2008). Notable sources of out-of-school influences include support and guidance from parents, and peer groups (Fass and Tubman 2002; Dennis et al. 2005). Combined, these factors are capable of determining the outcomes of young people in terms of their participation in higher education after leaving school. This project will identify and compare such key factors for students from low socio-economic background. The primary focus of the project is on in-school factors, namely student engagement and support received at school, however parental and peer influences will also be incorporated in the analysis.

Three broad categories of factors have been proposed in the social stratification literature to explain the relationship between social position and educational outcomes (Plewis & Bartley 2014), all of which bear relevance for the socio-economic stratification of school engagement and support received. The first theory posits that educational outcomes are shaped by class-determined expectations, aspirations and aims (Breen & Goldthorpe 1997; Goldthorpe 1996). Another explanation focuses more directly on resources, by arguing that educational outcomes are constrained by factors such as household income and wealth (Blanden & Gregg, 2004; Huang et al. 2010; Marks et al. 2006; Orr, 2003). This is because parents from wealthier families are able to secure for their children access to better schools, private tuition, and better learning conditions at home - for instance, a private quiet learning space, or a computer. A third set of theoretical explanations focuses on socio-cultural differences between more and less advantaged families. Those arguments focus on the advantages that students from higher socio-economic backgrounds gain through exposure to more stimulating cultural and intellectual environments at home, boosting their cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1996; Aschaffenburg & Maas, 1997; DiMaggio, 1982; Gunn, 2005). This increased cultural capital may improve the communication between teachers and students; it also leads to teachers evaluating children from advantaged families in a more favourable light (Andersen & Hansen, 2012; Tramonte & Willms 2010), increasing students’ participation in learning, their engagement with school and, in turn, their educational attainment.

School engagement is considered an important mechanism through which socio-economic background translates into academic achievement and attainment (Hospel & Galand 2015). Moreover, previous research suggests that engagement may be more easily shaped by educational interventions than achievement itself (Finn, 1993; Fredericks et al., 2004). Accordingly, many of the equity initiatives in Australia aimed at increasing participation in higher education among disadvantaged groups are school-based and involve keeping students engaged with education, improving the quality of teaching and raising career aspirations of young people. Despite the importance of the subject, the evidence on the impact of student engagement and classroom practices in secondary school on subsequent university participation is extremely limited, particularly in Australia. The few previous studies tended to focus on the predictors of student engagement, rather than its consequences (e.g. Gemici & Lu 2014).

This paper fills this gap in knowledge by focusing on the long-term impact of student engagement and school support, as well as parental and peer influences, on the likelihood of attending university after leaving school among young people from low socio-economic background, as compared with other students. The analyses will isolate the specific in-school practices and behaviours, as well as out-of-school factors that have the strongest effect on students’ subsequent participation in higher education.

Data & Methods
We use data from a major Australian longitudinal dataset: the Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth (LSAY), a series of large-scale cohort studies of young people. The LSAY data tracks young people as they move from school into further study, work and other destinations. The survey uses large, nationally representative samples of young people to collect information about education and training, work, and social development. Survey participants enter the study when they turn 15 years and are subsequently contacted once a year for 10 years. Over 10,000 students start out in a cohort. Studies began in 1995 (Y95 cohort), and since 2003 the survey has been integrated with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Survey participants enter the study when they turn 15 years and are subsequently contacted once a year for 10 years. Over 10,000 students start out in a cohort.
We use the 2003 LSAY cohort for the purpose of this study, covering ages 15-25. The 2003 cohort is the most recent full LSAY cohort (data collection is still ongoing for the 2006 and 2009 cohorts) and the one with the best coverage of student engagement measures and classroom factors. The survey provides good quality data to identify student from low socio-economic backgrounds (e.g., parental education and occupation). The data also contain rich information on various aspects of student engagement (encompassing behavioural, cognitive and emotional dimensions), aspirations, and support and advice on career planning received at school. The survey also covers a range of relevant educational performance measures, such the results of PISA test scores at age 15. Finally, LSAY contains information about university enrolment, along with tertiary entrance rank.

Our analyses use discrete-time Event-History Analysis, a modelling technique used to study the time elapsed until the occurrence of an event of interest, such as enrolling into university. We chose this modelling strategy for two reasons. First, with the data at hand, university enrolment is a right-censored variable, i.e. we only observe whether students had enrolled by age 25. In the light of the increasingly complex educational trajectories experienced by young people in contemporary Australia, some students enter university at a later age, which would not be captured in the LSAY data. Second, not all students would enter from secondary school straight into university. For many of them, a more complex trajectory would be evident, perhaps incorporating spells of employment or Vocational Education and Training. Event-history analysis is designed to deal with those issues and provides more reliable estimates than those from cross-sectional modelling strategies, such as logistic regression. An additional advantage of this modelling strategy is that it incorporates, by design, the differences in timing of entry into higher education, which may have important policy implications (e.g. if it is demonstrated that students from certain equity groups tend to enter higher education later than other students).

The outcome variable (the event modelled) is enrolment into university (measured up until the age of 25). School engagement (spanning across behavioural, cognitive and emotional dimensions), as well as advice and support from school, parents and peers are the key predictors, measured during the late stages of secondary school (ages 15-17). These variables are interacted with measures of students’ socio-economic status to test the differences between students from disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged backgrounds, and to help identify the factors which to target with an aim of reducing educational inequalities. Differences in abilities, as captured by academic achievement measured through PISA test scores, are controlled for in the models, as is a range of sociodemographic characteristics of students that could confound the analyses. The results of these analyses, as well as a draft full paper, will be available for presentation at the RC28 Spring Meeting in Bern in August 2016.

How the educational system produces social inequality and exclusion. Dual VET in Germany and the organizational interests of stakeholders of the corporate system

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Inequalities along social dimensions like gender, social or ethnic origin, and at last exclusion from education system are among the main reasons for further social and economic deprivation in the life course. This contribution aims to investigate how the educational system produces social inequality and exclusion. Using the example of the dual vocational education and training system (VET) in Germany our contribution deals with the impact of the organizational interests of stakeholders of corporate system on the production of social inequality and exclusion from the educational system.

The majority of young people in Germany complete general schooling without an upper secondary school leaving certificate (higher education entrance qualification) and depend on non-academic tracks in order to achieve a fully recognized vocational certificate. The dual system of dual VET is the most important track of non-academic education, which is steered by a corporate governance system.

Like in Switzerland and Austria, the transition from general education into non-academic dual VET is influenced by an “employment-centered transition regime” (Stolz & Gonon 2008, 306). In Germany, the access to dual VET is characterised by contradictory expectations, the decision to offer a training place and to whom is left to the companies (market-based access), to ensure training aligned to the needs of companies (“manpower requirement approach”). On the other hand, there is a general agreement in German society that the economy always ought to provide sufficient training places for all young people (social demand approach; Gaulke &Weißhuhn 1975), which represents a powerful social expectation, legitimized by the Constitutional Court.

Several times over the past decades not even half of all applicants for a VET place succeeded to find one. Even in the last years tens of thousands of school leavers could not find a training place, especially in regions without a sufficient offer of in-company dual VET places. This contributed to substantial inequalities in the access to dual VET along social dimensions such as social and ethnic origin, age and gender (Hillmert 2010). As a result, the dual system and its market-based access came under substantial legitimation pressure, as did the corporate governance steering dual VET (Baethge 2006).

Our contribution therefore addresses these questions:

(1) How do stakeholders of social partners and the public sector, as members of the corporate governance of dual VET system, deal with the expectations of access-opportunities for all youngsters interested in dual VET?

(2) How do the contradictory expectations affect political debates and reform proposals to improve the inclusion of (all) applicants into dual VET?

(3) How does this contribute to produce social inequalities and exclusion from the education system?

Neo-institutional approaches and the principal—agent theory allow us to better understand how political governance works in a corporate system like dual VET.
We assume that the unbalanced power relations between different groups of stakeholders within the corporate governance system of dual VET, mainly between stakeholders from employer’s and business associations and trade unions have an important influence. As research method we use document analyses (official statements of VET-organizations, et.al.) as well as bi- and multivariate analyses (e.g. structural equation modelling) of a survey of dual VET experts (2013).

(1) In the light of neo-institutional approaches our results point out, that the strategies especially employers’ organizations use, to successfully establish legitimacy within their institutional context (and thereby legitimize companies’ autonomy of choice given the lack of training places) accepting only formally the powerful social expectation “training places for all young people” (‘myths’) without integrating them into their own goals:

Employers’ and business associations influence regulations, e.g. the way of accounting the number of applicants for dual VET places by official statistics. This way the lack of in-company dual VET places remains hidden. Then they have an active role trying to change or prevent laws by influencing their institutional context and working as “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio 1988, 14), to avoid fundamental reforms of market based access. They also influence social norms and determine the public discourse of German society towards young people (e.g. discourse about lack of ‘maturity’ of youngsters to start an apprenticeship).

State stakeholders often accept legitimization strategies of business associations (Granato, Krekel & Ulrich 2013). When economy doesn’t provide enough in-company VET places for all young people state stakeholders do not force companies, which do not offer (enough) apprenticeship places to pay a compulsory charge. Especially stakeholders from the public authorities, thereby seem to pursue their “muddling through” strategy (Powell & Colyvas 2008, 277) whilst still adopting a ‘both/and approach’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 348).

(2) There is empirical evidence from the expert survey that (a) experts of employer’s and business associations are more willing to reject reform proposals, which could improve inclusion of all youngsters interested in dual VET, e.g. towards a training guarantee, compared to experts of trade unions, (b) that they reject significantly more such a reform proposal arguing that dual VET should primarily be aligned to the interests of companies rather than those of young people (…) and (c) that even experts who have an positive attitude towards reform proposals (like trade unionists) are skeptical towards the realization of reforms, which aim to reduce social inequality and exclusion, when they assume, that business associations do not agree with these reforms (Granato, Krekel & Ulrich 2015).

Employer’s and business associations have much more influence on policy making processes in the field of dual VET than other social partners, e.g. trade unions. When they are opposed (e.g.) to fundamental reforms of access to dual VET, the political implementation of this reform seems to have little chance of success.

(3) So fundamental reforms of access to dual VET are not realized and it seems, that still in the future many youngsters seeking an in-company training place will not find one - since there are not enough places provided by economy - and therefore remain without a recognised vocational qualification on the long term. In this way, the educational system produces social inequalities and exclusion from educational system due to this fundamental institutional contradiction and the organisational self-interest of corporate actors of the dual VET.

A life-course perspective on transitions to higher education – How much and for whom does spatial context matter?

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It is a known circumstance that local or regional contexts, e.g., neighbourhoods, cities, or countries are not equal regarding their socio-economic structure. People are (self-)selected into these contexts and these separations are consequential as they can affect individual behaviour and individual life chances. A large body of research shows that central spheres of life such as health outcomes, criminal activities, but also educational and occupational opportunities are affected by residential contexts (e.g., Ellen/Turner 1997, Mayer/Jencks 1989).

Beyond that, effects of a regionalised context refer to a specific spatial structure or extension (Sharkey/Faber 2014). Theoretically, it could be argued that the spatial extension of a contextual effect depends upon the social mechanism(s) through which local context conditions operate. Empirically, little is known about this relation between the geographic scale of residential contexts and individual outcomes; research that explicitly links geographical applications with established sociological research methods is scarce.

Among the most important individual outcomes in contemporary societies is the access to education and the completion of an educational career. Central explanations for unequal distributions of education prospects focus on class differentials. Following the concept of relative risk aversion, educational decisions are driven by the motivation to avoid social downward mobility (e.g., Boudon 1974, Breun/Goldthorpe 1997.). This idea forms the basis of an extensive amount of empirical research (e.g., Breun/Yaish 2006, Holm/Jaeger 2008) and the impact of social origin on education is indisputable. Furthermore, research indicates that residential effects on education vary according to social class origin (e.g., Micklewright et al. 1990, Wodtke et al. 2016). But, it is an open question if and how this heterogeneous context effects develop and change along the educational career.

To address these issues, I investigate the relation between geospatial contexts and individuals’ transitions to higher education. Central research questions are:

(1) To what extent do geospatial socio-structural context conditions influence educational transitions on the pathway to university?

(2) How can these socio-structural contexts be adequately measured in terms of spatial extension?
(3) Are there group-specific differences (social origin) in the influence of spatial socio-structural contexts on educational transitions?

Educational outcomes are understood as the consequence of subsequent educational transitions (Mare 1980). Corresponding with primary and secondary effects of social origin (Boudon 1974), I distinguish between direct (primary) and indirect (secondary) effects of local contexts; while the direct effects relate to actual educational opportunities within a specific spatial range; indirect effects base on individuals’ perception shaped by particular local conditions.

Empirically, I utilise the case of Germany and focus on two institutionally defined educational transition steps from (1) elementary school to (higher) secondary education and from (2) higher secondary school to university. Beyond these two transitions that directly address the educational career, I additionally capture (3) if higher-secondary graduates leave or stay in their home region and if and how this mobility decision is related to the educational decision and the socio-structural conditions in the local context of the home region.

The analyses are carried out with individual micro-level data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS)–Starting Cohort 6 (Blossfeld et al. 2011). The data is enriched with regionalised macro-level information (e.g. unemployment, population, university infrastructure). The macro-level data is available for West-Germany from 1986 to 2011 on the level of municipalities (LAU-2). A travel-time matrix between all 8,854 West-German municipalities allows for a flexible operationalization of spatial radii. To account for the geographic scale of residential conditions the macro-level information are aggregated within travel-time radii between 15 and 120 minutes. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to establish two main constructs regarding the university infrastructure. Discrete choice and event-history models are calculated to assess the impact of socio-structural context conditions (unemployment, population structure and constructs on university infrastructure) on educational transitions. Models are calculated for different travel-time radii.

Results indicate that transitions to secondary school and to university both depend on socio-structural spatial context characteristics. The spatial range of importance is smaller for the first than for the second transition. Furthermore, students of lower social origin are to a much larger extent affected by local conditions; they are more likely to study when unemployment is low and education infrastructure is beneficial. Also, they are more likely to select educational alternatives in their home region. Students of higher social origin almost always opt for higher secondary school and university regardless of the local situation. Findings suggest that the link between educational and mobility decisions at the end of secondary school is influenced by the interrelation between social origin and residential context conditions.

Literature cited:


A long-established literature in sociology, political science, and economics attests to the importance of national educational systems for the quality of adult lives along a host of dimensions. For several decades, much of this literature also has paid systematic attention to the different ways that educational systems articulate with the labor market. It is frequently asserted in this literature that institutional characteristics of educational systems affect the distribution of skills and the employment and occupational “returns” to education of school leavers (Shavit and Müller, 1998; Müller and Gangl, 2003; Wolbers, 2007; Andersen and Van De Werfhorst, 2010; Van de Werfhorst, 2004; Reimer et al., 2008; Altonji et al., 2012). It is further argued (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001) that the institutional configurations that link education, training and the labor market constitute different “varieties of capitalism,” and have developed over the specific histories of countries from efforts by firms to solve coordination problems in the market, from political conflict involving labor and capital, unions, firms, and political parties and from state actions in response to both market and political challenges (Streeck, 2005; Thelen, 2004; Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012; Anderson and Hassel, 2013). The configuration of educational programs and outcomes, the impact of this configuration for the matching of workers to labor market positions, and the influence of these institutional linkages for productivity and the organization of work are seen as having broad consequences not only for skill distributions of workers, but also for the national economy, the distribution of wages and earnings, and the level of inequality.

The comparative stratification literature in sociology made significant progress in the 1980s and 1990s by identifying a set of institutional dimensions along which national educational systems were thought to differ. This effort examined whether countries could be classified in useful ways along a concise set of institutional dimensions, as well as the impact of these dimensions on employment and occupational outcomes. The comparative stratification literature, however, failed to develop rigorous tests of the validity of these classifications. Consequently, even though both literatures acknowledge that “training regimes” (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012) are heterogeneous across nations, research too often has treated these regimes as undifferentiated “country-level” constants, assuming that there is no variation in training programs within countries. Moreover, the highly abstracted institutional dimensions have generally been unsuited for studying historical change, both because the gap between concrete institutional changes and the abstract categories requires subjective assessments of the size of change, and because the literature lacked a method for assessing the structure of school to work linkages that was precise and objective enough to allow for rigorous testing of theoretical propositions.

In this paper we advance the literature by studying the development of school-to-work linkages in France and Germany from the 1970s onwards. The comparative analysis of these countries led to the influential “organization space-qualification space” distinction by Maurice et al. (1986), which they based on their case study of two specific industries in these countries, namely a petrochemical plant (petrochemical industry) and a steel tube plant and an automobile wheel rim plant (batch and line metal manufacturing). This distinction has become a staple in the school-to-work literature (see, for instance, Shavit and Müller, 1998). Maurice et al’s dichotomy seemingly put France and Germany on opposite sides of an institutional continuum, which is at odds with the finding of a recent comparative paper that uses segregation analysis to compare the structure of linkages between the U.S., Germany, and France (DiPrete et al. 2015). In their analyses of data from the early 2000s, they find that educational qualifications do not link stronger to specific occupations in Germany than in France. An important question is therefore if the strong French-German contrast argued by Maurice et al was an accurate characterization of the French-German difference at the time, and that the institutional configurations of France and Germany have changed. By using data from the 1970s to the present, we are able to assess whether there has been significant change in the structure of linkages in France and Germany from the 1970s to the present, which provides the basis for assessing the empirical importance with respect to the structure of linkage of institutional reforms that have occurred in both countries during these decades.

The research is novel in applying recent developments in multigroup segregation research to the measurement of school-to-work linkages (Mora and Ruiz-Castillo, 2011; Theil and Finizza, 1971; Theil, 1972; Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002). This measure is uniquely suited to investigate linkages strength, because it allows for decomposition of overall linkage strength into different educational levels and fields of study. The main argument is that an educational credential has a high linkage strength if many graduates work in the same (specific) occupation. To estimate the linkage strength for Germany and France over time, we use country specific surveys. A big challenge was to find older surveys with information about fields of study, since DiPrete et al. (2015) found the field in which graduates obtained their qualification to be particularly important for establishing a link with a specific occupations. French surveys that contain such a variable are the “Formation et Qualification Professionelle” from 1970 onwards and the two most recent waves of the Labor Force Survey (Enquête Emploi). For Germany, the censuses of 1970 and 1987 contain fields of study, as do newer instances of the Mikrozensus. For each country, educational levels, fields, and occupations are harmonized to capture the development of linkage strength over time (see Tables 2 and 3 for a harmonization of educational levels).

Some tentative results will highlight the fruitfulness of this approach. First, linkage strength, as measured for the mid-2000s for France and Germany, is not homogeneous within countries, but varies across educational qualifications (Table 1). Thus, aggregate differences in linkage strength across countries mask a considerable variation in the size of country differences at the level of educational categories or occupations. Second, the long argued structural difference between the effects of training on occupational placement in France and Germany are considerably smaller than commonly presumed since the work of Maurice et al. (1986). We find that the greater total linkage strength in Germany than in France comes from compositional differences in the distribution of workers across
educational outcomes and from composition differences in the occupational distribution of the workforce, not from structural differences in the connection between educational outcomes and occupations. Lastly, we find that in Germany linkage strength decreased considerably between 1987 and 2006, while it remained stable between 1970 and 1987. If we restrict the sample to young workers (under 35 years old), we see an especially sharp decline for higher education degrees (Table 4). Again, these results are tentative, and subject to further validation of the harmonization across the different German datasets used in this paper. The final version of the paper will also contain estimates of the evolution of linkage strength over time for France as well, in order to establish whether the gap in linkage strength between France and Germany has changed over the roughly 40 year period under investigation in this paper. The final results will allow a test of the theoretical claims of Maurice et al and the derivations from these claims that have been used in the more recent comparative stratification literature in sociology.


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Occupational segregation and earnings disparities between blacks and whites observed at the turn of the twenty-first century are considerably lower than those detected in the middle of the twentieth century. In addition the rate of decline in racial disparities was quite rapid following the enactment of the Civil Right Act but has generally slowed down in recent decades. Despite the uniform agreement that racial economic disparities are declining, however, researchers do not fully agree on the sources, causes and trajectory of the decline. Nor do they agree on whether the sources of the gaps and temporal changes in the decline are similar across the two gender groups.

Although the literature on racial earnings disparities has grown and become substantial, the overwhelming majority of studies on the topic have focused almost exclusively on the male population. The omission of women from most studies of trends in racial earnings inequality is unfortunate for several reasons. First, because women constitute almost half of the economically active labor force, analysis based exclusively on men may lead to inaccurate, even misleading, conclusions regarding the process of racial stratification. Second, gender interacts with race to produce divergent patterns of economic inequality. These divergent patterns are complex and yield, at times, unexpected findings. For example, while the literature on intersectionality emphasizes diversities between women from different racial groups, studies on racial inequality reveal a greater racial similarity among women than among men. Thus, the expectation that black women would suffer a ‘double disadvantage’ contradicts the findings that underscore much larger racial earnings gaps among men than among women.

Furthermore, differences in racial disparities across the two gender groups are not only evident in the size of the earnings gap but also in its sources and in the pace of its convergence over time. For example, racial discrimination is the prime source of racial pay gaps among men but not among women. In a similar manner, over-time changes in the structure of the economy have not equally benefited women and men. Nor have they equally benefited blacks and whites. For example, the occupational distributions of black and white women have become more similar following the growth of the service sector. By contrast, economic restructuring – like the reduction in manufacturing jobs and the decline in unionization – has been more costly for black men than for black women. Thus, structural changes have resulted in a more pronounced and faster convergence in racial earnings gaps among women than among men.

In the present study we fill a lacuna in the literature by attending to the intersection between race and gender from a longitudinal perspective. We examine the extent to which the temporal decline in the racial gap over the last four decades was affected by different sources and assumed different trajectories for men and women. In what follows we develop a theoretical framework in which we challenge the ‘double disadvantage’ thesis. Subsequently, we establish a series of expectations regarding the intersection between gender and race in relation to wage and to over-time change in wages. We expect more similar economic outcomes and smaller racial earnings disparities among women of different races than among men. We also expect that the different components of the racial gap will vary across the two gender groups. We then refer to the structural changes that took place in the American economy and address the expected effects of these changes on the over-time decline in the racial pay gap for men and women.

The analysis is based, for the most part, on the IPUMS data for five decennial years between 1970 and 2010; a period that begins after the implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts along with the enactment of affirmative action policies and stretches till 2010 (after the 2008 economic recession). The findings lend firm support to the expectations that the size of the racial pay gap, its pace of convergence, and its sources differ considerably across the two gender groups. Nevertheless, the findings also reveal a striking similarity in the over-time trend of the racial gap across the two gender groups. At the turn of the new millennium, the earnings gaps between blacks and whites had begun widening among both men and women, underscoring a reversal of the trend of declining racial disparities. Intrigued by this finding, we offer several alternative explanations for the reversal of the trend, and examine their plausibility. Through a thorough examination of the differential sources and trends in racial pay gap across the gender groups, our study stresses the significance of gender for understanding racial inequality, hence contributing to the literature on both race and gender.
Research question

In the wake of the Great Recession, vocational education has become a widely advocated policy solution to the staggering rates of youth unemployment. A tighter link between the skills provided by vocational training and the skills demanded by employers should ease the transition from school to work. International organizations propagate in particular the example of Germany and Switzerland’s apprenticeship systems which combine learning in the workplace with lessons at vocational schools.

Our paper analyses the evolution of employment and wages over the life course for workers with upper-secondary vocational and workers with upper-secondary general education. We thus examine whether VET pays off in the long run in terms of employment prospects and earnings. Our analysis focuses on Switzerland, the OECD country with the highest share of youth who attend a work-based (dual) VET course after the end of compulsory school: 60 per cent in 2011. If VET should pay off anywhere, then Switzerland’s apprenticeship system: It trains for both blue-collar and white-collar occupations, leads to nationally standardized skill certificates and enjoys broad support from employers.

Two contrasting hypotheses

In the short run, VET has several attractive features. As employers are closely associated in the development of degrees and teaching curricula, the vocational skills obtained are highly, and quickly, instrumental in the labour market. This enables young people to be integrated early on into the world of work – and the aggregate outcome is lower youth unemployment. However, while VET may help young people to find a good match at the beginning of their working life, it may leave older workers vulnerable to technological change and shifts in the occupational structure. Over the life course, job-specific skills learnt in vocational training may thus become obsolete at a faster rate than general skills learnt in more academic curricula. Accordingly, the advantages of VET in smoothing the entry into the labour market may have to be weighed against potential disadvantages later on in the career.

At the same time, there may be no reversal of fortunes over the life course between holders of vocational and holders of general education – because what really counts may be getting off to a good start. The idea is that the initial experience in the labour market crucially shapes later working life. As VET facilitates youth integration into the workplace, it may lay the foundation for a successful career. On the contrary, it can be difficult to catch up after prolonged youth unemployment which may have a scarring effect on subsequent work history – and an initial failure to secure a stable job appears more likely for people with general schooling than with work-based apprenticeships.

Data

We use two large data sets to study the life course implications of vocational versus general education: pooled cross-sectional data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey, years 1991 to 2014, and longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel, years 1999 to 2013. Our analysis first provides a description of the age-earnings and age-employment profiles for the two educational groups. It then accounts for differences in social origin and uses regional variation in the baccalaureate rate and mothers’ education as instruments to account for selection into different educational tracks. The baccalaureate rate has an impact on educational choice, but is unlikely to affect employment and earnings through another channel than education. This rate is set independently by each canton based on parameters such as school places, cohort size, political pressure, and varies strongly over time and across cantons.

Results

Our results show that employment prospects for mid-aged and older workers with VET are at least as good as those for workers with general education. However, general education is associated with consistently higher annual earnings than VET once workers reach the age of 30 to 35. The nexus between education and labour market outcomes looks very different for men than women. Vocationally trained men have life-cycle earnings that exceed those of men with general education by 2 per cent, whereas women with general education earn about 6 per cent more than vocationally trained women. Our findings for employment-weighted earnings over the life course show that men benefit more from vocational than general education, whereas women obtain higher earnings with a general education than with VET. In other words, Switzerland’s apprenticeship system offers men vocational degrees which are as attractive as a baccalaureate in terms of employment prospects and total earnings over the life course. For women, however, a baccalaureate clearly carries higher returns than a vocational degree. These results are robust to the use of regional variation in the baccalaureate rate as an instrument to account for selection into different educational tracks.

Does College Degree Still Pay? A Causal Analysis of the Impact of College Expansion on Earnings and Occupational Prestige in Taiwan
Likewise, those who entered the college in the post-expansion era could also be divided into always-takers and compliers. Of course, of the pre-expansion era would have entered the colleges if they had been given the opportunities offered after the expansion.

In short, we assume that those who were admitted into colleges pre-expansion would also be admitted into colleges after the expansion. Always-takers were identified, the rest of RI2003 and RI2009 were taken as compliers.

Backgrounds and high-school performance and predicted probabilities of not enrolling into colleges. After always-takers and never-takers were identified, the rest of RI2003 and RI2009 were taken as compliers. Always-takers include respondents of RI2003 who were admitted into colleges and respondents of RI2009 who shared with always-takers of RI2003 similar family backgrounds and high-school performance and predicted probabilities of not enrolling into colleges. After always-takers and never-takers were identified, the rest of RI2003 and RI2009 were taken as compliers.

In this paper, we followed the methodological strategy developed by Choi (2015) and examined a unique dataset collected by Panel Study of Family Dynamics in Taiwan. With this dataset, we were able to identify a pre-expansion cohort and a post-expansion cohort and then estimated the change in earnings and occupational prestige due to expansion for three groups: “compliers” (who would not have attended before the expansion but would do so after the expansion), “always-takers” (who would be predicted to go to college before and after expansion), and “never-takers” (who would not go to college in either period). By comparing the change in earnings and occupational prestige of compliers with always-takers and never-takers allows us to make causal inference about the impact of higher education expansion on earnings and occupational prestige in Taiwan.

Data and Method

The present study used the so-called “new” samples gathered by Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD) in the 5th wave and the 11th wave to analyze the impacts of expansion of higher education in Taiwan on earnings and occupational prestige. The new sample of the 5th wave of the PSFD, called by the project as RI2003, was collected in 2003. The population targeted by the RI2003 was adults born between 1964 and 1976 in Taiwan and the sample size is 1,152. The new sample of the 11th wave of the PSFD, called by the project as RI2009, was collected in 2009. The population sampled by RI2009 was adults born between 1977 and 1983 and the sample size was 2,092. The cohort of RI2003 was exposed to the college system before the 2nd wave of the higher education expansion and then estimated the change in earnings and occupational prestige due to expansion for three groups: “compliers” (who would not have attended before the expansion but would do so after the expansion), “always-takers” (who would be predicted to go to college before and after expansion), and “never-takers” (who would not go to college in either period). By comparing the change in earnings and occupational prestige of compliers with always-takers and never-takers allows us to make causal inference about the impact of higher education expansion on earnings and occupational prestige in Taiwan.

Our analysis adopted a counterfactual approach by first identifying within two PSFD samples those who entered college regardless of the expansion (always-takers), those who would never have entered college regardless of the expansion (never-takers) and those who would not have entered college but for the expansion (compliers). Always-takers include respondents of RI2003 who were admitted into colleges and respondents of RI2009 who shared with always-takers of RI2003 similar demographic characteristics, family backgrounds and high-school performance and predicted probabilities of being admitted into colleges. Never-takers include RI2009 respondents who did not enroll into colleges and respondents of RI2003 who shared with never-takers of RI2009 similar family backgrounds and high-school performance and predicted probabilities of not enrolling into colleges. After always-takers and never-takers were identified, the rest of RI2003 and RI2009 were taken as compliers.

In short, we assume that those who were admitted into colleges pre-expansion would also be admitted into colleges after the expansion. Those who did not enter the college in the pre-expansion era could be divided into compliers and never-takers. Compliers of the pre-expansion era would have entered the colleges if they had been given the opportunities offered after the expansion. Likewise, those who entered the college in the post-expansion era could also be divided into always-takers and compliers. Of course, compliers and never-takers of the pre-expansion and compliers and always-takers of the after-expansion period could not be observed.
and could only be predicted counterfactually. Since always-takers of the pre-expansion era were students of public universities and a few reputable private colleges and universities, it is not unreasonable to assume that always-takers of the post-expansion era would also have a higher chance to be admitted into these colleges and universities. Compilers of the post-expansion era, however, would probably be more likely to be students of less prestigious colleges and universities.

After identification of these three groups for both RI2003 and RI2009 samples, a difference-in-difference model is used to estimate the effects of college expansion on monthly income and occupational prestige of the first full-time job and the current job.

Preliminary Findings

As discussed above, we use the difference in difference model to examine the effect of college expansion on earnings and occupational prestige. To examine such impact, we propose two contrasting hypotheses to test the impact of college expansion on earnings and occupational prestige. One hypothesis follows the argument of the human capital theory and the signal theory, arguing that the college expansion helps the “complier” gain more earnings and occupational prestige then before, but the positive impact would decline with the increasing working experiences. The other hypothesis follows the argument of credentialism, proposing that there have no positive influences of college expansion on the individual earnings and their occupational prestige. Table 1 presents the preliminary findings of the DID model, testing the impacts of higher education expansion on monthly income and occupational prestige of two cohorts of college graduates in Taiwan.

Table 1 shows that although always-taker still has its advantage on earnings and occupational prestige. The interaction between always-taker and expansion, however, indicates that the return of attending college of always-taker has decreased after college expansion as far as income and occupational prestige of the first income are concerned. Always-taker’s advantage on income and occupational prestige of the present job is not affected by college expansion. Hence, the negative impact of college expansion on always-takers does not last. While Table 1 shows that complier’s earnings and occupational prestige are lower than always-taker’s, the estimation of the interaction effects between complier and college expansion reveals that college expansion brings clear positive effects on complier’s earnings and occupational prestige.

In short, it is clear that the findings lend supports to the argument based on the human capital theory and the signal theory and rejects the hypothesis of credentialism. Table 1 shows that the complier gains positively from college expansion. This is consistent with the prediction of the human capital theory and the signal theory since by attending college compliers may help them to increase their skills and qualification, which in turn improves their returns in earnings and occupational prestige. Apparently, college expansion in Taiwan provides more opportunities for young people to attend college and reduces inequality among young college graduates as far as their first job is concerned.

Occupational Licensing and the Wage Structure in Germany
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In many western countries, citizens need permission to work in particular occupations. These permissions are called occupational licenses. There is a broad discussion in sociology and economics about the economic consequences of licensing. Most scholars have interpreted it as state protection of organized interest (Kleiner 2010; Weeden und Grusky 2014). Licenses are said to protect monopoly rents and contribute to overall wage inequality. While studies of wage premiums of licensing in the U.S. abound (Weeden 2002; Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2010), few have analyzed distributional effects of occupational licensing empirically (exception: Gittleman et al. 2015). Studies of occupational licensing in European labor markets and effects on wage inequality are generally rare (Bol and Weeden 2015; Koumenta et al. 2014).

We focus on the German labor market to address two aspects that remain unanswered. First, we inquire the institutional background of occupational licensing in Germany. We do so against the background of the two dominant theoretical hypotheses of monopoly creation vs. consumer protection. Within the talk we will discuss the impacts of German Federal Constitutional Court decisions as well as the interplay of entry regulation and the regulation of prices for occupational tasks. Second, we ask what kind of wage premium correlates with occupational licensing and how these wage premiums influence wage inequality. Based on our previous discussion we deduce that the wage premium of occupational licenses is better understood as safety-net effect but as monopoly rent. Employees in licensed occupations have a lower likelihood to earn low wages but their likelihood to earn high wages is not increased in the same manner. The prominence of the safety-net effect qualifies occupational licensing as a reducing force for wage inequality.

To test our claims empirically, we calculate conditional and unconditional quantile regressions based on the BIBB-BAUa Employment Survey 2012. We analyze distributional effects of occupational licensing with quantile regressions. Our findings indicate wage contraction rather than wage dispersion. In line with the monopoly view, self-employed persons realize top wages most plausibly explained by bundling regulated licensed services with non-licensed unregulated ones. This group of lawyers, solicitors, and physicians usually gets much attention in public debates and in many academic contributions. However, they represent a relatively small fraction of the German labor force. There are relatively more wage earners at the middle of the distribution, who benefit from licensing of occupations. As a result, the distances between top and middle wages and bottom and middle wages is reduced. Hence, the net effect of licensing is the creation of a safety net at the bottom rather than monopoly rents at the top of the wage distribution. This finding contradicts earlier research that assumed inequality-increasing effects of occupational licensing.

Literature

Does a bachelor degree pay off? Returns to academic versus vocational education after Bologna
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1.Introduction

Studies on the labor market benefits of academic education compared to vocational education are numerous, however, they pertain to an outdated education system. In the course of the Bologna Process, shorter tertiary degrees (Bachelor’s) were introduced in Germany and several other European countries, in order to increase participation in tertiary education and to channel graduates more rapidly into the labor market. For students finishing upper secondary school, the system now offers academic and vocational education and training (VET) programs of approximately the same length. For those programs in higher education with a strong vocational orientation, coming students can decide between two different forms of education for a rather similar or even identical field of studies. But how are short academic degrees appreciated on the labor market? Focusing on Germany, we study differences in labor market outcomes – income, socio-economic status, unemployment risk and fixed term employment – between individuals receiving vocational or academic post-secondary education.

Previous research suggests that working-class children are diverted from academic education by vocational post-secondary training pathways (Becker & Hecken 2008; Hillmert & Jacob 2003; Müller & Pollak 2004). The diversion argument implies that academic education offers more rewarding returns than vocational education. While this is mostly true for the pre-Bologna long academic degrees (~5 years) (Glocker & Storck 2014; Klein 2013), it is an open empirical question whether short bachelor degrees (~3 years) convey similar advantages (Neugebauer 2015). The diversion argument would become obsolete to some extent, if returns are similar or even higher for vocational education in the new system.

2.Background and contribution

Because the first Bachelor’s graduates cohorts entered the labor market only recently, little is known about their labor market returns, both, in terms of mean returns, as well as in terms of associated risks, such as unemployment or probability of fixed term employment. In German public debates, a popular postulation is that Bachelor’s graduates employability is poor; they are considered to be ‘lightweight academics’, too young and low qualified to compete on the labor market (e.g. Olbrisch 2010). In light of these debates, it is little surprising that only a minority enters the labor market with a Bachelor’s degree.

Theoretically, it is less clear whether Bachelor’s graduates are at a disadvantage. While VET and Bachelor’s degrees hardly differ in length and often prepare young adults for similar occupations, Bachelor’s degrees may be seen as academically more demanding and thus send stronger signals for graduates ability and trainability. However, their actual skill level is rather unknown to employers, at least among the firstBachelor’s cohorts. On the other hand, the skills of vocational trainees are well known to employers, especially when they are trained in the dual system which combines apprenticeships in a company and vocational education at a vocational school.

Only recently, studies on the labor market chances of Bachelor’s graduates became available. These studies are either based on (typically not representative) surveys among company representatives (Konegen-Greiner et al. 2015; DIHK 2015), or they are based on higher education graduate surveys (Rehn et al. 2011). Lacking a control group of vocationally trained individuals, it remains unclear how the two groups fare in comparison to each other.

We contribute to the literature and the public discussion by comparing the returns to VET and Bachelor’s degrees (we also report returns to Master’s degrees). By using large-scale nationally representative data from official statistics, we are also able to limit our comparison to fields in which both vocational training and higher education are available. Our prime outcomes of interest are income and socio-economic status (ISEI) of the first occupation. To test whether there is a risk-return trade-off between VET and academic education we additionally examine the variation in income, unemployment risk, and fixed term employment of labor market entrants.

3. Data and methods

Our estimates are based on the 2010 and 2011 waves (adding 2012 once available) of the German Microcensus, a one per cent sample of German households. We compare labor market entrants with VET (n=7483) or Bachelor’s degrees (n=1419) who, theoretically, compete for the same jobs. The Microcensus includes detailed measures of type and field of education. This allows us to...
to compare different types of Bachelor’s degrees (from universities and universities of applied sciences) with different types of VET degrees (initial training and advanced training, for example to become a Master Craftsman or a Technician). In a first step, we compare graduates from all fields of study. In a second step, we compare only graduates in the same fields (business, technical, social work) but with different types of degrees.

4. Results

First results indicate that Bachelor’s graduates reach, on average, higher incomes and higher status occupations. On both return dimensions, they range in the middle between VET and Master’s degrees. Individuals with advanced training degrees match almost with Bachelor’s in terms of income, but not in terms of occupational status. The differences in ISEI scores point towards long term advantages of bachelor degree holders. In terms of a risk-return trade off, our findings indicate that VET holders experience lower income variance and less fixed term employment. Unemployment risks are very low for all graduates, and thus hardly differ. In sum, Bachelor’s degrees pay off compared to VET but they are, to some extent, an educational option associated with a higher risk during the first years of labor market participation.

References


The question of “who marries whom” holds important implications for understanding various aspects of social structure (Mare 1991; Wright 1997). A large number of research exists that investigates assortative marriage along a multitude of dimensions, such as education (e.g. Mare 1991; Schwartz & Mare 2005; Smits et al. 1996), race (e.g. Qian 1997, 1998b; Rosenfeld 2008), occupation (e.g. Hout 1982; Kalmijn 1991b, 1994), religion (e.g. Kalmijn 1991a), cultural capital (e.g. DiMaggio & Mohr 1985), and meeting settings (e.g. Kalmijn & Flap 2001). As marriage signifies the acceptance of someone in one of the most intimate senses, various forms of assortative marriage, or the lack thereof, have been seen as indicators of social openness or closure (e.g. Mare 2000; Uit ee & Luijkx, 1990) and group boundary permeability (e.g. Gordon 1964; Lieberson & Waters 1988). Furthermore, as individuals often pool their economic and socio-cultural advantage/disadvantage in couples (Blossfeld & Timm 2003), various patterns of assortative mating also hold implications for understanding the reproduction of social hierarchy and order (Mare 2000).

With significant scholarly attention devoted to describing the trends and patterns of assortative marriages along various matching dimensions and across time and social contexts, a conceptual distinction has been made between achieved versus ascriptive assortative mating (Kalmijn 1991b), that is, matching based on achieved (e.g. education) or ascriptive characteristics (e.g. race and social origin status). Moreover, a growing scholarship now considers more critically the intersection between different matching criteria. Moving beyond providing a descriptive account of “who marries whom” on a singular dimension, the questions become: how do individuals’ ascriptive characteristics interact with their achieved characteristics and jointly shape people’s marriage market outcomes? How do different configurations of such intersections further implicate our understanding of various aspects of social structure and order?

Although the scholarship on assortative mating is preponderance, three interlinked major limitations persist. First, existing studies on assortative mating has largely been descriptive. Empirical descriptions, drawing on evidences from different periods and societies with foci placed on a variety of matching criterion, naturally produce varied accounts. Such variations in findings have made the advancement of synthesized explanations difficult. Secondly, research on assortative marriage has relied almost solely on quantitative analyses of survey data. On one hand, the current standard approach of log-linear modeling cannot fully account for the populations at risk of marriage. On the other hand, the sometimes-employed event-history models that consider the unmarried population are generally single-sex approaches that do not address variability in marriage entry by age-sex compositions. Even when casting such methodological complications aside, the third limitation, which is a conceptual inadequacy, remains. From the evaluations and selections of suitable partners to the obstacles of and decisions about marriage entry, between preference and opportunity, the process of mate selection and marriage itself are wrought with emotions, normative values and meanings, all of which are generally invisible in statistical results. Taking all three limitations together, thus, existing research on assortative mating remains largely under-theorized. A great deal of attempts have been made to address the question of “who marries whom”, yet the answers to the questions of why and how, continue to be in a “black box”.

In this light, this paper makes two conceptual contributions with three empirical innovations. On the empirical front, first, I have adopted a unique mixed-methods design, utilizing three large-scale nationally representative surveys (2003 and 2006 China General Social Survey and 1996 Life Histories and Social Changes in Contemporary China Survey) as well as nearly 80 in-depth interviews to study the trends and patterns of assortative mating in China from 1987 onward. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses and evidences not only reveals the overall trends and patterns on the aggregate level, but also allows explorations of individuals’ reasoning, preferences and stated norms in the mate selection processes. Secondly, by using the harmonic mean marriage function, the statistical analyses in this paper extend the traditional single-sex models to a two-sex model and further account for both the population at risk of marriage and the variability in marriage entry driven by the age-sex-Hukou composition of the population. Thirdly, in addition to considering the effect of Hukou as a static social origin attribute, this paper specifically models the effect of Hukou change (from rural to urban) on individuals’ desirability in the marriage market.

In doing so, this paper moves beyond the descriptive results and provides a look into the “black box” of mechanisms underlying the mate selection process, paying special attention to individuals’ reasoning of preferences as well as stated norms and meanings regarding marriage. What is more, China, with its Hukou system, offers an exciting and unique case to investigate the intersection between ascriptive and achieved characteristics in assortative mating. Unlike most of the individual attributes that are either ascriptive (e.g. race and sex) or achieved (e.g. educational and occupational attainment), individuals’ Hukou status can be both a social origin and an attainment factor. Through looking at a particular segment of the population, i.e. individuals who have undergone Hukou change, I investigate the lasting effect of Hukou origin on marriage desirability for people who appear to have, at least on paper, successfully crossed the rural-urban boundary. Thus, this paper provides a more nuanced reading of China’s rural-urban boundary, both as a social distinction and a symbolic divide (Lamont & Molnar 2002).

The preliminary statistical results show that assortative mating patterns in contemporary Chinese society can be best described as a combination of homogamy and hypergamy. Furthermore, a strong rural-urban differential in marriage desirability exists. Obtaining an urban Hukou later in life indeed increases individuals’ desirability in the marriage market. Yet, such improvement cannot fully erase the adverse effect of the rural Hukou origin, nor can it truly elevate Hukou changers to be completely on par with urban-born individuals. Although both appear to be “urban” on paper, for Hukou changers, the disadvantage of a rural Hukou origin persists.
Using data from in-depth interview that are particularly well equipped in uncovering individuals’ deeply-held reasoning, emotion, preference and stated norms, I have found that the rural-urban boundary in contemporary China is not only a social distinction, but also a symbolic divide. Contrary to existing theorization of marriage, the in-depth interview data have revealed individuals’ mate selection choice, preference and reasoning to be heavily imbued with emotional meanings and narratives. Marriage is viewed not as an exchange of resources, but as a highly emotional give-and-take of mutual support, companionship, and attraction. In this way, for individuals who have crossed the rural-urban boundary through Hukou changes, their Hukou origin continues to be visible and acts a source of lasting symbolic distinction.

Childbearing after Union Dissolution: Does the Sequence of Union Matter?

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Research has examined the recent patterns of childbearing out-of-wedlock as well as the associations between childbearing and union transitions. Less systematic has been research on deciphering fertility patterns after union dissolution. This is limiting since life courses are increasingly diverse regarding partnership and family careers, and part of the well-documented changing fertility patterns across union types may be due to factors that lead individuals to dissolve unions and re-partner. We address this gap in knowledge by theorizing and examining how childbearing evolves after union dissolution. For the empirical analyses, we use hazard regression for first-, second- and third-order childbearing episodes of women aged 16 to 40 from the panel study Household, Income and Labor dynamics in Australia. Preliminary results from parity-specific models show that fertility rates are the highest among first-order marital unions. We also find that subsequent unions (to the first one) have increased first-order childbearing rates. Our study contributes to the understanding of contemporary fertility patterns, by shedding light on fertility variations across partnership life courses. Further work will include, among others, the simultaneous estimation of childbearing and union transitions to assess the effect of unobserved factors that commonly affect both processes.

Trigger events and poverty transitions after leaving the parental home among young adults in Finland

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Introduction

In the Nordic countries the relative poverty rates for young adults are remarkably high compared to other European countries due to the relatively young age when individuals leave the parental home. However, less is known about poverty dynamics after leaving the nest. This study analyzes the first poverty transitions of young adults who have moved away from the parental home. This research answers to the question, how employment and income events and demographic events explain poverty entries and exits among 18–24 year-olds in Finland. Since returning to the parental home can be an important route out of poverty, it is also analyzed whether among poor young adults some population subgroups are more likely to move back to the parental home. This study focuses on the years 2007–2012.

There are various reasons for focusing on the time after leaving the parental home. Firstly, leaving the parental home is one of the main markers of transition to adulthood (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011). Secondly, Finland is among the countries where young adults move away from the parental home exceptionally early and this is associated with an increased poverty risk (Aassve et al., 2007). In addition, little is known about returning to the parental home (Stone et al., 2014).

Earlier literature has distinguished three types of events affecting poverty transitions (e.g. Jenkins, 2011): those related to 1) employment status and earned income, 2) social transfers, and 3) household composition. The first two types can be thought as employment and income events while the third as demographic events. It is known that poverty is often associated with demographic events such as divorce or having own children. However, according to earlier studies employment and income events are the most common trigger events to be associated with poverty transitions (e.g. Jenkins, 2011; Polin & Raitano, 2014).

Data and methods

This study utilizes high quality Finnish register data. A random sample of twenty-five percent of cohorts born in 1984–1993 is used in the analyses including only those years when the sample persons were aged 18–24. Hence the length of the follow-up period is from two to six years. The follow-up of the individuals starts when they move away from the parental home and ends when they experience their first poverty transition or are otherwise censored from the data. In other analyses than the one focusing on moving back to parental home, an individual is censored when he or she moves back to parental home.

The poverty thresholds – set at 60 percent of annual median national equivalent disposable income – are calculated using time-series of the Income Distribution Statistics by Statistics Finland since it contains a representative sample of the total household population in Finland.

In the descriptive analyses the dichotomous trigger events are the following: new children are born for the sample person, partnership dissolution/formation, moving back to parental home, decrease/increase in earnings, decrease/increase in social transfers and decrease/increase in employment. Changes in earnings, social transfers and employment are decomposed to events occurring to the sample persons and events occurring to the spouse. The main explanatory variables in the multivariate analyses are based on household composition and employment months. Other explanatory variables include the highest educational level attained, enrollment in education, sex, country of birth, age when moving away from the parental home, the poverty status of the family before moving away, and the length of current poverty or non-poverty spell.
Firstly, the incidence of trigger events among young adults is illustrated. Secondly, it is analyzed what is the conditional probability of experiencing a poverty transition by different trigger events. Lastly, discrete-time logistic and multinomial logistic event history models are estimated. Discrete-time logistic models are estimated for poverty entries and exits. Event history models are also estimated in the competing risks framework to include moving back to the parental home to the analyses.

Main findings

The results of this study illustrate that individual’s living arrangement is an important contributing factor for financial well-being. Living alone or experiencing a partnership dissolution increase the risk of poverty. In addition, having own children during the early years of young adulthood increase the risk of poverty. Changes in employment and incomes seem to be common and hence often associated with poverty transitions. However, changes in employment and incomes do not necessarily result in poverty transitions.

With respect to other explanatory variables, higher education is associated with a lower likelihood to experience poverty. However, those enrolled in education have a significantly higher risk of poverty than those who are not. Women and those with higher age are more likely to avoid poverty. Additionally, those who lived in a poor household before moving away were more likely to experience poverty than others.

The results illustrate that for gaining the full picture of poverty dynamics among young adults living independently also the possibility to move back to the parental home should be taken into account. Those who were born in another country than Finland and those with higher education were more likely to return the parental home. Those with higher age or longer time away from the parental home, those enrolled in education, those that had lived in a poor family, and those living in a couple household or having children were less likely than others to move back to the parental home.

References


Family Structure and Leaving Home: Why Do Young Adults From Non-Intact Families Leave Earlier?

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Leaving home is considered a milestone in the transition to adulthood. The transition out of the parental home is characterized by considerable heterogeneity in the timing of leaving home. Previous research shows that especially young adults from non-intact families leave home earlier (e.g. Aquilino, 1991; Blaabjerg & Mulder, 2009; Goldscheider & Goldscheider, 1998). This is concerning, because earlier home leaving is related to poor outcomes later in life, such as poverty, lower educational attainment and divorce (Aassve et al. 2002; White & Lacy, 1997). Although there is consensus about the relationship between family structure and the timing of leaving home, little is known about how this relationship could be explained.

Early studies on leaving home suggested that all young adults desire to leave the parental home because they prefer privacy and independence. The feathered nest hypothesis challenges this view and argues that not all young adults desire to leave home; young adults prefer to stay in the parental home if their home is a “feathered” nest (Avery et al., 1992).

First of all, the nest can be feathered economically. Good housing conditions and a large living space offer comfort and privacy to the young adult. These benefits of the parental home are lost when the young adult moves out; the parental house is a non-transferable resource (Gierveld et al., 1991). Several studies show that housing conditions and being a homeowner lead to longer stays in the parental home (e.g. Buck & Scott, 1993; Mulder et al., 2002). Income can also feather the nest economically. Parents whose income is below the poverty line might feel more financial pressure and push their children out of the parental home or require their children to contribute to the rent, which gives the young adult less incentive to stay home. Young adults from non-intact families, especially from single parent families, are less likely to grow up in economically feathered home (Poortman, 2000). Hence, they might leave home earlier than young adults from intact families to “escape” from adverse economic conditions.

Secondly, the nest can be socially feathered. Support, affection and company of family members feather the nest, whereas conflict leads to a less socially feathered nest. The parental home could also be socially feathered in terms of support and company from friends, relatives, and neighbors. A socially feathered nest forms a (partly) non-transferable resource; daily face-to-face support and company would be lost if the young adult moves out (Gierveld et al., 1991). Indeed, previous research suggests that harmonious parent-child relations lead to later home leaving, whereas conflict leads to earlier move-outs (Cooney & Mortimer, 1999; Kiernan, 1992). Young adults from non-intact families might live in a less socially feathered home than young adults from intact families, because they are more likely to be caught-in-the-middle between their parents, have conflicting loyalties and have less contact with their co-resident parent (Amato, 1993; Sweeney, 2007). Especially young adults from divorced families with a step-parent might have strained relations, since the introduction of a new partner of the parent could lead to conflict (Sweeney, 2007). Moreover, non-intact
families are more mobile, hence young adults from these families less often live in the same area as they grew up and have weaker relations with their neighbors (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994).

Our goal is to examine to what extent these two aspects of the parental home – economic resources and social relations – can explain why young adults of divorced families leave home earlier than young adults from intact families. We draw on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of 3,841 young adults to examine economic resources and social relations as possible mediators between family structure and leaving home. We employ discrete-time event history models that combine comprehensive information from a youth questionnaire answered at panel entry (age 17) with prospective longitudinal data from subsequent panel waves.

Our analyses show that, controlling for enrollment in education and employment, young adults from non-intact families leave home significantly earlier than young adults from intact families, especially young adults from divorced families with a step-parent are likely to leave home early (Figure 1). Khb analyses show that this relation is explained by economic rather than social factors. Young adults from non-intact families leave home earlier because their parental income is more likely to be below the poverty line, their parental home is in a worse condition and their parents often are tenants rather than owners of the house. Young adults also left home earlier if they did not grow up in the same area as where their family is living at age 17 and if they had conflicts with their parents about their education, but these factors did not mediate the relation between family structure and leaving home. Other indicators of social relations - parent-child conflict, support and affection - did not affect timing of leaving home.
In this paper, we contribute to the growing literature on this topic by focusing on the trend of inequality of educational opportunities (IEO) over cohorts for the Italian case. The latter is particularly interesting, since research results are not completely consistent. While a majority of recent studies find IEO to have decreased over time, comparative research (limited to men) shows Italy to be one of the European countries where such a decrease has been weaker, and some authors even find IEO to have been stable. We argue that the dominance approach could make sense when studying the intergenerational transmission of social position in the past, in periods and countries where most women were not in a formal employment relation, there are at least two reasons why their exclusion can give a limited picture of the current patterns of intergenerational transmission of education, and thus their trend over time, up to the recent cohorts.

First, female participation to the labour market has increased, up to the point that it does not make sense anymore to assume that most of the economic resources useful for childrearing are provided by the father. Second, and even more importantly, when the outcome of interest is educational achievement it is clear that the mother, be she employed or not, exerts a crucial impact on those cognitive and non-cognitive skills which foster school achievement, and its omission biases the results, as it has been demonstrated by previous research.

In this paper, we contribute to the growing literature on this topic by focusing on the trend of inequality of educational opportunities (IEO) over cohorts for the Italian case. The latter is particularly interesting, since research results are not completely consistent. While a majority of recent studies find IEO to have decreased over time, comparative research (limited to men) shows Italy to be one of the European countries where such a decrease has been weaker, and some authors even find IEO to have been stable. We argue that measuring family background in a more detailed and accurate way, also consistent with theoretical claims about the family being the proper unit of analysis in stratification studies, could shed some light on the inconsistency of previous results.

We use data from three Multi-purpose (Multiscopo) surveys conducted by the Italian national statistics institute (Istat) in 1998, 2003 and 2009, enabling us to cover cohorts from the 1940s to the early 1980s, counting about 60,000 cases. The relatively large sample allows us to make a difference from (to our knowledge) all current papers on this topic: we adopt a transition approach, modeling the probability to achieve a lower secondary (compulsory), upper secondary and tertiary degree, conditional on having made the lower transition. Parental background is measured by both parents’ education.

Our hypotheses are built with reference to the different roles of parents in childrearing. Since the mother is expected to do most of the carework in the early years of life, especially in the Southern European countries, we expect that its role is more important in the earlier educational transitions. However, with the increase of both female education and participation to the labour market, and the change of gender stereotypes and roles implied by both processes, we expect such a difference to become less important over cohorts. We include gender in our analysis also on the children’s side: we follow gender-role theories in hypothesizing a particular relation between the child and his/her same-gender parent.

We thus expect that:
1. The role of mother’s education on the probability to make a transition is more important in the early transitions than in the later ones.
2. Over cohorts, we expect this difference to decrease, albeit not to disappear, as fathers increase their relative presence in the early children care and mothers increase the economic resources they can contribute to the childrearing process.
analyses indicated no significant or systematic gender differences.

In initially establishing DESO and in then seeking to account for it, we collapse cohort members into tertiles of relative educational attainment at LME and fit a series of linear probability regression models. We treat men and women together since exploratory advice on getting a job, a recommendation to an employer, the use of social contacts in helping them find a job, or by their parents. We also draw on information available in BCS70 on whether cohort members report having received help from their parents through

Cohort members’ educational attainment at LME is treated through a relative scale (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2015) that combines of parental status and education. Cohort members’ class destinations are indexed by their class positions at age 38.

We work with the dataset of the British Birth Cohort Study 1970 (BCS70) which has aimed to follow through their life-courses all children born in Britain in one week in that year. Our main social origin variable is parental class but we supplement this by measures of parental status and education. Cohort members’ class destinations are indexed by their class positions at age 38.

Our hypotheses will be tested by means of a systematic comparison of the “effects” of paternal and maternal education over the three transitions considered. We compare models including both parents separately and a combination of both (such as in the dominance approach), to establish: a) if the results are empirically and substantially similar; b) if the magnitude of both parents systematically change across educational transitions and over cohorts. Moreover, we also systematically compares different models, showing which fits the data better and how the trend over time changes depending on the specification adopted.

Our first results, under a simple metric specification of both parental education and achieved education, give a general support to our argument, since the trend over time of the association was found to be different for the two parents: while in the case of father’s education it decreases, as shown by most of the current papers, in the case of the mother the association is almost stable over time. Thus, while in the early cohorts the father’s “effect” was clearly stronger than the one of the mother, in the more recent cohorts their weight is more or less the same. Concerning sons and daughters, we find (differently from what expected) a stronger decrease for the father’s effect on the achievement of sons, because in the early cohorts this effects appears to be much stronger for sons than for daughters.

We also situate our work in the context of recent discussion, chiefly by economists, of restricted rates of downward social mobility (for Britain, see Mcknight 2015; for the US, Reeves and Howard 2013). What is here of main concern is the extent to which individuals from more advantaged social origins appear to be protected against downward mobility by a ‘glass floor’ that operates, at least in some respects, contrary to meritocratic principles. However, we think it important to complement the idea of a ‘glass floor’ with that of a ‘glass ceiling’ that may, in a similarly non-meritocratic way, prevent upward mobility from less advantaged origins.

Further, in the economists’ research DESO has been defined not in contradistinction to effects via education but rather to effects via cognitive ability, with education then being brought into the analysis as a variable that can in part account for DESO. But cognitive ability is a more problematic indicator of merit than is educational attainment. For whatever weight may be given to genetic factors or to family environment in determining such ability, it is clearly something that is essentially outside of individuals’ control, whereas educational attainment does involve effort and choice for which individuals could, in some degree, be held accountable. Consequently, we follow Bernardi and Ballerino in defining DESO in terms of the effect not mediated by education, and consider cognitive ability as a possible further mediating factor. However, we do at the same time see it as analytically valuable to make a distinction between educational attainment at labour market entry (LME), to which theorists of meritocracy such as Bell (1972, 1973) have attached key importance, and further educational attainment made in the course of working life; and we therefore define DESO in contradistinction to the effects of education at LME.

The ‘Glass Floor’ and the ‘Glass Ceiling’: the Role of Meritocratic and Non-Meritocratic Factors in Intergenerational Class Mobility in Britain

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Research question and theoretical framework

In recent literature (see esp. Bernardi and Ballarino eds., 2016) increasing attention has been given to the extent to which in economically advanced societies individuals’ social origins still exert a ‘direct’ effect on their social destinations (DESO): that is, an effect that is direct in the sense that it is not mediated through education. In the present paper, we seek, in the case of intergenerational class mobility in Britain, to ‘unpack’ DESO by identifying variables that can account for this effect: that is, other variables that, in addition to education, mediate the origins-destinations association.

We also situate our work in the context of recent discussion, chiefly by economists, of restricted rates of downward social mobility (for Britain, see Mcknight 2015; for the US, Reeves and Howard 2013). What is here of main concern is the extent to which individuals from more advantaged social origins appear to be protected against downward mobility by a ‘glass floor’ that operates, at least in some respects, contrary to meritocratic principles. However, we think it important to complement the idea of a ‘glass floor’ with that of a ‘glass ceiling’ that may, in a similarly non-meritocratic way, prevent upward mobility from less advantaged origins.

Further, in the economists’ research DESO has been defined not in contradistinction to effects via education but rather to effects via cognitive ability, with education then being brought into the analysis as a variable that can in part account for DESO. But cognitive ability is a more problematic indicator of merit than is educational attainment. For whatever weight may be given to genetic factors or to family environment in determining such ability, it is clearly something that is essentially outside of individuals’ control, whereas educational attainment does involve effort and choice for which individuals could, in some degree, be held accountable. Consequently, we follow Bernardi and Ballerino in defining DESO in terms of the effect not mediated by education, and consider cognitive ability as a possible further mediating factor. However, we do at the same time see it as analytically valuable to make a distinction between educational attainment at labour market entry (LME), to which theorists of meritocracy such as Bell (1972, 1973) have attached key importance, and further educational attainment made in the course of working life; and we therefore define DESO in contradistinction to the effects of education at LME.

Data, variables and analytical method

We work with the dataset of the British Birth Cohort Study 1970 (BCS70) which has aimed to follow through their life-courses all children born in Britain in one week in that year. Our main social origin variable is parental class but we supplement this by measures of parental status and education. Cohort members’ class destinations are indexed by their class positions at age 38.

Cohort members’ educational attainment at LME is treated through a relative scale (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2015) that combines academic and vocational qualifications. Cohort members’ further educational attainment is measured according to whether any improvement in their relative educational position was made between LME and age 38.

Cohort members’ cognitive ability is based on results from verbal and non-verbal tests administered at age 10; and we also include cohort members’ scores on a ‘locus of control’ scale as a non-cognitive attribute believed to be of importance to occupational attainment.

We also draw on information available in BCS70 on whether cohort members report having received help from their parents through advice on getting a job, a recommendation to an employer, the use of social contacts in helping them find a job, or by their parents actually employing them.

In initially establishing DESO and in then seeking to account for it, we collapse cohort members into tertiles of relative educational attainment at LME and fit a series of linear probability regression models. We treat men and women together since exploratory analyses indicated no significant or systematic gender differences.

Results
Our initial analyses show that British society is characterised by both strong ‘glass ceiling’ and ‘glass floor’ effects; i.e. men and women who at LME have similar levels of educational attainment have significantly differing chances of being later found in either salariat or working class positions, depending on their class origins.

When parental status and education are included in the analysis as further social origin variables, DESO, as we define it in relation to educational level at LME, is reduced; and it is reduced further, though only in rather limited ways, by the inclusion of cohort members’ cognitive ability and ‘locus of control’ scores.

However, our two most important findings are the following. First, parental assistance in regard to employment, even where reported, appears to play very little part in mediating DESO. Second, what emerges as the most important factor in this regard is whether or not, at age 38, men or women’s relative educational position has changed as compared with what it was at LME. An improvement in this position significantly increases the chances of their being found in a salariat position, while a decline increases the chances of their being found in a working class position. Our results do in this way lend some support to the idea of education-based meritocracy. But since we know from further research (Bukodi, 2016) that individuals of more advantaged class origins are more likely than those of less advantaged origins to obtain further – academic – educational qualifications in the course of their working lives, it would at the same time appear that in mediating the origins-destination association, education is as much – or even more – a force for class immobility, often via ‘counter-mobility’, as for mobility away from class origins.

Finally, we should note that the mediator variables that we include do not entirely eliminate DESO. In certain respects, parental class and also parental education retain their importance through processes that remain to be established.

References

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Decreasing Social Mobility? The Swiss Case in Western European Comparison
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Background and Research Question

Recent research on effects of social origin on class and education in 20th century Switzerland has not only demonstrated the persistence of these effects (Pfeffer, 2008; Falcon, 2012; Falcon, 2013) but some results suggest even increasing effects of social origin for the youngest cohorts (Jann and Combet, 2012; Jann and Seiler, 2014), especially on education (for a short overview, cf., Falcon and Joyce, 2015). This empirical evidence directly contradict the modernization thesis which predicts constant reductions of effects of social origin over the course of processes which are summarized under the label of modernization (eg., Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959; Kerr, 1962; Blau and Duncan, 1967).

The importance of these results from Switzerland is, however, difficult to assess, because, to my knowledge, occupational mobility in Switzerland has never and educational mobility has only once (Pfeffer, 2008) been studied comparatively. The two basic research questions of this paper are therefore: How do the effects of social origin on education and class found in Switzerland compare to those from other Western European countries? And: can the analyses in this paper confirm the increasing effects of social origin suggested by some results for the youngest birth-cohorts in Switzerland?

Data and Methodological Approach

To investigate these questions, a harmonized dataset is used with data on nine countries: Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Ireland (IE), Netherlands (NL), and Norway (NO). Data is drawn from the 2011 EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat, 2015) which includes a module on intergenerational transmission of disadvantages, and from the rounds 4 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012; ESS, 2014). For 63 897 respondents aged 35-60 the necessary information on their own and their parents’ occupation and education is available. These observations are grouped into three birth cohorts (the year used as label in parentheses): 1950-59 (1955), 1960-69 (1965), and 1970-79 (1975). The two main dimensions used in the analyses are class and education. To avoid empty cells, both of them are measured...
with only three categories. For class, we collapse the original EGP-scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1983) into three classes: The service class (I & II) becomes the upper class, non-manual employees (III), self-employed (IVa,c) and skilled workers (V & VI) the middle class, and semi- and unskilled workers (VIIa) as well as farmers (IVc) and agricultural workers (VIIb) the lower class.

In order to fully utilize the full richness of the data, homemaker is included as a forth class to the class-scheme of the mothers. Similarly, the ISCED categories for education have been collapsed into categories for low, intermediate, and tertiary education.

The applied methodological approach to estimate the effects of social origin builds on an approach first used by Jann and Combet (2012) and evaluated and described in more detail by Jann and Seiler (2014). The basic idea is simple: If origin strongly affects destination, the knowledge of origin strongly improves the prediction of destination. In turn, the improvement of the prediction of destination by knowing both parents’ education or class, measured by the Proportional Reduction of Errors (PRE), can be seen as a measure for the effect of origin on class or education of the respondent. In practice, this involves three steps: predict destination using a model without origin, predict destination using a model with origin and assess the improvement of the prediction by calculating the PRE conditional on each country and birth cohort. Contrary to the procedure described by Jann and Seiler (2014), a GMM-estimator and not a bootstrap procedure is used in to obtain valid standard errors.

Preliminary Results and Outlook

Figure 1 shows the estimated effect of social origin on class and education over the three birth cohorts, separately for men and women and for each of the nine countries. Additionally, each plot shows the estimated differences between the three birth cohorts. Estimates and differences whose spikes do not cross the zero-line can be said to be statistically significant different from zero.

For class, the general picture depicts persistence of effects across birth cohorts. There are two exceptions: Effects of parents’ classes on German women’s class have risen significantly from the first to the later birth cohorts; the same is true for French men. Apart from that, no increasing (but also: no decreasing) effects of social origin on class can be found.

The results are more diverse for effects of parents’ on respondent’s educational attainment. On the left side of the figure, we can see that effects of social origin are relatively high in Switzerland and Germany. Furthermore, the results show significantly increasing effects for German women and Swiss men. Rising effects of social origin can also be found for Danish women when we compare the youngest with the middle cohort. The opposite is only true for Norwegian women: Here, the effects decrease strongly and significantly from the first to the second before it again significantly increases again.

In summary, the present paper mainly draws a picture that is in line with the research on educational inequality and social mobility (cf., Breen and Jonsson, 2005). I.e., it depicts persisting effects of social origin. However, results deviating from this general picture do not exhibit de-crasing effects of social origin, but increasing trends.

The analyses presented in this paper support – at least for men – the findings from Switzerland suggesting increasing effects of social origin on educational attainment. They also show that this is not the normal case in Western European countries but that it is not the only exception either. Comparative research needs comparable data and comparable data always come to the prize that they are badly adapted to some local specificities. The present analyses should, therefore, be repeated with local data but comparable method. Comparable data are, on the other hand, the only way to see a specific result within a broader picture. And they can point to phenomena that need closer attained – and increasing effects of social origin is definitely such a case.

References


A long-standing hypothesis in sociology of education is that late school tracking reduces educational inequality with respect to social background. While there is evidence indicating that indeed a late timing of tracking reduces primary effects of social origin, Jackson and Jonsson (2013) find that the secondary effect of social origin (i.e. class-specific decision behaviour) varies more strongly across countries than the primary effect. They suggest that a reduction in uncertainty brought about by a late timing of tracking as an explanation (i.e. the uncertainty reduction mechanism hypothesis). Here, we show that the uncertainty reduction mechanism can be deduced from a decision model based on a prospect theory framework (Page 2005; Tversky and Kahneman 1979, 1981). The earlier a decision whether to participate in higher education has to be made, the less information actors have at their disposal when estimating their probability of successfully completing higher education. We know that individuals from lower social classes are more averse to uncertainty (i.e. ambiguity) than those from higher social classes (following inter alia from Einhorn and Hogarth 1986, see also Breen et al. 2014). It follows that when educational decisions are postponed, the negative bias in the subjective estimate of the success chances among the members of lower social classes is dampened and they invest in higher education with a higher probability, while timing of tracking only slightly impacts those from the higher social classes. As a result, the disparity in educational decision-making (i.e. secondary effect of social origin) between the social classes is reduced when decisions are made later. More to the point, the reduction of uncertainty and thus the decrease in the negative bias of their success probability in lower-class members should be specifically pronounced for the high-performing members of lower classes. This is because those with a genuinely low performance would also abstain from investing in further education in the absence of a negative bias in their probability of success.

In order to test the uncertainty reduction mechanism, we conducted a computerized laboratory experiment, based on an experimental paradigm suggested by Page et al. (2007). Under this protocol, individuals solve anagrams under time pressure. "High-social background" participants are endowed with a high amount of money and can lose up to a small amount which induces a loss frame and thus risk-seeking preferences. Contrarily, "lower-social background" participants start with a small amount of money and can win a high amount of money (the same amount those in a loss-frame start with) – which induces a gain frame and thus risk-averse preferences. After a certain number of anagrams solved, the participants decide whether or not to continue. Only when they continue and when their performance is sufficient can the participants in a loss frame keep the full amount of money. And only when they continue and when they solve enough anagrams can those in a gain frame win the maximum amount of money. Page et al. (2007) demonstrated that in this setting, those in a loss frame, wishing to maintain the status quo, are more likely to continue than those in a gain frame.

We replicated the Page experiment and additionally varied the number of anagrams participants solved before deciding whether to continue. As predicted, high-performing participants in a gain frame are more inclined to continue when decisions are made late rather than early (i.e. when they can solve a greater number of anagrams before deciding and thus performance uncertainty is reduced), while those in a loss frame are hardly affected by the timing of the decision. As a result, among the high-performing participants, the decisions between the two framing treatments (gain frame vs. loss frame) differ when they are made early, while they do not differ when they are made late. As predicted, these effects are not in play for low-performing individuals and thus, in the overall sample, the effects are too weak to reach statistical significance.

In short, the uncertainty reduction mechanism cannot only theoretically explain how early tracking could reduce class-specific biases in educational decision-making, but the results from the experiment also corroborate the theoretical mechanism.

Literature:

Student’s Dropout Intentions from Tertiary Education: Lack of Integration or Cost-Benefit Calculus?
University students’ dropout causes enormous direct and opportunity costs on the individual and collective levels. Furthermore, leaving higher education without a degree often creates substantial emotional and social burden for the affected individuals. Paralleling their disadvantages in earlier stages of the educational career, students from working class families are more likely to experience premature departure from university. The aim of this paper therefore is to test for two competing explanations for university dropout and the social disparities herein.

These theories are firstly Tinto’s (1975) “student integration model” (SIM) which has been dominating sociological research on dropout from higher education. This theoretical framework assumes that academic integration positively affects students’ persistence through grade performance and intellectual development, both capturing the congruence between the norms and standards in institutions of higher education and those held by the students. Social integration, on the other hand, is achieved through peer group associations and interaction with faculty staff, both facilitating identification with the university and successful program completion. The interplay of these two dimensions is left open for empirical research. Social disparities in dropout are assumed to be mediated by integration into both domains of university life.

Secondly, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) predicts dropout to result from instrumentally rational (re-) considerations of the costs, benefits and success probabilities of receiving university certificates. In order to explain the revision of an earlier enrollment decision, the theory needs to assume that at least one of these three parameters has changed since the initial enrollment decision. In this case even perfectly informed actors are expected to dropout, if the expected benefits of studying no longer outweigh its costs. A second possibility is to assume less than perfectly informed actors at the time of enrollment, who learn about the values of the decision parameters during their first years of studies. For example students might over- or underestimate their chances of successful completion or the perceived burden of university studies. Disparities in dropout decision according to social origin then arise from systematic differences in the perceived costs and benefits as well as the probability of successfully completing the tertiary education degree. Furthermore, pupils from lower classes may be less well informed before the entrance to higher education and, thus, more likely have to revise this decision.

While the SIM is the probably dominant paradigm in the field of research about university dropout, most empirical evidence for the empirical appropriateness is available from the context of the US-American tertiary system. The SIM has largely been ignored in higher education research in Germany. Although RCT can be regarded as a prominent explanation for other educational decisions, the theory has rarely been applied to dropout decisions of university students. The aim of this paper is to undertake one of the first comprehensive tests of the SIM in the context of the German university system and to compare the explanatory power with the one of RCT. The motivation of this endeavor is to test the factors predicted in one theory under control of those of the other. However, even more important is to provide advice to politics and tertiary administration about how best to reduce dropout probabilities and social inequalities. Although, the theories agree about some determinants and other predictions are not in conflict with each other, there are as well contradictory implications for fighting dropout.

We utilize data from the repeated cross-sectional “Student Survey in Germany”, which includes students from a countrywide sample of universities. The roughly 12,000 students in B.A.-, Master and State Examination programs entered higher education between 1999, when the so-called Bologna Reform was first introduced, and 2012. Our analyses are based on multiple indicators of academic and social integration, as well as on the perceived future benefits, current cost and success probability for completing the enrolled degree program. Using exploratory factor analysis, we determine the number of latent dimensions underlying the manifest integration and RCT measures. We then run a series of binary logistic regression models with clustered standard errors at the university level to test for the explanatory power of the theoretically predicted determinants of dropout. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data we are restricted to use dropout intentions as our response variable. Adopting the method suggested by Karlson, Holm and Breen (2012), we also compare the theories with respect to the extent they explain social disparities in dropout intentions.

Our analysis suggests that the two main integrational dimensions proposed in the SIM consist out of four separate sub-dimensions. Further, each of these sub-dimensions is related to dropout intentions in the expected direction and net of the others. The differences in academic performance and the relationship to fellow students are the strongest predictors and partly mediate social inequalities. However, student’s integration into the social and academic domain do not fully account for the differences in dropout intentions according to social origin. Just as the integration dimensions, all parameters of the RCT show the theoretically expected relation to dropout intentions. In contrast to the SIM, different benefits, costs and success probabilities virtually completely account for social class disparities herein. Of the theory’s three predictors, costs and success probabilities appear to be more influential than the perceived benefits.

Heterogeneity in Social Background Effects Regarding Different Facets of Educational Deprivation. Low Achievements in Terms of Competences and Certificates in International Comparison

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Since years educational deprivation is a prominent topic in research on social stratification (Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). One kind of studies analyse factors influencing different levels of students’ achievements including reasons for low level performance in terms of competences which can be seen a one facet of educational deprivation. It is shown that students from disadvantaged background suffer from a higher risk of being deprived (Jackson et al., 2007; OECD, 2010). Another kind of studies shows that educational deprivation comes with more problems in accessing the labour market (Gesthuizen and Solga, 2013; Gesthuizen et al., 2011; Solga and Kohlrusch, 2013). While the first kind of studies focusses on educational deprivation in terms of (low) competence
scores the second kind of studies mainly focuses on educational deprivation in terms of certificates of lower school-tracks. Both facets of educational deprivation mostly are analysed and discussed separately but described under the equal terminology of low achievements. Furthermore, the first kind of studies analyses low achievements when students are not older than 15 years. To more realistically assess with which competences students are equipped and which educational certificates they gained when they leave the formal education system, an older age-group must be analysed.

The recent paper contributes to this discussion by bringing together both streams of discussion of low achievements (competences/certificates) into one big picture and analyses 20 to 29 years old people. At a more general level this paper highlights the heterogeneity regarding the background dependency of different facets of educational deprivation. Previous empirical evidence shows that the risk of being low achiever in this age-group is shaped differently by social background depending on the facet of low achievements (competences/certificates) analysed (Köthemann, 2015). However, it is not clear where these differences stem from. The present paper uses mainly Boudon’s (1974) distinction between primary and secondary effects to theoretically describe assumed heterogeneities regarding social background and the risk of being low being low achiever for each facet separately.

Low achievements in terms of competences are assumed to be strongly related to the cultural background of a person and consequently to primary effects. Given that children do spent most of their lifetime with their parents primary effects hardly can be minimized by features of the educational system. One of the limited possibilities can be seen in the childcare- and pre-schooling-systems which can minimize primary effects (Becker, 2011). More specifically: the younger the age when the childcare- and pre-schooling-system begins and the higher the share of children enrolled in childcare- and pre-schooling-system the more the negative influences of the social background might be minimized and the lower the social background dependency for the probability of being low achiever in terms of competences. As early education is known to be fundamental for further learning the mentioned mechanism is assumed to last at least until early adulthood.

For low achievements in terms of certificates secondary effects are assumed to play a more prominent role. The extent and quality regarding the tracking of the educational systems – thus a characteristic of the educational system that is located somewhat later in the life-course compared to childcare and pre-schooling – are assumed to have a strong impact on the risk of being low achiever in terms of certificates (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). The more branching points an educational system has, the earlier the tracking begins and the more different tracks are available the higher the dependency on the social background for the probability of being low achiever in terms of certificates in young adulthood.

The individual-data used come from the Programme for International Assessment for Adult Competencies (PIAAC) (OECD, 2013) containing data from about 30 000 respondents in 23 countries. Macro-data are primarily derived from Bol (2014) and OECD (2015). As statistical tool two-step multilevel models are applied. In the first step logistic regressions to explain the probability of being low achiever are estimated countrywise. Control variables such as gender and migration background are considered. The average marginal effects (AMEs) for parental education are stored. In the second step estimated dependent variable models (Lewis and Linzer, 2005) are used to explain the heterogeneity of the AMEs.

The main findings support the assumptions made earlier. The higher the share of children enrolled in childcare- and pre-schooling-system the lower the dependency on social background for the probability of being low achiever in terms of competences in young adulthood. Furthermore, the number of school tracks when students are 15 years old, the higher the background dependency of low achievements in terms of certificates in young adulthood. This result does only hold for low achievements in terms of certificates and not for low achievements in terms of competences. Thus, social background plays a different role for different facets of educational deprivation in young adulthood dependent on characteristics of the educational system.

**Determinants without an effect: Non-causal correlates of PISA Literacy**

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Correlations between social origins, certain nurture practices and some school characteristics are often interpreted as causal. Are they? According to a literature review by Björkund and Salvanes, at most half of the descriptive correlations can be considered causal. But from the beginnings of PISA in 2000 and its last survey in 2012 literacy scores did not change in OECD countries, whereas most of their presumed determinants have strongly improved. This fact suggests that the whole of the relationship is not causal, unless unknown variables counteract their effects. The aim of this piece of work is to present in some detail this ‘natural experiment’ implicitly carried out in PISA. First, I estimate for the whole OECD the improvement in literacy that should have been brought about by changes occurred in some usual ‘determinants’ of literacy, like parents schooling, computer and internet at home, preschool years and grade repetition; second, I replicate this same estimation for groups of countries with different changes in PISA scores; finally, I look for possible counteracting variables and try to arrive at some conclusions.
The rise in inequality in most industrial countries has drawn attention to the social and economic processes underlying changes in the income distribution of individuals and households (Bryan & Martinez, 2008; Fortin & Lemieux, 1997; Frank, 2009; Gottschalk & Danziger, 2005; Hyslop, 2001; Kimhi & Shafir-Tidhar, 2012; Morris & Western, 1999; Neckerman & Torche, 2007). Common explanations focus on the consequences of industrial and economic transformations to rising income inequality in many western countries. However, there are also important demographic and social changes that occurred in many countries which contribute to inequality patterns (Breen & Salazar, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2007; McCall & Percheski, 2010; McLanahan & Percheski, 2008). One of this changes is the growing participation of women in the labor force and the transition from the male main provider to dual-earner families. Additional change is the educational assortative mating and our study focuses on the effect of these changes on the rising income inequality in Israel.

The effect of women's employment on inequality is not straightforward and depends mostly on patterns of selection into the labor market. Previous research in the US found that wives' employment reduced inequality across families because women's wages complemented the household income and drove family income toward the center of the income distribution. (Cancian& Reed, 1999; Nielsen & Alderson, 1997; Albrecht and Albrecht 2007; Western et al. 2008)

However, other studies suggest that women's participation in the labor market contributes more to the household income in households that belong to the higher quintiles of the income distribution, and therefore women's economic activity increase income inequality (Esping-Andersen, 2009). Stier and Lewin (2002) found that women's employment in Israel contributed to the generally high poverty level, since women are positively selected to paid employment. In other words, women with potentially higher wages are more likely to enter the labor force than are men with lower wages. Once women with higher wages enter the labor force, the income distribution changes, the median income rise, and a greater number of lower income households fall below the poverty line. The effect of women's employment on inequality is thus of great importance, especially since women's patterns of work are more varied than men's. Moreover, the inconsistent findings suggest that the effect of changes in women's labor force participation on inequality should take into account also other characteristics of the household, in particular the level of education and economic activity of both spouses.

Previous studies that have focused on assortative mating and its relation to inequality, found that the effect of marriage patterns varies across countries based on their level of inequality and other institutional arrangements. (Breen & Andersen, 2012; Breen & Salazar, 2011; 2010). In the current paper we investigate the contribution of changes in households' patterns of employment and education, and especially changes in women's economic activity and education to the increase in income inequality in Israel. Inequality in Israel is among the highest among OECD countries, and rose considerably in recent years. The high level of inequality is largely attributed to the transition to a knowledge-based economy and the disappearance of labor intensive industries that provided jobs for a large part of the Israeli labor force (Ben-David & Bleikh, 2013;Kimhi, 2012). In addition, the tight regulation of the labor market has eased considerably in the last decades along with processes of privatization, and the labor unions have weakened (Kristal & Cohen, 2007). Women's labor force participation grew considerably since the 1970s, from 29% to 58% of women aged 15 and older, and up to 83% of women aged 25 to 55 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, ICBS, 2011). The change in women's economic behavior is related to the rise in education. Israeli's higher education system has expanded substantially over the last decades, especially since 1990. In 1983, 34.4% of Jewish men aged 25-34, and 35.4% of Jewish women of the same age group had at least some post-secondary education (ICBS, 1985: Table 22.2). By 2008 these numbers rose to 55.3% for men and 58.5% for women (ICBS, 2008: Table 8.3).

We examine the changes in households employment and education between 1983 and 2008, using the model proposed by Breen and associates (Breen & Andersen, 2012; Breen & Salazar, 2011). Our model takes into account changes in employment patterns as well as changes in the level of education. Furthermore, we also take into account household structure by including single and couple-headed households. Prior studies (e.g., Stier and Herzberg 2013) found that during the period under study, the labor supply (including hours of work) of highly educated women increased while that of low-educated women declined considerably. In the current study, we take into account education as well as the variation in levels of employment (e.g., full-time vs. part-time). We also examine participation by education with an attempt to document patterns of self-selection into the labor market in Israel. We expect that the increase in women participation will contribute to an increase in inequality, possibly due to positive selection into the labor market and the differences in employment patterns by education.

The study is based on Israeli Census data (1983, 2008). Results indicate that income inequality has increased in Israel in the last decades, alongside an increase in the percentage of households in which both spouses work and both work full-time. Moreover, the higher education has expanded widely in Israel in the time period investigated and more couple-headed households are highly educated. Furthermore, it was found that different patterns of employment among households and the rise in education has contributed to the increase in income inequality.
Gendered income inequalities in the UK: A comparison across ethnic groups

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Background and aims

Individual income inequalities between men and women are substantial and persistent. However, analysis of gendered income inequalities tends to focus predominantly on labour income, rather than on individual incomes from all sources. Gendered inequalities in earned income are widely reported and accepted as indicative of wider gendered social structures. The role of unequal division of child-rearing responsibilities in helping to perpetuate labour market inequalities is also extensively analysed. However, a focus on women's labour income relative to men's may miss much of the complexity of how inequalities between men and women intersect with inequalities within different groups of men and women. First, a focus on labour income fails to consider all those who are not participating in the labour market. Second, comparisons between all men and all women (or even between equivalently qualified men and women) can disguise the extent to which gendered inequalities are more or less pronounced at different points on the income distribution. Moreover, the reference point, which men provide the most relevant comparison for adducing gendered inequalities is salient for the interpretation of their impact on overall economic well-being. It may be little consolation for poor women that they face relatively little gendered income inequality, while there may be little connection between the impact of the gendered inequalities they face and those of high-earning women. Both are worthy of attention, but they may have different impacts on wellbeing as well as different policy implications.

We therefore examine differentiation in gendered income inequalities, interrogating ethnic differences in (all-source) income inequalities in the UK. We explore inequalities across the distribution of individual incomes, as well as at the mean.

We locate our analysis within three overlapping literatures: that on women's inequalities in pay; that on ethnic economic inequalities; and the rich field of studies on income inequality, particular those use decomposition approaches to disentangle the role of compositional factors and the role of changes in income components in changes in inequality over time. While we do not focus strongly on temporal change, the methods and approaches we apply to decompose the factors contributing to ethnic differences in income inequality are informed by these studies.

Scope of paper and plan of analysis

The UK's ethnic groups as measured by standard categories demonstrate substantial differences in income, earnings, and employment, as well as in demographic and fertility profiles. This indicates that a more differentiated approach is relevant to understanding gender inequalities as well as providing greater insight into how household income inequalities between groups arise. Focusing on men's and women's individual income derived from all sources, both labour and non-labour income, we are able to demonstrate the extent to which different gender inequalities are differently patterned across ethnic groups, and for each group, across the distribution.

Given the very different overall income distributions experienced by different ethnic groups, we investigate gendered inequalities at different parts of the income distribution. Women's individual incomes show distinctive patterns by ethnicity, with women from some groups having particularly large proportions of zero incomes. We therefore use women's household income distribution to distinguish different levels of economic wellbeing and explore the patterns of individual income inequalities across ethnic groups at different points on distribution of household income. We repeat the descriptive analysis introducing a simple set of controls for age and family structure. This enables us to infer the extent to which differences in income inequalities across groups are linked to differences in demographic and fertility / marital status profiles.

The paper enables us to draw some conclusions about the extent to which gendered inequalities are, or are not, greater among better off 'groups' within the UK, and the consequent implications for policy addressing women's economic well-being. That is, it is sometimes argued that targeted gender equality initiatives are more salient at the top of the distribution, while initiatives that affect the incomes of both men and women are more relevant for women with lower incomes. However the implications of these approaches for the perpetuation or mitigation of ethnic inequalities remains unexplored.

Data, measures and methods

We use eight pooled years of UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) data (2006/7-2013/14). The FRS is a nationally representative annual cross-sectional UK survey of around 20,000 households. It collects detailed information on income sources for all members of the household. It also collects additional information on key socio-demographic characteristics. Derived measures of household, family and individual income are supplied with the data, as are weights for adjusting for missing top incomes.

The pooled data provide us with sufficient sample sizes to carry out ethnically differentiated analysis. Given the relatively small sample sizes, there is little scope for assessing the evolution of income inequalities over time. However, this eight year period overlaps with the recession, which resulted in structural changes in the labour market which appear to have affected men and women, and certain ethnic groups, differently. We therefore split the 10 years of data into a pre-recession and post-recession sample to allow us to explore the consequences of these changes. The data contain a measure of derived measure of individual income, which can also be broken down into its constituent parts, to test the sensitivity of the conclusions to incorporating or excluding particular components of income.

We operationalise income inequality as the absolute gap between men's and women's incomes. We use different measures of inequality (gini, mean logarithmic deviation) to ascertain the extent of within-ethnic/gender group inequality, and the sensitivity of our findings to the measure used; and we use inequality decomposition approaches to decompose individual income into the between- and within-sexes components. This allows us to assess the extent to which greater gender equality would reduce the levels of
individual income inequality for each group. We also use inequality decomposition approaches to ascertain the contribution of different components of income to within-group inequalities.

Findings

We find that there are substantial differences in income inequality among women and men across ethnic groups, with some minority group women having low and some higher inequality than the White British majority. While between-sex inequalities make up only a small part of overall income inequality, there is still considerable variation in gender inequality across groups. Caribbean women face both the lowest rates of individual income inequality and also the lowest levels of gender inequality. Employment income is the largest source of income inequality for most groups, but self-employment income contributes disproportionately to income inequalities among, for example, Chinese men and women. We discuss the possible reasons for and the implications of our findings, particularly in the light of recent changes in overall income and earnings inequalities.

Educational Mismatch, Occupational and Wage Polarization in the Labor Market: The Structure of Disadvantage by Gender and Race in Brazil

Ana Maria Hermeto

Over the last decades important changes have been observed in the Brazilian labor market, including changes in the myriad of occupations, either through extinction, loss of weight or appearance of new jobs, increase and decrease in demand for certain occupations, impacdis of technology on occupations, increasing number of women entering the labor market, etc. Using microdata from the Brazilian Household Sample Surveys from 1987 to 2013, conducted by the Brazilian Census Bureau, our objective is to analyze the dimension of the structure of gender and racial gaps in Brazil related to their status in the labor marked, measured by the occupational location and earnings. Changes in the Brazilian labor market are investigated from an occupational perspective, regarding the demand for particular occupations, the impacts of technology on occupations, the increasing number of women entering the labor market and the increased demand for workers with higher educational levels, required to carry out the tasks related to an occupation. Changes in wage returns attributed to the various occupational categories in the early 1980's to the 2000's, according to gender and racial attributes are the final outcomes addressed. We tested the hypothesis of the increase in the demand for labor in sophisticated occupations due to technological advances and its effect on the earnings and allocation of women and non-whites in occupations that require more management tools, technological processes and complex non-routine skills. The decomposition of the wage gap in individual vs. occupational components provides estimates of the sources of income inequality between vs. within occupations. In order to explain the mechanism operating in each occupational level, occupational characteristics that may contribute to the observed pattern of inequality of income from each source were considered. A hierarchical approach tests the persistence of the wage gap by gender and race according to occupational clusters.

There was a shift in employment in occupations requiring less education and offer lower wages for occupations requiring more education, management processes and technological tools and remunerate better. The increased demand for employment in positions that require more skills and operational technology should respond by increasing the level of income of these occupations over time. For all categories and years, male and whites wages are higher than female and non-whites wages and the proportional difference between them remains by strata. The gender gap, however, is reduced over time in all segments, standing out the increase for the high technological stratum for women. In subsequent regressions, where the variance of wages is no longer explained only by the technological level, the results demonstrate the reasonableness of the hypothesis of polarization. As a model for measuring the tendency of divergence of average wages between individuals in occupations with different levels of technology, we estimated wage regressions by years of schooling, dummies for technology categories and nature of tasks of the occupations, separately for the gender and race groups. For all groups, the regressions yielded increasing coefficients for the categories other than the extremely low technology category. Over time the relative coefficients of the low and intermediate categories lose significance. The upper stratum of technology coefficient is positive and increases over time for women, and remains large for men.

There was an inflow of white women into more sophisticated occupations over time. We tested whether the increase in demand for more qualified to an occupation that requires more technological skills and the admission of more women into this category meant that the wage gap in most sophisticated occupations to be reduced more than proportionally than the decrease of the average gap between men and women over time. Over time, the median wages returns of routine manual and non-manual occupations fell behind those of the non-routine. Quantile regression models address the variation of the impact of variables across different quantiles of the distribution of wages. The high correlation between more sophisticated occupations and higher wages highlights the shift in the demand for professionals capable of performing non-routine tasks. Returns to education are higher for the upper quantiles, but decreasing over time in all quantiles. Given evidences of the reduction of the gender wage gap but not of the racial gap, hierarchical models test the reduction of these gaps in wage returns of occupations that require more skills and employ more technological resources. The ANOVA model with random effects attests the reduction of the wage gap between men and women over time and the intra-class correlation coefficients indicate that the remuneration of women is more susceptible to occupational characteristics and to a greater and increasing extent for non-white women. The effect of polarization with technological bias is significant on the remuneration of the use of advanced technological resources for women, and the gender difference reduces. The returns associated with non-manual non-routine activities converge for white men and women over time, but not for non-white women, for whom it raises significantly, reducing additionally the gap. The impact of occupational polarization under technological bias in this perspective is to reduce the gap in wage returns of occupations with more complex requirements. At the individual level, the reduction of the wage gap between men and women is fostered by the reduction of the wages difference by education and age. Thus, the impact of polarization with technological bias in the gender gap reduction over time is due to the requirements of complex occupations and to the use of technological resources. The highest technological occupations hired more women than men over time and women's wages increased.
more in relation men, which is representative of the attenuation of the source of income inequality between occupations, where there is a negative relationship between the use of technological resources and wage level, but also the strengthening of the source of inequality within occupations. Nevertheless, most occupations pay better to men compared to women, although employing more women than men, which represents the combination of the weakening of the sources of inequality between occupations and the strengthening of inequality within occupations.

**Destination as a Process: Sibling Similarity in Entry into the Labor Market**

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The effect of family background on educational and labor market outcomes is the most studied question in sociological research on intergenerational mobility. It has been shown that family background affects both educational and labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the mediating effect of education on labor market outcomes has been studied and debated in detail. However, very few studies have covered the entire educational and labor market trajectories and even fewer have considered them from the intergenerational perspective. We show here that family background affects education and labor market statuses, observed not only as the outcomes at the selected time points, but also as the trajectories leading to these outcomes. We use Finnish register data from cohorts born in 1970 to 1980 to construct longitudinal educational and labor market trajectories in young adulthood for siblings and unrelated dyads (over 10,000 dyads). The labor market trajectories are analyzed from the age of 16 to 35 (years 1987 to 2010) using sequence analysis. The results show that the distances between siblings’ trajectories are clearly smaller than distances between unrelated persons. The difference is even more pronounced when comparing same sex siblings. In order to acquire more detailed understanding on the factors behind sibling similarity, we apply a quasi-experimental dyadic regression design to analyze which family background characteristics are associated with the similarity and show that around 20 percent of the association can be explained away with observed family background. We further analyze the sequences and show that certain trajectories are stronger associated with family background than others. Finally, we show that family background affects the trajectories strongly even, if the end outcomes are identical in the dyads, i.e. much of sibling similarity in trajectories remains hidden when looking only at outcomes at certain age.
Local labor market contexts and employment outcomes among immigrants in Japan

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This paper addresses the question concerning how local labor market contexts shape employment outcomes among immigrants in Japan. Many studies highlighted the important role of the context of reception in generating significant divergences across immigrant groups in the process of adaptation and integration into the host societies. In this paper, the contexts of reception consist largely of two dimensions: resources they can mobilize from their own ethnic communities and societal environments external to immigrants and their ethnic communities (Levanon 2014; Portes et al. 2005; Shin and Liang 2014). Empirical evidence has also suggested that both dimensions of the contexts of reception have played a critical role in shaping labor market outcomes among immigrants.

To systematically investigate the effects of contexts of reception on labor market positions, previous studies employed two types of comparative research design: comparison of immigrants across different receiving states and comparison of immigrants across local places such as neighborhood, county and municipality in a given country of destination. Cross-national comparative studies have highlighted the fact that immigrants’ labor market outcomes depend significantly on welfare regimes to overall populations, how state governments selected immigrants in terms of human capital, the rigidity of labor market structures and aggregate demand for unskilled labor (Kogan 2006; Van Tubergen et al. 2004). Conversely, other comparative studies, although focusing on a single country of destination, have explored how local contexts of reception affect labor market positions among immigrants, using detailed information on the social and economic conditions in local labor markets (Levanon 2014; Shin and Liang 2014).

These two types of research, nevertheless, focused exclusively on institutional contexts of reception in North American and European countries, whereas little is known about how conditions of immigration policies, labor market structures and ethnic communities influence immigrants’ labor market positions in other institutional settings. Several Asian countries have recently begun accepting a large number of immigrants from other countries. Among recent countries of immigration in Asia, Japan is a very distinctive case because Japan is highly reluctant to accept immigrants from other countries, although this country needs to introduce a large number of immigrants due to massive shifts in demographic composition and decrease in the number of workers. By looking at the case of immigration in Japan, we can expand our theoretical insight into the roles of both national and local contexts of reception in shaping trajectories of immigrants’ adaptation and integration into the receiving society.

This study focuses solely on the case of immigration in Japan. By observing the role of local contexts of reception for immigrants in Japan, we can highlight the national character of the way in which immigrants have been accepted in the Japanese labor market. Following Levanon (2014), and Shin and Liang (2014), we explore what kind of roles the two important contextual factors play in shaping labor market outcomes among immigrants, such as available resources from ethnic communities and external conditions outside ethnic communities. Based on previous literatures on ethnic communities and ethnic economy, relative group size, group socioeconomic advantage and ethnic concentration in a given industry are used as indicators of ethnic community resources. In addition, industrial structures and economic conditions in local labor markets are used as indicators of external conditions outside ethnic economy.

Previous studies on immigration in the US have suggested that immigrants are able to make upward mobility because immigrants can obtain a significant amount of resources from ethnic communities (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). However, whether people can gain resources from ethnic communities depend on the presence of ethnic enclaves where immigrant entrepreneurs are spatially concentrated. In several countries where a small proportion of immigrants are entrepreneurs, immigrants may face difficulties in making upward mobility or even finding a job by relying on ethnic communities or supports from other coethnic members (Lancee 2010). In fact, a large number of immigrants in Japan have been unskilled workers and incorporated into the periphery sector of labor market, whereas a small number of immigrants are entrepreneurs. Brazilian immigrants, a fourth largest population among immigrants in Japan, cannot move from a precarious employment to a stable employment, even if they rely on relatives and other co-ethnic members (Takenoshita 2013). Given the way in which immigrants are incorporated into the Japanese labor market, immigrants’ labor market outcomes may depend significantly on external conditions outside ethnic communities such as industrial structures and economic conditions in local labor markets, but not on available resources from ethnic community.

We use data derived from the Census of Japan, conducted in 2010. As immigration scholars employed the census data to capture the socioeconomic conditions among immigrants in several countries, the Japanese census is a valuable source of information in addressing the question raised in this study. We apply the multi-level model to investigate the role of local labor market contexts in shaping employment outcomes among immigrants in Japan. Dependent variables used in this study include the unemployment status, the non-standard employment, and occupational status. Independent variables consist of individual-level and macro-level variables. Individual-level variables include gender, age, education, years since migration, industry and nationality. Macro-level variables are constructed at the level of municipality. The size of ethnic population, the proportion of co-ethnic members with post-secondary schooling, the proportion of co-ethnic entrepreneurs, and the concentration of co-ethnic members into the same industry are used as indicators of ethnic community resources. External conditions outside ethnic communities are measured, using the unemployment rate, the proportion of Japanese workers in the manufacturing sector, the proportion of those in the sector of retail, wholesale and food services, the proportion of those in the sector of finance, real estate, information technology and research. Our preliminary analyses showed that external conditions in local labor markets played a greater role in shaping socioeconomic outcomes among immigrants in Japan, whereas ethnic community resources played a minor role in doing so. Based on these findings, we will make a discussion on why ethnic community did not allow immigrants to move upwardly and to secure employment in Japan.
Assimilation vs downgrading: a comparative analysis of immigrants' occupational careers in Spain, France and Italy

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1. Research question
The international literature on the economic integration of immigrants in the destination countries tends to highlight a U-shaped occupational mobility pattern: a downgrading from last job in the country of origin to the first job in receiving country and then a recovery to a better job. Little comparative evidence is available due to the specific longitudinal information needed to the purpose. However, in recent years, some national surveys have addressed the problem recording immigrants' occupations in both the origin and in the destination country, and, as for the destination country, they have recorded not only their present but also their very first job. In lack of proper longitudinal data, these surveys allow to compare three different "points" in immigrants' occupational careers. Our paper aims at studying immigrants' occupational careers in Spain, France and Italy along the three points to assess: i) whether the hypothesised U-shaped mobility pattern stands in all the three cases; ii) which individual characteristics are more likely associated with successful occupational trajectories in the destination countries.

2. Theoretical framework
The hypothesis of immigrants' progressive assimilation with natives as for occupational opportunities — i.e. an upgrade in the occupational status, following the initial downgrade — has been originally developed (Chiswick, 1977, 1978 and 1979) and empirically corroborated mostly for the North American (Redstone, 2006 and 2008) and other Anglo-Saxon countries (McAllister, 1995; Moddod, 1998). Very limited is the empirical evidence for European countries, especially for the new immigration countries in Southern Europe. However, it is possible to hypothesise that the immigrants' upward mobility foreseen by the assimilation argument might be very partial in Southern Europe because immigrants are mostly inserted and likely entrapped in the secondary labour market (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). Contrary to the assimilation hypothesis and in line with the segmented assimilation theory (Zhou and Portes, 1993), it has already been shown that immigrants in Spain experience a loss of occupational status, with very limited occupational progress during their stay in Spain (Ayala-Lastra and Cachón Rodríguez, 2013; Simón et al., 2014), largely because of the high-demand for unskilled labour. The same could hold for Italy where immigrants are hugely overrepresented in unqualified occupations in the household and personal services, in the construction and in the manufacturing (Reyneri, 2013). On the contrary, France, an older destination for international immigration, could show a lower entrapment risk for immigrants in the secondary labour market, due to the lower demand for unskilled labour.

Whatever hypotheses on cross-country differences should however take into account the heterogeneity of migration inflows: significant differences both between and within countries in immigrants' characteristics should indeed be considered. First of all, countries differ in the type of migration inflows they attract — refugees and political immigration is much more common in France than in Southern Europe, while economic migrants constitute the large majority of immigrants in Italy and Spain — and labour market outcomes are likely to be affected by immigrants' reasons for migrating. Secondly, migration inflows also differ in terms of origin countries, this implying a significant heterogeneity of immigrants within destination countries which can significantly affect the chances of upward mobility due, for instance, to the different level of schooling (and recognition of educational titles), to the different language skills and to the previous cultural, political and economic connections between origin and destination countries. Citizenship acquisition should also be related to higher chances of upward mobility (Kogan, 2003; Corluy et al., 2011; Gathmann and Keller, 2014).

3. Data and Methods
Our paper makes use of three different national surveys:
• the INE "National Survey on Immigrants" (2007-2008) for Spain,
• the INSEE-INED "Trajectories and Origins" survey (2008-2009) for France,
• the ISTAT "Condition and social integration of foreign citizens" (2011-2012) for Italy.

The three datasets have been harmonised and so have the samples for analysis, selecting only individuals aged 18-60 at the time of the interview, who were between 15-55 at the time of their arrival in the destination country and who have ever worked in their country of origin.

The dependent variables of the multivariate analysis are the first and the current occupation held by immigrants in the destination country, operationalised in terms of the level of occupation and the socioeconomic status (ISEI), both ISCO88-based. Immigrants' occupational careers are considered in terms of:
1. the risks of downward mobility when finding a first job in destination countries, compared to the last job in the country of origin;
2. the chances of upward mobility between the first and current job after migration.

Multinomial Logistic Regressions and OLS are used based on the nature of our dependent variables (level of occupation and ISEI).

As independent/control variables, we consider a set of individual characteristics that refer, when possible, both to immigrants' condition before migrating and to their condition at the time of the interview in order to take into account the longitudinal dimension of the occupational careers as much as possible. The control variables are: labour market condition (employed/not employed) just before migrating, migration motivation (family, economic or political reasons), age at arrival, having a partner/spouse and number of children (at arrival and at the time of the interview), educational level (with information on the place of study and recognition of degrees), knowledge of the language (at arrival and at the time of the interview), possession of citizenship of the host country and year of
naturalisation (to ascertain whether citizenship has been obtained before starting current job), country of birth, years of stay in the host country and migratory trajectory (immigrants arrived only once and directly into destination countries vs those passed through other countries).

4. Preliminary results
Preliminary descriptive results show that in the three countries we do not observe a U-shaped mobility pattern and highlight some common patterns, as well as important differences:

a) in all countries, upward mobility when finding a first job in the host country is a rare event and mostly concerns unskilled manual workers finding skilled manual jobs. The most important outflows concern mobility from all occupations to elementary and household personal services' occupations. This pattern is much stronger in Italy and Spain, while in France a larger share of immigrants originally in qualified occupations preserves the same level of occupation;

b) the large majority of immigrants in the three countries remain immobile between the first and the current occupation. In this transition the most important outflows concern moves from all occupations to elementary and household personal services' occupations in all the three countries but in Spain, and especially in France, there is also space for upward mobility.

Beyond these differences in absolute mobility patterns, multivariate models will verify the existence of common micro-mechanisms underlying immigrants’ chances to avoid downward mobility after arrival or experiencing upward social mobility during their stay in the host countries.

The effect of recognition of foreign education for newly arrived immigrants

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The problem with international transferability of education is an issue that enhances labour market inequality between immigrants and natives. Education obtained prior to migration, is valued less in host societies than comparable levels of education obtained domestically, which places immigrants at a disadvantage. In response, many states offer the possibility to get foreign educational credentials formally recognised on a par with domestic degrees. In Sweden this is done for non-regulated professions by the Swedish Council of Higher Education, and has become a major policy component in the government’s attempt to facilitate faster labour market integration for newly arrived immigrants.

The objective of this paper is to ascertain the effect of formal recognition of foreign tertiary education on labour market integration for newly arrived immigrants. The research questions are whether there is an overall effect of recognition on the probability of being employed, and whether the effect differs among different categories of immigrants. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that the effect of recognition is being explicitly analysed.

In the theoretical framework of country-specific human capital, immigrants fare worse on host countries’ labour markets because of a deficit in host country knowledge and experience. One point made within this framework is that education from immigrants’ countries of origin is not always perfectly transferable to the host society. This can be due to educational mismatches, differences in quality, or because risk-averse employers avoid employees with credentials they do not fully understand. In line with this framework, previous research has shown that education obtained before migration is lesser valued, and that higher levels of education are even more so.

In addition, there is variability in the undervaluation based on where in the world the individual and the education is from, with immigrants from Africa and the Middle East having the lowest return on their pre-immigration education.

The study’s main hypotheses are that formal recognition will increase the probability of being employed. This is because recognition provides credible information about the nature of the foreign education, and signal some sort of approval of quality. Some categories of immigrants, especially those from Africa and Asia (including the Middle East), have both overall worse labour market outcomes, and lower returns on their pre-immigration education. If the reason for this is that employers are risk-averse and more uncertain about the quality of education from these regions compared to others, then immigrants from Africa and Asia will experience the strongest effect of recognition on employment. If, on the other hand, employers are unwilling to hire people from Africa and Asia no matter their level of human capital, consistent with previous research that have found these categories to be most exposed to ethnic discrimination, then they will instead experience the weakest effect of recognition on employment.

The data of this paper comes from a unique combination of the Swedish population level longitudinal register data. The authors have merged data on labour market outcomes with data on formal recognitions from the Swedish Council of Higher Education. The population of study comprises of all individuals who got their foreign educational credentials recognised at some point during the years 2007-2011, were aged between 20-60 the entire measurement period and immigrated to Sweden no earlier than nine years before recognition. As formal recognition is only done for completed foreign tertiary education, all included individuals have a tertiary degree.

The analysis is conducted with a fixed effects regression model following individuals from the year 2005 (or the immigration year if later) to the year 2012. The strength of fixed effects is that the model exploits variability in timing of recognition to estimate the effect, while at the same time controlling for time invariant individual characteristics such as unobserved skill. The dependent variable has a binary outcome depending on whether an individual had any employment during a calendar year.

The average effect of recognition is a 10 percentage point higher probability of being employed in the subsequent years. Given that the employment rate of newly arrived immigrants is about 50 percent in Sweden, this is a substantial increase. The result confirms the main hypothesis and is consistent with the country-specific human capital framework: there are problems with international transferability of education for immigrants, but some of these problems are eased with recognition of foreign credentials.
Immigrants from Africa and Asia experience a much smaller effect of recognition on employment probability, compared to immigrants from other regions. One possible interpretation of this result is that some categories of immigrants are being discriminated against by employers, implying that recognition have a weaker effect for them as employers will discount them in employment decisions regardless of level of human capital.

The policy intervention of recognition is, on average, effective as it substantially increases the probability of being employed for immigrants, and thus decreases the employment gap compared with natives. However, the categories of immigrants that have the worst outcomes on the Swedish labour market, immigrants from Africa and Asia, also experience the weakest effect of recognition. Thus, the policy is not effective for everyone, and recognition may be outdone by discrimination.

Financial Well-Being and the Non-Pecuniary Cost of Unemployment: How Do Immigration Status and Gender Matter in Life Satisfaction of the Unemployed Population in the United Kingdom, 2009-2015?

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By using a countrywide longitudinal survey, Understanding Society (waves 1 to 5) in Great Britain between 2009 and 2015, this study examines the negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction, the cognitive component of subjective well-being (SWB hereafter). Two research questions this study aims to address are: 1) What is the relative importance between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of unemployment? And 2) how the patterns of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of unemployment differ across different groups of the labor force population, particularly along the lines of immigration status and gender?

Regarding the first research question, two debating arguments exist about the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of unemployment. The deprivation theory, on the one hand, emphasizes the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment. From this perspective, the direct consequence of unemployment in income loss is only of secondary importance. The more damaging effect of unemployment is because it deprives one from work, and therefore from attributes attached to work, such as social relations, social identity or status, and self-esteem (Jahoda 1982; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).

On the other hand, Ervasti and Venetoklis (2010) pointed out that the above deprivation perspective might have under-stated the crucial role economic resources play in fulfilling one’s various needs via employment. Income loss accompanied with unemployment does not only undermine one’s economic status, but more importantly, harms one’s SWB, as one’s potential for self-fulfillment would be severely limited with income loss. This financial strain perspective is supported by economists’ studies on the negative associations between economic stress and mental health, as well as the general decline of well-being (Creed and Macintyre 2001; Feather 1989; Starrin, Rantakeisu, and Hagquist 1996; Vinokur and Schul 2002).

The commonly adopted strategy of distinguishing the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of unemployment in the existing literature is to include both the status of being unemployed and direct income measures in the model. However, although income loss indicates the change in one’s economic status directly, it indicates the restriction of the exercise of personal potential — namely, the psychological effect of income loss, only indirectly. This study fills the gap in the existing literature, in this regard. By using both objective and subjective income measures, this study takes into account both the direct effect and the psychological effect of the financial situation on life satisfaction. The non-pecuniary cost of unemployment can thus be clearly identified, with both the objective and subjective measures of the financial situation controlled over. We thus hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: In terms of life satisfaction, the subjective perception of the financial situation, rather than the objective financial situation by itself matters. Therefore, the negative effect of unemployment – the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment can be explained, at least partially, by the effect of one’s subjective perception of the financial situation.

Regarding the second point, existing studies are even rarer. There has no study that examines the intersection of immigration status and gender in this line of research. The second contribution of this study thus lies in its focuses on different subpopulations. By examining immigrants and the native-born, and further, the gender-specific subpopulations among these two groups, respectively, this study provides robust evidence about how the impact of unemployment differs for different groups of populations in the labor market.

First, because the native-born population, relative to the immigrant population, usually possess higher-status jobs that are attached with higher income, the perceived income loss due to unemployment should be greater within the native-born than within the immigrant population. Namely, Hypothesis 2: The effect of the subjective perception of the financial situation explains the negative effect of unemployment more within the native-born population, than within the immigrant population.

On the other hand, as Sirgy et al. (2001) identified, the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment exists, because job loss restricts one’s possibilities to fulfill seven major needs related to work: health and safety needs, family needs, social needs, esteem needs, actualization needs, knowledge needs, and aesthetic needs. During job loss, one may seek other alternative sources to satisfy these needs and therefore reduce the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment. In this regard, a native-born should be in an advantageous position. Being born in the society, a native-born normally has a much bigger support network constituted by parents, other relatives, and close friends, who likely play an important role in alleviating depression, anxiety, and restoring one’s self-esteem. By contrast, an immigrant often leaves his or her primary support network behind when moving to a new country, and therefore benefits little from other alternatives in reducing the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment. Thus,
Hypothesis 3: After the pecuniary-cost of unemployment and other covariates are controlled, higher non-pecuniary cost of unemployment should be observed within the immigrant than within the native-born population. Namely, the negative effect of unemployment should be larger within immigrants, other covariates being equal.

Regarding the second research question, existing studies have pointed out that the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment is higher for men than women, based on the traditional gender division of work that emphasizes men’s role as breadwinners and women’s role as household maintainers (Clark 2001). By dividing the immigrant and native-born population further into subpopulations along the gender line, we expect to observe different patterns between immigrant and native-born males, as well as immigrant and native-born females. As most of immigrants move from the developing countries or areas to developed countries, it is reasonable to expect that the immigrant population, on average, hold stronger values about the traditional gender division of work than the native-born population in the host society. Namely, immigrant males feel more strongly about being able to provide for the family through work than native-born males, while immigrant females feel less strongly about the need to work than native-born females. Therefore, after the pecuniary cost of unemployment and other covariates being controlled,

Hypothesis 4: The non-pecuniary cost of unemployment is higher within immigrant males than within native-born males. By contrast, unemployment significantly for the native-born population, but does not too much for the immigrant population. Therefore, after the pecuniary cost of unemployment and other covariates being controlled,

Hypothesis 5: The non-pecuniary cost of unemployment is lower within immigrant females than within native-born females.

Data used in this study were drawn from a countrywide longitudinal survey, Understanding Society (waves 1 to 5) in Great Britain between 2009 and 2015. We exclusively focused on respondent's active in the labor force. Namely, all selected respondents, aged between 18 and 65, were either employed, or self-employed, or unemployed but actively seeking employment. The total number of observed individuals was 7,932 with in total 20,221 individual-wave observations. The dependent variable, life satisfaction came from the question: "Please choose the number which you feel best describes how dissatisfied or satisfied you are with your life overall.” Responses were measured by a seven-point scale ranging from "completely dissatisfied" to "completely satisfied".

Our focal independent variables were measures of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of unemployment. The pecuniary cost was measured by both objectively and subjectively. In the objective measure, one’s position in income distribution was used (coded as 0=the median 20%, 1=lowest 20%, 2=low-median 20%, 3=median-high 20%, and 4=the highest 20%). The income distribution was based on the total household income, adjusted by the household size. In the subjective measure, one’s perceptions of the current and future financial situations were used. Both measures were coded in the same way, with the perception of the current financial situation categorized as “just getting by,” “doing all right or well,” and “finding it quite difficult or very difficult” (coded as 0, 1, 2, respectively), and the perception of the future financial situation categorized as “about the same,” “better off” and “worse off” (coded as 0, 1, 2, respectively). Following the literature, the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment was measured by the employment status by itself, with being unemployed coded 1 while being employed or self-employed coded 0. Analyses were conducted along the lines of immigration status (0=native born, 1=immigrants / non-UK born) and gender (0=female, 1=male).

Control variables include age and its quadratic form, marital status (0=single, 1=married or living with a partner, and 2=divorced, separated, and widowed), formal qualifications (including having a degree, having other degrees, A-level, GCSE, other qualifications) with “no qualification” used as a reference group, and general health (0=good, 1=excellent, 2=very good, 3=fair, and 4=poor) with the status of “good health” used as a reference group. The time effect was taken into account by including the variable of wave. For the immigrant population, the duration of staying in the UK was also included as a control variable.

Fixed effect models were adopted to establish a relatively robust causal argument about the pecuniary and non-pecuniary impacts of unemployment on life satisfaction, as unobserved, individual-specific, and time-invariant disturbances, such as one’s dispositions, could be avoided this way. For the immigrant population, standard errors were estimated by using the countries of origin as the cluster variable.

Our findings show that without controlling for the pecuniary measures, the coefficients of being unemployed are similar between the immigrant and native-born populations – being unemployed reduces life satisfaction by about 0.22 to 0.24 points. The inclusion of the objective measure of the financial situation does not reduce the negative coefficient of unemployment for either the immigrant or native-born population. However, the inclusion of the subjective measures of the financial situation reduces the negative coefficient of unemployment significantly for the native-born population, but does not too much for the immigrant population. Therefore, after the pecuniary cost of unemployment is controlled, unemployment has a larger non-pecuniary cost within the immigrant population than within the native-born population.

This trend becomes even more salient when the comparison is narrowed down to immigrant and native-born males. After the subjective measure of the pecuniary cost of unemployment is controlled, the negative coefficient of being unemployed is reduced from -0.31 to -0.21 points for native-born males, while this negative coefficient remains high for the immigrant males (close to -0.30 points). When we turn to the comparison between immigrant and native-born females, the patterns are drastically different. Compared to the male population, the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment is significantly lower for the female population, regardless of the immigration status. The inclusion of the pecuniary measures reduces the negative effect of unemployment for both immigrant and native-born females. In fact, after the pecuniary cost of unemployment is controlled, the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment becomes non-significant for foreign-born females. However, unemployed native-born females still feel significantly less satisfied with their lives, compared to their employed counterparts.
Across decades numerous studies in research in social stratification and mobility find that social origin and educational attainment are both strong determinants of occupational attainment. However, holistic and dynamic approaches of occupational attainment over the life course have only been recently brought into the field. A few studies have examined occupational trajectories and career progression of different social origin and education groups to examine inter- and intragenerational mobility simultaneously (e.g. Barone, Lucchini, & Schizzerotto, 2011; Härkönen & Bihagen, 2011; Manzoni, Härkönen, & Mayer, 2014). Whereas differences in career advancement between educational and social origin groups have already been documented (e.g. Barone et al., 2011; Härkönen & Bihagen, 2011; Manzoni et al., 2014), we are interested in within-group differences among graduates. This allows us to evaluate the impact of so-called ‘qualitative’ differences that are assumed to be increasingly important as more and more individuals attain higher education in the course of educational expansion (e.g. Lucas, 2001).

Recent research has increasingly been concerned with graduates’ field of study as an important criterion for selection into the labour market and graduates’ labour market outcomes (e.g. Van de Werfhorst, 2002). This strand of research on field differences in labour market rewards, however, commonly uses ‘snapshot’ measures at labour market entry and is therefore unable to treat individual careers as continuous and dynamic entities over the life course. Furthermore, it has been shown that the effect of social origin on wages substantially varies between graduates from different fields (Hällsten, 2013). Likewise, social inequalities in career progression in terms of stable, increasing or decreasing social gradients over the life course might be dependent on the graduates’ field of study.

We aim to shed light on (1) processes of career progression by different fields of study and on (2) changes in social inequality during career progression among graduates. Against this background, our main interest are (3) differences between fields of study in social inequality in career progression incorporating two central aspects of occupational stratification across the life course to assess variation in inter- and intra-generational mobility across fields of study. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies so far that look at the interacting effects of field of study and social origin on career progression.

We expect large social inequalities in initial labour market allocation for graduates from arts and humanities. This is because parental resources such as social, cultural and economic capital may compensate for unspecific skills in arts and humanities and help students from higher social background to integrate in the labour market particularly from fields while students from lower social backgrounds lack those resources. Across the career, we expect some occupational mobility for all graduates these fields as initial mismatch is corrected in the on-going working-live with the accumulation of more specific labour-market and occupation-related skills. Thus, we expect those from lower classes to overcome their initial disadvantages and have a steeper career progression over the working life and a catching up with those from higher backgrounds.

With regard to STEM fields we expect low social inequality in occupational attainment at all stages of the career. On the one hand, the skills and qualifications gained in STEM fields are assumed to lead to smoother integration into the labour market compared to unspecific and general skills acquired in the humanities. Thanks to this strong link between STEM fields and occupational placement, there should be less leeway for parental influences on labour market outcomes. Furthermore, we expect graduates from STEM fields to more homogenously in terms of student’s ability, motivation, commitment or other beneficial traits as these fields are highly demanding. Hence, we expect rather limited social inequalities in initial placement and in career progression among STEM graduates.

In the social sciences and professions, we expect increasing social differentials in labour market returns over time due to a steeper progression of those from advantaged backgrounds. First, parental social capital provides advantages by providing better information on job vacancies for leading occupational positions via parental networks in the elite labour market. Higher and lower class children also differ in the attainment of social skills, soft skills or manners in their parental home. This cultural capital might be particularly demanded in higher managerial positions or services and thus helpful in gaining access to these positions (Jackson et al., 2005).

Finally, intergenerational inheritance of business and self-employment among the professions might also play a crucial role for career progression to be steeper for those from higher classes.

Figure 2 illustrates the field-specific hypotheses distinguishing between arts and humanities, STEM-fields and social sciences, medicine and law.

For our empirical analysis we use the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) which follows the lives of more than 17,000 people born in England, Scotland and Wales. We use information on parental social class and cognitive ability at age 10, type of degree and field of study at age 30 and 34 and full employment histories from age 16 until age 38. We measure occupational status at each job according to the Treiman occupational prestige scale (SIOPS) (Treiman 1977). To analyse career progression for graduates from different fields of study and social origin, we use multilevel growth curve analysis (Halaby 2003; Steele 2008). This method allows for a regression analysis of holistic occupational trajectories, characterized by multiple measurements over time.

References
Signals, Educational Decision Making, and Educational Inequality

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Signals, Educational Decision Making, and Educational Inequality
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Background
In this paper we propose and test a theoretical model of educational decision making that focuses on the impact of signals about academic ability on educational decision making. Building on recent rational choice models of educational decision making (e.g., Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Morgan 2002; Hillimert and Jacob 2003; Morgan 2005; van de Werfhorst, Breen, and Jæger 2014, Holm and Breen 2016), we argue that signals comprise an important aspect of the educational decision making process because these signals provide information to students and their families about the potential costs and benefits of different educational decisions. Signals – for example in the form of a grade or test score – may thus lead students to re-evaluate their academic potential and to enroll in a different educational track than they would otherwise have done. Moreover, drawing on the theory of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA), we argue that the impact of signals on educational decisions may depend on socioeconomic background because students from different socioeconomic backgrounds need different levels of education to reach at least the same socioeconomic position as their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Jæger and Holm 2012). In particular, we hypothesize that students from advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are less responsive to signals than those from less advantaged backgrounds because, irrespective of the value of the signal, they need to pursue higher education to reproduce their parents’ socioeconomic position.

Theory
Our model is derived from the Danish educational system. In this system students receive a strong signal about their academic ability through their Grade Point Average (GPA) in the final exams at the end of compulsory school (around age 15). This signal is likely to inform their decision about whether or not to enroll in upper secondary education, the college-bound track in Danish secondary education (and the exclusive gateway into higher education). Our model argues that (1) students from all socioeconomic backgrounds need different levels of education to reach at least the same socioeconomic position as their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Jæger and Holm 2012). In particular, we hypothesize that students from advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are less responsive to signals than those from less advantaged backgrounds because, irrespective of the value of the signal, they need to pursue upper secondary education to reproduce their parents’ socioeconomic position.

Empirical Design
We use register data from Denmark to test the predictions of the model. The main explanatory variable is students’ GPA and the end of compulsory school (the signal) and the two dependent variables are (1) the likelihood of enrolling in upper secondary education and (2) given enrolment the likelihood of completing upper secondary education (the educational decisions). We measure students’ socioeconomic background with a dummy variable indicating whether or not at least one parent has completed upper secondary education.

The main inferential challenges are (a) to isolate variation in GPA that represents a new signal to students and (b) to estimate the effect of this signal on education decision making. To do this, we use data on Danish Monozygotic (MZ) and Dizygotic (DZ) twins and decompose variation in GPA and educational decisions into additive genetic (A), common environment (C), and a unique environment...
We argue that the E component in GPA (which originates outside the family, for example via learning or peer effects) captures an idiosyncratic signal independent of genetic and family background to the student about academic ability which affects the likelihood of enrolling in, and completing, upper secondary education.

Results

We use data on MZ twins and estimate the effect of (standardized) GPA on the likelihood for enrolling in and completing upper secondary education (both binary variables). We also estimate these models separately for children from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds. Table 1 summarizes our three main results:

1. Children from all socioeconomic backgrounds respond to signals about academic ability when deciding on whether or not to enroll in upper secondary education. A one standard deviation increase in exam GPA is estimated to increase the probability of enrolling in, and completing high school, by 12 and 10 percentage points, respectively. Since all analyses are based on comparing MZ twin pairs, we estimate the effect of the E component in GPA on educational choices (the MZ design controls for the A and C components).

2. The effect of signals on educational decisions varies by socioeconomic background. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds respond stronger to new signals about academic ability than those from advantaged backgrounds (regression coefficients on the effect of GPA are statistically significantly higher for students from disadvantaged backgrounds). Consistent with our model, this result suggests that students from advantaged backgrounds are less responsive to signals about academic ability.

3. The effect of GPA on educational enrollment and completion varies by socioeconomic background. Among children from advantaged backgrounds the effect of GPA on the likelihood of enrolling in upper secondary education is statistically indistinguishable from the effect on the likelihood of completing upper secondary education. Among children from disadvantaged backgrounds, the effect of GPA is higher on the likelihood of enrolling in upper secondary education than on the likelihood of completing this track. This result suggests that children from disadvantaged backgrounds “misinterpret” a positive signal on academic ability: It makes them more likely to enroll in upper secondary education but not equally likely to complete this track (perhaps due to underestimating the difficulty associated with completing this track).

References


Table 1. The effect of standardized GPA on the likelihood of enrolling in and completing upper secondary education. MZ twins

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All children:</td>
<td>GPA 0.121 (0.017)*** 0.099</td>
<td>GPA 0.090 (0.021)** 0.087</td>
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<td></td>
<td>N 992 992</td>
<td>N 554 554</td>
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<tr>
<td>At least one parent w. Up. Sec. Educ.:</td>
<td>GPA 0.166 (0.029)*** 0.121</td>
<td>GPA 0.166 (0.029)*** 0.121</td>
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In the study of social mobility, a college degree has often been described as "the great equalizer" (Hout, 1988; Torche, 2011): for college graduates social origin matters less for social destinations. Viewed from a different angle, this means that students with low socio-economic status (SES) profit more from college in terms of labour market outcomes than students from higher origin (Brand and Xie, 2010). At the same time, low-SES students are much less likely to attend college. This situation where those who are least likely to select into college, are the ones that would profit most from it is characterized as "negative selection" by Brand and Xie (2010) and seen as an inefficient educational allocation.

Two important aspects, however, are disregarded in this research. First, low-SES students are diverted from college by different processes. If those students are less often found in college because of lower ability, then this meritocratic selection can hardly be considered as inefficient. It also seems unlikely that those who do not select into college based on ability would profit most from a college degree in the labour market. However, if low-SES students stay away due to ascriptive processes (e.g. lack of financial resources), the inefficiency argument is much more appropriate. Brand and Xie (2010) do not distinguish between those different processes but only look at overall selection. Second, the influence of different institutional contexts on negative selection remains understudied. We know that educational institutions affect stratification (e.g. Jackson, 2013) but it remains unknown how they affect heterogeneous returns conditional on selection. We expect that institutions play a significant role for the level of negative selection in an educational system as they have been found to affect both, selection into education as well as labour market returns to education (Allmendinger, 1989; Breen and Jonsson, 2005; Jackson, 2013).

The main questions that result from these considerations are, first, to which extent negative selection is caused by ability and by ascribed characteristics, and second, if heterogeneous returns conditional on selection differ between countries with different institutional environments.

We separate the relationship between social origin, educational attainment and heterogeneous returns to education into three components: meritocratic selection into education, non-meritocratic selection and returns to education conditional on selection. Thereby, individual characteristics such as ability, performance and motivation are considered as meritocratic and ascribed characteristics such as financial resources, family structure, parental education and families' cultural capital as non-meritocratic selection mechanisms. Separating these two kinds of mechanisms allows us to assess how much of negative selection is in fact inefficient. When looking at returns to education conditional on these two selection mechanisms, we can assume that any heterogeneous returns to education that remain across groups with different levels on ascribed characteristics are inefficient.

We select two countries -- the Netherlands and the United States -- that differ in their educational institutions on several dimensions such as differentiation in secondary and higher education and public funding of higher education. By analyzing these cases with different institutional environment, we want to explore how the structure of educational and labour market institutions shape the amount of selection and heterogeneous returns across groups with different social origin. We expect differences in the relative strength of meritocratic and non-meritocratic selection in education and differences in labour market allocation of college graduates between these two countries with very different institutional contexts.

We use longitudinal educational cohort data for both countries to study our research questions. For the Netherlands, we combine information on social origin, performance and school careers from the VOCL 1989 educational cohort study (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1989) with information on higher education completion and income from register data. For the US we revisit the hypothesis of heterogeneous returns posed by Brand and Xie (2010) using the NLSY79 (Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Department of Labor, 2012).

First, we model the selection into having a college degree based on our two mechanisms (meritocratic and non-meritocratic). VOCL and NLSY79 offer a wide array of ability and social background measures that allow for an elaborate selection model. For meritocratic characteristics we use intelligence, performance and motivation. Non-meritocratic selection is modeled using parental education, cultural capital and family structure. Second, we estimate the income returns to a college degree for different social groups conditional on overall selection (similar to Brand and Xie, 2010) and separate for meritocratic and non-meritocratic selection. We compare three different models for heterogeneous returns to assess the robustness of our findings: multivariate regression with control variables, propensity score matching combined with a hierarchical linear model (Brand and Xie, 2010) and endogenous switching regression models (Mare and Winship, 1987).

For the Netherlands, our analyses of selection show that performance at the entry of secondary school is the strongest predictor for receiving a college degree, followed by parental education. Although both processes play a significant role, meritocratic selection is stronger than non-meritocratic selection.

A first analysis of heterogeneous returns conditional on overall selection shows that in the Netherlands, there is significant negative selection across groups with different propensity of having a college degree. Figure 1 shows these results for men (see pdf file). Across propensity score strata (1-10) the propensity of obtaining a college degree increases (strata 1 = low propensity, strata 10 = high propensity). The y-axis displays the treatment effect i.e. the effect of a college degree on logged income for each of these
propensity groups. A hierarchical linear model shows that the treatment effect decreases with increasing propensity of receiving a college degree. This result is very similar to the overall negative selection found for the United States by Brand and Xie (2010).

In further analyses we will show these models for both countries and separately for meritocratic and non-meritocratic selection to assess how much of this negative selection is inefficient and how this varies across institutional contexts. Additionally, we will utilize alternative modeling techniques to test the robustness of our results.

Models of Socioeconomic Mobility: Distinguishing Absolute and Relative Causal Processes

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This paper distinguishes and models two fundamental causal processes of intergenerational mobility: one based on the nominal metric of a socioeconomic trait and the other based on the positional rank metric of the trait. Applicable socioeconomic traits include income/earnings and occupational status. The formal analysis helps distinguish the implications of the processes. Although the two causal processes are difficult to separate, under certain conditions their presence can be inferred from trends of mobility.
**Main findings**

Figure 1 illustrates the results for the first research question. We expected a higher level of deprivation for the treatment group of sanctioned persons. In a cross-sectional setting, this is confirmed. Following the descriptive and naïve estimator, the treatment group has on average a deprivation level which is increased by 1.18 goods compared to the control group (p<0.05). After controlling for observables with CEM, strong positive effects on the deprivation level remain. The SATT is slightly higher (1.78) and statistically significantly higher compared to the control group (p<0.05).

**Analytical strategy**

To estimate the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT), we apply a nonparametric conditional difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator. First, we use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM; lacus et al. 2013) to adjust the respective treatment and control spells on observed covariates measured at t before the sanctions treatment. Second, we estimate the DiD among the matched subsample. Using CEM and DiD together allows us to take account of both selection on observables and individual unobserved heterogeneity.

**Theoretical framework**

Social exclusion theory (SET) is used to explain why sanctions should affect deprivation. SET understands social exclusion as a multidimensional process of decline (European Comission 2010; Kronauer 2010, Castel 2000). The event of unemployment leads to cuts in economic resources and the standard of living; this makes it more difficult to participate in social activities. The lack of resources, in combination with the stigma of being unemployed, leads to growing social isolation and to increasing social inequality (Gallie et al. 2003). This article focuses on the long-term unemployed who are out of work for more than one year or have never worked. This group should be particularly affected by the process of social exclusion. All of the long-term unemployed should by comparison be highly deprived without relevant reserves. The sanction is assumed to be a temporary intensification of the economic precariousness, because of benefit cuts that directly cause higher material deprivation and social exclusion. To detect changes in the material and social situation of persons with low incomes, we use a deprivation framework in order to directly measure the use of resources (Ringen 2003). This article focuses on the long-term unemployed who are out of work for more than one year or have never worked. This group should be particularly affected by the process of social exclusion. All of the long-term unemployed should by comparison be highly deprived without relevant reserves. The sanction is assumed to be a temporary intensification of the economic precariousness, because of benefit cuts that directly cause higher material deprivation and social exclusion. To detect changes in the material and social situation of persons with low incomes, we use a deprivation framework in order to directly measure the use of resources (Ringen 2003; Halleröd 1995). We assume that the effects of sanctions differ in dimensions of deprivation (see Data). It is expected that sanctioned recipients reduce spending in all areas possible in the short-run, but try to maintain their consumption for their “short-run-essential goods”. For the essential goods (Christoph 2008), we distinguish between “short-run goods” (e.g. one warm meal per day) and “long-run goods” (e.g. inside toilet).

**Data**

Our data are drawn from the German Panel Study Labour Market and Social Security (PASS) 2006-2010 (Trappmann et al. 2013). PASS is a unique source for research on the welfare state and poverty. It oversamples unemployed and collects longitudinal and detailed data on deprivation. Deprivation is split into five dimensions (habitation, food/clothing, consumption, finance, social participation) and 26 items. It is possible to differentiate between lack of property due to either consumer preference or financial restrictions. We combine monthly data on unemployment spells with data from yearly interviews to define the following transitions between the interview in t and t+1: (1) benefit receipt and not sanctioned to benefit receipt and sanctioned (treatment group), (2) benefit receipt to benefit receipt (control group).

**Analytical strategy**

To estimate the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT), we apply a nonparametric conditional difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator. First, we use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM; lacus et al. 2013) to adjust the respective treatment and control spells on observed covariates measured at t before the sanctions treatment. Second, we estimate the DiD among the matched subsample. Using CEM and DiD together allows us to take account of both selection on observables and unobserved timeconstant individual heterogeneity.

**Main findings**

Figure 1 illustrates the results for the first research question. We expected a higher level of deprivation for the treatment group of sanctioned persons. In a cross-sectional setting, this is confirmed. Following the descriptive and naïve estimator, the treatment group has on average a deprivation level which is increased by 1.18 goods compared to the control group (p<0.05). After controlling for observables with CEM, strong positive effects on the deprivation level remain. The SATT is slightly higher (1.78) and statistically significantly higher compared to the control group (p<0.05).
significant (p<0.01). The use of longitudinal data and the DiD-CEM-estimator indicates that the cross-sectional estimators are upwardly biased. After controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, the effect is close to zero (0.28) and statistically insignificant (p<0.55). Regarding the second research question, the same results are found: strong, significant effects in a cross-sectional setting vanish after introducing a longitudinal design. According to our results, we first conclude that sanctions do not have a positive effect on deprivation and do not increase the risk of social exclusion. Second, the results cast doubt on the assumed mechanism about how sanctions motivate the unemployed to re-enter the labor market. This underlines the importance of using longitudinal data to study deprivation.

Objective deprivation and subjective economic stress in Europe before and after the financial crises

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In the decade before the beginning of the current financial, economic and sovereign debt crises, the European labour markets became more inclusive. In the course of such convergence one might expect that the degree to which material deprivation is associated with subjective economic stress becomes more and more the same in each country. This contribution analyses the question whether or not Europeans felt troubled by material deprivation to a similar extent in the last decade. The analysis makes use of all available country-data from the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for every two years between 2005 and 2013. Mixed effects multi-level OLS-regression is applied to measure the relationship of material deprivation and subjective economic stress. The results show that the effect of material deprivation on economic stress increased between 2005 and 2013, whereas it reached its peak value in 2009, at the peak of the financial crises. The finding that in poor countries material deprivation is associated with economic stress to a lesser extent than in rich countries replicates earlier findings. The differences between the countries in the relationship between household's material deprivation and economic stress widened until 2009 and narrowed slowly afterwards. Post-estimation reveals that for deprived persons, living in Social-Democratic and corporatist countries is less stressful, closely followed by Liberal countries, whereas living in Southern European and Post-Communist countries adds extra burden on deprived households. In each of the respective years, more than one third of the overall variance in subjective economic stress stems from the country level.

Social policy, demographic trends, or labour markets: What is behind the diverging trends in income poverty in Great Britain and Germany?

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Germany and Great Britain both experienced shifts in patterns of relative income poverty in the last decades. Since the beginning of the 1990s and until the global financial crisis in 2007, poverty rates in Great Britain declined. In the same time frame, poverty increased markedly in Germany (Corneo et al., 2014; McKnight and Tsang, 2014). Not only the development of cross-sectional poverty rates followed opposing trends: changes in poverty dynamics and material deprivation also following different patterns. Taken together, poverty seems to be hardening in Germany (Groh-Samberg, 2014), while the relative position of poor households in Great Britain improved over time. Because of different levels of poverty at the beginning of the 1990s, this can partly be interpreted as a convergence between both countries.

Comprehensive theoretical accounts for the development of poverty are not well developed and conceptual approaches like social exclusion or individualisation suggest relatively uniform developments of patterns of poverty in rich countries. Comparing the opposing trends in Germany and Great Britain therefore offers an interesting test case.

Potential drivers of change can be structured along the three fields of social policy, household structures, and labour markets. Especially changes in the labour market have been identified by the previous literature as main drivers of increasing poverty rates (Biewen and Juhasz, 2012; Haupt and Nollmann, 2014; Peichl et al., 2012), while social policy targeted at families is often cited as one explanation for the improvement of poverty figures in Great Britain (Jenkins, 2011; McKnight and Tsang, 2014). Little is known about the relevance of these developments for changes in poverty dynamics and material deprivation among the poor. I argue that more encompassing explanations must be sought to address the shifts not only in the level of poverty, but also in its patterns and content.

I mainly use the perspective of new social risks (Bonoli, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Ranci, 2009) and the concepts of liberalisation and dualization established in research on institutional change (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Thelen, 2014) as a starting point for the explanation of changing patterns of poverty. I argue that in Germany, institutional changes exacerbated and interacted with polarising tendencies in both labour markets and household structures. In contrast, policy shifts in Great Britain hardly intervened in the latter, but compensated for polarising tendencies, by strengthening benefits targeted at vulnerable groups.

I use Household panel data for both countries and conduct several separate analyses to draw a comprehensive picture of changes in poverty. In a first step, I examine the basic trends in poverty and their relation to structural variables. The results confirm that the observed trends in cross-sectional poverty rates are not simply a result of shifts in the distribution of variables like education or age. Instead the trends are related to shifts in poverty, conditional on these characteristics. Furthermore, I assess different components of household income and their contribution to increasing poverty risks separately. The results suggest that the developments in individual and household earnings put an increasing proportion of households at risk of poverty in both countries. These trends are stronger in Germany than in Great Britain. However, the main difference between both countries is the changing effect of social transfers. These are responsible for the decreasing poverty risks in Great Britain, while they do not compensate for the changes in labour markets and household structures in Germany.
These results also hold in a dynamic perspective, when I assess the relation of labour market events and poverty risks: while both countries saw an increase in households in low-paid employment, the resulting patterns in exits and re-entries from and into poverty differ. Exits from poverty become less frequent, while people re-enter poverty more often in Germany, whereas the opposite pattern holds for Great Britain. The results also indicate that especially households at the margin of the labour market experience longer and more frequent poverty spells in Germany in later periods. Thus, the social security systems did not only fail to compensate for increased risks in labour markets and household structures. The level of protection for those dependent on assistance also declined.

Finally, I check how the changes in income poverty relate to a measure of material deprivation that is less sensitive to changes in patterns of income inequality and more closely related to absolute concepts of poverty. The extent of material deprivation decreases strongly for the British sample, mainly due to a relative improvement among persons with low incomes. It is partly explained by the development of real household incomes, suggesting that those at the bottom of the income distribution profited from a general improvement of living conditions. In contrast, there was no clear pattern in material deprivation in Germany and the gap between the poor and the non-poor was stable over time. This suggests that the larger share of persons that are poor was not balanced by a relative improvement of living conditions among them.

Overall, the results show shifts in the formation of households and the workings of labour markets in both countries. Social security systems were not successfully adapted to these changes in a way that limits their impact individuals and households vulnerable to poverty. In Great Britain, interference of the state in labour markets is limited, but means-tested benefits with a special focus on families with children seem to have compensated for pressures in market incomes at least up to the financial crisis.
Among several forms of consumption, participation in highbrow culture most strongly marks cleavages between social status groups (Bourdieu). As such, cultural participation is thought to be important in the status attainment process and therefore has received attention in numerous empirical studies. The literature can be roughly divided into two branches: cultural participation is studied as an outcome or as a cause of social inequality. In both lines of literature an important question is to what extent the status attainment process can be described as either cultural reproduction (parents are decisive) or cultural mobility (schools have additional effects) (DiMaggio).

In this paper we seek methodological improvements on the following points. First, we study the status attainment process longitudinally, among a sample of adolescents (age 14-17), followed until the age of 20-23. Second, we combine both lines of literature and study processes of cultural reproduction versus cultural mobility simultaneously. Third, we use information from three sources: students, their parents, and the secondary schools.

The longitudinal data set, Youth and Culture (Ganzeboom and Nagel, 1998-2002; Ganzeboom et al., 2004), comes from a sample of 1521 secondary school students (from 69 school classes, 23 schools) throughout the Netherlands, who took part in a classroom survey in 1998 and then were re-interviewed three times. For analysis we use linear multi-wave cross-lagged panel models (Green) in which measurement attenuation is corrected by using panel constraints.

Selectivity and internal migration: A study of refugees’ dispersal policy in Sweden

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Following the intensified waves of refugees to Europe, dispersal policies of newly arrived immigrants are proposed for speeding up their integration in the hosting societies and for distributing the financial burden associated with it across the EU countries. However, the economic theory of migration suggests that economic immigrants are self-selected to destinations based on both - their observed and unobserved attributes. Highly skilled people tend to migrate to labor markets with a broader opportunities structure, while less capable individuals choose markets that are more sheltered. There is some empirical evidence that refugees show patterns of self-selection that are similar to those found among economic immigrants. Therefore, if refugees indeed show similar patterns of selectivity to those of economic migrants when making their destination choices, the effectiveness of refugees-dispersal policies depend on the extent to which refugees tend to stay in their initial location assigned to them and their pattern of selectivity.

In the present paper we use a quasi-experiment approach in order to examine whether the economic theory of migration applies not only to economic immigrants but to refugees as well. We follow refugee cohorts who came to Sweden between 1990-1993 when a "Whole-Sweden" policy was applied. This policy was designed to reduce the concentration of refugees in mainly large cities by randomly deploying asylum seekers in almost all municipalities within Sweden. This dispersal policy of refugees can be seen as an exogenous effect on individual initial place of residence. Those refugees were given a choice a few years after assigned their initial assigned location, whether to stay there, or to move to another place within Sweden. This policy allows us to examine refugees’ self-selection patterns within Sweden and its effect on their subsequent economic assimilation.

We use individual register data from Statistics Sweden to study refugees who arrived in Sweden during 1990-1993 and we follow them during a 6-year period from the time they received residency (1990-1999). We defined refugees as immigrants who arrived from Yugoslavia, Bosnia-herzegovina, Somalia, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran and compared them to immigrants from non-refugees countries. The decision to define these immigrants as refugees is based on the fact that most of the immigrants coming from these countries come under the definition of asylum seekers and therefore where part of the settlement program.

A movement from one labor markets to another is our unit of analysis. Since municipalities alone do not measure accurately the economic opportunities in the local labor markets we use the Statistics Sweden's definition of labor markets which include 112 categories (i.e., local labor markets in Sweden).

The analysis is divided into two stages. First, we examine the tendency of refugees and non-refugees with similar levels of education to migrate to different labor markets. Second, we examine the impact of these transitions on changes in wages and disposable income. We employ discreet time survival analysis in order to assess the effect of abilities on destination choices of refugees, and lagged dependent models to assess their wage and income growth.

Two types of models where used, each with a different dependent variable. In the first-type models the transition studied was from and to labor markets with different levels of income inequality (measured by an index composed of the GINI coefficient of the labor market and the coefficient of returns on education in that market). In the second-type models the transitions examined were from and to labor markets that differ in their structure of opportunities (measured by an index of three variables: size of the labor market, mean wage and percent having a BA in the market). In our analyses we try to assess whether refugees with higher capacities were more likely to migrate to unequal (broader structure of opportunity) labor markets, to more equal (sheltered) labor markets, or to stay in markets of the same levels of inequality (structures of opportunity).
The results suggest that first refugees affected by that policy are more likely to move within Sweden relative to immigrants that were not affected by it. Second, refugees’ education levels are found to be related to differences in their destination choices. Highly skilled refugees are more likely to migrate to labor markets with wider opportunities and with higher levels of inequality relative to less skilled ones. Finally, it seems that destination choices have implications on refugees’ disposable income but not on wages. These findings may indicate that choices of refugees’ internal migration are mainly influenced by welfare maximization rather than wage maximization.

The results imply that the internal migration processes of those who can be defined as refugees are similar to those of economic immigrants, and based, at least to a large extent, on economic considerations.

As for the effectiveness of population dispersal policies, the results of this study show that at least in the long run, immigrants with high capacities will probably continue to be attracted to areas where there are employment opportunities for them. In contrast, less capable immigrants tend to stay where they were originally placed in.

Industrial Segregation in the Choice of Majors across Five Decades: Evidence from Soochow University in China

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This paper examines the influence of parental industrial sector on children’s choice of major in China after 1949. Previous studies of educational attainment in China have focused largely on the roles of parental occupation and social class, and neglected the role of parental industrial sector. In the decades after 1949, the People’s Republic of China, however, explicitly prioritized specific industrial sectors when allocating resources, creating especially strong reason to expect that parents’ industrial sector may also have a strong influence on children’s attainment. Using the school registration records of 51,801 students who entered an elite regional university between 1952 and 2002, this paper examines the overall strength of association between children’s field of study and parental industrial sector. This study demonstrates that the overall strength, as well as the qualitative pattern of segregation between majors according to parental industrial sector, is remarkably stable across time. Our results also indicate that existing theories about parental influence over children’s attainment cannot fully explain differences across parents’ industrial sectors in children’s fields of study.

Conceptualizing relevant contexts in local context analyses

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While the relevance of local contexts for life courses and individual development has been repeatedly acknowledged, the adequate conceptualization of these contexts has remained a critical issue. It is known that measured context influences are sensitive to the scaling of contexts, but the reasons for this phenomenon have been rarely investigated. The aim of this paper is to make decisions about context definitions more explicit and theoretically justified. The paper discusses central aspects of the conceptualization, definition and measurement of spatial contexts in analyses of context effects. It provides a theoretical basis for the conceptualization of local contexts acknowledging possible group-specificity of context boundaries and the adaptation of context boundaries to local conditions. Concentrating on the aspect of scaling, it follows a micro-level approach which conceptualizes context conditions as a set of opportunities which are relevant for individual actions. This approach takes into account that both the relevance and the number of available opportunities depend on the distance to the actor. Regarding empirical measurement, a flexible concept of local contexts is introduced which acknowledges that relevant social contexts are individualized, heterogeneous and variable. Various aspects of this concept are illustrated with an empirical analysis of context effects on life-course transitions.

Conventional and flexible contexts

Many studies of context effects study individuals in a fixed structure of uniform, proximate contexts typically defined by administrative units such as neighborhoods, communities or districts. There is clear political and administrative demand for having social indicators on the level of these units. Typically, administrative boundaries tend to fit with the range of influence of relevant institutions, legal entitlements etc. However, they typically tend not to fit with a number of other important social mechanisms. Individual behavior in its spatial extension (the "range of action"), social interactions or markets can be expected to transcend such formal boundaries. Administrative units – and the respective data, which is typically available only for these units – may often turn out to be "too small", "too big" or otherwise inadequate to capture the phenomenon under study. An operationalization along individual spaces of action requires the issue-specific definition of contexts, taking up the idea of individualized, scalable neighborhoods – also known as egocentric neighborhoods or "egohoods". Such an approach allows having as many contexts as individual cases. The question arises how to define the adequate scale of the contexts.

A theoretical model

Context conditions are characteristics of aggregate units, but many of them can be analytically subdivided into characteristics of elementary units. In the theoretical model proposed in this paper, context conditions are conceptualized as a set of opportunities that are taken up (or not taken up) by individuals. Such opportunities may be courses or jobs that can be taken up, potential partners that can be married, etc. Due to individual costs (of travelling, information etc.) proximate opportunities are typically more relevant than distant opportunities. The second important component is defined by the number of opportunities. Taking into account that both the relevance and the number of opportunities depend on the distance to the actor, theoretical considerations suggest a typically non-monotonic pattern in the relevance of contexts at different scales.

Heterogeneity of relevant contexts
Due to different levels of resources, we can also expect group-specific patterns for the combination of both functions – relevance and number of opportunities – i.e., for the expected relevance of contexts, depending on distance. Note that this is not necessarily a statement about the absolute size of context effects but about where these effects can be expected. There is also another important source of heterogeneity. The extent of relevant local contexts may depend on characteristics of the context itself. Again, a theoretical justification of such differences may be based on the assumption of different levels of resources which either encourage individuals to make use also of opportunities in greater distance (as they can afford the necessary information or travel) or prevent them from doing so (in the case of a lack of resources). In contrast to the previous argument, however, this proposition refers not to inter-individual differences but heterogeneity in collective (regional) resources such as local infrastructure.

An empirical example: Context effects on young adults’ transitions to unemployment

Selected empirical analyses serve as an illustration. I use individual-level data on the life courses of Dutch school leavers that can be matched with context information on various levels of aggregation. The aim is to identify local context effects on individual post-training transitions. The sample contains approximately N=30,000 individuals whose place of residence is known and who completed vocational training in 2011/12. These data have been merged with aggregate data on various administrative levels. Context characteristics are defined by population variables. The effects of context characteristics are estimated using multivariate linear-probability models. These models control for various individual-level variables and use an additional control for spatial autocorrelation. With approx. 12,000 units, neighborhoods (buurten) are the smallest administrative units for which aggregate data is available. A specific individual context is constructed by aggregating all neighborhoods that lie within a given range around the location of the respective individual case. Using this operationalization, the following aspects of flexible spatial contexts are illustrated: (1) customized spatial contexts (individualization and scaling), (2) group-specific relevance of contexts, and (3) condition-specific relevance of contexts. These aspects are brought together by a flexible model of local context effects on individual behavior which distinguishes between partial context areas. The results indicate group-specific differences in the extension of relevant contexts and the dependence of this extension on the conditions within the proximate context.

Summary and outlook

Many applications suggest sensitivity to or even an “optimal” size of measurement contexts where the context effect is maximal. Both theoretical justifications and adequate empirical techniques are necessary to specify relevant contexts. The general conclusion of this paper is that defining “relevant” areas in contextual analyses is an analytical challenge of its own which may require efforts similar to what is necessary when dealing with the specific substantial question.
Public childcare expansion and mothers’ return to work behaviour – Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Germany

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Mobilising non-working mothers to participate in paid employment and to make further progress towards gender equality remains at the top of the political agenda in most OECD countries. Germany in particular, has a long standing history of being a conservative welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) with low maternal labour force participation (Boeckmann et al. 2015), long employment interruptions due to generous parental leave periods and a lack in formal childcare, and a large motherhood penalty (Gangl/ Ziefle 2009; Hinz/Gartner 2005). A substantial provision of early childcare is considered to be a powerful instrument in promoting mothers’ continuous employment and to encourage dual-earner families (Hipp/Leuze 2015). Consequently, the European Council set precise targets to increase female and maternal labour force participation and tackle gender-specific disadvantages by providing childcare services in all member states. By 2010, childcare facilities should provide access to at least 33 percent of children under the age of three.

Since 2005, Germany has made immense public investments in state-subsidized all-day childcare to meet the European policy targets. However, the question remains: How does the recent expansion of public childcare facilities for under-three-year-olds affect mothers’ employment interruption after childbirth and their return to work behaviour in Germany? The scientific literature on the effects of the recent childcare expansion on mothers’ employment from other European member state as well as Germany is sparse. However, theoretically, it can be assumed that childcare availability for under-three-year-old children largely impacts on maternal employment. The economic labour market theory predicts that the mother’s decision to return to work depends on her wage net of childcare costs and other family income. As the child gets older the intensity of caring declines, the mother’s utility from being at home falls and returning to work becomes increasingly attractive. Introducing affordable public childcare arrangements for very young children therefore increases incentives for an early return to employment. Similarly, sociological gender construction theories (Cotran 2002), such as the exposure model (Bielby and Bielby 1989) as well as the doing gender approach (West and Zimmerman 1987), consider life course transitions such as childbirth to trigger changes in role and role expectations. With regard to non-parental childcare, the theories assume that an increase in childcare services enables mothers, to combine maternal employment and family duties and, hence, reduces potential inter-role conflicts, such as the work-family and the family-work conflict. As a result, the expansion of childcare facilities enables mothers to combine work and family related roles far earlier and shorten maternal interruption durations. Overall, both economic and sociological theories assume that mothers reduce the time out of employment after birth and resume employment earlier and with substantially more working hours. In particularly for Germany it can be expected that earlier returns to employment can be observed in areas where childcare facilities for under-three-year-olds were sparse and a large post-reform increase occurred.

This article aims at providing first quasi-experimental evidence on the employment effects of the German childcare reform, starting in 2005. Our intent is to contribute to the growing empirical literature on childcare availability and mothers’ return to work behaviour. Germany provides an interesting country-case with an unusual cultural twist. Differences between East and West Germany in public childcare provision for under-three-year-olds persist since reunification and differences are also visible with regards to a higher level of maternal employment in the East, particularly in full-time employment (Hanel and Riphahn 2012). In addition, regional variation in the childcare availability across districts and time are observable in both parts of Germany. Our empirical strategy exploits this regional variation on the districts level prior and during the reform period, in order to analyse the reform effects on maternal employment.

To estimate whether the expansion of childcare provision for under-three-year-olds is associated with shorter employment interruption duration and a change in return behaviour of mothers, we apply survival analysis with a difference-in-difference approach. Precisely, we adopt the piecewise-constant exponential model to estimate the probability of returning to the labour market, conditional of not having returned to work yet. The flexible piecewise-constant exponential model allows us to address the changing parental leave entitlements across our observation period by using a set of parameters to mirror the different probabilities of occurring events across different time periods. We use half-yearly intervals. Our dependent variable measures the duration out of employment until a return to employment is observable.

We use rich panel data from the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP) and the associated study “Familien in Deutschland” (Families in Germany (FID)) for the years 2005-2014. Since structure and content are similar, both data sets can be analysed jointly. Individual and household information is combined with yearly administrative records on state subsidized childcare provision on the respective district level (Kinder und Jugendhilfestatistik; Deutsches Jugendinstitut).
Our preliminary results suggest that an increase in public childcare services for under-three year old children has an impact on the return behaviour of mothers. The reform is associated with shorter interruption duration after birth before re-entering the labour market. Overall, the results point towards a significant influence of institutional factors, such as available public childcare on the interruption duration of mothers, even after controlling for individual and household factor.

On whose account? Financial democracy within heterosexual couples in Australia
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This paper contributes to the within-couple finance literature by longitudinally investigating bank account arrangements, systematically assessing the effects of economic, life-course, and socio-cultural characteristics associated with partners in intimate relationships, and taking into consideration both the intra-generational and intergenerational impacts on bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia. We find that mixed banking strategies are favoured in organising money, while separate accounts are also prevalent, with egalitarian setup of separate accounts being the most common and on the rise over time. Income, relative resources, transaction costs, relationship history, gender role and family background are significant predictors of joint vis-à-vis separate accounts, after controlling for basic socio-demographic characteristics.

The economic crisis and changes in work-family arrangements in European countries
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Throughout the second half of the 20th century, women’s economic and social standing in Western countries has largely improved. Women’s increased enrolment in education (Breen et al., 2010) has fostered their presence and competitiveness in the labor market (Betlio et al., 2013; Eurostat, 2014) and this, in turn, has led to important changes in the way women’s employment is perceived and acknowledged (Treas and Windmer, 2000). Women’s increased presence in the work force has modified what are known as ‘work-family arrangements’, that is, the distribution of working hours between partners. Indeed, European Labor Force Survey data for a variety of European countries representing different welfare and care regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Korpi, 2000; Lewis, 1992) show that, from 1994 to 2011, couples have moved away from the ‘male-breadwinner model’ toward the ‘one-and-a-half earner model’ and toward the ‘dual-earner model’ (Lewis, 2001; OECD, 2014). Despite the common shift toward a more equal participation in paid work between partners, work-family arrangements vary notably between European countries (Lewis et al., 2008; Hook, 2015). Indeed, research shows that while the dual-earner model is much more present in Scandinavian countries - the so-called "social democratic" welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) – than in other European countries (Lewis et al., 2008), the ‘one-and-a-half earner model’ if found to be predominant in liberal and conservatives countries, such as the UK and Germany. In southern Europe, by contrast, work-family arrangements appear to be severely affected by social class, as families “polarize between the dual full-time and male breadwinner families” (Hook, 2015, p.15). In particular, women with higher levels of education are more likely to be part of dual-earner households as compared to women with lower education, with important implications for within-gender inequalities.

There are several reasons for which the growing shift toward work-family arrangements that see women as main or secondary earners vis-à-vis non earners is considered a positive outcome. On the one hand, scholars have emphasized the “economic case” for gender equality in employment, stressing that female and maternal employment are not just beneficial to the cause of gender equality per se, but also that having more women in the work force fosters economic growth (Smith et al., 2013). Furthermore, states largely benefit from the tax revenue stemming from high female employment rates (Olovsson, 2009). On the other hand, maternal income has become an increasingly important asset to protect children from poverty, especially in times of economic recession (McLanahan, 2009; Barbieri et al., 2012) and marital disruption (Tamborini et al., 2012). Moreover, scholars have underlined the tight link between the sub replacement fertility rates that have been characterizing many European countries over the past decades and gender inequality in employment and wages (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2013). Last but not least, full time employed mothers appear to be happier than homemakers (Berger, 2013) and maternal employment has positive spillovers for children’s well-being (Cooklin et al., 2014). Thus, it is not surprising that – at least until 20120 - one of the European Union’s goals has been to increase the presence of mothers in the workforce (Council of the European Union, 2011).

However, the recent economic crisis that hit European countries might have had unexpected consequences for work-family arrangements. On the one hand, growing levels of unemployment in typically male sectors such as manufacturing could have reduced men’s ability of being full-time earners (Rubery, 2014), hence potentially leading to a reduction of male-breadwinner households. On the other hand, the cuts in the public sector due to austerity measures – both in terms of services and of jobs – might have shifted part of the negative consequences of the crisis on women’s employment (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). Considering that the countries that were hit hardest by the crisis were also the ones where women were less employed to begin with (e.g. Greece, Spain and Italy), the consequences of the recession are expected to pan out differently according to the context. Despite the abundance of cross-national studies on work-family arrangements (among others: Lewis, 2001, 2008; Hook, 2015), the literature is lacking empirical evidence on the link between the economic crisis and work-family arrangements.

The objective of this article is to carry out a comparative analysis on the relationship between the economic crisis and work-family arrangements in comparative perspective. Using multinomial logistic regression models on ten countries from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) the article fills a gap in the literature by addressing, first, whether work-family arrangements have changed from before to after the beginning of the recession in countries with different gender and welfare regimes and whether the changes have been toward greater or lesser gender equality (i.e. the moves have been toward dual earner families or away from them). Second, considering the importance of women’s education for work-family arrangements in different countries
During the last decade, the persisting gender inequality in the domestic division of labour and childcare has been repeatedly linked to very low fertility rates. The debate became more elaborated in the three contributions published in 2015 in Population and Development Review (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015, Goldscheider et al. 2015, Anderson and Kohler 2015). These contributions share a broad view of a tight link between an increase in gender equality and fertility change. They argue that the trend towards “less family” observed in the last three decades of the twentieth century – the declines in fertility and marriage and the rises in divorce – was caused by the fact that the increases in women’s labour force participation were not accompanied by changes in women’s family roles. Once the family roles become more gender equal, Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) and Goldscheider et al. (2015) predict a return to “more family” – rises in fertility and marriage rates and decreases in divorce rates, especially among highly educated women. We argue that gender equality cannot be seen as a single dominant factor explaining the changes in family and fertility, but it should rather be seen as a part of the “institutional package” that can either support higher fertility and stronger family or depress fertility to low levels.

Objectives, data & method

For selected countries representing different welfare regimes we evaluate the links between gender equality and family changes as suggested by Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015, Goldscheider et al. 2015, Anderson and Kohler 2015. Specifically, we aim to:

- Provide a systematic analysis of macro-level trends and reversals in family behaviours, especially in marriage, fertility, and divorce. This will be done with the help of data from various sources, e.g. Human Fertility Database, Cohort Fertility and Education database or Eurostat.
- Study the links between changes in family behaviours and the trends in gender equality, and investigate whether the observed patterns are in line with the hypotheses outlined by Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) and Goldscheider et al (2015). To this end, we will link demographic indicators of family change with attitudinal data on gender norms from the European Values Study.
- Incorporate evidence for selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are often neglected in empirical research. These countries are important from the theoretical point of view as they had experienced a shift towards high levels of female labour force participation already in the 1960s (e.g. Greece and Spain) there has been a considerable decrease in dual-earners households with highly educated women while the proportion of dual earers with low educated women has remained constant. In contrast, higher educated women have been the ones to most increase their chances of being in dual earner households in Germany. These results point to important educational differences in the way work-family arrangements have evolved over the past years and suggest diverging paths between countries that suffered the economic crisis differently.

Preliminary findings

The discussed contributions imply that the total fertility rate first declines and then rises in the course of the “gender revolution”. They predict a similar U-shaped trend also in the total marriage rates (U-shape) and the total divorce rates (inverted U-shape). We demonstrate that the empirical record is mixed, with considerable cross-country variation. Our preliminary findings show that the macro-level U-shaped trends are not well substantiated: the reversals have mostly been manifested in period data, often only in some countries and in some periods of time. When tempo effects are controlled for or when the analysis adopts a cohort perspective, a trend that initially looked like a U-shaped pattern of change often turns into a decline followed by a broad stabilisation (see Figure 1 for Sweden as an example).

Next steps

1. We will study the macro-level trends in family-related behaviours by education.
Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015: 2) argue that besides macro-level turnarounds in family behaviour a reversal in the education gradient in fertility has taken place. Based on the existing literature, we expect a mixed evidence of the changing education gradients in fertility, marriage and divorce. For selected countries we will analyse the trends in these gradients and assess whether there is a systematic direction of change among younger cohorts living in more gender egalitarian context.

2. We will examine whether macro-level family and fertility changes were linked to changes in gender equality in the predicted way. Because fertility and family trajectories often did not follow the predicted U-shaped trend, it is difficult to identify a two-stage process of the retreat from family and the subsequent family resurgence in the progression of gender revolution, outlined by Goldscheider et al. (2015). We will inspect the suggested temporal pattern of fertility and family changes in the studies outlined above and discuss whether the empirical record is consistent with the main arguments presented.

3. We will analyse the link between the stalled gender revolution and family trends. We will also discuss the possibility that in some societies the gender revolution has “stalled” (England 2010). We will explore possible links between the stalled gender revolution and family changes. This exercise is not entirely hypothetical: for instance, in Australia the trend towards more egalitarian gender attitudes stalled and in some cases reversed after the mid-1990s (van Egmond et al. 2010). In contrast with Esping-Andersen and Billari’s (2015) perspective, some societies with stalled or incomplete gender revolution may actually experience relatively high fertility levels, especially if they show strong inequalities, social status polarisation in family behaviour and/or their significant minorities adhere to the traditional gender views, like for example in Israel or Utah in the United States.

4. We will discuss Andersen and Kohler’s (2015) argument of “gender equality dividend”. We will examine in which societies and in which periods the hypothesised marriage squeeze became strongest and whether its size was linked to the later shift towards gender egalitarianism. Among the broad sets of arguments on the links between gender equality and family behaviours we find this argument to be the weakest and expect it will not stand a more careful scrutiny.
The consequences of welfare cuts for union formation and dissolution in Denmark among welfare recipients with and without dependent children

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Economic difficulties and shocks to income often lead to family strain and increased risk of union dissolution (e.g., Conger et al. 1990, Lewin 2005; Poortman 2005), and make single individuals less desirable as potential partners (Becker 1973). Such difficulties lower the perceived pecuniary value of a (potential) relationship (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977), as well as increase friction between partners already in a relationship. In addition, income drops may make a union less economically efficient (Oppenheimer 1997). Previous research in economics has focused on shocks to employment and sudden shifts in each partner’s expected economic contributions to the union (e.g., Weiss and Willis 1997; Browning, Chiappori and Weiss 2014:427ff), finding that negative income shocks increase risks of union dissolution and singlehood. Research explicitly studying the impact of welfare reforms on union formation and dissolution is sparsely and predominantly uses macro- or survey-data without a strong causal design (see however Gennetian and Miller 2004). An increase in welfare payments lowers risk of dissolution, especially among female recipients (Bilter et al. 2004; Carlson et al. 2004; Gennetian and Miller 2004), but the findings on the impact of welfare reforms on union formation is ambiguous (Bilter et al. 2004; Carlson et al. 2004; Gennetian and Miller 2004; Herbst 2011). Thus, there are indications of a strong association between a strong economic safety net for those at the bottom of the income distribution and their union stability. We know less about the relationship between individuals’ economic safety net and their propensity for union formation, as well as how different family constellations could mitigate such a relationship.

In this paper, we use Danish administrative data to study how changes in welfare benefits affect family stability, examining both how it affects the risk of relationship dissolution, as well as how it affects individuals’ propensity to enter into a relationship. We exploit a 2003 Danish welfare benefit reform that introduced time-dependent welfare payment ceilings for individuals who had received social assistance for an unbroken spell of six months (Danish Employment Act, Law no. 419; Graversen and Tinggaard 2005; Hansen and Hussain 2009). The ceiling imposed severe budget constraints, making it an especially appealing policy intervention to analyze, as it could induce large changes in family life. An early study of the impact of the reform found no employment effects, but that affected families had a harder time making ends meet financially (Graversen and Tinggaard 2005). Later research corroborated these findings (Hansen and Hussain 2009). Thus, individuals experienced a decrease in income, without it leading to an increase in labor market activities among treated.

Methodologically, we use a differences-in-differences approach, using uninsured individuals with less than six months’ continuous welfare dependency as a control group for individuals who received the benefit cuts. We consider heterogeneity across recipients’ gender as well as whether recipients have dependent children. We also use pre-reform information on relationship status to study whether the reform affected union dissolution risk, union formation probability, or both. One concern is that people officially dissolve their unions by moving apart, but remain a couple unofficially. This would be the case if they would gain additional benefits by decoupling. Yet, the specific group of individuals who the 2003 reform affected likely had little incentive for dissolution for purely financial reasons. Social assistance is a means-tested benefit, and individuals affected by the reform therefore already had low means. In addition, their estimated equivalated disposable income would drop if couples dissolved their union (Hansen and Hussain 2009). We are able to track affected individuals’ later residential movements in the data, so we can study how their housing situation evolves, to further control for dissolution for financial reasons.

We find that the reform caused an increase in the risk of union dissolution among affected married and cohabiting couples, with effect heterogeneity across whether the couple had children living with them when affected. Results are ambiguous for the effect of the reform on the likelihood of union formation among individuals who were single when the reform was introduced. Overall, decreasing benefit levels for recipients with long term benefit dependence appears to increase the risk of family instability.

Do children really stabilise partnerships? Pregnancy intentions and partnership dissolution in Ireland

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At a first glance there seems to be consensus in quantitative empirical research, that the presence of minor children born to a (married) couple stabilises partnerships. Therefore, research on divorce or partnership dissolution normally controls for the presence of children or the age of the youngest child. A deeper look at theories and research reveals that the picture is not so clear. The economic theory of the family, which conceptualises children as commodities, i.e. as non-market goods produced in private households, presents arguments, why children stabilise marriages (Becker 1993). But at the same time the authors of this theory claim that in societies with high divorce rates, couples with limited or bad long-term prospects have a lower probability of having children (Becker et al. 1977). Consequently, the positive correlation between children and marriage (or union) stability might not be causal, but due to previous selection processes.

A different theoretical perspective on children and partnership is the transition to parenthood as a crucial life course event, which causes severe changes in several domains and has the potential to increase stress and instability. After a birth partners have less time for each other, show less affect, and so forth. In a lot of cases, one parent, often the mother reduces her paid work. This might lead to conflicts in pursuing her professional career, but might also increase financial constraints and pressure. Whereas the economic
theory of the family assumes, that mother’s employment and higher female wages destabilise partnerships (Becker 1993), the family stress model by Glen Elder and colleagues claims that financial restrictions are a major cause for conflicts and strains reducing marriage quality and increasing the risk of separation (Conger et al. 1999).

In line with the view of giving birth as a critical life course event and the family stress model, Guzzo and Hayford (2012) provide more arguments. They claim that the impact of giving birth on partnership dissolution should be especially strong, if the pregnancy was unplanned. In such a case parents are less prepared to this new situation and have less time to adapt to it. Guzzo and Hayford present some empirical support for their arguments with panel data from the US.

The current paper asks if and why the planning status of a pregnancy is important for partnership (in)stability. It focusses on Ireland, as there is a large, high-quality data set, which contains very specific information. In addition, marital breakdown is a lower social class phenomenon in Ireland.

The current paper contributes to existing research in several ways:

1. In comparison to previous research, we take into account different degrees of unplanned pregnancies, namely a) somewhat and b) severely mistimed as well as c) unwanted pregnancies. The term unwanted refers to cases, where mothers report that they didn’t intend to have any (further) child in their life before becoming pregnant.

2. The data at hand offers rich information to investigate, if differential degrees of union instability by pregnancy intentions are merely due to factors jointly increasing the risk of a mistimed or unwanted pregnancy and partnership dissolution or if there are pregnancy specific effects at work.

3. We test theoretical arguments, why mistimed and unwanted pregnancies should have an independent effect on splitting-up. The tested mechanisms are constraints in pursuing work or training as well as changes in partnership quality due to the new child.

4. Finally, we investigate if economic hardship speeds up union dissolution and if this is related to pregnancy intentions.

The data are from the infant cohort of the panel study “Growing up in Ireland (GUI)”. Mothers and fathers of 9 month old children were interviewed in 2008 and 2009 for the first time. Up to now, there had been two follow-ups, when the child reached the age 3 and 5 years (for details see www.growingup.ie/). There is plenty of information regarding the time before conception. We reconstruct parents’ partnership career over the three survey waves. The data are analysed in the framework of discrete event history analysis. The starting point is living in a consensual or marital union when the child is 9 month old; the dependent variable is dissolution in the following four years. The analyses are based on over 8,000 couples.

Couples with a somewhat or much too early pregnancy have a very similar elevated risk of separation compared to those with a planned pregnancy. This risk is even higher if the case of an unwanted pregnancy. Controlling for previous partnership history, education and socio-economic status (plus parity, age at birth, living in urban area) reduces the impact of pregnancy intentions by more than 50%, although there are still significant effects for bit too early and unwanted pregnancies. A subjectively rated decrease in partnership quality due to the new child increases the dissolution risk, but problems in combining work or training with family duties don’t. Difficulties in making ends meet and having the means-tested medical card rise dissolution risks. This underlines the relevance of poverty for union instability in Ireland.

All differences by pregnancy intentions disappear in the final model, except those who have a pregnancy a bit too early. The increased risk of other types of pregnancies can be fully attributed to selection (lower educated, poorer, younger... people have higher rates of unplanned pregnancies and lower partnership stability) as well as to increased partnership conflicts. The results support the selection effect in the economic theory of the family, not the stabilizing effect of children. In addition, it supports the family stress model in respect to partnership conflicts and to general financial strains in the family. There is no support for a specific effect resulting from mother’s work-family conflict.

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The Socio-Economic Consequences of Divorce before and after the Divorce Law Revision in Switzerland
Research Questions and Theory

Increasing divorce rates alarm due to the decreases in individuals’ economic and subjective well-being separations often precede. Political scientists argue that traditional social risks such as job loss are being replaced by new social risks such as family break-up (Bonoli 2007). Indeed, divorcees in Switzerland have an about three-and-a-half times higher risk of social assistance receipt than married (Bundesamt für Statistik 2015). Longitudinal studies using the Swiss Household Panel suggest consequences of divorce for individuals’ health (Budowski, Masia, and Tillmann 2009; Covizzi 2008) and significant gender disparities in the income and employment effects of divorce (Covizzi 2008; Falter 2009; Masia and Budowski 2009). Comparative research recently estimated divorce effects in Switzerland to be relatively modest with respect to household income (De Vaus et al. 2015) and relatively accentuated with respect to women’s employment (van Damme and Kalmijn 2014).

One limitation of existing research is its short-term perspective. The stress-adjustment model of the consequences of divorce (Amato 2000) suggests that divorcees reclaim pre-divorce levels of economic and psychological well-being within a few years. However, more recent studies motivate larger windows on the life-course trajectories of divorcees because divorce may also cause chronic strain (Amato 2010; e.g. Tamborini, Couch, and Reznik 2015). As a first research question this contribution therefore asks: are there long-term implications of divorce for individual’s income (adjusted household income), employment (status, activity level), living arrangements (size of apartment, share of housework) and happiness?

The socio-economic consequences of divorce are essentially linked to how men and women arrange market and non-market work during marriage. If marrying and eventually becoming a mother is linked to retreat from the labor market and becoming a father with in investing in careers, the negative economic effects of divorce depend upon gender and parental status. Consequently, because of a relatively high level of specialization in marriages (Levy, Widmer, and Kellerhals 2002) divorce effects in Switzerland are expected to be particularly segregated. A second research question therefore asks: to what extent is there a gender-gap in the socio-economic consequences of divorce and how does it differ between men and women with and without school-aged children at the moment of separation?

Following this line of reasoning, the life course perspective stresses that the way separations influence individual trajectories is widely shaped by the social context (Mayer 2009). Research on the influence of the historical context found economic consequences of divorce to decline in the US and the UK (Jenkins 2008; McKeever and Wolffinger 2001; Tach and Eads 2015; Tamborini et al. 2015) and to remain largely stable in Germany (Bröckel and Andreß 2015; Kohler et al. 2012). There are reasons to expect changes in the effects of divorce in Switzerland: gender roles have become more equal, selection into divorce has changed and divorce law, divorce law practice and welfare policies have been adapted. As a third research question, the contribution investigates to what extent the socio-economic consequences of divorce have changed: do they differ for those that divorced before 2000 from the consequences for those that divorced after 2000 and the introduction of the new divorce law regime?

Method

Analyses base on a synthetic dataset that combines observations from five cross-sectional surveys with information socio-economic outcomes and partnership histories. The Family and Fertility Survey (surveyed in 1994/1995), the Swiss Labor Market Survey (1999) and the first wave of the Swiss Household Panel (1999) represent the situation of divorcees in the 1990ies. The 14th wave of the Swiss Household Panel (2013) and the Inquiry on families and generations (2013) deliver the observations of those that divorced in the new millennium.

The main analytical strategy is to compare socio-economic indicators of people that divorced their first marriage with those that had been continuously married in their first marriage. To reduce selection bias, continuously married are balanced with divorcees using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) on the year of entering their first marriage, their age at formation, their educational achievement, experiences of parents’ separation and the number of under-school-age and older children at the moment of the survey. This method allows for the calculation of control groups to divorcees with similar covariate distributions. Balancing is redone for each combination of duration since the divorce, child care responsibilities at separation and observation period. Differences to continuously married arise interpreted as the difference between the observed situation of the divorced and the counterfactual situation had they remained married.

Preliminary Results

Three conclusions emerge from intermediary results. First, both, a stress-adjustment and a life course model of the socio-economic consequences of divorce seem valid. For instance, women with school-aged children at the moment of divorce have lower incomes than the control groups if their divorce is 8 or fewer years away, but show no differences if their divorce is 9 to 13 years away. However, no matter how far away the divorce was, divorced women with children always had lower levels of happiness than the control groups. Second, divorce effects seem to reflect the gendered nature of marriage in Switzerland. Generally, results point to the fact that divorcing a first marriage is followed by a slow integration into the labor market for women with care responsibilities. On the other hand, divorced men take up more responsibilities for domestic tasks after separation - much more than divorced women. Thirdly, there are some signs of change in the effects of divorce. Supporting the idea of decreasing specialization in marriage, in the after-2000 group, divorced women without children show smaller differences in employment rates, but higher differentials in full-time employment, when compared to the continuously married. Also, divorce seems to cause smaller transitions for men’s domestic work. However, the gender-gap of divorce effects seems to be more stable for divorcees with child-care responsibilities. This may be due to a more restrictive post-divorce-transfers policy under the new divorce law regime.

Literature

they have difficulty paying bills or buying things the household needs, such as food, medicine and medical care. The current study focuses on income alone, measures of material hardship incorporate aspects of need. Families experience material hardship when non-custodial children and do not enjoy the benefits of these filial ties later in life.

The current study focuses on the effect of divorce on material and emotional hardship in Israel. While official poverty measures tend to focus on income alone, measures of material hardship incorporate aspects of need. Families experience material hardship when they have difficulty paying bills or buying things the household needs, such as food, medicine and medical care. The current study...
develops five measures of material and emotional hardship and examines whether divorced men and women have a higher risk than married couples of experiencing hardship and whether this holds also for low-income households.

In this study we focus on gender differences and we expect divorced women to be more vulnerable than divorced men. We also ask whether material and emotional hardship differ between those who divorced recently and those who have been divorced for a longer duration. Here we expect recent divorcees to experience higher levels of emotional and material hardship than people who have been divorced for a longer duration. Studies on household income show that most divorced women recover from the decline in economic resources several years following the divorce either by increasing their work effort or by re-marriage (Andreß et al. 2006). Nonetheless, studies also document long-term effects. For example, Dewilde & Stier (2014) found a long-term effect of divorce on homeownership. Regarding emotional hardship, studies show that people reach a stable level after they have overcome the crisis stage (Waite, Luo and Lewin, 2009).

This study draws on the Israel’s 2013 Social Survey, conducted by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. This data set is a large representative sample of Israel’s population (n=7438) and includes detailed socio-economic information and questions on material hardship as well as questions on social networks and retrospective questions on poverty during the life course. The study examines five measures of hardship: food necessities (such as giving up food for economic reasons); housing necessities (including inability to pay bills, electricity disconnected and more); medical-care, worries about the future and satisfaction with neighborhood conditions.

Our findings show that divorced individuals suffer more severe hardship than married couples, even when controlling for income. Divorced men are more likely than married men to give up basic necessities and medical treatments, and they are more worried about the future. Among women, the differences are more pronounced than among men, emphasizing women’s more vulnerable economic position. Furthermore, we find that divorced men rarely fall into poverty, hence part of these gender differences reflect men’s superior economic position. We also find that remarried men and women do not differ in levels of hardship from those married continuously, suggesting that marriage improves their economic and emotional wellbeing.

Although studies show that women’s economic hardship is more pronounced in the early years following divorce, we find that hardships become more severe, perhaps because they extinguish the social networks that supported them during the crisis period or because of the selection mechanisms to re-marriage. Moreover, men remarry faster and at higher rates than women, thus overall, women remain divorced for longer periods than men.

References


To date, few studies have examined the consequences of intragenerational social mobility for well-being. The present analysis investigates the effect of intragenerational rank mobility on happiness, using data from the China General Social Survey 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008 waves. We find no support for the traditional Durkheimian hypothesis that social mobility produces higher levels of dissatisfaction, net of prior and current status and controls. However, the direction of social mobility makes a difference: Downward rank mobility increases Chinese people’s happiness whereas upward rank mobility lowers happiness only for men due to adaptation mechanisms. Our results suggest that although higher status itself generates higher levels of happiness, the process of upward mobility is not a happy road.

Health Across Urban Dimensions in China

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, urban areas were associated with an urban health penalty. As city living standards improved, the urban health penalty faded and generally gave rise to an urban health advantage (Woods 2003). The magnitude [and direction] of the rural-urban health differential will vary across studies and countries, since urban areas are diverse, and different urban definitions exist. Documenting the presence of rural-urban differentials in health has been especially difficult in China because of blurred distinctions between different urban definitions, specifically administrative and statistical definitions (Woods 2003). Another limitation of the urban health literature has been the lack of ability to distinguish which and how features of urban areas are associated with health (Galea and Vlahov 2005).

In the Chinese context, it might be possible to quantify the effect of being administratively designated an urban area versus being labeled urban solely based on population size and density. Administratively defined urban areas, cities (jianzhi shi), receive more financial support from the state, which can be used for urban services (Ma and Cui 1987; Qin and Zhang, 2014). Consequently, individuals living in communities with similar population size and density on average might not have access to the same amenities or government services if the administrative status of the locations differ. In China, the urban status is also conferred at the individual level through hukou designation. Consequently, residents of the same neighborhood might not have the same access to services because of differences in their hukou status. In the data section of this paper, we will describe the different urban dimensions in China in greater detail. Papers that have focused on urbanicity and health in China have failed to distinguish between the different urban dimensions that exist in China.

Rural-urban disparities in mortality and morbidity in China

The magnitude [and direction] of the rural-urban health differential will also vary across studies because of differences in the health measures used. The urban health advantage is larger when investigating measures of mortality instead of morbidity. In a study of adults older than 50 in the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), Zimmer et al. (2007) found lower mortality rates in the urban compared to rural sample. Other studies that have focused on the general population and used CHNS data also confirmed an urban health advantage in mortality; furthermore they found the ratio of rural to urban mortality to have increased from 1993 to 1998 (Van de Poel et al. 2012). Although, mortality rates are lower in urban areas than in rural areas of China, the urban advantage does not extend to other measures of health, such as self rated health (SRH) (Van de Poel et al. 2012). Mortality and SRH are correlated (Idler and Benyamin 1997), but they may capture different aspects of health, which might diverge in the Chinese context.

Self-rated Health:

In the United States, and other western countries, researchers have found that on average a smaller proportion of urbanites rate their health as fair/poor compared to rural residents (Eberhardt et al. 2001). In contrast to the urban health advantage in SRH found in many western countries, Zimmer and colleagues were the first to reveal new and differing patterns of rural-urban differentials in SRH in Asian developing countries. In a cross-country study, Zimmer et al. found that SRH did not differ by rural-urban residence among the elderly in the Philippines, although an urban advantage was significant in Taiwan and Thailand. Yet, in another study of adults aged 50 and over in Thailand, Zimmer and Amornsirisomboon reported that urban residents were more likely than rural residents to report poor health.

In China, using data from the Survey of the Support for the Elderly in Rural and Urban China, Zimmer and Kwong (2008) found no differences in SRH when comparing urban and rural elders, but did find worse health when comparing incidence of specific health conditions. They used the administrative definition of urban/rural in their study. The authors also mentioned that one of the factors behind their findings might be that urban elders might have a greater disposition to reporting health conditions compared to urban elders.

The lack of an urban SRH advantage is not limited to the elderly population but has also been documented in the general population. Based on data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), Pei and Rodriguez (2006) reported that rural respondents were significantly less likely than urban respondents to report poor or fair health after controlling for individual characteristics and provincial
Income inequality. Also using CHNS data, Van De Poel and colleagues went a step further and found that urbanization (an increase in the urbanicity index) was associated with a decline in self-rated health in the short run. The authors raised the point that health status might not have worsened but that the residents in increasingly urbanized location might have increased/revised their health expectation. The latter highlights one of the limitations of self-rated health measures—heterogeneities in health ratings.

Other studies of the general Chinese population have also reported urban disadvantage in SRH. Using data from the 2004 National China Survey on Attitudes towards Inequality and Distributive Justice, Whyte, King, and Sun (2010) found that rural villagers had better self-reported physical and emotional health status than did urban citizens after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

Study’s Contribution to the literature

The existing studies reviewed above have not been able to explain the lack of a robust urban SRH advantage in China and many other Asian countries, which is puzzling given the higher socioeconomic levels and improved access to health care typically associated with urban areas. Possible factors behind this puzzle include differences in urban definition used (papers that have focused on urbanicity and health in China have failed to distinguish between the different definitions of urban that exist in China), and group heterogeneities in reporting of SRH. In this study we address this puzzle by using survey data with better health measures such as SRH with anchors. We exploit the lack of correlation across urban definitions/dimensions to better understand how features of urban areas (especially government designation of urban) are associated with SRH and depression.

DATA AND METHODS

Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS)

The data in this study comes from two waves (2010 baseline and 2012 follow-up) of the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS). The CFPS is a nearly nationally representative longitudinal survey that collects information at the individual, family, and community levels (Xie 2015). The survey has a broad focus and contains information on economic and educational outcomes, migration, family dynamics, and health. Some of the health measures of interest are self-rated health, self-rated health compared to a year ago, and depression (six point Likert-type item). The sample used in this study consists of approximately 29,000 adults between the ages of 18 and 70.

SRH and Anchoring Vignettes

The CFPS includes anchoring vignettes along with the questions on SRH. Anchoring vignettes are brief texts describing hypothetical individuals with varying levels of health; survey respondents are asked to rate the health status of the hypothetical individual. The survey respondents are asked to assume that the hypothetical individuals described are of the same age and background as themselves, and to evaluate that person’s health as if they were rating themselves (response consistency). Anchoring vignettes help address the problem of heterogeneities in health ratings—systematic differences in health reporting (Grol-Prokopczyk et al., 2011).

By using the anchoring vignettes available in the CFPS datasets, we can identify whether differences in SRH between rural and urban residents are real or if they are due to heterogeneities in health ratings (Xu and Xie, 2014).

Urban Dimensions in CFPS

In designing the sampling frame for the CFPS, the Chinese population was treated as a single entity and therefore was not stratified by any rural-urban definition. The motivation for this was that given China’s rapid urbanization, rural-urban administrative definitions might not be dynamic (Xie 2014). Furthermore there is also the question of which rural-urban designation to use. Therefore there are multiple definitions of urban found within the sample that can be exploited. In addition to administratively defined urban areas, there is information on rural/urban classification from the statistical office, information on family hukou status, andfinally information on agricultural and non-agricultural occupational status (Table 1 and Table 2).

Dependent and Treatment Variables

The health outcomes of interests are SRH, and depression. At this time we only have two waves of data CFPS 2010 and CFPS 2012, therefore we do not look at mortality. Important differences might exist between residents in the different urban dimensions, therefore we control for important individual and family demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (Van De Poel et al. 2007).

Intergenerational educational mobility and negative life-style behaviours in Belarus, Hungary and Russia

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Background

Public health and social stratification literature suggests that intergenerational social mobility might be associated with individuals’ health outcomes (Boyle et al., 2009; Cardano et al., 2004; Nicklett and Burgard, 2009). The mechanism would be that downward social mobility brings about the elevated level of stress and feeling of insecurity as individuals find themselves unable to direct their own lives, while according to the upward mobility hypothesis an intergenerational rise in socioeconomic status could have a protective effect and lead to better health among other reasons by generating confidence and sense of control of one’s own life (Alcántara et al., 2014; Newman, 1999). If the association between intergenerational mobility and health outcomes does exist, one on the main pathways connecting the two could go through life-style behaviours (Hemmingsson et al., 1999; Karvonen et al., 1999; Paavola et al., 2004).

A set of countries which are characterized with both specific social mobility patterns due to long history of de-stratification policies and alleviated level of substance abuse are post-communist societies. While sociological scholarship on the trends and covariates of

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intergenerational social mobility in post-communist societies exists (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2010; Gugushvili, 2015) along with public health literature on negative health behaviours (Cockerham et al., 2006), virtually no studies that we are aware of enquire into the links between social mobility and health outcomes or negative health behaviours. One recent exception is the article by Campos-Matos and Kawachi (2015) who analyse how social mobility in educational attainment associates with self-rated health in various welfare regimes using data from the European Social Survey.

Dataset and variables

Our analyses is based on the PrivMort dataset which is a multi-disciplinary project funded by the European Research Council with the main research objective to investigate the post-Communist mortality and morbidity crisis using sub-national multi-level data. The PrivMort project conductes surveys in 20 towns in Belarus, 52 towns in Hungary and in 30 towns in the European part of Russia. PrivMort focused on Belarus and the European part of Russia mainly because the post-Communist mortality crisis was especially severe in these regions of the Former Soviet Union. Collecting data in Hungary makes it possible to investigate the transitional health crisis in a non-Soviet country. Like in Belarus and Russia, life expectancy in Hungary declined significantly in the beginning of the transition and it also has a high level alcohol consumption among men, including homemade products. In the selected towns the houses/apartments were randomly selected by random walk method, and interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews in a selected household.

We use three measures of health related behaviour as our outcome variables. The first measure on drinking is operationalised by the consumption of alcoholic beverages at least 2-4 times a month. Binge drinking is operationalised by drinking up to half a litre of vodka or two bottles of wine or 5 bottles of beer in one evening at least 2-4 times a month or more often. For smoking we are interested in those individuals who report being regular smokers as opposed to individuals who never smoked or used to smoke but quit.

In order to generate the main independent variables of this study, intergenerational mobility in education status, we use the PrivMort information on the highest level of education respondents and their parents achieved. To derive the measure of relative educational mobility, we generate relative education attainment separately for fathers and mothers by creating relative education quartiles with the following two-step procedure. First, based on the distribution of cohort members’ attained education in each of the following cohorts – born before 1905, in 1906-15, 1916-25, 1926-35, 1926-35, 1936-45, 1936-45 and 1946-54 – we create ten variables of quartile education distribution. Second, we combine these ten variables, depending on fathers’ and mothers’ year of birth. Once we generate a single quartile of relative education for both parents, we employ the ‘dominance’ method (Erikson, 2006) which implies assigning the highest educational attainment between father and mother as the indicator of parental education.

For respondents educational attainment we use the same procedure as describes for their parents but in this case relative quartiles are separately calculated for those aged 42-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80 and more than 80. Respondents are classified as upwardly mobile if they find themselves in the higher quartile of education attainment than their parents.

Results

Controlling for a wide array of individual level explanations, we find that both parental education and intergenerational educational mobility have statistically significant associations with negative health behaviour. Respondents’ with parents in the bottom or next to bottom education quartiles are more likely to engage in frequent drinking, binge drinking and smoking in Belarus and Hungary. As regards downward mobility, expectedly we seen positive albeit weak association with the frequency of drinking in Belarus (with odds ratio of 1.18, p<0.1) and in Russia (with odds ratio of 1.13, p<0.1). However, the magnitude of the effect of downward mobility on smoking is strongly significant in all countries but especially in Belarus and Russia. In the former downward mobile individuals have odds ratio of 1.49 (CI95: 1.22-1.82) to be current smokers, while in the latter downward mobile respondents have odds ratio of 1.36 (CI95: 1.16-1.59).

The effect of upward mobility is more salient for both drinking frequency and binge drinking than it was the case for downward mobility. In Belarus upwardly mobile individuals have odds ratios of 0.72 (CI95: 0.59-0.89) and 0.90 (CI95: 0.81-0.99) to drink regularly and to engage in binge drinking. In Hungary significant effect of upward mobility on drinking is observed only for binge drinking with odds ratio of 0.76 (CI95: 0.64-0.89). The most consistent and systemic association of upward mobility with negative health behaviour is observed for smoking. Upwardly mobile individuals have odds ratios of 0.76 (CI95: 0.62-0.93), 0.80 (CI95: 0.72-0.89) and 0.81 (CI95: 0.69-0.94) to be regular smokers, respectively in Belarus, Hungary and Russia.

References


The Stratification of Dietary Compliance in Italy: Cultural Capital or Social Class?

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Introduction and Background

Sociological accounts of food consumption and its social stratification are certainly not new. As far back as 1913, Halbwachs (2014) dedicated a chapter of his analysis on the consumption patterns of the classe ouvrière to describing the cost and composition of the diet. More recently however, backing on Bourdieu’s pages in the Distinction (1984), a bulk of studies examined diet stratification and its determinants. In a very recent literature review, Sato et al. (2016) indentify 38 articles that stemming from Bourdieu’s legacy analyzed food and its relation with social class. However, only 7 of those examined eating patterns and its determinants from a quantitative point of view, and few of them tried to disentangle the net effects of cultural and economic resources on eating styles (e.g. Oygard, 2000).

Interestingly, this research stream on food stratification has proceeded almost in parallel with the body of literature provided by health and nutrition experts, the difference being that while the former focused on “taste” preferences by making use of Bourdieu’s distinction between cultural and economic capital, the latter tackled food consumption from a health perspective, by analyzing diets or diet components and their relation with individuals’ socioeconomic status. For instance, Demon and Drewnowski (2008) reviewed the literature based on epidemiological data in order to show how foods and micronutrients intake are related to the socioeconomic status, with higher SES individuals generally eating healthier than lower SES ones. Nonetheless, as it has already been noted (Braveman et al., 2005), these studies end up neglecting the multidimensionality behind the so-called socioeconomic status. Income, educational level and social class are often confused or conflated, and few try to decompose their net effects.

The search for causes regarding the persistence of a relation between health inequalities and socioeconomic status has recently drawn these two perspectives closer (Mackenbach, 2012). Cultural capital has in fact gained increasing attention over the last decade as a possible explanation of differences in health and health-related behaviours (e.g. Veenstra and Patterson, 2012; Pinxten and Lievens, 2014). As far as food is concerned, it has been argued that people with higher levels of cultural resources tend to be more dietary compliant, by choosing more wisely what to eat or drink and what avoid (Abel, 2009). However it is still not clear which dimensions of the socioeconomic background precisely influence dietary compliance. For instance, some authors suggest that also economic resources play a role, since sugars and fats can guarantee the necessary energetic intake for less money (Drewnoski et al., 2004; Drewnowski and Darmon, 2008). Furthermore, despite health behaviours strongly depend on individuals’ marital status, little is known on how familial characteristics might affect dietary compliance. This is particularly relevant, since marriage has a protective health effect which usually favours men (e.g. August and Sorkin, 2010; Johnson et al., 2000).

Research Question

The present paper aims to contribute to the debate by examining dietary patterns among the Italian adult population. In particular, I set out to accomplish three main goals. First, I try to understand whether dietary compliance in eating and drinking patterns is mainly driven by cultural capital in its threefold form (institutionalized, embodied and objectified) or rather by economic resources (proxied by social class (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2013)). Secondly, I evaluate whether the degree of dietary compliance is higher among couples than among single household. Finally, I examine whether men take advantage of the couple more than women, and how this change when considering partner’s characteristic.

Analytical Strategy

- Data

I use data from the Multipurpose survey on daily life and cultural consumption by ISTAT (2012) and I restrict the investigation to working adults aged 25-60. The final sample can count 15,723 cases with non-missing values for all variables.

- Dependent Variables

I take into account food consumption (including soft drink) and alcoholic beverages separately so to create two different dependent variables. As for the former I consider weekly consumption of salty snacks, soft-drinks, sweet, cured meat, fish, leaf vegetables, fruit vegetables, fruit and salt usage and I create an index of dietary compliance (PI) based on the Mediterranean food pyramid (Balzo et al., 2012). The index is constructed giving 0-1 or 2 points depending on the pertinence to the “right” dietary conduct (tab. 1). For the latter I instead consider the intake of wine, beer, aperitifs, tonic liquors and hard liquor and recode them (tab. 2) so to create an index...
of alcoholic consumption: the higher the index score, the higher the intake. I apply OLS Regression for both indexes dividing the sample between males and females.

- Independent Variables

Independent variables include age, sex, family type (single, cohabiting, married and others), number of children and place of origin. Socioeconomic variables include social class and three forms of cultural capital. For social class, I rely on the EGP scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993) and, more precisely, on its adaptation for Italy as proposed by Cobalti and Schizzerotto (1993). As far as cultural capital is concerned I distinguish between three forms of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). For the institutionalized state I distinguish between three levels of educational attainment: tertiary, upper secondary, lower secondary or less. For the embodied state here I use two variables: cultural participation and number of books read over the last 12 months, which can be considered as respectively its social and individual component. Finally I use the number of books in the house for the objectified state. I also control for place where lunch is consumed.

Results

Preliminary results show that dietary compliance (tab. 3), as far as food consumption is concerned, is not related to social class but rather by cultural capital in its threefold form. For both men and women, the degree of dietary compliance increases with higher educational levels, books read and cultural participation. The numbers of books in the household have a significant positive effect only for women. As expected, married couples, compared to single and cohabiting households, tend to eat better. Also, this effect is stronger for men than for women (.26 vs .12). These findings suggest that in Italy the quality of the diet does not depend on economic resources, but rather by the cultural resources of individuals.

With regard to alcohol consumption (tab. 4), results are instead scattered. The highest class position (bourgeoisie) compared to all others drink more alcoholics. As far as educational level is concerned, alcohol consumption seems to decrease for better educated men and increase for better educated women. However these effects are not significant. Interestingly, introducing the squared terms for cultural participation and the number of books in the household suggest that alcohol consumption has an inverted U relationship with cultural resources. This might imply that people with higher levels of cultural resources are less likely to be non-drinkers and heavy drinkers at the same time. Finally, also in this case married people drink less compared to single and cohabiting couple, and men seem to take advantage more than women. Additional analysis will permit to understand how partners influence each other in eating and drinking habits.
In the past few decades a majority of researchers in social stratification have been focused on status attainment process and the constraints of social structure on social mobility, such as a structural perspective over-emphasizes the influence of social structure on individual outcomes and neglects the possibilities that individuals can respond positively to social structure (Breiger 1982; Lieberson 1985). In the meantime, researchers in social stratification tend to neglect the heterogeneities in individual responses to social structure. Because of differences in resource, ability, and life adversity, different individuals could have different responses to social structure (Yeh 1982; 1998; Tsay 2008).

Since the 1950s Taiwan has gone through a series of social change, transformed from a developing nation into a newly-developed one, and per capita income has increased substantially in the past five decades. However, economic development has been the national top priority goal in Taiwan, economic inequalities and its consequences on health and well-being have not been the major policy concerns. From the perspective of Cumulative Advantage Theory, economic inequalities during the early decades in Taiwan and individual’s childhood adversity and economic deprivation are very likely to have serious negative impacts on adult health and well-being. Moreover, it would be intriguing to examine how agency’s positive outlook and optimism alleviate the negative impacts of social structure (external environment) on well-being in Taiwan from a life-course perspective.

This study uses the Cumulative Advantage Theory to analyze well-being inequalities in Taiwan. The unique strength of this theory is that it emphasizes the dynamic process of life course inequalities (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Willson et al. 2007; O’Rand 1996). This theory takes into account the initial advantage (disadvantage) of individual’s structural location as well as the divergent trajectory across individuals over time to examine social outcomes. Past research that used the Cumulative Advantage Theory has been concentrated on career mobility, educational attainment and wealth accumulation to explain inequality-generating process on these social outcomes (Willson et al. 2007; Ferraro and Shippee 2009; Ferraro et al. 2009); much less research has used the Cumulative Advantage Theory to investigate well-being inequalities.

This study asks three research questions: First, drawing from Cumulative Advantage Theory, this study examines to what extent early adversity, socioeconomic (SES) traits and health influence individual well-being on a long-term basis? Taken health as one of the domains of well-being, does health also has cumulative advantage (or disadvantage) effects on well-being as early adversity or SES traits? Second, this study investigates the mechanism of how individual agency’s positive outlook interacts with structural constraints (such as early adversity), and consequently influences individual well-being? Third, this study addresses the effect of selection bias, caused by the SES-health gradient, when analyzing the cumulative advantage (disadvantage) effects on individual well-being.

This study analyzes the panel data from the Survey of the Elderly in Taiwan (SET), this survey started in 1989, continued follow-up survey was conducted in 1993, 1996, 1999, 2003 and 2007; this study analyzes six waves of publicly available data from 1989 to 2007. This survey includes comprehensive information on elderly respondent’s demographic characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, health status, childhood adversity and well-being, and is well suited for the analysis of this study. The dependent variable in this study is individual well-being. This study analyzes six waves of SET, and each wave of data includes three measures of individual well-being, such as respondent’s life evaluation at three time points in their life, the past, the present, and the future. This data advantage allows us to examine individual’s life course trajectory of well-being in more details by investigating respondent’s lived well-being at the present, retrospective well-being toward the past, and prospective well-being toward the future.

The first set of explanatory variables in this study is childhood adversity. Schafer et al. (2011) included the following variables (or events) of childhood adversity, which are: (1) receipt status of welfare; (2) father (or mother) has less than a high school education; (3) report of being “worse off” than average family; (4) lack of male presence in the household, parental divorce, or death of a parent; (5) physical abuse from father, mother, sibling or other person; (6) emotion abuse from any of the above parties; and (7) report of “fair” or “poor” physical health and mental health at the age of 16. In Schafer et al. (2011)’s analysis, childhood adversity is measured by the count of events experienced in childhood. In this study, childhood adversity is measured by 5 variables (events), three of them are the same as in Schafer et al. (2011), namely: (1) father (or mother) has less than a high school education; (2) death of a parent; (3) report of “fair” or “poor” physical health and mental health at the age of 16. During the past five decades Taiwan has witnessed large scale of migration from rural to urban areas or from Mainland China to Taiwan; therefore we constructed two variables to reflect childhood adversity generated from this unique social change, namely: (4) for respondents who had migration experience, at what age did they migrate to Taiwan? And (5) resident areas of respondents at the age of 12.

The second set of explanatory variables is health status. This study includes four measures of health status: (1) childhood health status prior to age 16; (2) youth health status after age 16; (3) subjective health status evaluation; and (4) objective health status that reflects respondent’s disease history. Other control variables in this study include respondent’s age, sex, marital status, education, and household income. The first stage of the analysis uses growth curve models, which is a unique form of multi-level models, to examine how an individual’s experience of childhood adversity and poor health (intercepts) and their life course progression speed (slopes) jointly determine inequalities in well-being across individuals. The second stage of the analysis uses probit models and/or propensity score models to adjust for sample attrition bias due to SES-health gradient.
Over the past 100 years, most European countries have experienced a considerable influx of immigrants from a wide range of countries. As a result, persons with a migration background have become an increasingly important part of society, both culturally and economically. Research on the social integration of young migrants is already fairly widespread, particularly on such topics as educational attainment and labour market placement. Little is known, on the other hand, about older migrants. Based upon the data from the 5th wave of SHARE, which covers most European countries, we know that about 21 percent of the respondents aged 50 and older either migrated themselves or had at least one parent who migrated. Given the growing representation of people with a migration background within the ageing populations of Europe, studying this particular segment of the population is an increasingly important goal.

We compare the extent of deprivation among first- and second-generation migrants in relation to the respective native 50+ populations in 14 European countries and Israel (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Italy, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Israel). For this purpose, we employ indices for material and social deprivation (Bertoni et al. 2015, Myck et al. 2015). The material deprivation index measures the extent of material hardships of households with respect to the affordability of basic needs (e.g., foods for a healthy diet, payment of heating costs, replacement of clothes, or purchase of glasses, etc.) and financial difficulties (e.g., in the payment of rent and mortgages or loans, or having to borrow money to cover unexpected expenses). The social deprivation index measures the extent to which individuals are limited in socio-culturally “normal” interaction (e.g., live in an area with providing a nearby pharmacy, a nearby general practitioner or health centre, or a nearby bank or cash point; and items like number of rooms per person, social participation, organizational activities, social trust, and loneliness). Although there is substantial heterogeneity among migrants within each country and across countries, we nevertheless expect to find common patterns, i.e., long-lasting effects of the migration experience. Toward this end, we examine migrants’ generational status in relation to deprivation controlling for socioeconomic status (i.e., gender, age, household size, marital status, number of children, level of education and indicators for health status).

Figure 1 provides an overview of the proportion of respondents who live in households that are classified as socially or materially deprived according to our definition. Setting aside the overall country differences in the level of deprivation on both dimensions the pattern with respect to generational status is surprisingly stable. First-generation migrants, i.e., those with own migration experience, are significantly more often classified as deprived than native respondents. This is true on both the social and the material dimension, although the pattern is more pronounced for the latter. Second generation migrants, i.e., not themselves but one or both their parents migrated, score between the natives and the first generation on the material dimension in some countries while, in other countries, e.g., Spain or Luxembourg, they are hardly distinguishable from the natives. This pattern only applies to the material dimension. Regarding social deprivation, second-generation migrants are classified significantly less often as socially deprived in some countries, e.g., Sweden or Spain, in some countries they score even higher than the first generation, e.g. Belgium or France; and there are also several countries in which they seem very similar to the native respondents, e.g., Switzerland or Austria. On the social dimension, especially Israel stands out. This reflects the low proportion of natives, the concentration of the Arab minority among the natives, and the overall high deprivation scores for Israel.

Several processes may cause the group and country differences just described and also generate the generational pattern in which the first generation usually stands out and the second generation scores much more like the natives. The most prominent explanation for the pattern is that immigrants integrate into the receiving society over time and we observe this in the countries when comparing the first and second generations (e.g., Rumbaut 1997). The same pattern can be caused, however, by heterogeneity in the influx of migrants over time. On average the first-generation has spent less time in the receiving country than the second generation. Differences in average education or other resources may not only explain the generational pattern observed but also the differences between countries. For example, there is considerable heterogeneity with respect to the country of origin of migrants among the countries included: While in Sweden the majority of first- and second-generation migrants originate from Finland, in France most first-generation immigrants are from Algeria and Morocco and most second-generation immigrants are from Italy and Spain. Moreover, country differences, and to a lesser extent the generational pattern, might be caused by variation in citizenship and naturalisation policies (e.g., Borjas 1999, Euwals et al. 2010). There is variation with respect to countries limiting the economic opportunities for non-nationals. Moreover, countries also differ with respect to who is eligible for naturalisation. In general, migrants from the second generation more often obtained their current country of residence’s citizenship by birth or via naturalisation, which is probably the main reason why they score similarly to natives.

The first results indicate a robust generational pattern: first-generation migrants are more frequently amongst the socially or materially deprived, whereas the second generation’s disadvantages are smaller, overall. After controlling for socioeconomic confounders, as well as for citizenship status and health indicators, the observed generational pattern attenuates slightly. The proportion of first-generation migrants classified as deprived on both dimensions is, however, still significantly higher than among the other groups. There is also a second stable pattern that emerges from the preliminary analysis with regard to the two dimensions: the disadvantage is more pronounced on the material dimension. These patterns are in line with the view that migrants integrate into the host country’s society over time and from one generation to the next. In most countries investigated this assimilation process takes longer with regard to material as compared to social deprivation.

Rural Infrastructure and Farming Households’ Wellbeing in Ekiti State, Nigeria.
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Rural Infrastructure and Farming Households’ Wellbeing in Ekiti State, Nigeria; the Functioning Approach.
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Abstract
Poverty is a rural phenomenon in Nigeria and its reduction largely depends on improvement of rural infrastructure. Physical infrastructure facilitates higher agricultural productivity, distribution of farm produce as well as the functioning (the achieved wellbeing) of the rural people. Owing to the dearth of literature on physical infrastructure and wellbeing in Nigeria, the study therefore assessed the effect of rural infrastructure on the functioning of rural households in Ekiti State, Nigeria.

A multi-stage probabilistic sampling was done in which all the three senatorial districts of the state were represented. A total of 225 households were randomly selected out of which only 203 respondents gave consistent responses. Data were collected through a semi-structured questionnaire and information on infrastructures in the study area were authenticated by a field survey. Households were categorized based on their level of achieved functionings into very low, low, high and very high functioning groups. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics, fuzzy set, ordered probit and two-stage least square.

Age and household size of the farmers were 52.4 ±12.7 years and 5± 2 respectively. Functioning index for the state as estimated using the fuzzy set theory is 0.351. However, based on socioeconomic characteristics, the female respondents have higher functioning index of 0.362, also, respondents within the age group of 25-39years have the highest functioning index of 0.371 while those with other types of primary occupation apart from farming have the higher index of 0.384. Households with electricity, potable water source, good educational and health facilities, good roads, drainage systems and those that practice irrigation farming had higher functioning indices than their counterparts. The ordered probit regression showed that there is an inverse relationship between achieved wellbeing and having farming as primary occupation, implying that achieved functioning increases with not being primarily a farmer. Also, gender and owning a farm have reverse relationship with achieved functioning. This means that the females have higher functioning and those that do not own a farm (the elites/ very literate ones) have higher functionings in the study area. However, age, years of schooling were positively related to achieved wellbeing. The marginal effect of rural infrastructure on their functionings showed that an improvement in infrastructure had negative relationships with the functioning dimension of wellbeing of the very low and low wellbeing categories. Conversely, it revealed that improved infrastructure will increase achieved functionings by 6.6% and 11.9% for those in the high and very high groups respectively. The two stage least square regression followed by the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity showed that there is a reverse causality between rural infrastructure and achieved functioning of the rural people in Ekiti state, Nigeria.

Keywords: Achieved wellbeing, physical infrastructure, ordered probit, reverse causality and two-stage least square.

Dual Deprivation of Well-being by One’s Origin: The Effect of Three Kinds of Relative Deprivations on Subjective Well-being
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1. Theoretical framework and research question
Relative deprivation hypothesis has been one of the key perspectives in explaining the perceived inequality in sociology (Merton 1949; Kosaka 1986). The recent development of empirical happiness studies has also paid great attention to the effect of this mechanism (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Graham 2009, 2011), partly motivated by Easterlin’s “income-happiness paradox” (Easterlin 1974; Easterlin et al. 2010). However, the empirical evidences regarding which of actual socio-economic status such as income or perceived relative deprivation better explains subjective happiness have been inconsistent so far.

This inconsistency would partly stem from the ambiguity of the concept of relative deprivation. Theory of relative deprivation assumes one’s internal/subjective comparison between his/her actual status and something else. The latter could theoretically include various social/personal situations such as (1) subjectively perceived current socio-economic status of the someone else belonging to his/her “reference group,” (2) aspired or expected socio-economic status of him/herself in the future, and (3) his/her past status, for example in his/her childhood, in other words his/her origin in the theory of social mobility.

Thus this study empirically compares the relative effects of these three measures of relative deprivation on subjective well-being, including the comparison with one’s actual socio-economic status.

2. Data and analytical strategies
The data used were collected by a web survey conducted by the author’s research group in Japan, February 2015. The respondents were randomly selected from the pre-registered monitors of the survey agency such that their distribution in gender, age, city size, and region are proportional to the latest census data. The respondents were aged 20-69 and the effective sample size was 10,419.

To compare the effects of the three relative deprivation measures and of the actual socio-economic status on his/her subjective well-being, OLS regressions are employed in this study. The dependent variable is subjective well-being which is measured by so called Cantril’s ladder of life question (Cantril 1976). This question asks the respondent’s subjective evaluation of his/her current situation in his/her whole life which is compared to a ladder with eleven steps. It has been used for example in Gallup’s World Poll. The previous research has regarded it as measuring more reflective evaluation of one’s subjective well-being than a simple question for asking subjective happiness (“How happy are you now?”) which measures emotional feeling at the moment (Daeton 2008; Graham 2011).
The independent variables consist of respondent’s actual socio-economic status measured by his/her household income and the above-mentioned three possible measures of relative comparison. (1) The comparison between respondent’s actual status and perceived status of someone else in his/her reference group is defined by the difference between his/her actual household income and expected household income at the moment of the persons who graduated the same school as the respondent. (2) The comparison with aspired or expected socio-economic status is measured by his/her aspired household income. (3) The comparison between respondent’s current status and his/her past status in childhood is measured by the question, “How did your own life circumstances change compared with your situation when you were 15 years old,” which is measured by eleven-point scales.

The regressions were conducted in male and female samples separately, because the literature on subjective happiness found gender difference in the causal mechanisms (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Graham 2009, 2011). Age, education, marital and employment status were controlled because the previous studies also discovered these factors affect one’s subjective happiness. To compare the relative strength of causal effects of the four independent variables, all quantitative variables were standardized in the regressions. All squared interaction terms between the four independent variables were examined, and finally there remained one significant interaction between household income (or relative deprivation with one’s reference group) and relative deprivation with one’s own childhood.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables.

3. Main findings and conclusion

Tables 2 and 3 shows the results of OLS regressions for male and female respectively. The important findings for our research question are the following three points.

Firstly, among three concepts of relative deprivation, the comparison with others in one’s reference group and with one’s own childhood have significantly positive effects on one’s current subjective well-being, whereas the comparison with one’s aspiration has no significant effect in both sexes. This suggests the theoretical necessity for us to articulate the concept of relative deprivation into meaningful subcategories.

Secondly, among two significant deprivations, the comparison with one’s own childhood has a huge positive effect on one’s current subjective well-being. The standardized coefficients of it (.446 for men and .422 for women) are even larger than those of marriage (.437 for men and .314 for women) which has been known as one of the most influential variables for subjective well-being (e.g. Frey 2008). Those who were rich in their childhood but became poor in their later life tend to feel themselves unhappy. This findings remind us the great influence of one’s origin to his/her whole life course not only in objective socio-economic status which has been repeatedly argued in the literature on intergenerational mobility but also in subjective evaluation for his/her life.

Lastly, the significant negative interaction effects between actual income (or deprivation with reference group) and deprivation with one’s own childhood are observed. This means that the effects of actual income or deprivation with their reference group on happiness are stronger for those who were poor in their childhood than those who were rich in their childhood. In fact, the effect plots suggest us that for those who were rich in their childhood, income and deprivation with reference group have no significant effects on their current subjective well-being.

We could conclude from these findings that those who were poor in their childhood are doubly deprived in their current subjective well-being: the poverty in their childhood itself and its after-effect for their excessive sensibility to their current socio-economic status in evaluating their current situation. This conclusion suggests the huge effects of one’s origin for his/her whole life course.
This paper highlights the relationship between educational expansion, assortative mating and income inequality. This study contributes to two streams of literature. The first one monitors how patterns of partner choice have changed over time (Blossfeld, 2009) and the second one investigates the impact of demographic changes on inequality (Nolan, Salverda & Smeeding, 2011). The main research questions of that this paper tries to answer are: how has educational expansion translated in assortative mating? How has assortative mating affected income inequality over time?

Case study

This paper is based on Switzerland. Switzerland appears to be an interesting case study in this context because previous comparative research suggests that the correlation between spouses' earnings is particularly low in this country (Cancian & Schoeni, 1998; Kuhn & Ravazzini, 2015). In addition to this, the latest scientific information about homogamy in Switzerland is quite outdated and information stop in 1994 (Diekmann & Schmidheiny, 2001).

Theoretical framework

Marriage someone alike is a worldwide phenomenon that social scientists call homogamy or assortative mating. Homogamy is related to many societal factors among which educational expansion plays an important role. A non-gender neutral expansion of tertiary education can potentially reduce the probability of couple formation augmenting the number of singles and at the same time facilitating the encounter of highly educated partners (Blossfeld & Buchholz 2009, Breen and Salazar 2011). This is because education can change the earning potential and the social status of individuals and of their possible partners (Sweeney & Cancian, 2004). The attractiveness and the probabilities to meet a potential partner are thus potentially influenced by education. As a result of these changes, equality and social mobility for the current and for the future generation can substantially decrease.

On the one hand, these statements are supported by theories that forecast how skill-based technological changes can give more importance to education in the future (Smits, Ultee & Lammers, 1998). Some studies indeed claim that a change in the number of people in different educational levels come together with a change in mating patterns (Blossfeld, 2009, Esping-Andersen, 2007, Schwartz & Mare, 2005). On the other hand, increased mobility might have offset this effect and other theories question the relative importance of education during educational expansions. The conflict theory of Collins (1971), for instance, looks at education as a relative positional good. As a result of educational expansion, tertiary education might have become a weaker signal for status and therefore be less relevant for the choice of a suitable partner. In this scenario, assortative mating should not be tightly linked with educational expansion. Whether educational expansion affects assortative mating or not remains therefore an empirical question.

At the societal level, homogamy is used as an indicator of stratification and it can be seen as a form of group closure and of social immobility (Kalmijn 1998). Assortative mating is often considered a driver of economic inequality (Lam, 1997) because societies in which similar earners intermarry are more unequal than those in which high earners marry low earners (Schwartz, 2010). The intensity of the effects that educational expansion and assortative mating have on income inequality depend, however, on how mating patterns have changed for the whole society and for some educational groups in particular and on how education translates into actual earnings (Schwartz 2013).

Data and analytical strategy
The empirical analysis has three parts and it mostly relies on the Swiss Household Panel from 1999 to 2014. Taking into account also single households, the first part provides descriptive evidence on the intensity and on the evolution of educational homogamy. We additionally use the Swiss Labour Force Survey to extend the period of observation to the 1990s. As education may reflect less and less future earnings (Breen & Salazar, 2011), the second part monitors and compares the correlation in partner’s education, earnings potential and observed earnings. Moreover, using panel analyses we can show effects of selection and adaptation by testing how the relationship between partners’ earnings evolves over their cohabitation. The third part focuses on possible consequences of assortative mating on earnings inequality. We first disentangle the effects of educational expansion from changing returns to education with a semi-parametric decomposition to test the impact of this socio-demographic change on inequality. We rely on the commonly used DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) (DFL) decomposition quantifying the contribution of the returns to education, educational composition and educational assortative mating on household income inequality. This approach uses a multivariate reweighting function that is able to change one element at a time and to keep the others constant. The effect of changes in labour supply due to assortative mating on inequality are further tested creating counterfactuals on earnings potentials. In order to do so, we compare Gini coefficients of couple’s earnings under different counterfactual scenarios. Our counterfactual scenarios imagine situations where assortative mating is maximal (e.g. all high earners cohabit with other high earners), minimal (e.g. all high earners live with low earners) or random. Random assortative mating is performed both on actual earnings and on earnings potentials.

Main/First findings

First results show that there is considerable educational homogamy in Switzerland. Homogenous couples are the majority of couples and they are followed by women “marrying up”. Although assortative mating has remained stable over time (from 1992-2014), there have been changes for some population groups. There is a higher probability for low educated men to remain single and increasing homogamy among low-educated individuals. In addition to this, the probability to marry up has considerably decreased over time. Considering that in gender-traditional societies women have more incentives to “marry-up” choosing a partner with a higher level of education and higher potential earnings to secure themselves a good social status (Brines 1994), this means that women are now better able to decide for their own social status independently from their partners. Correlation coefficients are higher for educational homogamy (around 0.4), slightly lower for earnings potentials and around zero for observed earnings. This means that education does not perfectly translates into actual earnings. Results of the longitudinal analysis on partners’ correlations are still to be presented. Finally, the observed inequality in earnings (Gini) is very close to the counterfactual Gini assuming random mating. This is however not only due to weak assortative mating, but also to labour supply decisions. Results of the DFL decomposition are still to be presented.

Bibliography

Economic and family life is becoming less stable. Not only do more people work for more hours, less pay, fewer benefits, and less long-term security, but employment is more precarious than it once was (Kalleberg, 2011). Instability also characterizes family life as connections among partners and children are formed and broken with increasing rapidity (Cherlin, 2010). Further, many sources of family and economic stability are declining in importance, like religion (Hout and Fischer, 2014) and labor unions (Visser, 2006). One outcome of decreasing stability is rising income volatility. Income volatility has been increasing steadily since the 1970s in many industrialized countries (Nichols and Rehm, 2014), but especially in the United States (Dykan et al., 2012).

This paper examines changes in the distribution of income volatility in the United States over time. The fact that incomes are not as stable as they once were is not only understood to be true, but a life defined by income precarity is also understood to be a problem for the well-being of individuals and families (Standing, 2011). Despite this fact, research on income volatility has been restricted to debates about measurement, trend, and its relationship to income inequality at the aggregate level (Shin and Solon, 2011; Moffit and Gottschalk, 2012). Without negating the value of the traditional research agenda, we must shift our focus to the distribution and consequences of income volatility for the individuals and families who are experiencing it, as is done here. In doing so, our current understanding of income volatility is revised.

Methodologically, one must distinguish income volatility from income trend. Most scholars define income volatility as the standard deviation of income from the average in a study period (for review, see Shin and Solon, 2011), but this definition classifies all changes in income as volatility. Instead, income volatility is better characterized by the standard deviation from a trend line. Using a hierarchical linear model, the results suggest that a large proportion of volatility is explained by movements along an individual income mobility trajectory and is therefore not volatile. The definition of volatility used here reveals the distribution of volatility by income mobility, not just income level, a distinction which was previously hidden using the traditional definition.

While there is nearly uniform agreement that income volatility is rising (see Dahl et al., 2011 for an exception), the distribution of volatility is not equal. Volatility is concentrated among low income groups (defined variously as bottom decile, quintile, or quartile) (Gottschalk and Moffit, 2009), very high income groups (i.e., top 1%) (Hardy and Ziliak, 2014), and the self-employed (Jensen and Shore, 2015). At the same time, it also appears that the ratio between groups have changed little over time (Jensen and Shore, 2015). For example, while the poor experience higher levels of volatility than high income groups and both groups have seen rising levels of volatility, the difference between these two groups is constant. Despite the unequal distribution of volatility between groups, volatility is no more unequal in the 2000s than in the 1970s.

However, our understanding of both the level and distribution of income volatility is altered if income volatility is defined from an individual’s own mobility trend line as opposed to the average, as it traditionally is. The evidence presented here suggests that the level of income volatility has changed little since the 1980s. Instead, the distribution of volatility is growing more unequal, especially within groups as distinct from between groups. Between group inequality refers to the fact that some groups, like the poor, have higher average levels of volatility. Within group inequality refers to the fact that the distribution of volatility among those who are poor is rising. Rising inequality is decomposed into within and between groups using a variance function regression (Western and Bloome, 2009). Distinguishing between the two informs our understanding of the source of inequality.

Results indicate that levels of volatility are stagnant over time in the population, but the variation in the distribution within groups is rising. In particular, the poor and those with declining levels of income not only experience higher levels of average volatility, but also experience a distribution of volatility that is growing wider. In other words, it is not so much that the poor have higher levels of volatility as a group, it is that some individuals who are poor have higher levels of volatility. Therefore, income volatility is less a condition of being poor or having declining income than it is a condition of certain individuals who are poor or whose incomes are declining.

A life defined by income precarity is understood to be a problem for the well-being of individuals and families. This paper shifts the debate on income volatility from exploring rising levels of income volatility in the population to understanding the individuals who experience high levels of volatility. On the one hand, changes in employment, family life, and health are important, if obvious, explanatory factors. On the other hand, holding these factors constant, much remains unexplained. While more people are living lives that are marked by increasing levels of income volatility than they once did and with it a greater degree of economic insecurity, the evidence on who experiences income volatility is scant. Focusing on the distribution of income volatility clarifies our understanding of its importance: high levels of volatility are a symptom of low levels of well-being.
In all countries there is intergenerational correlation in income, educational level, employment and welfare use (Blanden, 2013). Benefit receipt in one generation is believed to promote benefit receipt in the next generation. There are at least four possible causal mechanisms that explain intergenerational correlation in benefit receipt. Firstly, the theory on social influence on welfare use suggests that benefit receipt among parents reduces the strength of the norm to provide for oneself through gainful employment and of the stigma attached to benefit receipt (Bertrand, Luttmer, & Mullainathan, 2000; Dahl, Kostøl, & Mogstad, 2014). Children growing up with parents who are on welfare might learn to think of social benefits as the default means of support (Page, 2004). Secondly, having benefit recipients among one’s parents reduces the application costs as they can provide first-hand information on how the system works (Dahl et al., 2014; Vartanian, 1999). Thirdly, intergenerational correlation in benefit receipt can be explained via social resources or network social capital. Welfare parents, and the social network ties that children access via their parents, provide less information about job opportunities and job application strategies (Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981). Greater access to valuable social resources enhances individual labour market success and thereby reduces the probability of benefit receipt. Fourthly, children will resemble their parents in skill level and earning capacity due to genetic transmission, learning within the family (Blanden, 2013) and diverging parental investments in education and human capital (Vartanian, 1999). As a consequence they will also have a similar likelihood to be benefit recipients.

Genetic transmission alone ensures some correlation in benefit receipt between parents and children. However, relatively high levels of intergenerational correlation are an indicator that also other mechanisms are at work and parental characteristics affect children’s labour market opportunities and outcomes over and above children’s (inherited) personal ability. Insight in the level and the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission is relevant for policymakers for various reasons. Social policy is often designed and reformed under the assumption that (long term) benefit receipt should be prevented because it may evoke ‘family welfare cultures’ in which values and behaviours that lead to unemployment are transmitted from parents to children. These policies assume that such a transfer of values and behaviours takes place, but empirical research is inconclusive about this (Shildrick, MacDonald, Furlong, Roden, & Crow, 2012). Secondly, it is not economically efficient if children from disadvantaged households, with less access to social resources, cannot live up to their full potential (Blanden, 2013), and if children are disadvantaged by the circumstances of their parents, this violates the policy goal of equality of opportunity.

In this paper we use longitudinal register data on the entire population of the Netherlands on the timing and duration of benefit receipt. We distinguish three types of benefit programs; unemployment insurance, disability insurance and social assistance. We create individual benefit histories based on the number of months that parents received a specific benefit in the (separate) years 1999 up to 2012 and link parents to children. If parents are divorced or widowed, we can also link them to new (co-residential) partners, thus for every child we have information on up to four (step)parents. We estimate binary logistic regression models explaining whether (adult) children receive a specific benefit in 2013 from parental benefit histories. For all three benefit types we estimate an entry model on all individuals who did not receive that benefit in the previous year and a continuation model on individuals who were already benefit recipients in 2012.

All four causal mechanisms will lead to correlations between parental benefit history and children’s entry and continuation in specific benefit programs. However, differences in the strength of the effects indicate which mechanisms are most important. If providing information on benefit schemes is an important mechanisms we expect to find stronger effects on children’s entry into a benefit program from recent parental experience with that same program than from parental experience with other benefit programs or benefit receipt longer ago. The longer parents are on social security the less access they provide to valuable labour market information. Labour market information in parental social networks is especially important for children who are currently on benefits since they will have limited access to labour market information through their own social network. Therefore, based on the social resources mechanism we expect stronger effects of parental duration of benefit receipt on benefit continuation than on entry. On the other hand, parental duration of benefit receipt reduces the strength of the norm to work and the stigma of benefit receipt. Based on this mechanism we expect stronger effects on entry than on continuation as social stigma costs of benefit receipt are highest upon entry and decrease over time due to cognitive dissonance reduction (Mood, 2004). Finally, if genetic transmission and early investment in children’s education are the main mechanism, we expect a larger effect of parents then of stepparents.

Our unique longitudinal dataset allows us to study the effects of timing and duration of parental experience with three different benefit programs on children’s entry and continuation of benefit receipt and thereby to provide insight in the relative importance of the various causal mechanisms.

References:
Long term effects of education on life satisfaction

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Background and Research questions

This paper aims to shed light on the relation between education and life satisfaction. Although growing empirical evidence has meanwhile shown that life satisfaction does not only depend on genetic factors but also on individual choices (among others: Easterlin 2003; Diener et al. 2006; Lucas 2007), the impact of one key factor of sociological research, namely the educational decision, on life satisfaction has barely been investigated. In recent years research began to scrutinize the relation between education and life satisfaction (Chen 2012; Cunado/Gracia 2012; Del Mar et al. 2011; Michalos 2008). However, our literature review reveals a lack of longitudinal results on short and long term effects of education on happiness. But it is obvious that the returns to education may change over the life course and differ between educational groups. Besides, following the theory of social production functions, we argue, that sociological education research would profit from a complementary look on the “final outcome”: well-being.

In this vein, we address the following research question: How does life satisfaction of different educational groups develop over the life course and which mechanisms explain happiness differentials of different educational groups? (“long term” effects)

Theoretical framework

Ormel et al. (1999) argue, that life satisfaction depends basically on physical and social well-being. According to social production function theory, actors draw on intermediate goods (e.g. education, income, family circumstances, health, housing) to maximize physical and social well-being given their set of resources and restrictions (Lindenberg 1996, Kroneberg/Kalter 2012: 80).

Long term effects of educational level on life satisfaction over the life course

Regarding the question how the individual educational level affects life satisfaction over the life course we test three competing hypotheses (Yang 2008): (i) The cumulative advantage/disadvantage hypothesis which states that happiness differentials increase with age. (ii) An opposing reasoning claims that negative life events act as an equalizer. Hence, happiness differentials decrease over the life course. (iii) Personality traits cause stable, unmediatable differentials.

Data and Methods

We use SOEP data from 1984 to 2012 (v29) (SOEP 2014). The GSOEP is described in detail in Wagner/Frick/Schupp (2007). In the GSOEP, overall life satisfaction is measured by answers to the following question: “How satisfied are you currently, all in all, with your life?” Respondents answer this question on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, whereby 0 denotes ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 10 means ‘completely satisfied’. We operationalize educational levels using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). To investigate how life satisfaction of different educational groups develop over the life course and which mechanisms explain these happiness differentials we estimate random effects growth curve models. We model the age effect using a flexible dummy variable approach.

Figure 1 shows a growing happiness gap between educational groups over the life course, which is in line with the pattern suggested by the cumulative (dis-)advantage mechanism.

Regarding the impact of education on domain satisfaction over the life course (figure 2) the findings for income and job satisfaction are again in line with the pattern suggested by the cumulative (dis-)advantage mechanism. In contrast the difference in health satisfaction remains fairly stable over the life course, which is consistent with the notion that stable individual traits (perhaps healthy genetics) affect both educational success and life satisfaction.

Figure 3a shows the results of a random effects growth curve model controlling for confounders only. Figure 3b-d show the results when critical life events related to the dimensions of family events, employment and income as well as health are additionally included in the analyses. The results suggest that educational differences in life satisfaction are mainly explained by differences in employment characteristics and health. Differences in family characteristics seem to play a minor role.

Conclusion
Our preliminary results show strong effects of education on well-being over the life course that increase with age. This pattern is consistent with the general mechanism of cumulative (dis-)advantage. The impact of education on well-being seems to be mostly mediated by employment and income (employment and income satisfaction) and health. While good employment and income seem to be causal mechanisms that are a result of education, the health pattern is rather consistent with a selection explanation.

The effect of fertility on parent’s happiness

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Recently, the effect of fertility on parents’ happiness has garnered much attention in scientific papers as well as in the media. We focus on the effects of first births on life satisfaction and make three distinct contributions to the literature:

1) Analysing data from the German Family Panel (pairfam), we estimate separate impact functions (distributed fixed-effects) for women and men and account for the age of the first child in 3-month intervals. This allows us to estimate the time-varying effect in more detail than does previous research which groups children’s age in broader categories.

2) We conducted extensive robustness checks and the results are exceptionally robust. This is graphically illustrated by the range of impact functions across many differently specified models.

3) We discuss numerous potential mediators and put them to empirical testing. Besides income, education and health, which already have received attention in previous studies, we also considered stress measures (e.g. average hours of sleep) and frequency of sexual intercourse. These variables could potentially explain why the effect of children on happiness varies with the child’s age. We also tested whether (states of) pregnancy can explain a positive anticipation effect, which is the case for women, whereas partner’s pregnancy does not moderate the anticipation effect for men.

Overall, we find a positive effect of a first child on happiness. The effect is stronger for women and lasts until the child is 6-9 months old. Men show positive anticipation effects 12 months, women only 6 months before childbirth. The moderating impact of costs (e.g. more stress, less sex, lower income) is weak. Women and men would, by trend, be happier if children did not reduce sleep, income and the satisfaction with sexual intercourse. These factors, however, cannot explain why happiness declines to a baseline-level after 6-9 months.

Working time structures and mental health in Germany

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In Germany, like in many other industrialized countries, mental diseases become more and more widespread. This does not only induce high economic costs for the welfare state (in particular the health system) and reduces economic competitiveness due to increasing work inabilities; it is also a major threat to individuals’ quality of life. So far, the reasons for the high prevalence of mental illnesses have not yet been understood satisfactorily. In this paper, I address the research question whether flexibility on the labour market, in particular flexibility in working times, increases the risk of mental health problems.

In a first step, a typology of working time structures is presented. As working time structures are part of the general social structure, this kind of research is particularly interesting for the discipline of sociology (Pearlin 1989). The general idea is that it is not only the duration of work (in particular long working hours) that might affect mental health. The focus will rather be on different working time structures and deviations from standards. Four dimensions of working time structures will be differentiated. These are: 1. Duration (hours worked per week) and 2. Timing (days of work, times of work). The standard for Germany is working 40 hours per week on five days (Monday to Friday) during the daytime. Atypical or flexible working times (long work hours, work on weekends, night work) are hypothesized to negatively affect mental health (hypothesis 1). 3. Density (time pressure) and 4. Autonomy (decide about time spending). It is hypothesized that highly compressed working times (density) and a lack of autonomy to decide of when and how to work (autonomy) should increase mental health problems (hypothesis 2).

But why should different working time structures affect mental health? Stress theories provide an answer to this question. Working time structures might be regarded as stressors, i.e. potential sources of stress. If stress becomes chronic, this might then lead to negative health outcomes, mental health problems amongst others. With regards to mechanisms one should further differentiate between direct and indirect effects of working time arrangements on mental health. Whereas long working hours or time pressure might be stressful per se, some types of working time arrangements, such as working on weekends might indirectly affect mental health due to low compatibilities between work life and private life. Empirically, a corresponding moderator hypothesis (hypothesis 3) will be tested.

The analyses are based on the BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012, which is a representative survey of around 20 000 German workers aged at least 15 years. The data cover a variety of variables with a strong focus on working conditions and health, but also including several standard variables for education and labour market analyses. The dependent variable mental health is operationalized via 6 items: sleeping disorders, fatigue, nervousness/irritability, depressiveness, emotional exhaustion and physical exhaustion. The reliability, i.e. internal consistency of these items is satisfactorily high (alpha = .82) and an additive index is constructed. The four dimensions of working time structures are represented by 13 single working time items, which are coded into dummy variables (e.g. working long hours, working at night, having to meet deadlines often, on-call duty etc.). As for the analytical strategy, first, simple correlations between these working time items and the mental health scale are calculated, which gives a first impression on the importance of these items. In order to get closer to the actual effects of working time structures on mental health all
working time variables as well as potential confounders such as characteristics of the work place are integrated in multivariate OLS models and robustness checks are conducted (propensity score matching).

Descriptive statistics show that non-standard working times are not negligible in Germany. For example, more than one fourth in Germany is usually working long hours (more than 45 hours per week), one third is regularly working on Saturdays and one fifth is working on Sundays and at night. Notably, high time pressure is one of the most widespread time characteristics reported by the German work force. Bivariate correlations show that all 13 working time items affect mental health significantly, supporting hypotheses 1 and 2, with time pressure showing the strongest correlation with mental illness. In the multivariate OLS models, the effects of Sunday work and on-call-duty are not significant anymore, which suggests that it is not these two characteristics per se which makes workers mentally ill, but other factors that are related to them. When including the variable on work-family-balance, this reduces the effects of long work hours and Saturday work on mental illness significantly. This partly confirms hypothesis 3, that some effects of working time on mental health are not only direct effects. Propensity score matching techniques (Kernel matching, nearest neighbor matching) mainly confirm these results.

Finally, limitations of the paper and ideas for future research (e.g. the actual analysis of time diary datasets) are presented and implications for labour market policies are discussed.

Literature:

Aims

Education expanded in Europe for nearly the whole of the twentieth century. However, access to education remained unequal depending in part on the education of the parents. It is a point of debate whether, taking parental education into account, the overall outcome became more equal. The gender difference in favour of boys at the beginning of last century by its end had nearly or wholly disappeared. The paper aims to track these three processes over time.

Data

The paper used the 7 rounds of the European Social Survey with 318433 respondents. These were tabulated into educational transition tables of parental education (the highest education of a parent) by obtained education of respondents over 27 years or age; using design weights this left 242069 respondents. 4 educational levels were considered for parents and respondents: less than lower secondary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary, including post secondary vocational training. Tables with fewer then 100 respondents were removed from the data set, leaving 403 tables covering 239494 respondents. The tables were organized by country (32), decade (7; born in 1920-29, 30-39 and so on, to born in 80-89) and gender.

Model

These tables were analysed by a cumulative logit model. Three parameters, e1, e2 and e3, allocate children with a given parental background to the first three titles, The remaining fraction of children belonging to that background, which has a known size, are allocated to a tertiary degree. The 4 parameters governing the position of parental education were made to sum to 0 (with obvious symbolism g1+g2+g3=g4) removing an indeterminacy of the model, since adding x to all e parameters and subtracting x from all g will not change the predicted logit. Differences in parental positions correspond to inequality in educational outcomes, The model assumed that educational backgrounds and separators do not interact. For the twelve cell table of the first three childrens’ educational levels and the four parental backgrounds the logit for the cumulative frequency(g=i,e=k), logit(i,k) = gj + ek. The six parameters leave six degrees of freedom for evaluating the model. Where necessary subscripts can be added for country, cohort or gender.

Generalized linear models can include an offset, a fixed value to be added to an observation. The analysis in this paper used the same offset for all frequencies in a table but found its value by trying out offsets till the fitted values reached a given level of education: the proposed EU criterion of 40% of the relevant age group obtaining tertiary education. The offset value is, within the model, a measure of the distance from that goal (or by how much it has been superated). Over time in each country these distances should diminish, measuring expansion, and converge to similar values for boys and girls under lessening gender discrimination. This is a validity test for the measure, but the speed of expansion and gender convergence can also be measured. All model parameters can be analysed by country, cohort and sex the structural elements which identify the tables.

Analysis

The application of the cumulative logit model to educational transition tables by country-decade (and gender) leads to a two-level structure in the set of parameters: 14 (or fewer due to missing country-decades) observations for each variable-parameter nested in 32 countries. A two level model will analyse these parameters further, especially over time.

Expansion

The total amount of education obtained in a cumulative logit model depends on three factors. Firstly the values of the education parameters. If two parameter move closer together then more of those who superate the first parameter will also pass the second; if further apart few who pass the first will pass the second. A second element determining the total amount of education is the set of parameters (positions) of parental education. The paper assumes that parents with different levels of education have different aspirations for their children. The rule seems to be: at least as much as papa and mamma, and by preference a bit more (but not too much if one believes the Breen Goldthorpe risk aversion hypothesis). Distances among educational backgrounds have been discussed in the literature as inequality of educational outcomes (IEO). The overall span of these parameters tends to diminish, but this trend is much clearer for social class background than for educational background. The third element determining outcomes has been discussed much less: the composition of the parental population in educational terms. If higher education of parents leads to more education of the children (see above) then part of the observed educational expansion in the last century may have been due to changes in population composition towards higher titles of the parents rather than changes in the parameters of the model.

Counterfactuals

Whether educational expansion is due to change in parental population composition rather than to change in the parameters of the models, or both, can be disentangled considering two counterfactuals. For a given early decade in a country the e and g parameters can be kept fixed while changing the background educational composition to that of a later decade. An increase of total education in such a situation can be ascribed to the change in educational background composition rather than to educational expansion through changes in the school system as mapped by the parameters of the model. The second counterfactual leaves the educational composition unchanged, but applies the model parameters of a later decade. Any expansion of education in this counterfactual would
be ascribed to changes of the school system. The construction of such counterfactuals, whether based on the cumulative logit model parameters or on empirical percentages is straightforward and shown in the paper.

Have Socio-Economic Differences in Outcomes in Childhood Cognitive Tests Changed?
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Have Socio-Economic Differences in Outcomes in Childhood Cognitive Tests Changed? Evidence from the Analysis of Three British Birth Cohorts

Background

Outcomes on cognitive ability tests in childhood are sociologically important because they have been found to be associated with later educational attainment, and with occupational positions in adulthood. A child’s outcomes on cognitive ability tests are also influenced by the socio-economic position of their parents. Outcomes on childhood cognitive ability tests have therefore been theorised as intermediary variables in the process of social stratification, and have been included in empirical analyses of both status attainment in adulthood and in inter-generational mobility analyses.

This paper forms part of a wider project investigating the relationship between parental socio-economic positions and outcomes on childhood cognitive tests. In this paper we focus specifically on verbal skills. The association between socio-economic position and language skills is well established. The empirical focus of the paper is comparing three distinctive cohorts of children who represent different generations growing up in Britain. The use of the three birth cohorts allows us to directly investigate potential changes in the relationship between parental socio-economic inequalities and outcomes in childhood cognitive tests.

Objectives

The ‘Flynn Effect’ suggests that there is an observable systematic increase in average levels of cognitive test performances over time. Little is known about the role that socio-economic inequalities play in these changes. A central objective of the paper is to compare the relationship between parental socio-economic positions and filial outcomes on verbal skills tests in a unified analysis of the three British birth cohorts. This is a novel approach and the results will make an original contribution.

In approaching the substantive objective, the paper also addresses three distinctive methodological challenges. The first is the development of measures that are comparable across the three cohorts. The second is the provision of a sensitivity analysis of different measures of parental socio-economic position. The third is the development of a strategy for analysing data from the three cohorts within a unified multivariate framework, which appropriately accounts for the differences in the design and structure of the datasets.

Data

Britain has a unique collection of large-scale nationally representative birth cohort datasets. We undertake analyses of three of the major British birth cohort studies. The National Child Development Study, which is a systematic sample of children born in 1958. The British Cohort Study, which is a systematic sample of children born in 1970. The Millennium Cohort Study, which is a complex sample of children born in 2000/02.

These datasets allow us to compare distinctive cohorts of children who grew up in Britain in different circumstances to assess the relationship between parental socio-economic differences and outcomes in childhood verbal skills tests. The datasets contain childhood cognitive test outcomes and relevant explanatory variables that can be rendered into measures that are comparable over time. An especially challenging aspect of the analyses is that the contemporary data are drawn from a complex sample with a different structure and selection mechanism to the earlier birth cohorts.

Main Findings

The results show that there is a persistent association between parental socio-economic positions and children’s outcomes on verbal skills tests. This original finding is consistent with results from other nations. There is evidence that the effect of parental social class has decreased between cohorts.

The paper provides methodological insights on the development of cross-cohort measures, and on evaluating alternative socio-economic measures. The problem of how best to combine data from surveys with different designs is an increasingly common problem in sociological analyses using multiple surveys, but it is frequently ignored. In light of the empirical analyses we reflect on this methodological issue, and offer some practicable guidance on suitable data analytical strategies.

Key Words: Cognitive Ability, Verbal Skills, Socio-economic Inequalities, Flynn Effect, British Birth Cohort Studies.

Educational Reproduction in Great Britain: A Prospective Approach
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Educational Reproduction in Great Britain: A Prospective Approach
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Extended Abstract
Education is often seen as an investment, by individuals and governments, that pays off in higher incomes, greater productivity, and perhaps in other ways too, such as a healthier and better-informed citizenry. But there is another way in which educational investments, and especially investments in women’s education are thought to pay off, and that is in the increased education of the next generation. This issue has been of particular interest to social scientists working on developing countries (Heckman and Hotz 1986, Schultz 1993, Mare and Maralani 2007). Studies of this question in developed countries deal only with the US (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Maralani 2013, Lawrence and Breen 2016). Here we consider the case of Great Britain.

At the start of their paper, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002: 323) point out that “most studies from a variety of countries report a significant positive and robust relationship between women’s schooling and the schooling of their children”. Yet, a positive relationship between parents’ and children’s education is far from sufficient to tell us how investments in the education of one generation affect the education of the next. For one thing, it takes no account of other behavioural consequences of increasing education, particularly the consequences for fertility, which are especially important given the robust negative association between education and fertility found in many countries. For another thing, we require more than evidence of associations between, say, education and fertility and between the education of parents and their children. We need to establish the degree to which these associations are the result of causal relationships. Accordingly in this paper, we try to model some of the behavioural links between the educational attainment of successive generations in Britain and we try to assess the degree to which these links are formed through relationships of cause and effect. Our study thus attempts to give an account of the causal pathways that link the educational attainments of successive generations.

Data

Our data come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and we focus on people born between 1936 and 1961 and their children (if they have any). Education for respondents and children is measured as their highest level of education observed over the 18 waves (1991-2008) of the BHPS. We consider only children aged 23 or older at the time our most recent data were gathered (because we need them to be old enough to have potentially acquired a degree).

Method

The specific question we address is: what is the effect of having acquired a University degree on the probability of having a child who also acquires a degree? To answer this question we estimate two processes: the effect of having a University degree on whether or not a person has a child and, conditional on having at least one child, the effect of having a degree on whether at least one child acquires a degree. All our variables are binary and our estimates come from linear probability models. The first process is modelled as a set of two equations that capture the effect of a having a degree on marrying and of the effect of a degree and having married on the probability of having of at least one child. The second process estimates the effects of having a degree and having married on the probability of having a child who attains a degree, conditioning on those individuals who have at least one child. Figure 1 shows these two processes in the form of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The upper part of the figure shows the causal paths from a degree, D, to marrying, M, and from both D and M to having at least one child, C. The lower part depicts the effects of degree and having married on having a child who acquires a degree, Y, but it also shows the conditioning on having a child (indicated by the box around ’Child’).

To obtain causal estimates of the models underlying these DAGs we assume no unmeasured confounders and we use inverse probability of treatment weighting to deal with possible confounders. We use an extensive set of measures to estimate three propensity scores: for having acquired a University degree, for having married, and for selection into observation the education of at least one child. We follow VanderWeele (2009; see also Lawrence and Breen 2016) in using these propensity scores to form weights, which we then use to rebalance the data to deal with selection into University, into marriage, and into our sample according to measured factors.

Results

Among the 1936-61 birth cohort, men who have a University degree have, on average, a probability of having a child who also has a degree that is 0.143 (s.e. = 0.03) points higher than the probability for men who do not have a degree. For women the figure is 0.104 (s.e. = 0.03). When we apply iptw to control for measured confounding these numbers decline: to 0.087 (s.e. = 0.03) for men and 0.076 (s.e. = 0.04) for women. Although the women’s estimate is not significant at p < .05 (the p value is .053) the estimates for men and women are quite similar.

We find, as expected, that, among children, having a parent with a University degree and having a parent who has married, are both related to acquiring a degree. For female parents, conditional on marriage, having a degree increases the probability of having a child who also has a degree by 0.180 (s.e. = 0.068) and marriage, conditional on having a degree or not, increases it by 0.268 (0.085). For men, a degree increases the probability by 0.197 (0.050) whereas being married or not, conditional on having a degree, has no effect (-0.167, se=0.230). Thus the causal effect of having a University-educated mother is the same as for a University educated father, but whether or not a woman has married is much more important for her children’s educational attainment than for a man’s. These results are shown in Figure 2 with the estimates for women above those for men. The asterisk indicates statistically significant at p = .05 or less.

Figure 2 also shows the causal estimates for marriage and having a child. Acquiring a University degree reduces the probability of marriage for both sexes, but most markedly for women (-0.088 compared with -0.037 for men). Marriage has a very strong causal effect on whether or not someone has any children (0.64 for women, 0.74 for men). Conditional on this, having a University degree has no effect on parenthood among men but it has a sizeable (-0.042), though not significant, effect for women (the p value is .053). The total causal effect of having a degree on having any children is estimated as -0.040(s.e. = 0.027) for men and -0.099 (s.e. =0.030) for women.

Summary

While, among parents, having a University degree has a strong effect on the likelihood of having a child who also acquires a degree, having a University degree makes people less likely to marry and less likely to be parents in the first place. This latter effect is
particularly pronounced among women (see Brand and Davis 2011 for comparable US findings). These findings have important consequences for our understanding of how inequalities evolve over generations. For one thing, they make clear that we cannot base our understanding on the "robust relationship between women’s schooling and the schooling of their children" because this would lead us to overestimate the effect of schooling in one generation on the schooling of the next. For another thing, they tell us that the advantages gained in one generation are not being passed to the next to the same extent as we might have thought and thus it may be that educational inequalities between groups are declining less quickly then we might have believed. This latter is something we hope to investigate further.

Further analyses

These findings are preliminary and require further investigation and explanation. We intend to do this and also to extend our model to include characteristics of who men and women marry and not just whether or not they marry. We will also test the sensitivity of our estimates to the assumption of no unmeasured confounding. For this purpose we will follow Lawrence and Breen (2016) and use the method developed by Robbins (1999; see also Brumback et al 2004 and Sharkey and Elwert 2011).

The Effect of Family size on Children’s Educational Success: Evidence from the Extended Family

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Background

Theories of intergenerational transmissions suggest that there is a tradeoff between family size and per capita investments in children, suggesting, ceteris paribus, that parents with larger families will generally have children with worse outcomes. While evidence of the negative association between family size and children’s outcomes has been repeatedly identified in correlational studies, many have failed to address the well-known problem of endogeneity in this relationship, namely that parents jointly decide upon both how many children they will have and what share of their resources will be distributed to each one (Blake 1981; Becker 1991; Downey 1995). It is therefore possible that, although there may be a negative correlation between family size and children’s outcomes, there is no causal relationship between the two, as both decisions may be determined by other, unobserved factors.

In recent years, researchers have become increasingly stringent in addressing the endogeneity problem by exploiting “natural experiments” that provide quasi-experimental variation in family size that is unrelated to other factors that affect children’s outcomes. This has primarily been accomplished using twin births or the sex composition of the two first-born children as instrumental variables (IVs) to isolate variation in family size that is unrelated to other factors that affect children’s outcomes (e.g., Black, Devereaux, and Salvanes 2005; Conley and Glauber 2006; Åslund and Grönqvist 2010; Fitzsimons and Malde 2014). These IVs suffer from several shortcomings, however, the most serious of which being that they only allow for the identification of Local Average Treatment Effects (LATEs) for highly restricted, if not selected, samples of the population.

In this paper we propose a new approach to analyzing the effect of family size on children’s educational development, which we demonstrate using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS). Instead of solely relying on IVs, we exploit variation in family size within extended family networks to compare outcomes between first cousins while controlling for extended family fixed effects, which capture health, abilities, preferences, and socioeconomic characteristics shared by the extended family. We then extend the analysis by exploiting variation in genetic relatedness among siblings (e.g. adopted, half-siblings, twins) to distinguish between the influence of genetic and environmental components on their children’s educational attainment. Finally, we utilize information on in-married spouses’ family size to provide plausibly exogenous variation in nuclear family size within the extended family. The main contribution of this approach is that it circumvents some of the inferential and interpretational limitations in existing research in two ways. First, the extended family setup does not rely solely on untestable exclusion restrictions that, in the case of both twin births and children’s sex composition, may not be valid. Second, the approach offered here allows for us to draw on the experiences of children from the entire childbearing population rather than only a restricted sample of it.

Research Design

Figure 1 illustrates our research design. We label the focal respondent A. The WLS also includes a randomly selected (older or younger) sibling of A, labeled B. Moreover, it includes the spouses of A and B, labelled A’ and B’. A and B, and their spouses, are the middle generation in the WLS. There is also information on the parents of A and B, labeled AB-1, and some information on the parents of A and B’s spouses, labeled A’-1 and B’-1, respectively. Finally, the WLS includes information on the children of A (nuclear family AA’) and B (nuclear family BB’), labeled A+1,n and B+1,n (where subscript n refers to child number). These children (N = 18,000) are first cousins (linked via A and B) and siblings (linked via nuclear families AA’ and BB’). Our analysis includes three steps:

1. There is variation in nuclear family size (and many other characteristics) within the extended family. In a first step we exploit this variation to estimate the effect of family size on first cousins’ educational attainment (years of completed schooling) net of extended family fixed effects and controls.

2. In some cases there is variation in A and B’s genetic relatedness (most often A and B are full siblings, but in some cases either A or B is adopted or A and B are half-siblings or Monozygotic [MZ] twins). We exploit this variation to further control out genetic factors in the extended family that jointly affect family size and first cousins’ educational outcomes.

3. In a final step, we use differences in in-married spouses’ family size (i.e., family size in families A’-1 and B’-1) as an IV for differences in family size in nuclear families AA’ and BB’. We argue that in-married spouses’ family size is a proxy for their fecundity and fertility preferences. Assuming that the extended family fixed effects control for assortative mating (and conditional on observable controls), this IV identifies an Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of wider generalizability than the LATEs identified by the twin and sitbship sex composition IVs.
Results:

Table 1 summarizes (very) preliminary findings:

• In the baseline OLS regression the correlation between family size and years of completed schooling (among first cousins) is -0.16 (p < 0.001) before including controls and -0.03 (p < 0.05) after including controls. This suggests that family size is correlated with other family factors that affect educational attainment.

• In the model with extended family fixed effects the estimated effect of family size is -0.08 (p < 0.001) before including controls and 0.04 (p > 0.05) after. This suggests that, after controlling for extended family fixed effects and observable controls, family size does not affect educational attainment. This finding is in line with other research using IVs.

• The models in which we take the genetic relatedness among A and B into account yield no clear results, probably because sample sizes are small.

• The model in which we use differences in in-married spouses’ family size as an IV for differences in family size suggests that family size has a negative effect on educational attainment. Unlike previous IVs, this IV has an ATE interpretation. The first stage regression shows that the IV is statistically relevant and operates in the expected direction.

• Standard IV models in which we replicate the twins and sex composition IVs with the WLS data suggest that family size has no effect on educational attainment (LATE interpretation).
Material deprivation since the early 2000's in Switzerland
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In the context of a larger research project funded by SNF on the evolution of socioeconomic inequality in Switzerland, we investigate material deprivation and its dynamic in Switzerland from 1999 to 2013 at a micro level. Material deprivation, as defined by Peter Townsend (1979, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A Survey of Household Resources and Standard of living. London: Penguin), focuses on inequality at the bottom of the welfare distribution and those situations of a household which can’t match the common and socially approved standard of living in a given society. When research on economic and social inequality mainly focuses on distribution of income (and wealth) in the population, material deprivation provides a more direct and more stable measure of the standard of living of households.

Our presentation focuses on the evolution of material deprivation in Switzerland since 1999 and on the determinants of material deprivation of households in a longitudinal perspective. These determinants can be divided in four sets, namely household attributes and composition, ascriptive inequalities and demographic attributes (gender, ethnicity/nationality, age/generation), socioeconomic position and vertical inequality dimensions (income, educational level, employment status and trajectory, social class), and critical life event and life course transitions (job loss, separation, health condition, retirement).

Data
In order to analyze the effect of time on material deprivation, we use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), conducted since 1999 with yearly interviews of two joint household panels (SHP I from 1999 with 5,074 households; SHP II from 2004 with 2,538 households). Actually, other datasets were not available for time series (Euromodule 1999/2000 for example) or only for a shorter period (SILC). In addition, SHP delivers information on the situation of every person in household, making possible the construction of variables gathering characteristics of all household members. SHP collects information on around 17 deprivation items, with some changes in the annual list. Ten unchanged items are available for longitudinal analysis.

Method
Material deprivation is mostly analyzed at the individual level. However, as household members are mainly supposed to share their economic resources, material deprivation relates to the household level. Considering this level (household), we aim providing innovative findings on the determinants of material deprivation taking into account the complexity of the household situations. Household characteristics are constructed considering the situation of every household member (e.g. household composition, jobless household, etc.) or the situation of the head (defined as the main income provider member and its partner if any). In order to take into account the panel structure of SHP data, i.e. the repeated measure within households (time), we use multilevel models with household as random effect.

Results
As we can see in Figure 1, material deprivation declined from 1999 to 2013 (linear decrease of the log odds of deprivation over time), suggesting an improvement in the welfare of Swiss households during that period. Actually, the disruptive increase in 2004 (Time = 2) has to be related to the introduction of the refreshment sample SHP II: As households facing material deprivation in first wave are more inclined to leave the panel, the refreshment reintroduces more deprived household in the survey (see Gazareth and Suter 2010, Privation et risque d’appauvrisssement en Suisse, 1999–2007, Swiss Journal of Sociology, 213–234). The real evolution of material deprivation since the early 2000’s in Switzerland.
Genetic resilience, neighbourhood poverty and problem behaviour in boys and girls

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Introduction

Resilience is a dynamic developmental process, encompassing the attainment of positive adaptation within the context of adversity (Cicchetti, 2010). Youths experiencing neighbourhood adversity face the risk of problematic developmental outcomes in adolescence (e.g., increased problem behaviour; Dietz, 2002). However, not all youths develop equally when faced with neighbourhood adversity. While some youths develop towards maladaptation, others might demonstrate resilient adaptation when experiencing neighbourhood adversity. The interactionist perspective proposes that individuals' developmental outcomes depend on a dynamic interplay between innate characteristics and environmental influences (Magnusson & Stattin, 2006). This approach has been adopted prominently in the study of interactions between proximate environments (e.g., family) and individual characteristics, to understand the mechanisms and processes that contribute to resilient functioning. However, this perspective has received less attention with regard to effects of distal contextual factors, such as neighbourhood environments. Given prior evidence of potential detrimental effects of neighbourhood adversity on youths' various developmental outcomes, it is important to identify which individual characteristics make youths more prone to negative effects of neighbourhood adversity.

Genetic characteristics might contribute to the resilient adaptation that protects some individuals from developing problem behaviour when growing up with neighbourhood adversity. Several molecular genetic studies have indicated that interactions between certain genes and adverse environments may lead to differences in youths' developmental outcomes (Wu et al., 2013). However, most of these studies related genes to negative family environments. It is still an open question whether these gene-environment effects also occur in terms of distal environmental factors, such as neighbourhood characteristics, as opposed to proximal family factors. One cross-sectional study has shown that neighbourhood socioeconomic conditions interact with the effect of gene MAOA on antisocial behaviour (Tuvblad et al., 2006). But, to fully understand how gene-neighbourhood interactions relate to youths' development of problem behaviour, we will test the interaction in a longitudinal setting, which enables estimation of within-individual changes over time.

Genes related to resilience

Based on a review of the gene-environment interaction literature, we selected two key genes on the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, that have been shown to be important for shaping individual resilience: corticotropin-releasing hormone receptor 1 (CRHR1) and FK506 binding protein 5 (FKBPS). Both have been found to interact with early life stress to predict later life depression and PTSD (Wu et al., 2013). The HPA axis is involved in the secretion of cortisol, a major stress hormone which plays a crucial role in the regulation of individuals' emotional and behavioural response to environmental stressors (Fries et al., 2009), and has been found to interact with adverse neighbourhood environments (Yu, Nieuwenhuis et al., 2016). Therefore, functional genes on the HPA axis are ideal candidates to test whether genetic resilience contributes to coping when youths grow up with neighbourhood adversity.
Specifically, we will test how the interaction between CRHR1 and FKBP5 and neighbourhood adversity, contributes to the development of problem behaviour in youths.

Data
We used the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC), a population based cohort study that recruited 14,541 pregnant women living in the county of Avon, UK, and who were expected to give birth between April 1st, 1991 and December 31st, 1992 (Boyd et al., 2013). This study is based on 7,118 youths, whose problem behaviour was assessed three times by their parents, when they were 10 years and 8 months, 13 years and 10 months, and 15 years and 6 months old. Additionally, for each year of the children’s lives, we linked in Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) for the neighbourhood in which they lived that year (on July, 1st). For these children, genetic information was available in the form of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).

Analytical strategy
To test for gene-neighbourhood interactions in the development of problem behaviour in youths, we employed a between-within random effects model, in order to examine the differences between children growing up in different kind of neighbourhoods, and the effect of within-individual change in neighbourhood adversity on change in problem behaviour. Problem behaviour (a scale of 7 items) was measured three times. We measured neighbourhood adversity as the years of exposure to neighbourhoods within the 10th (worst) decile of the IMD, up until all three moments that problem behaviour was assessed. Genetic resilience was assessed using the SNPs of two genes: CRHR1 and FKBP5. The SNPs were, for CRHR1: rs4076452, rs7209436, rs4792887, rs110402, rs242924, and rs173365. And for FKBP5: rs9296158, rs1360780, rs9470080, and rs3800373. We interacted the individual SNPs with our measure for exposure to neighbourhood adversity. Also, we stratified the analyses by gender.

Results
The results for both CRHR1 and FKBP5 are quite similar. For girls, increased exposure to neighbourhood adversity is related to increased levels of problem behaviour between measurement periods. Furthermore, boys with longer exposure to neighbourhood adversity are more likely to show increased levels of problem behaviour than boys with shorter exposure to neighbourhood adversity. Our results indicate that genes CRHR1 and FKBP5 moderate the effect of cumulative exposure to neighbourhood adversity on problem behaviour in youths.

References


How regional disparities shape the burden of spousal caregivers in Europe
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Keywords: Long-term care, Multilevel, quality of life, depression, loneliness

Caring for ones relatives can be both rewarding and stressful – and the individual burden depends not only on the kind and intensity of care needed and given, but is also related to the care setting and the support by social contacts and formal providers. All across Europe two thirds of all informal home care is provided between partners. Partner caregivers, however, experience an especially burdensome situation since such care is often not only very intense but also linked to losing the partner as confidant.

Different support policies have been established to prevent informal caregivers from social and economic deprivation related to the care arrangement. It is an important open question how effective these policies are in reducing negative impacts of caregiving on informal caregivers’ health and wellbeing. There is evidence that the provision of formal long-term care (LTC) services assessed on the country level is associated with caregivers’ quality of life (Ruppanner, Bostean 2014; Verbakel 2014) and self-rated health (Dujardin et al. 2011). The objective of this study is to take a closer look and find out if and how the provision of LTC in a specific region
is linked with the quality of life, loneliness, and depression of spousal caregivers. Europe with its immense regional variation in LTC offers can be seen as a “natural laboratory” to study this relation.

The psychological constructs of internal versus external locus of control help explaining why caregiver’s burden might be linked to the availability of formal care services: Whenever a person believes that he or she has control over the things that happen (=internal locus of control), this person will cope better with the situation than when things are believed to be out of control (external locus of control). If caregivers can (really) choose between taking over the care for the partner themselves or paying for professional care, they will cope better with the care situation. Moreover, caregivers feel overburdened less likely if they can share the responsibility and different care tasks with a formal provider (Brandt 2013).

We generally expect that spousal caregivers experience a lower quality of life, higher loneliness and higher levels of depression than non-caregivers. We test whether such negative impacts of caregiving for a partner within the household are reduced for spousal caregivers who (could) make use of formal LTC offers at home. We hypothesize that caregivers’ burden in terms of lower wellbeing and mental health is mediated by the availability of formal care services in a region, measured by the number for LTC beds in nursing homes and residential care facilities among the population 65 plus. Moreover we are able to analyse, if people actually make use of care services within their own home and how this affects caregivers’ quality of life, loneliness and depression. We will control for regional GDP as the wealth of a region is expected to affect overall wellbeing and people in richer regions experience higher quality of life.

We apply a multilevel design with data from more than 24,000 Europeans aged 50 and over nested in 130 European regions at the NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) 2 level which comprises basic regions with 800,000 to 3,000,000 inhabitants. Individual data is taken from the SHARE study (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 5 release 1) and regional macro indicators were retrieved from the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and national statistical offices. Applying random intercept models with individual level variables only, we find that across Europe, caregivers aged 50 and above state a lower quality of life, they feel lonelier and have higher levels of depression also when controlling for important other influences such as socio-economic factors including physical health. As expected, we find that the complementary utilization of formal LTC goes along with reduced burden (better quality of life, lower loneliness and depression) for the caregiver, showing the positive impact of such task sharing for informal caregivers on the individual level. When including a cross-level interaction we additionally find evidence that the regional context shapes the burden of informal caregivers via the availability of formal care arrangements. The number of LTC beds in a region is positively linked with quality of life and mental health of caregivers, signaling that such negative impacts are reduced by the availability of LTC beds and thus a choice (internal locus of control) informal caregivers experience reduces their burden. However no such relation was found for loneliness. These results are robust to including regional GDP into the model.

Our results provide first hints how a reduction of negative health impacts for an ever growing group of informal caregivers in older age might work. Longitudinal analyses to assess mechanisms more closely and thus provide a solid basis for concrete policy implications are ongoing. In sum, formal care availability should be examined closely with respect to its potential to facilitate the role of spousal caregivers and, in addition, in respect to its capacity to better promote their social inclusion.

References:
In a companion paper, which was presented at the 2015 RC28 summer meeting, Tsai, Smith, and Hauser develop a novel approach (namely, multiple-level MIMIC model) to analyzing inequality in different dimensions of student academic achievement (math, science, and reading) by family background and school context in three East Asian (Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea) and three Western (USA, Germany, and the Czech Republic) nations. Thus far, we have concentrated on cross-national comparisons in reporting the research. In this paper we focus our attention on the effects of gender. Data for this study are derived from the 2012 PISA survey.

For every country under study, we first gauge the gender disparities in both the mean and the variability of standardized achievement test scores in math, science, and reading. Table 1 reports descriptive results. In terms of gender differences in average performance and in variability around the average, our findings confirm three stylized facts established in international testing results. First, 15-year-old boys outperform girls in math and science in all countries examined, with one exception (that is, the female disadvantage in science performance is not statistical significant in the Korean case). Second, girls outperform boys in reading in every country. Third, girls’ test scores have smaller variances than boys’ in every subject. This pattern describes all cases examined, except the Czech Republic.

Next, we employ the multiple-level MIMIC model approach to assess in what ways and to what extent the observed gender gap in the three subjects can be accounted for by family background characteristics and school factors. This analysis uses three kinds of observed variables. First, our outcome variables (Y) are the first plausible values in student test scores in math, science, and reading in PISA 2012. Second, variables related to family background (X) include the following: (1) father’s years of schooling, (2) mother’s years of schooling, (3) the highest ISEI of either parent, (4) number of books at home, with response categories: 1 = 0-10 books, 2 = 11-25 books, 3 = 26-100 books, 4 = 101-200 books, 5 = 201-500 books, and 6 = more than 500 books, and (5) home educational resources, with items indicating the total sum of whether or not the student has a desk to study at, a quiet place to study, a computer to use for school work, educational software, textbooks to help with school work, technical reference books, and a dictionary. Third, school factors (Z) include two dummy variables indicating whether the school attended is private or public, and whether the school is located in rural area (non-urban); other dummy variables are included indicating the classification of school types in upper secondary education. We consider distinctive school types in upper secondary education: two types for Japan and Korea (academic/general and vocational high schools); and three types for Taiwan (senior high schools, senior vocational schools, and comprehensive high schools, in which both academic and vocational tracks are available), the Czech Republic (Gymnasium, technical schools with the school-leaving exam, and vocational schools without the school-leaving exam), and Germany (Gymnasium, comprehensive schools (Realschule), and vocational schools (Hauptschule)).

For each of the two sexes, we estimate (via MPlus 7) two types of two-level MIMIC Model: one with intercorrelations between outcome variables (Model A) and another without (Model B). Estimation results will be reported in a full paper to be presented at the 2016 RC28 summer meeting in Bern.

Does the Likelihood that a Younger Sibling will Pursue a STEM Major Depend on the Gender of Other Siblings?

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Despite the large influx of women into higher education, gender segregation in STEM college majors persists. Sibship composition has been a major focus in explaining vertical gender differences in educational attainment, yet studies looking at sibling dynamics in understanding horizontal gender segregation have been rare. We will close this gap in the literature, suggesting a new line of thought. We hypothesize that the sex of the first child ‘sets the tone’ for a gendered environment in the family, which subsequently impacts gendered self-concepts, interests and eventually choice of college major of subsequent siblings. Using data from the NLSY79 Youth and Children, we investigate whether second born girls with older brothers are more likely to choose a college major in a predominantly male field, compared to girls with older sisters. In particular, we examine whether having an older brother increases the likelihood for girls with above average math skills to choose STEM majors. First descriptive results indicate that second born girls with an older brother versus an older sister are more likely to ever attend college, even though among those ‘attenders’ the likelihood of STEM majoring does not differ. The multivariate analyses will be presented in the next version of the paper, and will address whether a possible ‘setting the tone’ effect on STEM majoring is based on compositional effects such as higher college enrollment or based on a direct contextual effect.
The Gender Revolution in Context: How Later Tracking in Education Benefits Girls

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Not too long ago, gender inequality in education referred to a female disadvantage, whereas nowadays females reached parity with or even, in many industrialized countries, outperform men in educational attainment (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013; Goldin et al., 2006). The educational inequality to the detriment of men is likely to persist and even to amplify in the upcoming years (Vincent-Lancrin, 2008). Various demographic, sociological, biological, economic and educational factors have been examined to explain the reversal of the gender gap (Becker et al., 2010; Buchmann et al., 2008; Machin & McNally, 2005; Vincent-Lancrin, 2008), also referred to as ‘the rise of women’ (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013). So far the potential effect of educational systems has been largely overlooked. It is, therefore, unclear if a specific setup of the educational system works better for boys than for girls, or vice versa.

Only recently studies began to examine the relationship between educational structures and gender differences in educational expectations and attainment (Buchmann et al., 2008; Jürges & Schneider, 2011; McDaniel, 2010; Pekkarinen, 2008). The educational structure most of these studies were concerned with is timing of curricular tracking, on which we build further in this study. Some educational systems select students into different academic and vocational tracks at a young age (in Germany for example at the age of 10), whereas others track students at a much later age (in Sweden for example at the age of 16). Several studies showed that the female-favorable gap in academic performance widens as students grow older, i.e. between the age of 10 and 16 (Atkinson & Wilson, 2003; DiPrete & Buchmann, 2013; Machin & McNally, 2006; Sammons, 1995). This increasing divergence already indicates that the moment of tracking can be expected to influence gender inequality in educational attainment, as track recommendations are, at least partly, founded on previous educational achievement (Hallinan, 1994; Korthals, 2013). Therefore, in line with Pekkarinen (2008) we expect later tracking age to be related to increased gender inequality in educational attainment to the detriment of men. However, although gender differences in maturation and timing of puberty are suggested (Jürges & Schneider, 2011; Pekkarinen, 2008), a clear theoretical elaboration about why timing of curricular tracking would influence gender inequality is still underdeveloped.

Empirical evidence for the effect of tracking age on gender differences in education is also scarce (Jürges & Schneider, 2011; McDaniel, 2010; Pekkarinen, 2008). Besides, these studies investigated the effect of a specific school reform in one country (Jürges & Schneider; Pekkarinen, 2008) or examined the relationship utilizing cross-sectional data (McDaniel, 2010). To improve on previous research we exploit a within-country over-time design. A multilevel model with country and cohort fixed-effects allows us to investigate the relationship more closely, as we examine the effect of policy changes concerning age of first selection within countries over time. This enables us to control for time-invariant country specific factors and unobserved general time trends that affected all countries. It also allows us to take several other over-time factors that might have influenced gender inequality in education into account. Specifically, gender-ideological climate and demand on the labor market are important to control for, as previous research already demonstrated these factors to influence gender inequalities (Buchmann et al., 2008).

Hence, in this study we examine to what extent policy changes concerning timing of curricular tracking influenced gender differences in educational attainment within several European countries. To answer this question we utilized longitudinal contextual data on educational policies (Braga et al., 2013), which cover the period of 1929 until 2000. We combined this data with cohort specific information on educational attainment in 22 European countries, which is retrieved from the European Social Survey (ESS). Longitudinal data on other contextual factors are mostly gathered from external sources, such as the World Data Bank and the EU KLEMS database.

We find that a higher age of selection is detrimental for boys and beneficial for girls, even after controlling for several other factors that might have caused the gender gap. Figure 1 displays the marginal effect of male on educational attainment for different ages of selection, and clearly shows that when a country raises the curricular tracking age the gender inequality in educational attainment in favor of women also increases. The figure shows that when the children are tracked at an age of 10, we do not predict a (significant) difference in educational attainment between boys and girls. However, when the age of curricular tracking is 16, girls outperform boys in education, with a difference of about 0.17 standard deviation on our scale of educational attainment. Our paper thus shows that policy changes that led to raising the curricular tracking age in European countries helped girls in surpassing boys in educational attainment.

Hence, our results demonstrate that tracking age positively affects gender inequality in education to the detriment of men. As age of curricular tracking has repeatedly been shown to negatively affect social and ethnic inequalities in education (Bol & Van de Werfhorst, 2013; Marks, 2005; Larrivée & Nicaise, 2015), this study also provides evidence for the existence of an interesting trade-off between gender equality and social and ethnic equality of educational opportunity.

Explaining gender differences in job authority: The role of social capital

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This study examines to what extent gender differences in job authority can be explained by differences in social capital between women and men. Although it is well-known that women are less likely than men to hold positions of authority in the labour market, much remains unclear about the sources of such gender differences in job authority.

One potential explanation that features prominently in the public and political debate focuses on gender differences in social capital. It is popularly assumed that opportunities to obtain powerful labour market positions are associated with access to “old boy” networks – networks occupied by white, high status men – because they provide valuable resources, and that women have less access to such networks than men. Hence, gender differences in social capital are thought to contribute to explaining differences between women
and men in their chances of obtaining authority positions in the labour market. Previous research has shown that social capital is positively related to career outcomes such as promotions, job status, wages, and job satisfaction. Yet, empirical research on the role of social capital in explaining gender differences in job authority is surprisingly scarce. The present study addresses this void in the literature by investigating the role of two aspects of social capital: network diversity, and network composition. Our research question is: to what extent do differences between women and men in the diversity within and composition of their social network account for gender differences in job authority?

Our expectation regarding the role of network diversity is based on the idea that networks with more diverse contacts contain more diverse, new and therefore more useful labour market information. Also, there is some evidence that women’s networks are smaller and consist of less diverse contacts than men’s networks. Hence, we predict that women are less likely than men to hold authority positions in the labour market in part because the status diversity in women’s networks is smaller than in men’s networks (H1). Moreover, drawing from the social resources theory, we assume that having higher-status contacts is associated with better labour market outcomes, because such contacts possess more (beneficial) resources (e.g., information, influence). We therefore predict that women are less likely than men to hold authority positions in the labour market in part because the average status level is lower in women’s networks than in men’s networks (H2). Moreover, based on this theory, having certain types of contacts within one’s network can be expected to be particularly beneficial to individuals’ careers. Male contacts are assumed to be particularly helpful, because men on average hold higher labour market positions than women. Thus, we expect that women are less likely than men to hold authority positions in the labour market in part because the proportion of men is lower in women’s networks than in men’s networks (H3). Finally, knowing managers can be assumed to be particularly beneficial, because they hold key positions within organizations, have knowledge of high-class and business culture, and are likely to be connected to other high-status contacts. Hence, we expect that women are less likely than men to hold authority positions in the labour market in part because the proportion of managers is lower in women’s networks than in men’s networks (H4).

We test these predictions using data from the first wave of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), which were collected between 2008 and 2011 (n=899). These data include measures of job authority and social networks. Job authority is conceptualized as the number of people under supervision. Network diversity is measured using information on diversity in contacts’ educational status, occupation, and job prestige, which was collected using name generator questions. Network composition was measured using information on the mean educational level and job status of network members, as well as on the proportion of men and managers within respondents’ networks.

Results of preliminary OLS regression analyses show, first of all, that men on average supervise almost twice as many subordinates than women (2.1. versus 1.2). This applies to all levels of management; 17.8% of men supervised 1-10 subordinates versus 10.1% of women, and 6.1% of men supervised 10-25 subordinates versus 3.5% of women, whereas 76.1% of men and 86.4% of women reported having no subordinates. Second, some evidence of gender differences in social capital was found, although these are mostly modest in size. Networks of women and men differ regarding network diversity in job prestige (with men’s networks being more diverse) but not in education. The composition of women’s and men’s networks differs in terms of mean level of education and job prestige (with higher averages in men’s networks), but only minor differences were found in the proportion of men and managers. Third, we find that the more diverse one’s network, the more likely one is to hold a position of authority. Also, knowing one or managers is found to have a marginally significant positive effect on one’s likelihood of holding an authority position. Sobel tests show that network occupational diversity explains a significant part of the association between gender and job authority (providing some support for H1) but that this is not the case for the managerial composition of the network (that is, H4 is not fully supported). No significant effects on the likelihood to hold authority positions were found for any of the other measures of network diversity (H1) and composition (H2 and H3).

Based on these outcomes, we tentatively conclude that gender differences in job authority are partly explained by the fact that the occupational diversity in women’s networks is smaller than in men’s networks, but that our analyses provide no evidence that other dimensions of social capital play a role. The study concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of these results and suggestions for future research.
Main findings so far can be summarized as follow:

1. The upper class social background is overrepresented among graduates of the Grandes écoles whereas the working-class social background is underrepresented. Furthermore, over time, these trends worsened.

2. Graduates with a working-class background have different occupational destination than graduates with an upper class or an intermediate class background. The former are more likely to attain positions outside the upper class, or “first class” civil servant position, and less likely to become an executive in the private sector.

3. Social reproduction is particularly high among graduates of the Grandes écoles and tended to increase among the recent cohorts.

In sum, we demonstrate that the Grandes écoles are mostly the “highway to success” for the social reproduction of the upper social class.

What did the German state do to make the rich richer?
During the past years, Germany has debated more and more about its growing income inequality. This is resulting in a growing share of households in poverty, but also a growing share of households with more than 200% of the median household income, which is a higher income. The share in rich households has increased from 6.2% in 1992 to about 8% present day. In absolute terms, about one million households jumped over the “richness threshold” during this time. There is also evidence that German had not only a higher share of rich households, but also that households with very high income accumulated more income over time and drifted further away from middle income households.

Taxes, social security contributions, and the form of the income distribution. Within this talk, we will analyze both the extent and the sources of these changes. We will not focus on a specific “richness threshold”, but instead use a distributional approach, and ask which social processes influenced the form of the upper half of the income distribution in such a way, that we recorded a higher share of rich households and a growing distance between households with very high incomes and those in the middle. We will focus the presentation on changes in the tax system, specifically within Germany’s social security contribution system.

The income of households can be based on two different sources: labor income and capital income. Germany taxes the former much higher than the latter. It is well known that capital income increases over the income distribution, which changes as to whether or not the German tax system redistributes money efficiently. This duality of the German tax system itself is a very plausible source of the growing income inequality within the upper half. This source has gained a lot of interest by researchers lately. What is rarely studied is the relevance of social security contributions to the increase in inequality. German citizens pay mandatory insurances for health, unemployment, long term care, and pension. These insurances are technically taxes deducted at source (the labor income), which makes them unavoidable (in comparison to taxes for capital income) and account for a very high share of the overall taxes of German households. Contributions to social security have increased strongly since the 90’s, with strong hikes noted within the 90’s themselves. However, these taxes only apply up to a defined threshold (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenzen”). Every euro beyond this line will not be taxed. The threshold has increased during the past decades – but by legislation must be proportionate to increases in the median wage. Keeping all of these points in mind, we assume that the social security system taxed households positioned in the middle and a bit above more over time, and therefore had an inequality-reducing effect. We also expect that this process is reversed for households with very high incomes. These households profit from the construction of the social security system in two ways: their capital income is less taxed than labor income, and their labor income above the contribution threshold will not be taxed at all. Given that capital and labor income increases at the top of the distribution, social security contributions should be a major source of growing income inequality, resulting in growing share and economic distance between rich households and the middle.

Results The upper half of the German income distribution shifted asymmetrically towards higher incomes. The median income (P50) increased about 7%, the 80th percentile value increased as well, but to a higher extent with about 10%. This asymmetric growth becomes much more pronounced for the upper percentiles. The 90. percentile increased about 12%, the 97th percentile about 17%, and the 99th percentile about 23% (see Figure 1). The growth of the distance between the upper percentile values and the middle reflects the increase in the share of rich households, as well as the increased gap between the very rich and the rest of the German society.

The multivariate results indicate that households from the median to the 70th percentile were moderately more taxed (the coefficient is slightly negative for these percentiles, see Figure 2). In order to interpret the results as inequality reducing or increasing, we need to use the influence for the median as reference (which is drawn as horizontal line in Figure 2). Households between the 70th to the 85th percentile experienced a stronger tax burden, which stems most plausibly from increases in social security contributions. Households within this area of the distribution have high labor market incomes but typically low capital incomes. Additionally, their labor incomes are not high enough to reach significantly over the social security contribution threshold. That makes them very vulnerable for increases in taxation. The German taxation system is until this point of the income distribution a counter force against the increase of income inequality. That changes after the 85th percentile. Within the upper 15% of the income distribution, the burden of taxation decreased. This decrease accelerates over the top percentiles. That qualifies the tax system as a strong source of the widening gap between the upper tail and the rest of the income distribution.

Social origins, academic strength of school curriculum and access to selective higher education institutions: evidence from Scotland and the U.S.

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Introduction and theoretical background

Social origins and prestige of the HE institution

It is well known that participation in secondary and tertiary education has increased considerably in modern societies over the last decades. However, as participation in education increases, qualitative distinctions such as the type of degree achieved and the prestige of the higher education institution entered, are expected to become more salient (Lucas, 2001). These distinctions are
important as they might translate into further inequalities in the graduate labour market (Jacob et al., 2015). Although a vast literature on social inequalities in entry to higher education exists (e.g., Shavit et al., 2007), relatively few studies have explored social inequalities in the probabilities of entering more prestigious tertiary education institutions and the role that curriculum choices in secondary school may have in explaining these inequalities (e.g. Iannelli et al., 2011). This paper aims to provide new evidence on this issue by comparing two different educational systems, the American and the Scottish systems.

Academic strength of school curriculum and entry into selective higher education institutions

In systems where there is selection for entering tertiary education, attainment in secondary schools plays an important role, especially for entering prestigious universities. However, an additional important criterion for entering prestigious institutions is the academic strength of the curriculum studied in secondary school.

In the US, the academic strength of the curriculum (i.e. having attended college preparatory courses such as Advanced Placement courses) tends to be one of the most important aspects considered by universities, even more important than the admission test scores and students’ overall grades in all courses (NACAC, 2013). This is particularly true of the most selective universities (NACAC, 2013; Adelman, 1999). Similarly in Scotland (and more generally in the United Kingdom), the more selective and research-intensive universities, the Russell Group universities, have highlighted that the subjects studied in secondary schools are an important factor in their admission process (Russell Group, 2011).

Social origins and academic strength of school curriculum

Research has shown that access to the academic curriculum is stratified by parental social class. In the US, Klugman (2013) shows that the provision of Advanced Placement (AP) courses, which are among the key indicators measuring the strength of the curriculum, depend on the social composition of the school, with the schools with most socially advantaged intakes offering more AP courses. In Scotland where there is flexibility in the choice of subjects for the final secondary school examinations, social inequalities in studying subjects particularly valued by the Russell Group universities exist (Iannelli et al., 2015).

Given that the academic strength of curriculum studied in secondary school is a key criterion for entry into selective tertiary institutions, we expect that the strength of academic curriculum plays an essential role in explaining the mechanism behind parental background differences in access to prestigious universities. Iannelli and colleagues (2015) provide some support for this idea in the Scottish context.

Comparing Scotland and the US

Our comparison between Scotland and the US can shed light on the institutional factors which may explain social differentiation in entering prestigious HE institutions. The education systems in the US and Scotland are similar with respect to the (a) low standardization of curriculum in secondary education; (b) pronounced hierarchy of tertiary institutions; (c) high importance of curriculum studied in secondary school for entry into selective universities. The US, however, differs in three important aspects from Scotland: (a) there are costs associated with attending Advanced Placement courses while there are no costs associated with studying Highers/Advanced Highers in Scotland; (b) tertiary education institutions charge tuition fees (the more prestigious the university, the higher the tuition fee) while universities do not charge tuition fees in Scotland, regardless of the prestige of the university; (c) entry into HE is not based on specific disciplines as in the case of in Scotland where students apply to both a university and college major. Given these country similarities and differences, we believe that the comparison between Scotland and the US can provide important information on whether there are different ways in which the academic strength of curriculum operates in mediating the relationship between parental background and access to selective higher education institutions. In order to analyse this, we employ three different components of the academic strength of curriculum: number of advanced/university preparatory courses taken in secondary school (APs in the US and Highers and Advances Highers in Scotland), the specific subjects studied in these courses and the obtained grade from these courses.

Research Questions

This paper aims to answer the following research questions: (1) Are differences by parental social class in access to more selective universities larger in the US than Scotland? (2) To what extent does the academic strength of curriculum in secondary schools explain these social differences in the two countries? (3) To what extent do the different components of academic strength explain parental background differences in Scotland and the US?

Data & Methods

This study uses data from the 2002 Scottish School Leavers Survey (N= 3,231) and the 2002 US Education Longitudinal Study (N=11,830). Both datasets provide rich information about the subjects studied in secondary school including the level (AP/Highers and Advanced Highers) and the obtained grades and the name of the attended tertiary institution. This latter information was used to create hierarchical groupings of universities in terms of prestige, using quintiles or quartiles based on the average admission score (except for colleges which were included as a separate category). All data have been harmonized and made comparable across the two countries. Data is analysed using descriptive statistics, nested multinomial logistic regressions followed by average marginal effects.

Preliminary findings show that inequalities by social class in access to selective tertiary institutions exist in both Scotland and the US, with the US displaying larger gaps. Also, those who entered more selective universities tend to have studied more traditional academic subjects than their counterparts in less selective institutions. Moreover, those from more privileged backgrounds are more inclined to choose such subjects.

Official Careers During the Qing (1644-1911): Evidence from the jinshenlu.
We present results from an analysis of the careers of Qing officials in a novel data source, the Tsinghua University Jinshenlu Collection. We examine the influence of place of origin, examination degree, hereditary political affiliation (membership in the Eight Banners), and other factors in shaping the careers of officials during the Qing. We focus on comparison of the 18th century, widely considered the height of the Qing dynasty, with the late 19th century, when the dynasty was generally considered to be in decline. Our primary source, the Jinshenlu, was a complete directory of all officials published every three months by the state during the Qing. This included their name, place of origin, current assignment, examination degree qualifications, mode of appointment, and other details. Each edition recorded approximately 14,000 officials, all the way from the central government down to the county. Recently, Tsinghua University published a consolidated set of 207 editions of the Jinshenlu held in its library, and we are constructing a database of official careers with it. Thus far we have entered 320,000 records describing 95,027 officials, and by this fall we expect to have 600,000 records entered.

We are conducting quantitative analysis of these data to examine how a variety of factors influenced entry into the bureaucracy, and subsequent careers. Whereas traditional studies of the Qing bureaucracy have emphasized the role of examination degrees, we are able to use our data to consider other background characteristics of officials, notably their hereditary political status (Eight Banner membership), and whether they had obtained office by some other mechanism, most notably purchase. Our initial results suggest that other modes of entry into the bureaucracy were as important as the examination system, or perhaps more important. Many officials with the highest degrees had mundane careers, and many high officials had no degree, having gained access as a result of their hereditary status in the Eight Banners, or through purchase. If these preliminary findings bear out, they would represent a major challenge to prevailing understandings of Chinese political elites before the 20th century. Whereas the Chinese bureaucracy has previously been held out as an example of a meritocracy, with top officials selected based on their performance on a highly competitive written exam, in fact wealth and hereditary status were also important pathways. Wealth made it possible to purchase office, and hereditary status in the Eight Banners gave individuals special advantages.

We will make use of standard techniques for the study of the determinants of career mobility. We are aided by the fact that each position in the bureaucracy had a numeric rank (pin) between 1 and 9, with 9 being the lowest, which is analogous to contemporary civil service grades like the GS ranking in the United States civil service. We have already begun using ordered logistic regression to estimate the predictors of rank at first assignment, and logistic regression to study the determinants of upward mobility after the initial posting. We will be experimenting with latent growth curve modeling and related approaches that make use of the entirety of the data on an official's career.

As part of the analysis, we are also the role of personal networks in shaping the chances of advancement. The data record county of origin for officials. If they had an examination degree, the year in which they obtained it is also recorded. Through record linkage, we can also link together officials who served contemporaneously in specific postings. We intend to examine whether common county of origin, completion of the exams in the same year, or service together in the same location, was a source of advantage to emperors and other policymakers who discussed personnel policy, and we will be able to assess the evidence for the existence of such cliques. Cliques based on simultaneous service in an initial posting are a more contemporary concern, and we can assess whether they were an issue historically. For this analysis, we will apply extensions of the regression based methodologies discussed earlier, as well as visualization techniques to explore whether there were networks based on place of origin or other factors.

To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of career trajectories in a complete national bureaucracy for any country, and certainly the first analysis of the Qing bureaucracy in its entirety.
Long-term trends in intergenerational social mobility in the Netherlands, birth cohorts 1760-1980

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Ever since the study on intergenerational mobility by Sorokin (1928), researchers have debated over trends in mobility over time. Sorokin (1928) and several others conclude that in the long-term, there is only a “trendless fluctuation” in social mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Yet, others argue in favour of increased social mobility over time (Boonstra, 1989; de Graaf and Luijkx, 1993; Treiman, 1970) or possibly even a decrease (Boudon, 1974; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Hence, results from previous studies do not provide a unified picture on trends in social mobility on the long-term.

There are two competing theories on trends in intergenerational mobility. The modernization theory argues that several modernization processes led to a decrease in the association between a father’s and son’s occupation over time, i.e. less social reproduction and more social mobility (Treiman, 1970). Advocates of this theory expect that current society is more open than it was in the past. The status maintenance theory, however, posits that through indirect mechanisms (i.e. son’s education), the influence of social background has been maintained or has even become stronger over time (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).

Studies on intergenerational mobility typically use archive data, e.g. marriage records or censuses, in order to study trends in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (van Dijk, Visser and Wolst, 1984; Zijdeman, 2009). Researchers interested in more recent developments use more modern data sources, such as surveys, which allow them to study trends in the 20th century (Ganzeboom and Luijkx, 2004a; 2004b). Most previous research is limited to a single data source and therefore often restricted to studying relatively short-term developments. Studying long-term periods is important since social mobility changes are thought to occur slowly over time (Lambert, Prandy and Bottero, 2007; Maas and van Leeuwen, 2013). Consequently, interpreting short-term changes might lead to wrong conclusions when, for instance, a short-term increase in mobility is actually a long-term trendless fluctuation (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Sorokin, 1928).

Moreover, important parts of the modernization processes, that are central to modernization theory, took place before and during the period in which survey data became available. Both archive data and modern survey data can therefore only cover a part of the modernization processes and consequently they can only reveal an incomplete picture of trends in social mobility. For instance, in the Netherlands several important processes took place between 1900-1950, such as the expansion of secondary education (Mandemakers, 1996) and industrialization (Manning et al., 2005). Furthermore, one cannot simply compare the findings of studies from both periods to assess long-term trends, as these studies often not only use different data, but also different samples and/or analytical strategies.

First and foremost, this study aims to investigate long-term trends in intergenerational social mobility in the Netherlands. Second, this study aims to overcome and elaborate on the challenges and advantages that arise when combining two different data sources, as there are many differences between the data sources that might complicate comparing results. Overall, this study aims to answer the research question: ‘How did intergenerational mobility develop during the last two centuries in the Netherlands?’

To do so, this study combines marriage records from the GENLIAS database with modern survey data from the International Stratification and Mobility File (ISMF) to collect information on sons’ and fathers’ occupations. The GENLIAS dataset covers all marriage records of six Dutch provinces between 1812 and 1922. The ISMF is a collection of 60 surveys taken in the Netherlands between 1958 and 2008. Together, this provides us with a unique dataset that covers birth cohorts ranging from 1760 until 1980, covering a period of more than 200 years. To assess trends in intergenerational mobility over time, log-linear models are estimated. An advantage of log-linear models is that they allow us to model the diagonal (i.e. immobility or social reproduction) as well as off-diagonal mobility (indicating class-based inequalities in mobility chances). This approach and the combination of these datasets provide a unique opportunity to assess long-term trends in intergenerational mobility in the Netherlands.

Over the whole period, immobility (see Figure 1) decreases while off-diagonal mobility (see Figure 2) increases substantially, although we see a slightly different picture in the initial period. From the beginning of the studied period until around 1855, immobility remains...
The relation of multidimensional inequality and social mobility

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The relation of multidimensional inequality and social mobility

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Introduction

We ask to what extent intergenerational mobility chances vary along crucial multi-dimensional inequalities. While a moderately strong correlation between economic inequality and intergenerational mobility has received increasing scrutiny (Corak, 2013), the “Great Gatsby Curve” (Krueger, 2012) alarmed politicians and the media alike. Additionally, analysis of social mobility in the US suggest that the take-off in income inequality coincides with deteriorating class mobility (Mitnik et al., 2016). The proposed research project adds to this research by employing a country-comparative perspective that broadens our understanding about the relationship of class mobility and multidimensional inequality.

Theoretical Framework

While the degree of intergenerational openness is related to variation in the economic and political organization (Yaish & Andersen, 2012), it is generally assumed that the fluidity pattern is at least basically similar across countries (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Consequently, country differences exist principally in the strength but not the pattern of the intergenerational association of origins and destinations (Hout & DiPrete, 2006). While some researchers repudiated the paradigm of cross-national similarity as simplistic and methodologically flawed (Hout & Hauser, 1992), the lack of any convergence of social fluidity patterns across European countries since the 1970s (Breen & Luijkx, 2004) motivates further inquiry into the forces that shape country differences in social mobility patterns.

While past research mostly employed overall inequality indicators (i.e., the GINI), we believe that between-class differences are crucial as they emphasize the degree to which advantaged classes can pursue mobility strategies at the expense of lower classes.

Economic inequality might influence mobility strategies at two points. Household income inequality during childhood might affect the degree to which well-off parents are able to affect children’s educational and cultural attainment through costly economic investments (Duncan & Murnane, 2011). Additionally, earnings inequalities later in life may covariate with higher fluidity as they motivate specifically mobility strategies from below. As education is the single most important factor for class attainment (Goldthorpe, 2014), the extent of educational inequality might have a large effect on social mobility (Müller & Pollak, 2004). In countries in which a high degree of equality of educational opportunity is accomplished, social mobility is arguably higher due to the lower importance of class background for higher educated individuals (Breen & Jonsson, 2005). Countries with a low degree of educationally driven social closure arguably allow for several routes into the higher classes and thus may demonstrate higher levels of social fluidity (Beller & Hout, 2006). Occupational structures may affect mobility through a muting effect on risk perception. In societies in which higher positions are plentiful, upward mobility strategies may be perceived less risky and thus produce more mobility whereas in societies in which higher positions are more limited risk assessment is more conservative.

Data and analytic strategy
We test for statistically significant and substantial covariation between social mobility chances and inequality levels across EU states and the USA. Analytical samples are drawn from the ISSP, the GSS (US), the EU-SILC, the CPS (US) and the ESS. The study design is as fellows. We use data from the ISSP and the GSS to construct origin specific inequality measures based on the actual (non-retrospective) income distributions that were experienced during childhood and young adulthood (age -15 to 15) of individuals that were between age 30 and 65 in the 2000s. We obtain the measures for the educational and occupational inequalities at the destination time point using the EU-SILC and the CPS.

In a first step, we investigate to what extent the strength of the origin-destination association co-varies with our inequality measures. To this end, we estimate a standard unidiff model with ESS, ISSP and GSS data and regress the respective unidiff coefficient on different combinations of our inequality measures (Pfeffer, 2008; Xie, 1992). In a second step, we model the strength and the pattern of the association of parental and offspring' class by employing the Goodman and Hout (1998) model. Their approach allows us to estimate whether or not the inequality measures are useful to describe country differences in specific log odds-ratios (Goodman & Hout, 2001, pp. 179-180). Finally, we study how the association between specific mobility trajectories (e.g. working class to service class mobility) vary between countries by employing a two-step regression approach (Bernardi & Ballarino, 2014). Initially, we run a linear probability model to estimate the impact of parental class on reaching a specific class destination within each country. In a second regression model, we separately regress origin class coefficients on the inequality measures. Because our dependent variable is an estimator, we weight the second variable with the standard error obtained from the first model. While we do not have obtained any results from the more complex log-linear and multivariate regression models yet, we have prepared the data set and studied the covariation of inequality measures and absolute mobility patterns. We find that the inequality measures overall correspond neatly to absolute mobility patterns. We do believe that our results will contribute to a better understanding of cross-country differences of relative mobility chances as well as demonstrate how variation in inequality dimensions contributes to differences in specific mobility patterns.
Marriage has been linked to a wide range of beneficial outcomes such as enhanced economic attainment. Continuously married, heterosexual individuals are consistently found to have more household wealth compared to the never married or individuals with disrupted marital histories. Examining this wealth premium, in addition to the well-researched marriage wage premium, is relevant because wealth is only moderately correlated with wages, is more unequally distributed than wages and provides unique benefits such as enhanced consumption potential and real and psychological safety nets.

I identify two major shortcomings in previous literature on the marriage wealth premium. First, the exclusive focus on household-level wealth in prior research ignores that individuals’ financial wellbeing may not be accurately captured by household-level measures alone – a type of ecological fallacy. Previous research has called for a gender-sensitive within-household perspective on the marriage premium in personal wealth, but no research has addressed this issue yet due to a lack of personal wealth data. Any conclusions about gender disparities in the marriage premium in previous research are, therefore, severely limited. It remains unclear whether marriage induces similar wealth benefits for both spouses. Second, economically more resourceful individuals select into marriage and those prone to accumulate wealth may be more likely to marry due to unobserved characteristics. This selectivity may have led to an overestimation of the marriage wealth premium in previous research.

Focusing on individuals rather than households, I examine the association between marriage and wealth using unique longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP; 2002, 2007, 2012) which records personal wealth of all adult household members. Personal wealth is defined as all assets that individuals (solely and jointly) own less their debts. The sum of all household members’ personal wealth equals the conventional measure of household wealth used in previous literature. Using these data and tracking individuals over time enables me to make two main contributions to the literature. First, I assess the marriage wealth premium using both measures of personal wealth and of household wealth to gain a more holistic picture of the individual-level and gender-specific consequences of marriage for economic attainment. Second, to reduce potential selection bias, I assess the immediate marriage wealth premium by examining within-individual changes in wealth associated with changes in marital status using longitudinal fixed-effects regression models. Using personal wealth instead of household wealth facilitates such within-individual analyses. Because the marriage premium may only materialize in the long run and to replicate previous studies, I complement the within-individual fixed-effects regression models with between-individual regression models using retrospective marital histories for a subsample of older respondents.

Consistent with prior research and my expectations, I find marriage premiums in household net wealth among women and men using a between-person research design. Going beyond previous research, I examine gender-specific marriage premiums in personal net wealth. As expected, I find higher personal net wealth among married women and men compared to the never married. These results are corroborated in a within-person research design using fixed-effects regression. Thus, under the assumption that individual time-variant unobservables are unrelated to marriage and wealth, marriage is found to cause an increase in wealth. This conclusion is also supported by the novel finding that marriage is positively associated with personal wealth which is by definition independent from simple changes in household composition that come along with marriage.

I do not find consistent evidence for the expected gender disparities in the marriage premium. Still, several innovative findings indicate that women may benefit less from marriage than men regarding their wealth, which was obscured in prior studies of household-level wealth. First, among women and men aged 51 to 75, I find gender disparity in the association between marriage and personal wealth with women being less advantaged (but this finding depends on model specifications). Second, in the birth cohorts 1936 to 1955, married women do not have more personal wealth compared to the never married in contrast to men. Third, when excluding housing wealth, which is often shared between spouses within marriage, women’s non-housing wealth is not positively associated with marriage, while men’s non-housing personal wealth is higher when married. Fourth, women in the bottom half of the wealth distribution seem to gain less from marriage than men.

The findings of the present study suggest that marriage provides “institutionalized benefits” such as higher wages enabling higher saving for wealth accumulation that go beyond adding an additional person and her or his wealth to the household. These institutionalized benefits, at least in older cohorts, seem to be more advantageous for men than for women. This does not preclude that women participate in the personal wealth of their spouses to some degree, but in light of previous research on limited sharing of resources within households men do not seem to share their enhanced wealth accumulation during marriage fully with their spouses. Thus, the present study suggests that beyond wage premiums, men’s economic attainment is more likely enhanced by marriage than women’s attainment through wealth premiums.
The well-deserved attention granted Thomas Piketty’s Capital (2013) has spurred a renewed focus on the distribution and transfer of economic capital. The paper discusses capital transfer in Norway over three generations, analysing some possible benefits in the youngest generation of having a family background form milieus that are part of what could be defined as an economic elite and an economic upper middle class. The ordering of subjects into ‘elite’ and ‘upper middle class’ is based on a comprehensive classification of occupational categories into class-fractions. Although the focus is on the social significance of economic capital transfer, the broad conception of economically privileged class-fractions that is employed also comprise non-economic aspects of the family environment that may influence life-changes in the youngest generation. Moreover, the class-fraction approach can be used to map transfer of resources in other elite fractions, and thus give a framework for comparison.

The analysis presented in the paper is based on a large, linked, dataset from Statistics Norway’s population, taxation and education statistics. For individuals with parents born after 1954 (and some earlier as well) it has been possible to construct a dataset that contain information on their parents and grandparents. The Oslo Register Data Class Scheme (Hansen et al. 2009) was used to code class affiliations in the parents’ and grandparents’ generations, and as a framework for analysing the distribution over broad occupational classes in the youngest generation.

In order to map transfer of capital, a model of capital distribution in the parents’ and grandparents’ generations is constructed. This model – generated by multi correspondence analysis (MCA) and referred to as the accumulation room – can give a spatial representation of class-fractions and capital transfer in the two older generations. The solution from this analysis is included in combination with other variables in regression models to predict class affiliations, income levels, distribution of wealth, and occupational and educational choices among subjects in the youngest generation.

Preliminary analyses suggest that effects in the youngest generation of having background from economic elite and upper middle-class milieus persist when controlling for parents’ income levels (using measures based on the parents’ income level when the offspring were 16 years old). This suggests that effects of inherited economic advantages are not captured solely by focusing on purely economic assets. Cultural factors associated with an economically advantageous environment should also be taken into account. It is common knowledge that early inculcation of motivation, and adaptation of informal information about opportunities, may be at the core of future career plans. By considering such factors when assessing effects of capital transfer a more comprehensive view of possible benefits associated with economic privileges could be accomplished. In order to probe into effects of the cultural milieu accompanying economic advantages, patterns of mating in the youngest generation are analysed. Preliminary analyses suggest a gender-specific homogamy pattern, although the homogamy is not as pronounced as it is in the patterns of mating found among class-fractions that relay more strongly on cultural assets (or what is often referred to as cultural capital).

The relative importance of family background, parental income and inherited wealth when predicting choices of education, occupation and spouse is considered. Theoretically, the analyses presented in the paper may suggest that it would be fruitful for studies of social inequality to give more attention to cultural factors associated with transfer of economic capital over generations.

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The Effect of Parental Wealth on Children’s Educational Attainment: Demotivation or Risk Minimization?
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In our paper we aim to establish wealth as an independent dimension of social inequality, focusing on its role in the process of intergenerational social mobility. Precisely, we are interested in the relationship between parental wealth and children’s educational attainment. In theoretical terms, we aim at an extension of the classical status attainment model by Blau und Duncan (1967), which estimates the relative effects of different background characteristics on individual’s educational and occupational success. While the relations between parental income and children’s educational attainment are already established, this is not the case for wealth.

This is unfortunate as wealth – which can be understood as an individual’s consumption potential (cf. Spilerman 2000) – offers a more profound picture of individual economic well-being. We argue that wealth is an important additional indicator of parental financial resources, which is likely to exert an even stronger impact on children’s educational attainment as compared to income and thus has to be included in the model of status attainment.

Past research already found some associations between parental wealth and children’s educational success and social mobility that differs in magnitude depending on the institutional context (Pfeffer und Hällsten 2012; Pfeffer 2011). While these findings provide a first empirical validation for the existence of a substantive relationship between parental wealth and educational attainment, they are only of descriptive nature. In our study, we will go one step further by trying to disentangle the theoretical mechanisms linking parental wealth to children’s educational attainment. We will conduct our study within the German context. In Germany, educational success is strongly related to parent’s social class, although education – in contrast to for example the US – is free of charge. This makes Germany an interesting case to study.

We apply the subjective expected utility model as based on Boudon (1974), Erikson und Jonsson (1996), and Breen und Goldthorpe (1997) and expanded by Esser (1999) and Becker (2003) to understand the precise role of wealth in parental educational choices at the end of primary school education. At this point, parents have to decide between two alternatives: sending their child to the upper
secondary school track (A_high) or continuing on the lower or intermediate school track (A_low). The decision is predicted to rely on the respective expected utility value (EU) of each alternative. The calculation of the parents depends on four main components: the amount of educational benefit (B), the expected costs of education (C), the expected amount of status decline (SD) and the probability to experience it (Psd), and the subjective probabilities of success of their child in the respective track (Pep). Equation 1 below presents the expected utility of an investment in the upper secondary school track, while equation 2 presents the alternative choice:

EU(A_high) = P_ep B + (1 - P_ep) P_sd (-SD) - C (1)
EU(A_low) = P_sd (-SD) (2)

As illustrated by equation 3 below, the higher educational track will be chosen when it is valid that:

EU(A_high) > EU(A_low) (3)

P_ep B + (1 - P_ep) P_sd (-SD) - C > P_sd (-SD) (4)
which can be simplified to

B + P_sd SD > C/P_ep (5)

Equations 4 and 5 demonstrate that a decision for the upper secondary school track (A_high) will yield the expected utility only if the likelihood of status decline and the investment risk are low. We understand parental wealth to have an effect on both components of equation five: the educational motivation component (B + P_sd SD) as well as the investment risk component (C/P_ep).

Assuming benefits (B) from the educational decision to be constant over wealth groups — because they depend on the structure of the educational system and the labor market — we first expect parental wealth to exert a so-called “educational demotivation effect” on educational attainment. This implies that wealthy parents consider educational attainment to represent a marginal value for family status maintenance, if at all. Wealthy parents know that they can secure their family status by means of wealth transfers, and therefore, that the education of their children is unlikely to imply a family status decline (low Psd). According to the educational demotivation effect, parental wealth is thus negatively related to educational attainment.

Second, assuming that the direct (e.g. tuition costs) as well as the indirect (e.g. private teaching) costs of education (C) are constant over wealth groups, the risk of the investment in children’s education is correlated with the expected probability the child has to successfully finish upper secondary school. The higher this expected probability, the lower is the risk of investment in upper secondary education. If a child has only low probabilities to succeed in upper secondary school, the parents must account for the potential costs of an investment, and if their economic situation is not sufficient, an investment will be less likely to occur. The “risk minimizing effect” implies therefore that wealth decreases the investment risk, and increases the subjective utility of upper secondary education. In other words, we hypothesize that parents of low wealth are less likely to decide to send their child to upper secondary education as compared to parents of medium or high wealth. According to this effect, parental wealth is positively related to educational attainment. Unlike the mechanism described above, here, wealth is likely to work similar to income.

We will test our competing hypothesis drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), which is a household-based panel study with a yearly questionnaire since 1984. Wealth in the GSOEP has been surveyed on the individual level three times so far, in 2002, 2007 and 2012. The 2002 and 2007 data will serve as our basic files for the assessment of parental resources. Our basic file consists of parents with children born between 1996 and 2007. These parents made the decision for their children’s secondary school track between 2002 and 2013. We will apply logistic regression models to estimate the odds of the children to be in upper secondary education as a function of the relative position of their parents in the wealth distribution of 2002, and 2007. Specifically, we compare parents represented in the top 25% of the wealth distribution and those in the bottom 25%, to those represented in the middle 50% of the wealth distribution. Our preliminary analyses show first, that controlling for parental education, income and occupation, parental wealth has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of opting for upper secondary education. Secondly, we find this effect to disappear when controlling for children’s school performance. This can be understood as first empirical support for the risk minimizing effect of parental wealth.

Parental wealth and children’s school performance – using family fixed effects with a new unconditional quantile regressions approach

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Introduction

The relation between parents’ social class, their educational resources and the children’s educational choices and school performance is one important and often studied aspect of intergenerational educational inequality. But we know less about whether the parents’ economic resources, and their wealth in particular, influence their children’s educational outcomes. The significance of parental wealth is particularly pertinent as economic inequalities in most western societies are growing (Hansen, 2014; Piketty, 2014).

In this study, new methodological tools and high quality Norwegian administrative register data are used to explore the role of family wealth as a means to improve school grades of the children within the same family — neither to compensate their low school performance or to enhance the grades of a talented son or daughter. More specifically, the analyses focus on whether the impact of family wealth is stronger if you have bad vs good school grades.

When the associations between parental wealth and the children’s school performances vary within the same families, this may be an indication that parents invest differently in the children depending on their children’s needs. These investment strategies, contingent on the level of parental economic resources, may in turn shape the set of prospective opportunities in educational attainments for...
these children. As a consequence, these strategies may also have larger societal implications as they may reinforce or maintain social inequalities in the educational system as well as the labor market. To shed light on such within-family variations, new unconditional quantile regression models (UQR) are used in combination with family fixed effects regressions. This new methodological approach overcomes prior difficulties when using more than one predictor.

Theoretical framework

Prior studies show how economic deprivation and low family income during childhood influence school grades and performance later in life (Duncan, 2012; Duncan et al., 1998, 2011). If the impact is causal, as some studies suggest (Løken et al., 2012), this has important consequences for stratification processes. By using their economic resources, affluent families can then boost their children’s school grades to ensure that they stay ahead. Boosting the school grades of low achieving children can also be a way to prevent downward mobility. Both actions are central components of intergenerational family strategies within the sociological literature (Boudon, 1974; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Hout, 2006; Khan, 2012; Lucas, 2001). However, these parental strategies do not necessarily only vary between families with different resources, but also within families. That the parents treat their children differently is a point stressed by Conley and Glauber (2008).

Models of differential parental treatment of children opens up for three main family strategies (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Behrman et al., 1982; Conley and Glauber, 2008). First, families can function as mini-welfare states where they attempt to ensure equal outcomes. These parents compensate sibling differences by investing more in the low performing child. Second, parents can rather make the same investment in the all of the children, ensuring that they get equal opportunities rather than outcomes. This could be understood as a “child-neutral” investment strategy. Third, parents can make more efficient investments to boost the school performance of their most talented child, in order to maximize the overall outcome for the family.

Analytical strategy

The analyses examine the associations between parental wealth and grades in different parts of the school grades distribution. To compare the effect of changing parental characteristics on the different siblings’ school performance within the same family, the analyses rely on family fixed effects regressions. These regression models also control for demographic differences between the siblings. This analytical strategy considers the expectations from three different and potentially important parental differential treatment strategies: (1) if parents compensate the lack of success in school, the school grades should be most influenced by economic resources for children with the lowest grades; (2) if parents rather direct their economic resources to their most talented children, these resources should matter more for them; (3) if parental economic resources do not matter at all, or if the parents deploy their economic resources regardless of their children’s talents, the resources should have a similar association across the distribution of school grades.

Data and methods

The data derives information on siblings, their parents, and extended family from several kinds of Norwegian administrative registers. The dependent variable is average school grades from lower secondary (age 16). The main predictor is a log of parental wealth. The analyses include control variables such as parental income, parental education, gender differences of siblings, and birth order. The data are restricted to the observational period of the school grades, but contains the complete individual records and consist of approximately 420K observations and 230K families in total. The school grades are available for the period 2002–2011.

In this study, the analyses use quantile regression with family fixed effects to assess the varying impact of parental wealth on high and low school grades. Standard conditional quantile regression enables us to assess whether parental wealth is more strongly associated with school grades in the lower parts of the grades distribution versus in the higher parts of the distribution (Hao and Naiman, 2007; Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978). However, known problems could arise when using more than one predictor within the standard quantile regression framework (Angrist, Joshua D. and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 2009: 281). This is particularly problematic when using a fixed effects approach (Killewald and Bearak, 2014). To overcome this issue, I therefore deploy a new unconditional quantile regression method that is specifically designed to handle more than one predictor (Firpo et al., 2009).

Main results

The family fixed effects analyses demonstrate that parental wealth matter more for school grades of children who are in the lower parts of the school grades distribution. This finding may indicate that parents use wealth as a means to compensate the school performance of their lower performing child. Another interesting finding is that parental income and education display similar associations with their children’s school grades.
Neighbourhood Deprivation, Social Ties and Unemployment Trajectories

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Recently a number of studies have started to question universal benefits of social capital. Instead, dense social networks are increasingly suspected to act as multipliers: they reinforce advantage in resourceful environments but exacerbate disadvantage in areas of concentrated disadvantage. In this study, we test whether this multiplying effect of close social network ties also applies to neighborhood deprivation and unemployment exit. We use four waves of the recently available British Understanding Societies data, that allows a particularly detailed measurement of different dimensions of neighborhood deprivation and types of social ties people hold in these neighborhoods. Findings from multilevel models with cross-level interactions support that indeed close social ties in the neighborhood increase the probability to exit unemployment in resourceful neighborhoods, whereas they decrease the probability of unemployment exits in deprived neighborhoods. With this study we seek to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we add to a growing literature highlighting the downsides of dense social networks in areas of concentrated disadvantage. Second, beyond what previous studies have been able to do, we disentangle in a more detailed way, which type of neighborhood disadvantages are particularly strongly associated with longer durations of unemployment.

The intergenerational transmission of advantage: The importance of social background, cognitive ability and education for attained social class, social status and earnings

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It is (more than) well known that individuals' social background affect their positions later in life. In most studies the social background is conceptualised by a single factor, like social class or SES. In recent studies of the effect on attained education, the social background has been partitioned in several factors (Bukodi et al. 2014; Erikson, 2016). These studies furthermore looked at how much of the background effect that remained when children's cognitive ability at an early age was considered.

The role of the social background, represented by parental education, social class, social status and earnings, for attained social class, social status and earnings will be investigated in this study. To what extent is the background effect on social class and status transmitted via cognitive ability and education – or, alternatively put, how important is the social background given cognitive ability at an early age and education? How important is the background for earnings in ages around thirty and is any effect remaining when not only cognitive ability and education is considered but also social class and status? Data refer to men and women in four cohorts of Swedish school children born 1948, 1953, 1967 and 1972.
